DEBATING ISLAMISM, MODERNITY AND THE WEST IN TURKEY

The role of the Welfare Party

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the Welfare Party elite's conceptualisation of modernity during the party's last 4-5 years before its closure in 1998. Since the party was the most important Islamist organisation in Turkey, it was at an important point of interaction between Islamism and modernity. The study tries to determine the significance of the WP discourse on key modernisation issues by answering such questions as how the WP elite conceptualised modernity; how this conceptualisation was formulated, constructed and what was modernity's relationship with the West in their view. It argues that, the WP elite had a distinct (Islamist) understanding of modernity which, despite its differences in its approach to some basic issues (e.g. secularism) overall remained within modernity by sharing most of its major characteristics. The WP elite, similar to many other Islamist movements, advocated a more Islamic (less secular and less Westernising) route to modernity; and they could not be considered as anti-modernists.

The study contributes towards a better understanding of the critical role that a version of Islamism plays in Turkey's politics and process of modernisation and provides insights about the impact of Western modernity on the sizeable Islamist section. The study employs important concepts such as secularisation, nationalism, the modern state, economic development (science, technology, industrialisation), capitalism and democracy as important components of modernity. (It also provides a general analysis of Islamism in the Middle East vis-à-vis modernity through these concepts). An analysis of the views of the WP elite with regard to these concepts and processes serves to better understanding the Islamist stance towards the particular path of modernisation in Turkey, modernity in general, and also the West.

Keywords: Turkey, Welfare Party, Islamism, modernity, West

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABIM : Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement,

DRA: Directorate of Religious Affairs

ECHR: European Court of Human Rights

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front

GUP: Grand Union Party

HADEP: People's Democracy Party

IHL: Imam-Hatip Lycees (Schools for Prayer Leaders and Preachers)

MGV: National Youth Foundation.

MLP: Motherland Party

MÜSİAD: Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen

NAP: National Action Party

NOP: National Order Party

NSC: National Security Council

NSP: National Salvation Party

PKK: [Kurdistan Workers' Party] Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

RPP: Republican People's Party

TAF: Turkish Armed Forces

TDN: Turkish Daily News

TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly

TPP: True Path Party

TÜSİAD: Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen

VP: Virtue Party

WP: Welfare Party

YÖK: The Council of Higher Education

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TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

INTRODUCTION

Similar to many other Muslim countries, in Turkey too, Islamism emerged as a powerful ideological force in the last several decades. It has challenged the main characteristics of the current secular system and its secular. nationalist ideology of modernisation. The Welfare Party (WP) [1] managed to become the biggest and most influential Islamist political party in Turkey in the mid-1990s. The thesis focuses on the Welfare Party elite's conceptualisation of modernity during this period. Since the Welfare Party could be characterised as *the* most important Islamist organisation whose sizeable core members acted often like an Islamist group while trying to promote the party in society; the WP constituted an important point of interaction between Islamism and modernity in Turkey. My main research concern is how the elite of the WP conceptualised modernity; how this conceptualisation was formulated, constructed and what was its relationship with the West in their view. It will be argued that, they had a distinct Islamist understanding of modernity and could not just be labelled and dismissed as anti-modernists.

Turkey is one of the most important Muslim countries with its roughly 70 million citizens and its strategic location. In 1995 parliamentary elections, the WP gained 21.4 % of the votes which, according to some surveys included around half of those voters who said that they favoured a shariah based state in Turkey, who overall constituted around one fifth of the population. Studying the WP presented an important opportunity toward better understanding the critical role that Islam plays in Turkey's politics and process of modernisation. An analysis of the views of the party elite also

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[1] As Heper (1997) points out, the party's name *Refah* brings prosperity to mind but Welfare came to be used dominantly in the works written in English, therefore the party will be referred as the *Welfare* Party.

provides insights about the impact of Western modernity on the sizeable Islamist section and the future path of modernity in this pivotal Muslim country[2].

I will employ important concepts such as secularisation, nationalism, the modern state, economic development (science, technology, and industrialisation), capitalism and democracy; all of which are frequently considered in the literature as important components of modernity. An analysis of the views of the WP elite with regard to these concepts and processes serve to explore their stance towards modernity. Such an approach is necessary because modernity was not directly discussed much by the WP elite (let alone by ordinary supporters of the party).

It is a much lamented feature of social sciences that terms and concepts are used in different contexts with different meanings. Likewise, almost all key concepts discussed in this thesis do not connote same meanings for all: this is natural, as people have different ideological convictions, social and individual experiences and hence, hidden or explicit agendas. It is therefore more important to understand how Islamists, who came to constitute one of the most important ideological groups in the world, understand modernity and how they see the West and place it in their conceptualisation of modernity. The case of the WP presented an important opportunity to understand how a most influential Islamist organisation constructed a discourse[3] about Islam and modernity. Although, as it will be seen in discussion of various topics, there is a vast literature on the various aspects of interaction between Islam and secular system in Turkey (Toprak 1981; Çakır 1994; Göle 1991, 1997; Yavuz 1997, 2000; Ayata 1996; Bora 1998), there has not been any comprehensive evaluation of the WP vis-à-vis

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[2] Ernest Gellner, observes that Turkey has a special claim on the attention of anyone concerned with the future of liberal societies, with Islam, with the relationship between the West and the Muslim world (1994a: 81)

[3] I take the discourse simply as a coherent set of ideas and views.

modernity[4]. Discussions remained partial and often journalistic. This study aims to contribute to this little researched area.

MODERNITY

As will be seen in Chapter 1 in detail, modernity was initially a West European experience. It makes sense of and facilitates a clearer understanding if one looks at this experience without losing the historical perspective. One of the results of a complex and long history of modernity is that there has been no agreement on its definition. One can liken it to the story of the elephant and the blind men (Cahoone 1996: 12), because it seems that for different disciplines different aspects of modernity seem more important (Friedman 2001: 500). Thus, a person's definition of modernity, at a given time, is almost always connected to his/her ideological position and his/her perception of the social change in societies, which he/she perceives as 'most advanced' in the world. In fact, it is almost impossible to escape from ethnocentric conceptualisations of modernity as one is often encouraged to see modernity in that way. It can be argued that this was the case for all great observers of modernity and this trend continues to be dominant. It has been almost always the case that modernity is associated or reduced to one or a few of the most important core processes seen as the factors making a society modern. For Marx, modernity was associated primarily with capitalism, for Durkheim with increasing division of labour; while Weber highlighted the importance of culture (Protestant Ethic) and the increasing importance of bureaucracy.

Although there is no universally accepted definition of modernity, Eurocentric or West-centric understandings of modernity have been dominant in the literature, while

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[4] As a sign of this neglect, as of summer 2002 when I last checked, the records of the YÖK (Council of Higher Education) shows that there has been only one PhD thesis directly related to the WP, which was completed in 1999. The study is about political Islam and analyses the WP in the last third of the study as a party engaging in political Islam (see, its published form, Akdoğan 2000).

non-Western understandings of modernity constitute some resistance to this. The WP experience included an example of an ethno-centric (Islamic-Turkic, Islamist) way of conceptualising modernity.

Modernity may not be monolithic but it is possible to talk about a '*Western modernity*'; which many observers do in practice when they discuss modernity. For example, after giving a somewhat tautological, but useful, definition as, "'Modernity' is that distinct and unique form of social life which characterises *modern* societies" (my emphasis, Hall et al. 1992: 2), Hall et al. continue to treat modernity as highly unified and equal to Western modernity: "The idea of 'the modern' was given a decisive formulation in the discourses of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, modernity became identified with industrialism and the sweeping social, economic and cultural changes associated with it". Modernity was constituted by the articulation of a number of different historical processes. "Modernity *is* the sum of these different forces and processes" (Hall et al. 1992: 2). Modernity can be associated with a number of institutions like the nation-state, and an international system of states; an "expansionist capitalist economic order based on private property; industrialism"; growth of bureaucracy, "the dominance of secular, materialist, rationalist and individualist cultural values", separation of the private from the public sphere (Hall et al 1992: 3). Thus Hall et al. gave their answer to the question voiced by Wittrock "which institutions and practices are the defining ones when we use the term modern [?...] we have to have an idea which institutions and habits are modern and which are not. A society is modern if some key defining institutions and types of behaviour can be said to be modern" (2000: 32). Thus, certain aspects of the distant or recent history of the modernisation processes of societies, which are now considered modern, are highlighted by observers as important aspects of modernity in the literature. Therefore, as will be seen in the first chapter, there may be a list of important factors that make a society or

individual modern:

- increasing use of inanimate sources of energy
- increasing share of industrial and service sector in the national economy

as opposed to agriculture

- social mobility, urbanisation
- emancipation from the tradition, secularisation
- increasing scientific knowledge, application of this knowledge in the

form of technology which brings mastery over the nature (including over other human beings as parts of that nature), meeting human needs more effectively by using this technology

- effective socio-economic organisation; (e.g. an effective state: tax

collection, defence industry; health system); a strong economy

- Democracy, realised by emancipated, communicative individuals, who

realised impersonal application of the rules, decreasing importance of ascriptive statuses.

Naturally, not all agree that these are undisputed characteristics of modernity; but one frequently encounters explicit or implicit association of modernity with these phenomena. It is often the case that modernity is understood by associating it with different important processes that have either occurred in the West or are happening in 'modern', advanced industrialised societies (see, for example Hall 1992a: 6; also Giddens 1990). These can be described in the following main, connected, categories:

Economic growth: Modernisation cannot be conceptualised without a kind of economic growth defined in terms of increasing production per capita. As will be seen in the first chapter in detail, analyses of the emergence and advent of modernity need to

mention the escape from 'the agrarian trap' to an industrialised economy. Thanks to the piecemeal technical developments, West European societies were able to make a break from being pre-dominantly agrarian. Agricultural output increased, different technologies were developed, increasing the power of the Western societies vis-à-vis others. Being technologically and industrially advanced has been a strong component in definitions of modernity. A historical analysis shows that those who were considered modern have always been technologically superior and industrially more developed (large scale, efficient production and consumption). A strong industrial base not only ensured the production of daily-consumed products but also of military superiority in most cases.

Secularisation: As will be seen, the decline of the social significance of the traditional religions has been an unmistakable and very important part of the modernisation process. The emergence of secular modern ideologies owes much to the general modernisation/ secularisation trend. Thus, for example, there emerged new ways and criteria to define the political and economic groups (e.g. the nation). Secular nationalism certainly has been challenging religions in most countries. Secularisation is strongly connected to the decline of the community in the modern societies, which meant the decline of the communitarian spirit, rise of materialist, individualist culture, promotion of the individual vis-à-vis the social group.

Centralisation of Politics: Emergence of the modern state, "which is large, interventionist, administratively bureaucratic and which intervenes to organise large areas of social life" (Hall et al 1992: 3), has been one of the most important modern developments (Carnoy 1984; Held 1989). It will be argued that the secular states in the Muslim world are perceived to be acting against Islamist definitions of Islam and this encourage Islamists to activities aimed at gaining the control of the state mechanism.

Today, widespread association of modernity with capitalism and democracy owes much to frequently equating modernity with, what may be called, Western modernity. From a historical perspective it must be admitted that there have been non-capitalist and non-democratic routes too (e.g. socialist, fascist) to modernity (Moore 1973 [1966]). Thus, it is possible to argue that over all, some aspects of modernity, like economic growth (industrialisation), secularisation, growth of state/ bureaucratic structures and processes that are associated with these, seem more *core-like* components of it, as they are much more often included in conceptualisations of modernity in the world.

It should also be noted that, in daily life, modernity of a country is often associated with being advanced and understood by comparisons with others in terms of such indicators as education facilities, health standards (number of doctors, hospital beds, infant mortality), housing, wages, democracy, industrialisation, technology (high value-addition to the products, military technology), bureaucratic efficiency, impersonal application of and obeying to rules (e.g. traffic rules). Since, the West is seen and presents itself as having these qualities, the importance of the West in a definition of modernity cannot be overemphasised.

MODERNITY AND THE WEST

As it will be seen in Chapter 1 in detail, modernity has a complex relationship with the West. Modernity started as a Western project/ experience (Giddens 1990). Thus, in the formation process of the identity of the West, the modernisation process occupied a central place. Therefore, modernisation of the West and the rest of the world differ qualitatively:

> The West forged its identity and interests in relation to endogenous developments in Europe and America, and through relations of unequal exchange (material and cultural) with 'the Rest- the frequently excluded, conquered, colonised and exploited 'other' (Hall et al 1992: 2).

It is important to note that since modernity emerged in Europe and continued to develop in the West, causes of transition from the pre-modern to modern have been being searched for by many observers within the history of the West. Could the greatest factor effecting the transition be considered as a form of Christianity (Protestantism), or development of a rational, scientific outlook, or was it emergence of capitalism and internal economic development or just plunder of other continents? The issue at stake here is none other than the identity of modernity. It is important for those who are critical of the West but in favour of modernisation (e.g. many Islamists) that modernity can be conceptualised as separable from the Western experience.

The European (later the Western) pattern, developed and spread throughout the world by Western economic, technological and military expansion into different Asian societies, to the Middle Eastern countries and to Africa. This expansion of Western modernity undermined the cultural premises and institutional cores of other societies. Elites and intellectuals have been either adopting Western modernity or opposing a non-selective appropriation in the name of native values and interests (see, for example, Eisenstadt 2000).

Obviously, 'the West' is not monolithic and as a concept it means different things to different people. It is more of a constructed concept than a natural entity. The West represents a certain type of society and level of development; thus no longer confined to Europe and not all European countries are in 'the West' (see, Hall 1992b). Nevertheless, it can be seen that, quite often, 'the West' is used to mean West European and North American countries who have certain common qualities like being

economically developed or having liberal democracies (see, Cahoone 1996:11). Thus, especially from a distance 'Western modernity' and the West may seem more unified than it may seem from within itself. Thus, it is possible to talk about 'the West'. (Hall 1992b; Özcan 2002: 117; Belge 2002: 43).

It will be seen in Chapter 1 that the West as a concept carries out different functions depending on the context. It allows one to characterise or classify societies, conveys images, and provides standards for comparison. It provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked, "it functions" like an "ideology" (Hall 1992b: 277).

When modernity is understood in terms of what existed or exists in the West or in other countries which are considered modern, one can even 'gauge' the degree of modernisation of developing countries by using these perceived standards. For example, it is possible to argue that, in many Muslim countries, the state has been modernised but the extent of this modernisation seems limited as it stopped short of full control by the elected representatives of the people. In other words, it did not become as democratic as in modern countries.

Obviously, especially in the modernising countries major sections of the elite do not see modernity just in terms of material progress; for them, secularisation of people's worldviews is a goal in itself, and is considered as a major force that has contributed strongly to the creation of the modern world with all its technological and industrial successes. Nevertheless, other elites and sections of modernising societies, who refused to conceptualise and accept modernity as an indivisible whole as represented by the West, responded and respond to modernity in a selective way by trying to strike a 'happy balance' between their native culture and material progress (Eisenstadt 1992).

Such a selective approach to modernity is unmistakable in most Islamist movements.

ISLAMISM AND MODERNITY

As will be seen in Chapter 2 in detail, the advent of modernity can be conceptualised as starting with the rise of Europe and later the West. Thus, the relationship between Islam and the West (i.e. between Muslims and the inhabitants of what is known now as the West) first witnessed the meteoric rise of Islam against Christianity and a period of clear superiority and then at least equality until the Ottoman Empire started to decline (17^{th}, 18^{th} centuries), and then witnessed the rise of the Western powers. Thus, the Muslim world has become open to various influences of the West; Islamism emerged in this context. In other words Islamists have been acting under the influences of Islam (i.e. their interpretation of it) and modernity (in most cases as represented by the West); they have been trying to promote the influence of Islam in Muslim countries at the expense of Western influences.

Modernisation is usually used as a shorthand to depict a series of social changes which are hoped to bring development, that is to say progress towards a valued state. In defining this valued state, one's ideology, religion, culture[5] and civilisation are determining factors.[6] Since there is no universal ideology, religion, culture or civilisation, conceptualisations of modernity are bound to differ greatly and quite often conflict with each other. In the case of Islam for example, secular nationalisms in various Middle Eastern Muslim countries functioned as a rival against the religion by defining the political community in secular terms.

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[5] Geerts offers a useful definition of culture as "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life" (1973: 89).
[6] Obviously these terms have overlapping aspects.

As will be seen in Chapter 2, despite the differences between different Islamist groups in the world, it is possible to argue that a broad body of Islamist political thought exists. In fact, a number of generalisations can be made about Islamist movements and groups (see, for example Sayyid 1997).[7] First of all, almost all emerged in the context of modernisation, most of them, under secularising, nationalist regimes. They are all, by definition, against secularisation and secular nationalism. It is difficult to make a sweeping argument that Islamists movements have been against modernity. In fact, they all make sense in a modernising context and have been employing different fruits of modernity, not just technological products but more importantly modern forms of social activism and organisations. Islamism involves a radical critique of the policies pursued by secular governments for causing national failures in various fields of life. These secular elite have been pursuing un-Islamic policies according to Islamists who think that there are certain core Islamic principles which cannot be re-interpreted according to wishes of the secular-minded or according to modern ideas. Thus, all acts, small or big, have a religious significance and can be classified as Islamic or un-Islamic. These views lead to a struggle between subscribers of Islamic and 'non-Islamic' lifestyles.

Islamists have ambitious aims. According to a leading Turkish expert, Islamism aims at "making Islam, once again, dominant in life in its entirety [...] save the Islamic world from exploitation of the West, tyrannical and oppressing administrators, enslavement, imitation, superstition [...] make it civilised, united, developed" (Kara 1986: XV)[8]. In other words, Islamists demand a greater say in politics, major issues, form and substance of modernisation policies[9]. These demands are reflected in the

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[7] In fact, as it will be seen, even about *Islam* as a much larger concept than *Islamism* generalisations are being made.

[8] Unless otherwise stated, I have done all the translations from Turkish.

[9] Islamism can be seen in one sense one form of the religiously motivated attempts in the world to reach a 'harmonious' state in the relation between tradition and modernisation. They are yet to disprove Bellah (1983) who argues "a right relation between tradition and modernisation is difficult to attain, precarious when attained, and in today's world is largely a hope rather than a reality".

growing place of Islamic symbols and ideals in the government programs (Voll 1994: 337).

Islamists operate mainly in modernising Muslim countries and they interact with modernity. In fact, the rise of Islamism owes much to the limited 'successes' of modernising drives in Muslim countries. "The actors of Islamism acquired professional profiles, increased their diversity and their public visibility. This was true not only of the militants and politicians. but also of engineers, lawyers, intellectuals, novelists, and journalists; all contributed to the production, transmission and dissemination of Islamic values and discourse" (Göle 2000: 93). Without fruits of modernisation such as universities, publication facilities or increasing mobilisation, Islamists could not acquire intellectual and economic power that increased their self-confidence vis-à-vis westernised/modernised elite and other sections of society.

Since almost all Islamists want modernisation of their societies along Islamic lines and see the West as having many un-Islamic features, Islamism contains a strong challenge to the equation of modernity with the West, a reflection on modernity from its edge, from peripheral areas, and a contribution to the decentralising of the West in the world in ever evolving conceptualisations of modernity (cf. Göle 2000: 91). Seeing Islamists as anti-modern prevents fully understanding of their stance vis-à-vis modernity, especially western modernity and the West.

Islamism should be seen basically as a discourse or rather there are various versions of Islamist discourses in many Muslim countries. These discourses are usually permeated with a heavy use of religious symbols making use of historical and religious knowledge interpreted from a certain angle and well known among the traditional and Islamically minded sections of Muslim societies. Judging by numbers of people

subscribing to them, Islamist discourses are powerful and usually second in importance to the currently dominant, often much more secular and less coherent, discourses in these countries. Islamism is ultimately based on the premise of existence of Allah who demands obedience to his commands which are to be applied fully and must constitute the basics of the social and private sphere. Thus, Islamism presupposes a Muslim [i.e. Islamist] identity[10] which is not only in tension with Western modernity but also with secular systems in Muslim countries. This contributes to the fact Göle points out, "tensions between identity and modernity are more salient and dramatic in the non-Western contexts of modernity" (cf. Göle 2000: 92).

One could see that even leading academics quite often cannot help themselves and seem to suggest that modernity or Islamism are clearly definable. For example, according to Göle who is a pioneering Turkish academician on the subject, "Islamism rests on civilisational antagonism and rejects *dominant* features of modernity [...] and monocivilisational imposition of Western modernity" (2000: 93, my emphasis). Here, it is important to note that when Göle conceptualise modernity, she prioritises secular, democratic characteristics of modernity in the West today, and its cultural reflections rather than, let us say, economic growth which has been and is one of the defining features of modernity; Islamists are clearly not against economic growth.

It will be seen in detail that Islamism also presupposes a *pure* Islam, knowable despite the historical corruptions, deviations by small or large Muslim groups from the norm. The coherence of Islamism as an ideology often increases for a given region and given sect of Islam. For example, it could be seen that different Islamist movements in the Greater Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan, as well as Islamists in India share

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[10] A simple definition of identity offered by Schwedler as "how individuals and groups define themselves and their relations to others" (2001: 2)

very similar ideas and Islam connotes many similar things for them: this coherence may be higher within two main (the Sunni and Shi'ite) branches of Islam.

Islamism is strongly related to what Islam stands for Muslims. This question has many complex and conflicting answers. Many Muslims may slavishly follow their ancestors, others may be using Islam to further or protect their interests: still others may simply believe in it and take comfort from its mega-narrative which meaningfully 'explains' life. Likewise, Islamists can be seen as turning Islam into an ideology to mask their real motives or they may simply want to 'save' their fellow Muslims in the best way they know how. In other words, their material and spiritual demands may be so deeply entwined that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate them.

In Chapter 2, the broad Islamist response to important modern concepts and processes and the West is analysed; this also prepares the background to the more specific response of the WP in Turkey. Thus, the similarities and differences between Islamism of the WP and wider Islamism in the Middle East will be seen.

One of the issues in Chapter 2 is the Islamist aspiration to state power. According to Islamists, Islamisation of state power is seen as a collective duty as its power is abused by the secular sections against Islamists and their interpretation of Islam (Ayubi 1991). In other words, Islamisation of the state structure seems to most Islamists a logical part of wider Islamisation of society. Extremist Islamist groups who advocate armed struggle with the state are excluded from this study. The Islamist stance vis-à-vis nationalism as a modern ideology is analysed. Islamists see that nationalism goes against the religious theory and the idea of ummah and thus divide the Muslims into nation-states when they need unity most against foreign power blocs (e.g. the West) to defend their rights.

It will be seen that there have been mixed approaches toward democracy among Islamists. While many prominent Islamist thinkers held that democracy is incompatible with Islam and Islam in fact provides *more* and *real* freedom than democracy, there are also some Islamic thinkers who argue that Islam allows a democratic political system. The place of women according to Islamists will also be discussed to point out that Islamists would like women to participate in economic and social life in an Islamic way, which, from a Western point of view, seems still not to be granting equal rights as with Western women. As to the non-Muslim minorities, it will be argued that Islamic political theory does not see non-Muslims as equal partners within the Muslim community (ummah) and accordingly their rights are not granted fully. Today most Islamists have a negative view of non-Muslim minorities, often due to suspicions about their loyalty to that particular Muslim state.

Another important topic for Chapter 2 will be Islamist views on scientific knowledge, technology and industrialisation; because, one of the central feature of modernity has been increasing scientific knowledge and the idea that 'truth' can be reached only via scientific research (not through revelation). It will be seen that contemporary Islamists maintain an Islamist line by arguing that Islamic knowledge does not conflict with scientific knowledge. They see scientific activity as an important prerequisite of technological progress which is in turn strongly related to industrial development. Islamists advocate rapid economic growth via technological progress and industrialisation and do not object to that the stimulus for these 'material aspects of life' may come from the West.

Capitalism is seen as a central component of Western modernity; it will be seen in Chapter 2 that, while Islamists claim that Islamic way of managing the economy is superior to both capitalism and socialism, quite often they are closer to basically a

capitalist understanding of economy. This may be because according to most Islamist interpretations. Islam safeguards private property, inheritance, justifies profit made in the market. and accepts market conditions (e.g. bargaining between employer and the employee to determine the wage).

In Chapter 2, it will be seen that Islamists have a certain, negative conceptualisation of the West. Especially in the Middle East, western, particularly American policies (e.g. supporting Israel, always trying to have an absolute control over the oil supplies) are not welcome. Overall, the West seems materialist, selfish and ready to abuse its power. Western societies are condemned by Islamists for things such as having low ethical standards (understood for example in terms of sexual permissiveness; amoral individualism), decline of the communitarian spirit and the family.

It is possible to see that some important processes associated with modernity have been detrimental to a traditionally understood Islam. This is what Islamists do; they approach modernity selectively and point out that some processes of modernity (e.g. secularisation) are incompatible with Islam. For example, a secular nationalism is against the conception of ummah. As will be seen in detail, broadly speaking, this has been the case in Turkey too.

THE CASE OF THE WELFARE PARTY IN TURKEY

As Huntington (1993a) argues in his famous article, there are "torn countries" in the world. In these countries, some sections try to redefine the identity of their countries but significant elements in the society resist to this redefinition. Turkish Islamists and the WP can be conceptualised in this perspective, as resisting the proposed route to

modernity by a secular Turkish elite (e.g. through westernisation, secularisation and secular Turkish nationalism).

For about 150 years, first during the Ottoman times and later in the republican era, the ruling elite have been trying to modernise Turkish society via westernisation. For the modernising Ottoman elite the European experience was the model of modernisation. As Lewis points out, Atatürk was an heir to the nationalist, positivist and westernising wing of the Young Turks and for him civilisation meant the modern civilisation of the West (1968: 292; Mardin 1981: 217; Karal 1981) and the aim was to reach the level of most advanced civilisations (*"muasır medeniyetler"*) (see, Kazancıgil 1981).[11]

It can be seen that from the outset, there has been an Islamist opposition and criticism of these modernisation attempts which predominantly followed the European (later Western) model and this Islamist objection has been one of the most important features of Turkish socio-economic and political life.

After Mustafa Kemal and his leading cadre led the War of Independence and "saved" Anatolia, the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, it quickly became clear in the early 1920s that Turkish modernisation adventure was to continue along a nationalist-secularist line under the guidance of the Kemalists. For example, the Turks would be the dominant nation in the new republic. Like any other political system, the newly emerging regime in Turkey had a certain, partial and selective interpretation of history (Kılıçbay 1998) and the glorious past. Turkish history was to be re-written, but research in the history of the Ottomans who were heavily influenced by Islam and who brought

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[11] *The word Muasır* is active participle of the Arabic root '*asr*' which means 'the age'. So *muasır* can be understood as modern or contemporary, but when Atatürk used the term he clearly meant the *most advanced* (European) nations of his time.

the nation to the brink of extinction (Atatürk 1929: *passim*) was not encouraged; instead greater emphasis was placed on the Golden Age of the Turks that meant pre-Islamic times. The Turks did not need Islam to be a great nation; they already had their own distinctive civilisation. Islam after all was a reflection of a certain *moment* in history;[12] for the nationalist Kemalists Islam was "religion of Arabs. Arab nationalism, and a servant of Arab imperialism" (Bora 1996: 20). The Ottoman Sunni interpretation of Islam seemed an obstacle, in many respects. in front of the changes deemed necessary by the Kemalist cadres toward a civilised. contemporary (modern) and strong Turkey which, with the help of science and hard work, would never be at the mercy of powerful countries again. Therefore, the secular nationalism which emerged during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, especially among the military bureaucracy, became the official ideology. Nevertheless, since the state dominance was never complete and it did not have enough intellectual and material resources to promote modern Western, secular, values as much as wished by the secular elite, the penetration of the Turkish modernisation project was uneven and restricted primarily to big cities and towns in the first decades of the republic and secularism only gradually became a dominant force.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the WP's discourse, as voiced by its elite, in order to find the answers to the research concerns stated above. The WP elite voiced their discourse and it was reported by the media, which included newspapers (e.g. the *Milli Gazete*) and TV channels close to the party. By the WP elite, I mean those who run the party, took important decisions, published newspapers, books, and expressed their views as representatives of the party in the media. As it will be seen, the WP elite had a coherent enough view of modernity, the West and Turkish modernisation, enabling an analysis of their views (discourse) to be made. In order to be able to join the party elite,

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[12] For a criticism of this view from perspective of an Islamist intellectual see İ. Özel (1995:24).

usually, hard-work along party lines for considerably long periods was required, thus all party elite were tried and tested as far as their loyalty to party ideology was concerned; Islamic knowledge and visible observance of Islamic rules like regular praying or wife or daughters wearing Islamic headscarf served as unwritten rules. The WP elite emerged as spokespersons and interpreters for the party supporters who were 'informed' about and reacted to political developments through these elite.

Although one should not be as certain as Laçiner, a socialist intellectual, who argues that "there is no doubt that all those who administer the WP think in the same way" (1996: 12), there was a high level of coherence among the WP elite as far as political, social, economic views were concerned. The party discourse, as expressed by its elite, touched upon economic growth (technology, industrialisation), science, capitalism. secularisation, secular nationalism, [modern] state, democracy, which are important parts of modernity. The analysis of the party discourse, therefore, can be very comprehensive as far as number of topics influencing party members' conceptualisation of modernity, and its relationship with the West is concerned. For the sake of this comprehensiveness, the thesis will focus on only the last 4-5 years of the party before its ban by the constitutional court in February 1998. As it will be seen, such a time span is enough to capture a meaningful analysis of their understanding of modernity in that period. During these years, there were official publications of the party, the articles of the MPs of the party and press coverage of their day to day views on secularity (laicite), Turkish nationalism, Turkish economic order, democracy and the need for scientific and technological progress for industrialisation etc. to modernise Turkey. All these kind of sources were used in this thesis to make a qualitative analysis.

In Chapter 3, it will be seen that according to the WP elite, Turkish modernisation project has been a secularising, de-Islamising one. Modernisation of the

Turkish state meant that secular elite had a powerful tool at their hands to implement their modernising policies. The WP members shared the general Islamist view that the Kemalist revolution and its continuation by the secular elite have been unnecessarily radical toward Islam. The predominantly secular system in Turkey meant that influence of Islam in Turkish social life declined.

The WP was clearly an Islamist party trying to work according to words of the strictly secular laws. As a party it greatly benefited from the general rise of Islamist power in Turkey; its members were very active in Islamisation efforts. Islamists published many newspapers, owned many radio and TV stations. formed thousands of associations, ran hundreds of foundations, schools and courses and owned an important share of business life. The WP succeeded to establish itself as the biggest party of the Islamist section in Turkey. The WP circles often used a radical language to criticise the secular elite and their policies. The WP elite argued that a wholesale adaptation of the West as the model for modernisation and undermining Islamic culture has been harmful to society in Turkey. They made it clear that Islamisation was the solution to the socio-economic problems in Turkey and the WP elite clearly based their legitimacy in the eyes of Islamically-minded on being active participants in the struggle for the soul of Turkey, as well as, being legal politicians, on promising more secular goals (e.g. economic development) to the wider public.

According to the WP elite, the Turkish modernisation project has failed the people and such a failure was natural as westernised-secularised elite have made de-Islamisation (understood in the WP discourse as secularisation of the political system and causing the decline of the social significance of Islam) part of this project. Thus, the secular elite (e.g. politicians, higher civilian-military bureaucracy) distanced themselves from Islam and hence from the people. The solution proposed by the WP elite could be

described as more, not less, modernisation but on an Islamic path.

Chapter 3 starts with a look at the modernisation (centralisation and secularisation) of the state in Turkey especially under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his close circle. Thus in the first decades of the republic, under the domination of a secular elite, one of the most important part of the modernisation drive which took the form of westernisation, was secularisation. Secularisation which meant decline of the influence of the religion (Islam) in public sphere and in majority of private lives included most importantly Europeanisation of the law and emergence of a new secular elite, who increasingly followed a westernised life style, especially in big cities. Thus, the new generations of the secular elite who continued to dominate important state institutions (the Presidency, the Parliament, the government, the Turkish Armed Forces, universities, the judiciary and other civil bureaucracy) inherited the duty of modernising Turkey from the first generation of the republic. It will be seen that, although there has always been an Islamist reaction to the secular republican ideology right from the start, this has been easily suppressed. The first openly Islamist party could only be seen in 1970, the National Order Party was the first party of 'the National Outlook', the name of the political movement and ideology which was developed under Erbakan's leadership. After the 1971 coup, the National Outlook movement formed the National Salvation Party which was banned after the 1980 coup. The Welfare Party was formed in 1983 as the third party of the movement and enjoyed some 10% of the electoral support until the mid-1990s when the party made a peak in terms of political support by gaining important mayorships and becoming the biggest party in the parliament.

The roots of rising Islamism in Turkey will be touched upon and the role of the WP as the most important Islamist group in the country in shaping of Turkish Islamism

will be analysed. It will be seen that an important part of Turkish society saw Islam as a solution to their problems, thus the WP could attract support of a dedicated grass roots, articulated a discourse critical of the Turkish modernisation route.

It will be seen in detail in Chapter 3 that, the WP elite had a distinctly different understanding of the content of modern concepts brought about by the Turkish modernisation project. Most importantly, it can be seen that, for the WP elite, secularisation did not have to be a part of modernity. The major Kemalist principle of secularism (laicite) was being applied wrongfully and was used by the state to control Islam; this meant that various religious foredooms were being undermined.

As will be seen, the WP elite argued that the 'militant' application of the principle of laicite, the attitude of the secular media, the place of the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) were all responsible for inadequate democracy in Turkey. For the WP democracy was part of being modern but they understood democracy primarily as the rule of the majority and in terms of religious freedoms.

As for the women, it could be seen that the WP circles encouraged them to be active in political and social life but by using familiar Islamist rationales they argued that their activities had to be subject to Islamic precepts. They emphasised the importance of being a mother and housewife. Islamists women were expected to join into the economic life without compromising the integrity of Islamic rules.

As an indicator of their inadequate understanding of democracy and their religious nationalism it will be seen that the WP elite approached the minorities, especially the Jewish and the Greek, with suspicion. Quite often, WP's anti-Israeli discourse mixed with anti-Semitism.

In Chapter 4, analyses of the views of the WP elite, vis-à-vis important aspects of modernity and of Turkish modernisation will continue in addition to Chapter 3, with a different set of concepts, in order to have a more comprehensive evaluation of their understanding of modernity. It will seen that the WP elite had actually its own brand of religious nationalism and they criticised the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey which, in their view, was undermining the social unity by denying cultural and political rights to non-Turk Muslims (e.g. the Kurds). 'The nation' was predominantly defined in the Welfarist discourse as the Muslim community (the ummah), with frequent references to the special importance of the Turkish Muslims in it. The Welfarist discourse was in agreement with the general Islamist discourse that current world order had to change because it has been working to the detriment of the Islamic world; the former glorious position of Muslims could be re-realised by increasing the intra-ummah cooperation. The WP argued that the most suitable candidate to lead other Muslim countries toward a just world was Turkey.

It will be seen that the WP elite thought that lack of satisfactory economic growth was an important component of 'the failed modernisation' in Turkey. The 'miserable' economic position and the poor performance of Turkey were attributed to mismanagement by the secular elite and de-Islamisation. The WP championed the rights of the lower income groups and promised to correct income disparities. It will be argued that, in line with the wishes of the rising Islamist economic elite in Turkey, the WP's economic views had become closer to basically a capitalist understanding of the economy as in Western countries, despite to their rhetoric against. The WP also demanded equal treatment of the rising Islamist business circles ("green capital") by the state institutions.

In the case of the WP elite, an example of an Islamist stance and its evolution

vis-à-vis modern science could be seen. They shared the Islamist belief that, contrary to the views of many of the secular-minded, Islam does not conflict with the science but encourages scientific activity. Nevertheless, they argued that unlike Islam, science couldn't be a guide for the life and some of what is considered as scientific fact (e.g. Theory of Evolution) was not the truth and should not be used against Islam.

It will be seen that technological progress and industrialisation occupied a central place in the Welfarist conceptualisation of modernity. Acquiring the latest scientific and technological knowledge was seen as a must by the WP elite for the rapid industrialisation, and economic growth of Turkey. The WP elite saw that lack of adequate technology and industrial base made Turkey economically weak and dependent on foreign, mainly western, countries.

It will be seen in Chapter 4 that, the WP elite, like many other Islamists in the world, had generally a negative view of the West. The West was suffering from a general moral decay, increasing amoral individualism, hedonism, consumerism, disrespect and sexual permissiveness; and westernisation in Turkey meant a similar erosion which had to be stopped. Islamists argued that the Western manipulation and exploitation of the world could also be seen in Turkey. Thus, according to the WP elite, it was necessary to separate modernity from the West, this could be done easily in their view; a non-Western route of modernisation was possible. This possibility stemmed from their larger, if implicit, claim that modernity itself was divisible. What really required adapting in the name of modernity from abroad (e.g. the West) was mainly understood in terms of technology and industry. As far as cultural matters were concerned, it was strongly argued in the Welfarist discourse that, the native Islamic culture was more than enough provided that its values re-invigorated properly. In other words, the WP elite shared a widespread Islamist belief that an Islamic way to

modernity was possible and preferable to westernisation.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS

I tried to base my analysis of the WP elite's related views directly on what they were saying/ writing predominantly in the period under analysis (1994-early 1998, which represent the WP's height of power and its banning process starting in May 1997) which was published daily particularly by the Islamist media (e.g. Milli Gazete which has been publication organ of the National Outlook Movement and Yeni Şafak), by the Welfare Party and in the books and articles written by them about the issues that are chosen in this study as most important areas worth exploring to reach a comprehensive understanding of the WP vis-à-vis modernity. It will be seen that, despite my efforts to organise them, often, the WP elite apparently jumped from one topic to another in their speeches and writings. This was so, because, most of the issues were strongly related to one another according to the WP elite and more importantly they trusted that most of their audience were well acquainted enough with the main themes of the Welfarist and Islamist discourse in general.

It should be pointed out that an analysis of the WP's discourse shows that like its target audience the discourse was complex and multidimensional. The party discourse, as analysed in this study, was constructed with the contribution of a diverse elite with greater input of the core (*çekirdek*) group of Erbakan and his very close circle. The WP elite made use of popular, religious and cultural vocabulary that the target audience was very familiar with. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the party elite and the supporters were connected to the party discourse with different degrees of commitment and awareness. It cannot be assumed that all the elite shared and contributed equally to the body of the party's discourse as put to the public.

It should be accepted that the thesis would have benefited very much from a number of interviews with the party elite. Unfortunately, as my two visits to Ankara in the autumn of 1997 made it very clear to me, those who occupied the top positions of the party (e.g. Erbakan and Gül) very extremely busy and had no time for a young researcher. Given the number of areas to be covered, interviews would last several hours to do justice to the topic. Instead, their published views were consulted. This method is also partly justified in my view because there was a lively debate going on in Turkey about different aspects of modernity which was rich enough but not evaluated and analysed in a comprehensive manner as attempted in this study.

The decision to focus only on the last 4-5 years of the party, which is by no means a very short term in Turkish political life, was taken to provide an in depth analysis of the WP's stance vis-à-vis an important and quite extensive set of aspects of modernity and its relationship with the West in a given period. It was not possible to make an in depth analysis of the previous or the later period because of time and space limitations and point out the evolution or changes in the WP's stance since 1983 (or indeed the National Outlook's since 1970) with regard to important areas (e.g. secularism, industrialisation and capitalism). Similarly, only a very brief evaluation of the JDP vis-à-vis issues covered will be provided at the end of the thesis. These are important areas for further research which would complement our understanding with regard to this particular stance vis-a-vis modernity.

It will be seen that the WP elite had a distinct (Islamist) understanding of modernity which, despite its differences (e.g. in its approach to secularism), overall remained within modernity by sharing most of its major characteristics. The WP elite, similar to many other Islamist movements, advocated a more Islamic (less secular and Westernising) route to modernity; and they could not be considered as anti-modernists.

CHAPTER 1

MODERNITY AND ITS CONTENT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter, I will try to locate modernity in time and space, analyse historical evolutions of some of its most important processes and concepts set out in the introduction. Modernity's relationship with the West will also be analysed to set the background for analyses of Islamist and the Welfarist views on aspects of modernity and the West. Thus, theoretical spaces will be opened up for the discussion of issues, concepts and processes that are chosen to be explored in order to make a comprehensive analysis of the stance of the WP elite vis-à-vis modernity and the West.

1.2 BEGINNING OF MODERNITY WITH THE RISE OF EUROPE

It make sense of to look at the initial development of modernity as a historical phenomenon that was strongly associated with the rapid rise of Europe vis-à-vis other parts of the world. Indeed, the momentous economic, social and political developments that occurred in Western Europe over the last several centuries are often described as extraordinary. There is even talk of 'A European Miracle' (Jones 1987). Moreover, like every extraordinary phenomenon, the European miracle does call for an explanation and analysis. Of course, this miracle, which meant, *inter alia*, the rise of Europe vis-à-vis other continents, was a result of a chain of fundamental changes. As a result, the West European experience manifested itself mainly as a successful economic development

closely interrelated to social and political developments. This experience diffused to other parts of Europe and the rest of the world, albeit unevenly. This spread of the European experience and the impact of the progress of West European peoples brought about the unprecedented increase of international or intersocietal contacts through which, in Marx's words: "The country that is more developed industrially only" showed, "to the less developed, the image of its own future" (1954:19).

The contacts between the more developed countries of Western Europe and the less developed countries took an unfortunate form in which the dominant and powerful countries, depending on the conditions, exercised different levels of control over the dominated (So 1990). Peoples of the so-called backward countries were bombarded with 'images' and 'pictures' of their future by their self-styled masters. Accordingly, during the colonial and economic imperialistic era, there was the talk of India as Anglicised or Indochina as Gallicised. However, long periods of colonisation showed important similarities among the imperialist regimes and these parochial terms were abandoned; and the term Europeanisation was employed. World War II marked the decline of the European empires and rise of the American presence and influence in many places including Europe; and thus one spoke of the Americanisation of Europe but for much of the rest of the world, the term was 'Westernisation'. However, even this larger term seemed inadequate to explain swift and enormous social change in many underdeveloped and developed countries that gained momentum especially after the war.

In response to this, a new term, 'modernisation' evolved. It enabled scholars to speak of similarities of achievements observed in all 'modernised' societies - Western

or non-Western (such as the Soviet Union or Japan)[1]. The term also referred to similarities of aspirations of all 'modernising' societies regardless of their locations and traditions (Lerner 1968: 386-7). Modernisation and aspirations to modernity are among the most overwhelming features of the last two centuries. Modernisation is a historical process and it is not uncommon to find it defined as a form of social, economical and political change that took place in Western Europe (e.g. Eisenstadt 1966:1; cf. Giddens 1990), which later spread to North America and other European countries. In other words, modernity emerged as a European success and other societies had attained the 'necessary' sophistication as the pupils of West Europeans.

In this sense, Europeanisation was equal to modernisation for a certain period and for a given society. The terms 'Europeanisation', 'Americanisation' or 'Westernisation' were and are employed to describe the influence of the more advanced countries on the less advanced. However, although they might be accurate in describing the modernisation processes in many places for certain historical periods, they fail to take into account both the original transformation within West European countries and

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[1] For example, a school of thought known as 'Modernisation theory' was developed and popularised in 1950s and 1960s by a number of scholars (e.g. W. Rostow, S. Smelser, D. McClelland and A. Inkeles) in a response to the particular historical conditions. For the lack of space, I had to discard a separate section explaining the theory and its defects as pointed out by its ideological rivals (e.g. Dependency theory) and by more neutral later generation of experts. Briefly put, the theory argued that Western countries are the most developed, and the rest of the world will eventually reach the same level provided that they pass through the necessary stages by taking the former as the model. In other words, the West has a positive effect in modernisation of the rest (strongly disputed by the Dependency theory) and development stages are unilinear. The theory has been very much discredited because of its pro-Western bias and some of its basic assumptions that went contrary to the facts as indicated by experts critical of this school and perception that it was designed as a program explicitly directed to the non-Western world and devoted to the promotion of Western institutions and values there. However, based on an extensive reading of the recent literature on modernity, which try to be much more neutral, I would argue that many processes (e.g. industrialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and democratisation) that were also emphasised upon by the 'Modernization Theory' are been seen by many experts, social groups and elites too as important components of modernity. Therefore, in this study explanation of modernity by some of the themes and concepts that were also employed by the Modernisation theory should only be understood as an indicator that the theory had also highlighted *some* of the important (and arguably obvious) processes as parts of modernisation as also widely accepted today. It will also be seen that with its quite distinct understanding of modernity, Islamism has a selective view with regard to which processes should really be part and parcel of future path of Muslim societies to modernity. For more on Modernisation theory and its ideological rivals, see for example, (So 1990).

the impact of the less advanced countries on the still less advanced. Thus, one cannot talk about the 'Westernisation' of England and France, or 'Europeanisation' of Manchuria by Japan. Given these considerations, especially after World War II, 'modernity' became widely used to refer to the characteristics common to countries that are seen as the most advanced in technological, political, economic and social terms; and thus, 'modernisation' refers to the *process* by which these characteristics were and are acquired. Therefore, in this thesis, the word *modernisation* is used to cover a vast array from original developments in Western Europe to present modernising policies pursued by all societies who wish to be more modern. Although, generally speaking, the modernisation process is much more easily observed in developing countries where it seems to have a faster pace.

Since, the original, epoch-making social changes occurred in Western Europe and then in time became globalised in their repercussions, it is fundamentally important to analyse underlying factors of these changes and the characteristics that Western societies have acquired through them. There are basically two ways of looking into the rise of Europe: the historical and the comparative. A historical explanation of the rise of Europe, however brief, must underwrite environmental factors, history of scientific and technical change, the stimulus of the discoveries, colonialism, the formation of markets and the implications of the constantly changing European state-system.

According to one view, the economic success of Europe compared to Asia owes much to the ecological contrasts of the continent which forced Europeans to trade goods such as grains, meat, fruit, wine, olives, salt, metal, wood, animal skins and furs -which were produced in different places of Europe- right across the continent. Transport costs were low due to high proportion of coastlines and navigable rivers. States had no

interest in plundering these commodities but only in taxing them in return of providing basic social order (Jones 1987: 90-91).

There were other gifts of geography. One was the fact that Europe and especially Western Europe was a long journey from Central Asia, home of invaders who captured some other parts of the Eurasian periphery, importantly India and China. This distance and a forested landscape, unsuited to cavalry, provided some protection. Another locational advantage was, once suitable sailing ships were built (Jones 1987: 59), the West European coasts were conveniently opposite to some of the richest seas and most exploitable but least defended lands in the world. Having a developed shipping technology makes the geography seem not so important a factor, but the layout of the world does affect the relative costs of economic activity involving transportation. What is more in this context was the fact that if Europe were to expand, ecology and climate ensured that it would not be towards the north or south. And during the period West Europeans had developed sailing capabilities adequate to cross the oceans, their expansion would not be eastwards either, because Europe never remotely threatened to defeat its eastern neighbours which were the Huns, Mongols or Tartars in the steppes or the Ottomans who penetrated deep into South-Eastern Europe (Mann1988: 17; Jones 1987).

Needless to say, the unprecedented European superiority, starting from 18th century onwards, was mainly result of the Industrial Revolution, which is taken either as what really mattered in economic history, or as a very convenient starting point or a negative development. The Industrial Revolution had provided Europeans not only with all sorts of peaceful consumables but also with deadly weapons assuring invincible military might. Europeans enjoyed a sustained agricultural growth and then an

'agricultural revolution' before Industrial Revolution that roughly took place in the second half the 18th century (for major technological inventions in agriculture, see, Cipolla 1976:159-60). The effect was by far the most productive system of agriculture the world has ever seen. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that a number of scholars have all argued that economic revival in Europe occurred well before 1000 AD (see, Duby 1974, Postan 1975 and Mann 1988). However, many popular explanations begin much later- with developments of the towns in the twelfth, the struggles in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between peasants and lords. fourteenth century capitalist accounting methods, the Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the fifteenth century-navigational- revolution, the scientific revolutions between 1400 and 1600, sixteenth-century Protestantism, seventeenth-century Puritanism, English capitalist agriculture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries...(Mann 1988:9)

One thing must be clear - medieval Europe was already very dynamic. In fact, historians frequently use the term *restless* to describe the medieval culture. For example, McNeill writes, "it is not any particular set of institutions, ideas or technologies that mark out the West but its inability to come to a rest". No other civilised society has approached to such *restlessness* from which true uniqueness of Western civilisation stems (1963: 539). However, such restlessness did not need to produce socio-economic development. A Hobbessian war of all against all or similar types of aimless vicious struggles among the people were also likely, if there were no social control or a sense of 'direction'.

Weber and Durkheim, two classical sociologists, tried to explain why not anarchy or anomie but social development took place by emphasising cultural factors. For Weber, the restlessness of Europe was always integrated to another peculiarity: the

rationality. Rational restlessness was the psychological make up of Europe. Weber found rational restlessness especially in Puritanism. This rational restlessness was put in the service of social improvement by a mechanism identified by Durkheim. Not anarchy or anomie but normative regulation was due firstly and primarily to Christianity (Mann 1988:12-3). In fact, although most of the people had more than one identity, the most powerful and extensive source of social identity was Christianity; and various churches that were preaching consideration, decency and charity to all Christians provided a normative pacification substituting costly coercive pacification (Werner 1988:172-3).

From a materialist perspective, the ecumene was both infrastructure and superstructure. Until the thirteenth century it monopolised education and written communication. The church also provided the *lingua franca*: Latin. The state bureaucracies and trading associations and manorial estates all had access to useful knowledge through church infrastructures. In short, the common culture of medieval Europe was Christianity. In addition, it was an achievement of Christianity to create, however minimal, a normative society across state, ethnic, class and gender boundaries. Its other achievement was integrating two major parts of Europe, the Mediterranean lands with their cultural heritage, their historic and predominantly extensive power techniques (literacy, coinage, agricultural estates and trading networks) and north-western Europe with its relatively intensive power techniques (deep ploughing, village and kin solidarities and locally organised warfare). The European development owes much to their creative interchange. The fact that medieval Europeans were primarily concerned with exploiting their locality intensively and a certain level of social norms provided a favourable environment to natural sciences, penetrating beneath the appearance and finding physical, chemical and biological 'explanations'. In a sense, medieval Europeans surpassed other civilisations in production of knowledge about

agricultural and scientific matters (Mann 1988: 14-15).

One source of European development was its almost uninterrupted production of unprecedented amount of knowledge. And if we define technology as the application of knowledge about nature, to create tools, machines, new ways of production, to train people in new techniques, in short, to increase mastery over the natural world, it was only a matter of time for Europeans to start their unprecedented technological progress. As with the agricultural technological developments, sometimes there was need for great time spans, and the effect might be regionalised but unlike Asia, Europe was one technological community where change in one cell tended to diffuse to the others. Cultural homogeneity and competitive state-systems forced continuous borrowing, which meant that if a problem were solved in one country, soon the same would be true for others (Jones 1987: 45; Goldstone 2002).

1.3 MODERNITY AS A CONCEPT IN HISTORY

Clearly, modernity has a very long and complex history and therefore to place the birth of modernity and its spread geographically in a historical setting is crucial to explore its relationship with some very important historical developments and concepts like the Enlightenment, capitalism, nationalism and industrialisation that also initially occurred in Europe and spread to other parts of the world.

The Enlightenment can be described as the interconnected philosophical, scientific and social beliefs that developed in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was a broad European intellectual movement that constituted the origins of many modern worldviews of today. The dominant Enlightenment thinking, in contrast to the previous generations, rejected superstition and belief in the

supernatural as ways of living. For most Enlightenment thinkers the natural world was to be understood through objective, detached and unemotional science; reason and rationality were the sole source of knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge generated by many individuals working freely was to be used for the human emancipation and to make the daily life easier. Among the nineteenth century sociologists, Auguste Comte, in particular, had much faith in this freely produced scientific knowledge. For him, the 'modern' society would be dominated by science; a positivist science would replace the influence of religion, superstition and philosophy[2] (see, for example, Hamilton 1992).

Another very important factor in differentiating Western Europe from the rest of the world was industrialisation. Nineteenth-century classical sociologists, such as

Comte, Durkheim, Marx and Weber all interested in the social change accompanying this industrialisation that had reshaped the world. Marx and Durkheim, unlike Comte, placed less emphasis on scientific and rational thinking but they both strongly believed that society was developing progressively; for Marx, towards a communist utopia, free from the exploitation -characteristic of a capitalist society-, and for Durkheim, towards a complex society based on organic solidarity. According to Weber, rationalisation and bureaucracy would increasingly be more important in the modern states. All of these sociologists believed they could tell the future direction of social change because they thought they had used scientific analysis. Such was the importance of the 'scientific' way of thinking and science. Science promised domination over nature and hence freedom from scarcity and calamity. Enlightenment thinking may be seen as the foundation of modernity and its belief in progress and faith in science have been the

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[2] Euben's observation, "The opposition of science to religion - like the correlative binaries of reason and revelation, rationality and irrationality - is central to the way in which the West has organised its intellectual history" (2003: 50), represents a dominant view in social sciences.

characteristic of 'modern thinking.'

The origins of modern scientific knowledge may be traced to the important new scientific endeavour and technological innovation in the Middle Ages, what is referred to by historians as the renaissance of the twelfth century. Although, in the fifteenth century, modern ideas and techniques emerged decisively, it is appropriate to say a full-fledged scientific revolution was in progress in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The enormous time span from the 12th to the 18th century had enabled the westernmost societies of Europe to digest the new knowledge and technology and absorb their social impacts *gradually* (in contrast to the late modernising societies of the twentieth century). However, this does not mean that the growth of knowledge and the related technology, after a warm welcome as a useful and acceptable development, had not had to face some fierce opposition, especially from the church. The trial of Galileo by the Inquisition in 1632 because of his 'heretical' view that the sun did not rotate around the earth, is an example (Black 1966:69-70).

Another relevant point about the origins of modern knowledge in the Western Europe of the twelfth century is the fact that, at that time, the writings of Greek and Arab scholars became available. The basis of this twelfth century renaissance was the recognition of the possibility of seeking a rational explanation of physical and natural phenomena. By the sixteenth century the growth in scientific knowledge and its application in the form of technology brought to West Europeans a great power and a previously unseen control over the nature. The scientific revolution generally led to a comprehensive re-evaluation of traditional ways of doing things. Almost all of humanity's conceptions became subject to scrutiny and all forms of intellectual activity went through a rapid transformation. In a way, each generation's idols were toppled

down by the next one. Change was considered the normal state of all knowledge. The classical periodisation by Europe's historians of the evolution of human understanding as a Renaissance, a Reformation and Counter Reformation. an Age of Enlightenment and an Age of Materialism remains useful. What is important here is to note that this process, which lasted from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, "was almost exclusively the product of Europe" (Black 1966:9-11). In other words, modernity emerged as a European success and other societies had to attain the 'necessary' sophistication as the pupils of West Europeans. In this sense, as stated above, one spoke of modernisation as 'Europeanisation'. However this evolution of the terms describing social change, from Anglicisation or Gallicisation to firstly Europeanisation, and then with the emergence of Americanisation to Westernisation and finally to modernisation, is not free from its critics. For example Wallerstein points out that to follow this line of evolution, without questioning, is tantamount to equate Westernisation with modernisation. In other words if there is a contradiction between modernisation and Westernisation this was 'solved' by asserting that they are identical. If Asia or Africa 'Westernises', it 'modernises'. This, according to Wallerstein, means arguing that Western culture is indeed universal. It also means a sophisticated form of arguing that only the Western civilisations among all other world civilisations was capable of transforming itself to modernity. Wallerstein disapproves this line of arguing and writes that some versions of anthropological theory, more specifically some versions of modernisation theory, reached the conclusion, "the West had emerged into modernity; the others had not". And what follows inevitably is to accept that in order to be modern one has to be somehow culturally 'Western', by adopting Western religions, Western languages or at least Western technology which is "said to be based on the universal principles of science" (Wallerstein 1990: 45). Turkish intellectual, Cemil Meriç also attacks the emergence of the term modernisation, presented as a larger and more

appropriate term than the terms of Europeanisation, Americanisation and Westernisation, as a form of covering blatant imperialism. The real matter, according to Meriç, for the economically more developed world, was to exploit and 'domesticate' the less developed parts. So "the imperialist" chose to use more polished and colourless words not to irritate the exploited people (1983: 234).

Social change is an age-old process that takes place in all societies. However, what is unique about the modernisation of the Western Europe is not only the enormous accumulation of knowledge never seen before but also its worldwide impact. In this context one definition of modernisation as "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge , permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution" (Black 1966: 7) does reflect the classical understanding of modernisation which is still shared by many.

1.4 A SELECTIVE CONTENT OF MODERNITY

Naturally, no exhaustive analysis of modernity and its relation to the West is attempted in this thesis. Instead, a selective approach to 'the content' of modernity is taken and its relation to the West is analysed according to this selection. In doing so, my main criteria will be the relative importance of the analysed vis-à-vis the Islamist views in general and the views of the Welfare Party elite on modernity and the West in particular. I will concentrate on capitalism, industrialisation, nationalism and the modern state and international state system, globalisation, secularisation and democracy as important aspects of modernity.

1.4.1 CAPITALISM AND MODERNITY

One of the globalising forces that accompanied modernity has been capitalism. Capitalism, in Max Weber's words, is "the most fateful force in modern life" (1930: 17). As a socio-economic system, it has been a central, if not *the* central, preoccupation of social theory since the nineteenth century. Capitalism, being the economic order of Western Europe in the modern era is indispensable to any analysis of 'modernity' and 'modernisation'. For both Marx and Weber, as for many others, capitalism as a peculiar social formation was born in Western Europe, specifically in England (Marx 1973: 277; Weber 1992: 251). According to Marx, the emergence of the town as a separate entity from the countryside is important in the development of capitalism. The existence of the town brought the necessity of administration, police, taxes, etc., in other words politics and bureaucracy. In short, the separation of town and country brought a political sphere, a division of labour and the constitution of economic sphere and, an industrial and commercial capital. Trade was subject to restriction of competition through protective tariffs, prohibitions and special treaties. "In the last resort, competition was carried on and decided by wars (especially naval wars)" (Marx 1938: 54) out of which England emerged victorious and found itself at the centre of the world commerce. The commercial superiority of England led to a massive demand for its products. From England, the industrial revolution moved on to other countries: "Competition soon compelled every country that wished to retain its historical role to protect its manufacturers by renewed customs regulations (the old duties were no longer any good against big foreign industry), and soon afterwards to introduce big industry under protective duties" (Marx 1938: 56). From this time on the modern industrial system was in firm position and its main characteristics were:

a) the creation of a world market that governs nations and individuals,

b) the resolution of "all natural relationships into money relationships";

c) large industrial cities, "the victory of the commercial town over the countryside";

d) the appearance for the first time of a class that was international by nature (Marx 1938: 57). According to Marx, there was something special within feudalism, a hidden spirit which led to capitalism. "The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former" (Marx 1954: 668). Capitalism, according to Marx, "put an end to all feudal, patriarchal ties that bound man to his natural superiors... created enormous cities and rescued enormous part of the population from the idiocy of rural life". It has engendered the modern state "one nation with one government, one code of laws, one national-class interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff" and "given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country" it "draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilisation... in one word, it creates a world after its own image" (Marx 1975: 486-9).

Weber's explanation of the emergence of capitalism starts with his rejection of the crudely technological and materialistic factors, namely the colonial trade, population growth, or the inflow of precious metals. Then, he isolates some necessary but not sufficient external conditions: The particular geography of Europe with its cheap transportation by water, the favourable military requirements of the small states, and the large demand for luxury from an unusually prosperous population. Finally, Weber concludes his search with a most important factor: The ethic, justification of the pursuit of profit; "the germs of modern capitalism must be found in a region where officially a theory was dominant which was distinct from that of the east and of classical antiquity and in principle strongly hostile to capitalism" (Weber 1930: 162). This region was medieval Christendom. What was most important in this region was the presence of Protestantism. Protestantism was not the cause of capitalism but it was the enabling force. By providing protection to older and deeper tendencies, Protestantism was like a

"wind-break" which allowed the "young plant" to grow (Macfarlane 1988: 187). What is important in Weber's account of the emergence of capitalism is the fact that, this "most fateful force" owes too much to the Protestant ethic. something that was found only in Western Europe. This sense of a 'unique Western civilisation' in Weber's works has a special importance since it affected many theorists of modernisation who also think that the West succeeded in building a unique civilisation. This success owes much to some certain factors that are found in the West and if repeated would lead modernisation of the other parts of the world. According to Weber:

> A product of modern European civilisation, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilisation, and in Western civilisation only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value (Weber 1930: 13).

Therefore, in Weber's view, there was an array of cultural phenomena distinctive to 'Western civilisation' and they reached their zenith only in modern times. The thread linking them was the idea of rationalisation. "Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognise to-day as valid." Other forms of knowledge like Babylonian, Indian or Chinese might be highly developed but were merely empirical, not rational. On the institutions, Chinese and Islamic academies were "superficially similar to our universities" but "a rational, systematic and specialised pursuit of science with trained and specialised personnel, has only existed in the West in a sense at all approaching its present dominant place in our culture" (Weber 1930: 15-6).

Marx and Weber approached capitalism in different ways and reached different conclusions: For Marx, it occupied a central place in his analysis of social change of his time, and capitalism meant, above all, exploitation. For Weber capitalism was "identical

with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise" (Weber 1930: 17). However, there are common points in their observations: Capitalism is "the most fateful force" (Weber) shaping the modern world and the "general light" (Marx) in which it is bathed. Moreover, for them, it is not the economic aspect of capitalism that causes modernity to be as it is, though for both, capitalism's colonisation of global economic life is a crucial agency of modernisation; rather, each comprehends capitalism as, in Marx's words, a "mode of life" (Sayer 1991: 1-2).

The relationship of capitalism with economic and political modernisation is very complex. However, it can be argued that, history 'showed' that capitalist mode of industrialisation has been more successful – in terms of amount of per capita production- than state-planned alternatives (fascist or socialist) routes, perhaps due to for example, as in the case of socialism, extreme difficulty of organising a society that produces for use rather than for profit (So 1990: 186). Historical experience also shows that capitalist societies have been much more successful to become democracies, although it is difficult to show that capitalism is *the* cause of democratisation.

As far as Marxist analyses are concerned, capitalism showed that it is far more flexible than these analyses predicted. Emergence of the welfare state was an important example. However –arguably with the implicit consent of the society due to force of economic globalisation- the new mode of capitalism is causing the decline of the welfare state in the West.

As for the issue of ethnocentric explanation of causes of capitalism firstly raised by Weber, it can be argued that capitalism had existed in pre-modern times at least in an

embryonic form. With modernity, capitalism 'emerged' in the sense that it become much more extensive and intensive in the society. It is not too convincing to argue that capitalism could *only* emerge in a Protestant society because, for example, Islam too could be an enabling culture with its safeguard on private property, justification of 'profit' or bargaining between employer and the employee to arrange the wage. Although it should be expected from Islam, like any other great faith, to teach compassion for the fellow human being and thus, delegitimise some excesses seen in a modern capitalist economic system.

The capitalist mode of economic activity has been resisted far less by the rest of the world compared to some other Western institutions or practices like liberal democracy. Many not fully democratic states from different cultures, like Malaysia, Singapore had no qualms with most of the basics of capitalist economy. China too is speeding up its transition to capitalism without relaxing much the authoritarian administration. Perhaps, in recognition of the historical failures of socialist or fascist attempts at organising a sustainable economy, capitalism is currently being accepted as superior. I will argue in Chapter 4 that the WP circles too did not object to a basically capitalist mode of economy and they were at pains to reconcile Islamic precepts and the demands of capitalism.

1.4.2 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIALISATION AND MODERNITY

As stated before, modernity has a complex relationship with a diverse set of phenomenon. Developments in the science, technological progress and related expansion in industrial fields have been very important in ever evolving definition of modernity. These developments have also been very important in Islamist

understanding of modernity at least since the beginning of the second half of the 19th century.

Rapidly accumulated knowledge on the nature had been an unmistakable feature of the history of modernity. If we understand the science simply as systematic knowledge about the nature, it is obvious that modernisation involved a massive increase in scientific knowledge including medical, metallurgic, mechanical and electrical sciences.

European industrialisation (itself mainly a product of growing knowledge[3] of Europeans) empowered the 'white imperialism' with the latest gadgets of the European technology and growing disparity in technologies between those of the leading European nations and those of the rest of the world made the Western expansionism irresistible. The most important aspect of this disparity was the technical superiority of Western armaments. This superiority enabled to Western powers to impose their will on the much larger colonial populations (Magdoff 1978: 20). "Around 1890 a little over 6000 British officials governed almost 300 million Indians with the help of a little over 70,000 European soldiers [...] Could there be a more extraordinary proof of absolute superiority?" (Hobsbawm 1987: 81).

Even when there was no enemy to fight against, the industrial technology transformed the scale of imperial exploitation.[4] While old empires, the British, French and especially the Dutch and Portuguese were rejuvenated by modern technology, new European powers, which were created in the last quarter of the century, struggled for

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[3] This also includes practical, technical knowledge that was much more important than advances in pure science in early industrialisation.

[4] For example, only after the Trans-Siberian railway construction started in 1891, 800,000 subjects of the Russian Empire were brought to Siberia within the decade.

Africa and what had remained in South-East Asia and Pacific. Germany, Italy and Belgium, who had no extra-European possessions before. acquired them almost on the map in collusion with other imperial powers and without any reference to the inhabitants of the areas concerned. Even other European states which continued to have no territories beyond Europe, actively participated in imperialism by supplying manpower to the colonies of other states. The South-East Europeans, on the other hand, had their own victories against the Ottoman Empire that was dominated by Muslim Turks.[5]

All European peoples could share in the collective feeling of superiority over the rest of the world conferred by the unstoppable imperialism of the great powers. For not only did the imperial experience give Europe a new place in the world, it also gave Europeans, in their own minds, a privileged rank in the order of humankind. This thought took the form of naked racism and allegedly disinterested science contributed to this attitude. For example, Darwin's theory of evolution may be seen as typical of its time. Like many other scientific theory, it was product of its circumstances and served to interests of a particular race and class. What is more, there was no clear line between 'scientific' and 'social' Darwinism. Darwin himself amazingly wrote: "When two races of men meet, they act precisely like two species of animals. They fight, eat each other... But then comes the more deadly struggle, namely which have the best fitted organisation or instincts (i.e. intellect in man) to gain the day". For him, blacks would have evolved into a distinct species if imperialism had not stopped this process by ending their isolation; otherwise, they were doomed to extinction (cited by Fernandez-Armesto 1995: 152).

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[5] The decline of the Ottomans will be analysed later.

Comte de Gobineau, who was a contemporary of Darwin, relying on a newly emerging 'science', anthropology, had prepared a ranking of human races in which Aryans were at the top and Blacks at the bottom. Shortly after, Mendel laid the foundations of the science of genetics. Genetics 'provided' an explanation of inferiority of a man to another just by the virtue of race. All these provided a justification for the 'better adapted' races of Europe to control the 'naturally inferior' (Fernandez-Armesto 1995: 152).

Even before Darwin's work on biological evolution, the notion of social evolution was well known in Western Europe. Indeed, if not the ordinary people, many sociologists were aware that they were witnessing massive social changes radically reshaping the structure of society. The nineteenth century theories of social evolution pointed out the naturality and inevitability of such changes and, where the change occurred, it was to follow same pattern. Thus, for the classical sociologists of the time such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim, societies were distinguished from one another according to their place on the evolutionary scale. The higher they moved up the closer they became to Western industrial societies that were regarded by these sociologists as the highest form of civilisation (Harrison 1988: 2).

Industrialisation is still a central concept of modernisation attempts in developing countries. In fact, some equate it with modernisation: "If you want to modernise you must industrialise" (Kumar 1988: 3). There are some core aspects of industrialised economies: One of these is use of high levels of inanimate sources of energy. This was pointed out by the modernisation school (Levy 1966: 11). However, correlation between amount of energy used and level of modernisation is not always direct. For example, in 1995, in the USA commercial energy use, in Kg. of oil

equivalent per capita was 7,905; in the UK, it was less than half of that: 3,786. Obviously, a US citizen is not twice as rich or as modern as a UK citizen, which opens the issue of the wasteful use of the natural resources. In that year, a USA citizen used almost 8 times more commercial energy than a Turk and 11 times more than a Chinese. In fact, a comparison between industrialised USA and industrialising China is a telling one. If China continues to develop five "pillar" industries, namely, automobile, telecommunications, petrochemicals, machinery manufacture and construction, patterned after western economies and Japan, the world would simply run out of resources. For example, if car ownership and oil use per person there reach the US levels, China "would need 80 million barrels of oil per day. In 1996, the world produced 64 million barrels per day" (Brown L. R. 1998:13). This shows that the industrialisation model of the West is no longer a repeatable option for the whole world. Environmentalists who insist that the application of science and technology (and the industrial societies based on it), has reached its ecological limits may be right (Brown R. H. 1998: 531).

Another important characteristic of industrialised economies is the extremely low proportions of employment in agricultural sector. With the industrialisation of the agriculture, we see that, in industrialised countries (e.g. USA, France, UK), only around 2 to 10% of the population are employed in agricultural sector and that only 2 or 3% of the gross domestic product is agricultural (see, World Bank 1999). Therefore, economic modernisation is like a 'war' against peasantry, in the sense that it reduces their proportion in the society (Harrison 1988: 50-52). Economic modernisation involves the process of increasing the economic capacity to meet non-agricultural human wants. In other words, an important part of economic modernisation is economic differentiation. This differentiation is required mainly due to some characteristics of agricultural

products. Most importantly, human demand for agricultural products (e.g. food) is inelastic beyond a certain point. Therefore, there seems to be an inherent limit in agricultural growth. Another important point is the inability of the agricultural products to meet some important human wants, for example mobility or telecommunication.

It should be noted that, although economic modernisation started with an escape from "the agrarian trap" by employing relatively simple technology in industrial production in small factories, cotton mills etc. the notion of economic modernisation has been evolving. Today a 'modern economy' entails, *inter alia*, a high level of technology, a strong service sector (e.g. banking, tourism, education). In fact, the share of service sector in the western economies is around 70% (see, World Bank 1999: 212). This shows that the importance of non-material 'goods' in developed economies. However, it should not be forgotten that western economies and Japan are still strong producers of material products.

It is assumed in this thesis that, all societies want to increase their real income. It should be noted that, the fact that agricultural products has little value compared to industrial products or compared to services is also a function of world political economy. However defined, 'unequal exchange' is also a similar function. The fact that the world economy is biased against developing, agricultural economics is not simply due to inherent qualities of agricultural or low technology products these countries produce, but also, for example, as noted earlier, due to restricted mobility of global labour. Another important factor is world demographic structure. In other words, to give a simple example, the value of two tonnes of wheat from a developing country may be equal to that of a personal computer from an advanced economy, not primarily because of the different levels of labour productivity, or because of inherent qualities of

agricultural products. Rather it is because in today's world with these levels of agricultural production and world population, these are the current prices securing the sale. Therefore, a high level of technology is sought after by societies to produce advanced products and to provide better services. However, production of high technology is very expensive and its transfer to developing countries is limited due to lack of financial power of the recipient and the strategic planning on the part of the advanced countries, which do not want to transfer their latest technology to other countries.

As we will see, like many other social groups in non-western societies, Islamists too are preoccupied with interpretation of modern science and the place of technology and industrialisation in their conceptualisation of modernity.

1.4.3 NATIONALISM AND MODERNITY

Nationalism as a modern ideology has been an important component of modernity. Although there are no adequate and agreed definitions of nation and nationalism, according to Hutchinson and Smith, many historians agree that as an ideology and discourse, nationalism became prevalent in the North America and Western Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century (1994: 4-5). Even Anthony Smith who argues that 'ethnic consciousness' existed in earlier times concludes that "nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon" (1986: 76-79). Gellner summarises the position of the 'modernist' theorists of nationalism who consider nationalism as inherently modern: culture and power are perennial but they are related to each other in a new way in modern age (Gellner 1997: 93).[6]

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[6] For other views that refute the modernity of nationalism, see (Smith 1995) and (Gellner 1997).

Perhaps most direct theory of the relation between modernity and nationalism belongs to Ernest Gellner: "industrialisation and modernisation notoriously proceed in an uneven manner... [and]...nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but its uneven diffusion" (1964: 158-169). According to Gellner, nations are not "natural, God-given way of classifying men" but rather, even it seems as a paradox, they can be defined only in terms of "the age of nationalism." Because, nationalism "engenders nations, and not the other way around." Although it uses pre-existing "cultural wealth" in a selective way (1983: 55-62). However, Gellner's thesis is not accepted by Michael Mann who writes, "industrialisation was not the principal cause" of nationalism; because "it arrived too late." He adds that two principal causes were the commercial capitalism with its universal social classes and the modern state with its professional armed forces and administrators (Mann 1992: 162). Giddens, who also regards nationalism as a basically modern phenomenon that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution, defines it as "the existence of symbols and beliefs which are either propagated by elite groups, or held by many of the members of regional, ethnic, or linguistic categories of a population and which imply a community between them" (1981: 190-191). Giddens also says that although nationalism associated in time with the rise of capitalism and the nation-state, this is not sufficient to assume that it is an excrescence of the nation-state or a sub-product of capitalism (1981: 191).

According to Anthony Smith nationalism can be defined as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a human population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (1996: 578). Gellner similarly defines nationalism as "a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (1983: 1). Smith points out that

nationalism has been with us for two centuries and in that period has spread from Western Europe and the Americas to other continents (1996:578).

Smith defines a nation as "a named human population with shared myths and memories occupying an historic territory or homeland, and possessing a common public culture, a single unified economy and common legal rights and duties" (1996: 581, cf. Smith 1995: 56-57). As Smith points out, modern nations are 'mass nations', i.e. they aim to elevate the 'people' into the nation and theoretically include all strata of the designated population in the sovereign nation. Secondly, "modern nation is a 'legal-political' community, as well as a historical culture-community." Thirdly, "modern nations are legitimated through a universally applicable ideology, nationalism." According to Smith:

> nationalism holds that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own character and destiny; that an individual's first loyalty is to his or her nation; that the nation is the source of all political power; that to be free and fulfilled, the individual must belong to a nation...and that a world of peace and justice can only be built on autonomous nations (Smith 1995: 54-5).

This 'core doctrine' of nationalism emerged only in the 18th century, first in Europe and then elsewhere (Smith 1995: 55; Kedourie 1966: 9). Modern nations implicitly subscribe to this nationalist ideology, in a world divided into separate national states.[7] "This system [of nation-states] came into being in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and became the dominant pattern in Europe, North America and Latin America after 1815. It was then carried by colonialism and post-colonial state-nations to other parts of the world -to the Middle East, Asia and Africa" (Smith 1995: 56).

Nationalism can be an elaborated ideology shared by many people right across a

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[7] Therefore, another characteristic of the modern nation state is its territoriality.

territory. Although, as Smith and Gellner among others, point out, nationalism demands a degree of commonality among the citizens, there are many culturally and ethnically plural states which possess dominant and minority nations. Indeed, Connor regrets that the term nation-state has come to be applied to all states. Whereas, he argues, it should be used to describe a territorial-political unit if its borders coincide with the territorial distribution of a national group. He adds that in 1971 only 12 states (9.1%) of 132 could be justifiably be described as nation-states, but in 39 (29.5%) states, the largest nation accounts for less than half of the population (1978: 39).

In the mid-1990s, there were important ethnic minorities in many states with nationalist aspirations many of which continue today. This means that although nationalism has been a quite successful ideology in delivering 'nation-states' to many nations, it has, at the same time, failed to do so for some other nations so far. However, as Anthony Smith points out, with the end of the Cold War, in one of the many resurgences since the French Revolution, some twenty new states have been created on the ruins of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. There are still a number of potential separatisms such as those of Quebecians, Kurds and Tamils. These facts, according to Smith, proved liberals and socialists, who are "committed to the view that humanity progresses in stages to greater units of inclusiveness and higher values, [and that] the nation and nationalism can only represent a halfway house to the goal of a cosmopolitan culture and a global polity," wrong. "[F]ar from withering away with the advance of modernity and mass communications, ethnic and national conflicts have been exacerbated [...] a progressive modernity and its all works have actually increased ethnic conflict and nationalism; and as modernisation bites deeper, we can only expect an intensification of such conflicts" (Smith 1996: 576).

There are different theories of explaining the power and variety of nationalism. One, as mentioned briefly above, regards nationalism as a response to industrialisation and the nation as a functional element of industrial modernity. Some try to derive the nation and nationalism from the modern (rational) state or from the interests of sub-elites who uses nationalism in struggle for the control of the state (see, for example, Breuilly 1982). Still others regard nationalism, and nations, as ideological constructs of intellectuals seeking to undermine *anciens regimes* and establish modern states and societies committed to progress, or to control mass mobilisation of a democratic era, or to gain prominent places in the coming society (Kedourie 1966; Hobsbawm 1990). Undoubtedly, the processes of modernisation create the conditions for the formation of nation-states and the spread of nationalism. Thus, modernisation perspectives are able to capture important aspects of nations and nationalism. However, they cannot explain the paradox of variety and persistence in nationalism. This is because, according to Smith, "they fail to take seriously three sets of components, or resources, that underlie all nationalisms: The uneven distribution of ethno-history, the varying impact of religious ideals, and the differential nature and location of the 'homeland' or ancestral territory" (1996: 583).

Smith points out that "collective cultural identities are based on the shared memories of experiences and activities of successive generations of a group distinguished by one or more shared cultural elements." Ethnic identity in turn may be seen as the product of these collective experiences and activities of successive generations of a group claiming a common origin and ancestry. Therefore, ethnicity may be defined as "the sense of collective belonging to a named community of common myths of origin and shared memories, associated with an historic homeland" (Smith 1996: 583, italics deleted.)

Ernest Renan long ago recognised the significance of the past: "To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together. to wish to do so again. That is the essential condition for being a nation" ([Renan 1882], see, Hutchinson and Smith (eds.) 1994: 17). Collective memories vary. They include recollections of wars and their heroes, religious movements and their leaders, foundations of states and cities, dynasties and their kings, migrations, discoveries and colonisations, law codes and their legislators, great buildings and their architects. painters, sculptors, poets, musicians (Smith 1996: 583).

Of course, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the genuinely shared memory from exaggeration, fabrication, idealisation or heroisation associated with myth and legend. However, one could agree with Smith that the more faithfully recorded, documented and more comprehensive a golden age, the more impact it can exert over the later generations of that community. Successive generations of the community may differ on selection of an epoch to be regarded as a golden age depending on the criteria of the time, perhaps largely determined by the political elite and milieu. For some it will be a golden age because of its religious glory with its great leaders, and saints, for others because the art and philosophy flourished, for still others because the community enjoyed its greatest territorial expansion and military power, or pioneered great moral and legal codes and institutions. Therefore, the ethno-history of a community may offer more than one golden age and different sections of the succeeding community may look back to quite different golden ages (Smith 1996: 584), perhaps generating or at least deepening already existing conflicts within that community, or between that community and other communities who were victimised during a particular 'golden age'.

A particular golden age, or ages, may end up just as a form of escapism or

consolation for present decline. But, generally, later generations or at least some sections of them extract certain characteristics of the nation to be emulated by the present community. Golden ages, again for those who look up to these times, define what is and is not to be admired and emulated, what is, and is not, distinctive about that community. They present an ideal to be recreated in modern terms. Thus, a golden age stimulates a sense of regeneration. The nationalist discourse goes more or like this: "Like 'our ancestors' 'we' too can create a great culture or civilisation provided that 'we' acquire their characteristics and follow their principles". Most nationalisms which start out from a sense of decline, promise restoration to a former glorious state. The interpreters of the golden age point out the inherent capacity of grandsons and granddaughters to recreate a civilisation, a culture and a strong country worthy of the golden age. They reveal to the community its 'authentic' (usually pre-industrial) self and the community is encouraged to reappropriate and realise that self. Different groups in a society may disagree on the characteristics of a particular golden age, or, if that community's past boasts more than one golden ages, may choose different golden ages; or one certain choice or interpretation can become dominant in that society (Smith 1996: 584-5).

The second major set of 'deep resources,' on which different nationalisms can draw, relates to religious beliefs which can be used when mobilisation of large numbers is required and when leaders and movements need to define the community in terms of their shared faith. As a part of the religious beliefs, the myth of ethnic election singles out the community as a 'chosen people' with a sacred mission. A stronger form of election myth is the idea of 'the covenant', the immutable contract between the community and its god, which requires certain obligations (Smith 1996: 586-8).

The third set of 'deep resources' relates to historic territories and more particularly to an 'ancestral homeland'. Generally, a specific area becomes associated with a particular community, in the eyes of its members. This relationship between the people and the land is the product over the *longue duree* of continual myth-making. The land becomes a historic homeland, a sacred territory.

Anthony Smith argues that the sheer diversity and variety of different nationalisms are to be explained partly by the difference between these three set of 'deep resources' each nationalism draws on and by the many permutations of myths, symbols, memories and values in these ethno-symbolic resources, as well as by any special geopolitical, ecological, economical, ethnical and religious features of a given community (Smith 1996: 591).

Nationalism is inextricably linked to modernity because it is a unique creation of the modern era. Modernisation and nation-building are inseparable. Kohn describes nationalism as a response to the political, social, and cultural problems of integration and legitimacy of the transition to modernity (Kohn 1944: 237). Anderson draws attention to developments of some products of modernity such as newspapers, books (narrating stories of their nations and for example read by pupils in schools), and administrative bureaucracies that made it possible for millions of people to identify with certain 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991).[8]

Whether nationalism is explained as linked to industrialisation and capitalism (Gellner 1983: 27-49; Hobsbawm 1990: 28-41) or in terms of intellectual history (Kohn

[8] According to Anderson, nation is an imagined political community as both "inherently limited and sovereign" The term 'imagined' is used to express the link among the members of the nation, who may not know each other, through a shared culture, history and common sovereignty.

1944; Kedourie 1966) one particular aspect of nationalism, important for this study, is the fact that nationalism can be seen functioning as a modern religion (Llobera 1994: 143). It is still the case in many countries that "[n]ationalism is sentimental, emotional, and inspirational" (Hayes 1926: 106). The most powerful expression of this new religion appeared in the millions of people who died for their nations during the times of warfare, especially in the First and the Second World War, while fighting against soldiers, often, from same religion or class. Normal affirmations of nationalist faith can be seen in peace times. Nationalisms seem to have appropriated religious traditions by developing sacred symbols (flags), sacred texts (constitutions, declarations of independence), sacred figures (founding fathers, heroes, martyrs), evil figures (traitors, enemies), sacred places (homeland, places of national battles, cemeteries), public rituals (national holidays, commemoration days, parades), sense of mission (promoting national ideas, recreating the golden age), sense of sacrifice for national interests, even mobilising crusades against those who oppose the nation's interest. Like traditional religions, nationalism gives meaning to death by offering similar higher reality to die for (see, Kramer 1997: 532-4). As Hayes acknowledged nationalism does not have to replace religion, in fact, it can gain even greater appeal when it is fused with traditional religious beliefs (1926: 119-123). However, a secular nationalism is indeed one of the greatest enemies of religion and one of the greatest secularising forces.

While some nationalisms can be more political and willing to grant some individual rights on the basis of residency or birth within the territory of a given nation state, still without being able to eliminate some discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or culture, other nationalisms can be cultural, perhaps stressing on the blood and

resistant to grant citizenship to people from other cultures.[9] Gellner has a plausible explanation for this situation. To be a full member of a modern society, one must acquire High (literate, education-transmitted) Culture. Unfortunately, the High Culture which, for the first time in history, able to pervade entire societies, is not simply made up of formal skills but was to be articulated in certain languages like Russian, English or Arabic, in other words. it must contain a 'culture'. People do not merely industrialise, but they industrialise as a German or Japanese. The result is that modern industrial High Culture has an 'ethnic' colouring. Therefore, an Englishman is expected not only to speak English but also to be white. "Poles or Croats are meant to be Catholic, Persians are meant to be Shi'ite, Frenchmen are meant to be, not Catholic perhaps, but at any rate *not* Muslim" (Gellner 1994a: 42-3).

One important aspect of nationalism is its complex relationship with democracy. The fact that democracy has always found its home in particular communities that have been constructed by nationalism rejects the simplistic view that it is an enemy of democracy (Diamond and Plattner 1994: x-xi; Nodia 1994: 7). One scholar argues that "the idea of nationalism is impossible-indeed unthinkable- without the idea of democracy and democracy never exists without nationalism," albeit in constant tension with it (Nodia 1994: 4). However, "failure to tame the ethnic flesh of nationalism can lead to chauvinism, racism or even fascism" (Nodia 1994: 15). The notorious role played by extreme nationalism in two horrific world wars is a painful reminder of this. Nationalism may be necessary for the creation of political units where democracy can flourish, but an intolerant nationalism, by definition is anathema to democracy.

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[9] English and American nationalism can serve as examples of political nationalism and German nationalism of cultural nationalism. This distinction is also referred as 'good' Western and 'bad' Eastern nationalism and the latter is accused of celebrating the culture, race and irrationalism (see, for example, Kramer 1997: 541-2).

1.4.4 SECULARISATION AND MODERNITY

Secularisation is also one of the most important core processes of modernity. The significance of religion as a fundamental component of any national culture is beyond any doubt and as cultural factors, religions greatly shape responses of individuals and societies to the advent of modernity. It has been a major thesis in social sciences that in modernisation process the social significance of religion declines. This is the secularisation thesis. There are some, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties in measuring secularisation. First of all, defining religion as a too general concept is not an easy task, although a distinction can be made between functional and substantive definitions (Dobbelaere 1981: 36).

Functional definitions identify religion in terms of what it does. For instance, religion may provide solutions to ultimate problems or answers fundamental questions about the meaning of life. Functional definitions are inclusive, thus communism, nationalism (Yinger 1970: 11-12), or evolutionism, Marxism and scientism can be considered as new religions emerged in modernity (see, Dobbelaere 1981: 36). Acceptance of functional definitions of religion poses a problem for analysis of secularisation by making human beings, by definition, religious. Therefore one may need to turn to a substantive and exclusive definition of religion in order to understand secularisation without however, forgetting that various '-isms' such as Communism, nationalism, Fascism, Humanism or any set of ideas can *function* like a religion in various contexts.

Substantive definitions identify religion as what it is. Wallis and Bruce give a substantive definition of religion that allows an analysis of secularisation: "Actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of either

supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set the condition of, or to intervene in, human affairs." (1992: 10-11, Cf. Dobbelaere 1981: 38). With secularisation, religion found itself increasingly competing with some other 'man-made' set of beliefs for the hearts and minds of the people.

According to John E. Smith some of the factors in the secularisation of modern life and rise of ideological rivals of religion are:

> The growth of modern technological society and mass production, the rise of power politics and national ideologies, the creation of multinational corporations and international trade, the struggles between nations for power and prestige and within nations for justice and civil rights, plus many other features of contemporary society, have conspired to create a powerful and largely secular society in which the concerns of traditional religion have been submerged, and, in many cases, actively opposed as outmoded relics of the past (1994: 8).

Thus secularisation is an important factor in the rise of 'quasi-religions'. "Even the mutual relations of the religions proper are decisively influenced by the encounter of each of them with secularism, and one or more of the quasi-religions which are based on secularism" (Smith 1994. 10).

The secularisation thesis asserts that modernisation, particularly three features of it, social differentiation, societalisation and rationalisation, brings the decline of the social significance of religion.

Social differentiation means that specialised roles and institutions are developed to handle specific functions previously carried out by one role or institution. For example, specialist institutions provide education, health care, welfare and social control, all once in the domain of religious institutions. In short, social differentiation lessens the importance of religion by decreasing the importance of religious institutions

and norms for life.

Societalisation is the process by which "life is increasingly enmeshed and organised, not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, the nation state)" (Wilson 1982: 154). Religion according to Wilson, has its source in, and draws strength from, the community. As societalisation process has been making the society rather than the community the locus of individual's life, religion has been shorn of its functions (Wilson 1982: 159).

The processes of differentiation and societalisation break the plausibility of any single overarching moral and religious system. Religion, increasingly, have less connection to most roles, defined in secular terms and is performed in an anonymous and impersonal public domain, and withdrawn more to privatised, individual domain where its existence can continue. Therefore, religion becomes privatised and is pushed to margins of the social order. It ceases to be a matter of necessity but a matter of preference, a leisure activity (Wallis and Bruce 1992: 13).

Rationalisation largely involves changes in the way people think and consequentially in the way they act. According to Weber the Judeo-Christian tradition was peculiarly susceptible to secularisation and Judeo-Christianity had prepared the milieu for secularisation "by freeing the way for empirical enquiry, pragmatic and instrumental treatment of this world, and by encouraging rationalisation of theology (and after theology, of economics, politics and public life generally)" (Wallis and Bruce 1992: 14).

As a multidimensional concept, secularisation can be used to mean different things: It may mean decline of religion, perhaps measured in terms of individual

attendance to church, mosque. or other forms of temples. It may mean religious change as a form of social change not necessarily implying the decline of the social significance of the religion. These kinds of usages may be misleading in the former case, and causing difficulty to understand secularisation thesis in the latter.

Religion quite often is an all-embracing worldview. Therefore, secularisation - decline of the social significance of religion- must mean that certain processes in the modernisation process increasingly disengage modern individuals from social forms of religion. Some of these processes can be identified as differentiation, societalisation, rationalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, and increasing mobility. Secularisation is, therefore, predominantly a latent process, an inherent part of modernity. However, it is sometimes a deliberate policy. For example, this was the case in *laicisation* of the French education system (under the influence of intellectuals such as Durkheim[10]) with an aggressive secularism, and with a desire to establish and inculcate a doctrine that would replace the religion[11]. Marx, Lenin and the Marxist parties were also in favour of a deliberate policy of laicisation. Marx upheld the autonomy of politics and this position was later affirmed by Lenin and implemented in the USSR. Indeed, the deliberate policy of laicisation that was mainly responsible in secularising the 'Eastern Bloc' was based on the Marxist thought. As "the opium of the people", religion was considered as serving to the oppression of the masses. For Marx, religion was the form of alienation *par excellence.* For Marxism, the future was to be classless, nationless and religionless (Gellner 1994a: 5). Rather than, in accordance with the Marxist theory, waiting for the natural withering away of the religion as the abolition of economic exploitation is realised (because religion would linger), the

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[10] See, for example, http://www.relst.uiuc.edu/durkheim/Biography.html (last visited February 2005).
[11] The influence of the French example in Turkish education reforms has been unmistakable.

socialist states tried to hasten the dying out of the religion through dissemination of scientific-educational anti-religious propaganda and through socialist education in the schools (Dobbelaere 1981: 28).

Historical notes on secularisation are helpful to understand this critical concept and process of modernity. Secularisation, as a process with a long history, has retained its ambiguous and controversial meaning. It was linked to the ideas of the Enlightenment. However, it is safe to say that 'secular' is used in opposition to 'sacred' and secularisation means a cultural 'emancipation' from religion and church. Secularisation refers to the differentiation process in which structurally different institutions are developed to perform different functions. Religion becomes one institution alongside others and in turn loses its overarching claim. Thus, the disengagement of society from religion occurs (Dobbelaere 1981). This view, which goes back to Durkheim, is also related to Weber's analysis of the social change in the Western society. Durkheim's concept of differentiation implies that society gradually takes over all the secular functions previously performed by religion. This transformation of the sacred domain into secular institutions means desacralisation of the world that Weber described as the process of disenchantment. The source of mastering the world shifted from magic to the technology and calculation, which implies a rationalisation process.

Secularisation is a process in which proper religions are pushed to the periphery of modern industrial societies. It is a process by which "sectors of society and culture are removed form the domination of religious institutions and symbols"... [its result is] the decline of religious content in the arts, in philosophy, in literature and, most important of all... the rise of science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective

on the world" (Berger 1967: 107). Thus, in a world that becomes increasingly crowded with institutionally specialised, rational, and secular modern ideologies, religion loses its primary social function of societal legitimation. The 'Church' loses its control over social institutions. As Durkheim pointed out "religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life", whereas, "originally it pervades everything; everything social is religious", however. gradually, "political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function", God progressively withdraws himself from the world and "leaves more place to the free play of human forces" (Durkheim 1964: 169-170).

According to Berger, the roots of laicisation are in the rationalisation of economic area, which "is the prerequisite for *any* industrial society of modern type" (1967: 128). A modern society requires large cadres of scientific and technological personnel with high degree of rationalisation both on the level of organisation and consciousness; the modern state becomes increasingly occupied with the political and legal requirements of the economy resulting in establishment of highly rational bureaucracies with adequate ideological legitimation. Thus, an affinity develops between economic and political spheres. "Secularisation then passes from the economic to the political sphere in a near-inexorable process of 'diffusion'" (Berger 1967: 131). Secularisation process is not limited to the economic and political spheres; knowledge also becomes increasingly secular, leading to secular schools of thoughts. Secularised science increasingly diminishes the impact of theological outlook on the world.

In modernisation process, rational institutional spheres develop at the expense of the community. Individuals are required to assume and perform roles in rational organisations. As the success of these rational organisations are measured by their

efficiency, unrelated to an over-arching meaning system, each person is required to perform his or her anonymous specialist function. The new rational empirical orientation to the world means that the individual becomes 'replaceable' in these rational institutions. The result is that relationships in modern societies become more and more secondary or gesellschaftist. They become impersonal, positional, contractual, formal, utilitarian, confined to segments of the person and transferable. The individual ceases to be an end in himself/ herself as in the Gemeinschaft, where the relationships were primary, affective, total, regulated by habits. "A community really involves face-to-face relationships of known persons...Society, in contrast, involves the interaction of role-performances of unknown role-players" (Berger 1967: 264). As the community (Gemeinschaft) ceases to be the basis of social organisation, religion as the constitutive element of community loses its social significance. Therefore, secularisation can be seen as decline of the community or communitarian spirit.

The individual is segmented in the modern society as the public and private sphere are segregated. Religion is left to private sphere and the private sphere becomes consumer oriented. One expert argues that the individual in constructing his identity becomes free to choose his religiosity in the same way he chooses friends, a marriage partner, goods and services. As a private matter, religion could no longer be imposed on him, but it has to be marketed. It has to compete with other leisure activities (Dobbelaere 1981: 19-22).

Secularisation indicates a process of laicisation. On the societal level, institutions such as politics and education are withdrawn from the religious sphere; the 'sacred' canopy is more and more restricted. On the individual level, people are said to be secularised when their involvement in the churches declines or when important

occasions in life (e.g. birth, marriage, burial) are not sacralised. Secularisation is a sensitising concept, giving the user a general sense of guidance, a general direction in approaching to empirical cases. Therefore, some apparent contradictions between the European and the American cases do not mean that they are not but two variations on the same theme of secularisation.[12]

The secularisation thesis is not free from criticism, for example Brown, mentioning counter evidence, expresses doubts by asking "why should religion be stronger in a community than in a society?" and points out that "religion is not a human failing that was born in ignorance and that is dying in knowledge." He also states that religion adapts to different social and economic contexts and it is not static but changing; and changes that churches undergo, do not mean secularisation (Brown 1992: 39). Therefore, to give an example, according to Brown, the social significance of religion can rise and fall in any social and economic context, pre-industrial, industrial, post-industrial; does not decay automatically or irreversibly with the growth of human knowledge, rationality or technology, or with urbanisation and industrialisation; can suffer short to medium-term decay, but adapts to new contexts (Brown 1992: 55-6).

There are naturally conflicting views on the result of modernisation as the cause of the rapid social change including secularisation. Johan Galtung provides a pessimistic picture of the social costs of modernisation. He observes that many societies are in a state of advanced social disintegration, they are caught up in a process of destructuration and deculturation, heading for structurelessness and culturelessness,[13] and at this stage in human history, we need to question whether there is any normative culture at all. Galtung warns that "we may be on the way" towards a society consists of

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[12] For a comparison between secularisation processes in Europe and the USA, and an explanation high church going in secular USA, see (Dobbelaere 1981).

[13] For the elaboration on the terms see (Galtung 1996: 382), he refers to culturelessness as 'anomie' and to structurelessness as 'atomie'.

isolated social atoms (1996: 379-384). In his analysis of wide-ranging developments Galtung observes that the secularism as a project of the West undermined transcendent religion and secularism in the form of humanistic ethics has not been capable of producing binding norms for human behaviour:

> Why shall you not kill, steal and lie when other humans are mere objects and there is no accountability to higher forces as there is no transcendent God anyhow? (Galtung 1996: 397).

He also observes that all over the world, people are in shock after reading, listening to or viewing the media. The world seems in turmoil, each nation wants its state and he adds:

> big blocs are taking shape at the world level, rich countries are set against poor...there are new military alliances; culture, and particularly religion, come up against secularised elites capable only of uttering the standard curse: 'fundamentalism'. Homo homini lupus, bellum omnium contra omnes; everybody for himself; apparently out of control, unrestrained; disintegration (Galtung 1996: 400)

Secularisation is a complex and ideologically weighted concept that is multidimensional, nonlinear, and sometimes reversible. In fact, for example, Kepel argues that starting from the mid-1970s the secularisation trend in the world went into reverse. A new religious approach emerged "aimed no longer at adapting secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organisation of society- by changing society if necessary" and moving away from modernism that had failed due to "separation from God" (Kepel 1994: 2; see also Eisenstadt 2000).

Secularisation as a trend and secularism as a political principle came under strong criticism from rising religious movements in the last several decades. Emergence of these movements and their agenda challenge almost every basic assumption of secularisation theory and secularism as a political ideology (see, Jakobsen and

Pellegrini 2000, McClay 2001, Baird 2000). Islamism should be considered within this global phenomenon. It is too early, nonetheless, to argue that the general trend of secularisation in the world, in the West or in the Middle East has ended and that a reverse trend has started.

1.4.5 THE MODERNISATION OF THE STATE

The advent of the modern state, which has come to dominate our lives, has been also an important part of the development of modernity. Once again, developments in Europe, the cradle of modernity, have been extremely important in shaping the nature of the modern state and modern international state system. The feudal political system with its overlapping and divided authority/loyalty (Poggi 1978: 27) left its place in Europe to 'absolutist' (France, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Sweden and Russia) or 'constitutional' (England, Holland) monarchies, with more apparent differences than real ones (Mann 1986: 476). Absolutism as the predecessor of the modern state signalled the emergence of larger and stronger states by annexing smaller-weaker political units. In the creation of these larger absolutist states, the impact of the European modernisation process, especially increasing technological mastery over the nature and other human beings who lacked that technology, was decisively important.

The most important feature of the European absolutist state, which was passed to the modern state, was its success in centralisation. The centralisation meant that political and economic decisions radiate from a centre towards the periphery. The state's administrative power had been increased by introduction of a permanent, expert bureaucracy and with the introduction of a standing army; the centralisation of means of violence was nearly complete (Anderson 1974; Giddens 1981). There was also centralisation of fiscal management with increasing (compared to feudal system)

efficiency to collect the taxes.

As far as the society of the European states is concerned, the Westphalian model of 1648 was a milestone in international relations. According to the model

- the world consists of sovereign states with no superior authority which means that;
- all states are equal before the international law, disregarding asymmetries of power.

But no higher authority means;

- differences among the states can and will be settled ultimately by force (Held 1992a: 86).

The importance of the absolutist state and the Westphalian model of society of states lie in the fact that they had been the proximate sources of the modern state and modern international state system.

Although, the transition from the absolutist to the modern state is very complex, it should be noted here that the modern state, for better or worse, is very different from the absolutist state in many fundamental aspects of life. In the modernisation process, ever-increasing centralisation of the state institutions, led to an enormous ability of the state to influence/shape the lives of individuals or social groups (e.g. religious groups) within its territory.

Before, analysing how the states influence our lives, the difficulty of generalising about the state must be recognised. However, Mann's definition of the state, which he says much influenced by Weber, provides a minimalist but very good starting point of analysis:

1. the state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel;

2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a;
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises;
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rulemaking, backed up by some organised physical force. (Mann 1993: 55).

Today, almost all states are nation-states and almost all of them posses the above qualities with varying degrees. The importance of how the state acts is obvious from the Mann's definition. First, the state extracts a certain income among other resources (e.g. manpower as conscripts in many countries) from the society. For example, it is not unusual in the West for state budgets to be around 40% of the national income. Naturally, the way the state spends these enormous amounts is fundamentally important for the whole population. For example the quality of education at all levels, health care, crime rate, quality of public/ private transport or even one's employment are directly or indirectly related to state's preferences in its redistributive spending.

Another important point in Mann's definition that the state makes rules governing crucial aspects of one's life and enforce them if necessary, through police force, judiciary[14], or even through military. Non-observance is punished, even by death in many countries[15]. The State's monopoly on the 'legitimate' use of violence within its territory is emphasised by Weber who writes: "force is a means specific to the state...state is a relation of men dominating men...a relation supported by means of legitimate[16] (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence" (cited by Gerth and Mills (eds.) 1967: 78).

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[14] Although the place of judiciary is not straightforward as an institution within the state, as it has certain levels of autonomy from the executive varying from country to country.
[15] It is interesting to note that, among the 41 members of the Conference of Europe, only Turkey retained the death penalty in its laws until 2003. In other words, the death penalty is banished from 'modern body of law' in Europe, whereas it remains in the most powerful and modern USA.
[16] I will return to the question of legitimacy. Suffice it to say that not all states can have a claim to legitimacy and hence legitimate use of violence domestically.

In short:

> the state has grown increasingly important in every society, from advanced industrial to Third World primary-good exporters. and in every aspect of society, not just politics, but in economics (production, finance. distribution) in ideology (schooling, the media), and in law enforcement (police, military). (Carnoy 1984: 3; some punctuation marks deleted).

Thus, modern state is politicising by definition because its policies are so important for our lives, it is more so in many Muslim countries because it is often seen, for example, by Islamists, simply as a tool of a particular group (e.g. secular, westernised or nationalist elite).

1.4.6 MODERN INTERNATIONAL STATE SYSTEM

A comparative look a the international state system makes one realise that there are vast differences among nation-states due to they are being at different levels of (economic, social and political) modernisation and also due to historical developments or even by luck (e.g. having large oil reserves or other natural resources).

The World Development Report (WDR) of 1998/99 (World Bank 1999) presents its statistical tables of countries, under the titles of "Size of the economy; Quality of life; Population and labour force; Distribution of income or consumption; Education; Health; Energy use and emissions; Growth of the economy; Structure of the output; Power and transportation; Communications, information, and science and technology." In the Table 1, "Classification of economies by income and region 1998," countries are classified according to income as, low, middle (lower or upper) or high-income countries.

The WDR is a contribution to the worldwide international 'culture' of

comparison. It is an affirmation that the nation-states or their members can be compared, for example, on the bases of population, land area, gross national product – absolute and according to purchasing power -, life expectancy, child malnutrition, adult illiteracy, level of urbanisation, income distribution, public spending on education, level of schooling, health expenditure, infant mortality, amount of energy use per capita, growth rate of their economies, structure of output; number of daily newspapers, TVs, land and mobile phones, personal computers used by per 1000 people; internet usage, proportion of scientists and engineers in population. number of patent applications.

The WDR (World Bank 1999: 190) shows that in 1997 the GNP of the USA was USS 7,690 billions (with per capita income (pci) of S 28,740), Japan's was 2,951 (pci: 23,400); Germany's was 1,748 (pci: 21,300); Turkey's was 410 (pci: 6,430). Ethiopia with a population of 60 millions had a GNP of 31 billions and a per capita income of S 510, equivalent of 1.4 dollar per day. A USA citizen had 4.5 times more income than a Turk and 56 times more than an Ethiopian. In 1997, 2,048 millions of world population who had low income had an average per capita income of $1,400; 2,855 millions who had middle income had an average of $ 4,550 and 926 millions (equivalent of one sixth of world population) had a high income of $ 22,770 per capita. The figures in the WDR reminds that there are very rich (developed, industrialised) and very poor (underdeveloped/developing, agricultural) countries in the world as well as countries which are somewhere between these two ends of the scale.

The WDR (World Bank 1999: 190) figures also remind that there are very big – in terms of population and land area- and very small and in between nation-states in the world. For example, population of China, in 1997, was 1,227 millions, United States' population was 268 millions, Germany's was 82 millions, UK and France had 59

millions each. Turkey's population was 64 millions. Hobsbawm observes that in around 200 states in the world, about 25 has populations of over 50 million each; this makes up to three quarters of the global population. "At the other extreme, 71 of the political units treated as 'economies' by the World Bank in 1992 contained less than 2.5 million; 18 of these contained populations of less than 100,000." (1996: 271).

It would be useful to add the category of democracy when comparing countries as an important index of (political) modernisation. "Modernity shifted the political power from kings to people" (Mann 1993: 46), and the fact that today there are both liberal democracies and non-democracies in the world provides another factor in 'measuring' modernisation. One of the most important differences between democratic and non-democratic countries is the mechanism of ensuring the obedience of the population to the state rules (laws). Failure of the state in this task has grave consequences, like long civil wars, low intensity wars within a region of the state or even death of that state.

Obedience may be due to many factors. Held (1989) distinguishes seven reasons: "We may obey or comply because:

1 There is no choice in the matter (*following orders*, or *coercion*)
2 No thought has ever been given to it and we do it as it has always been done (*tradition*).
3 We cannot be bothered one way or another (*apathy*).
4 Although we do not like the situation...[we] accept what seems like fate (*pragmatic acquiescence*)
5 We are dissatisfied with things as they are but... [we accept them] because it is in the long run to our advantage (*instrumental acceptance* or *conditional agreement/consent*).
6 In the circumstances before us, and with the information available to us at the moment, we conclude it is 'right', 'correct', 'proper' for us as an individual or member of a collectivity: it is what we genuinely *should* or *ought to* do (*normative agreement*).
7 It is what in ideal circumstances –with, for instance, all the knowledge would like, all the opportunity to discover the circumstances and requirements of others- we

would have agreed to do (*ideal normative agreement*)." (p.101)

Held thinks that only types 6 and 7 deserves the term legitimacy -an important concept for democracy- with category 5 being ambiguous, which could "imply a weak form of legitimacy", but since it is "instrumental or conditional" it does not deserve the term legitimacy (p. 102). Therefore, legitimacy is something that the state has to won (Held 1992a: 88) and if the power belongs to the rulers, legitimacy rests with the general population. It seems that, a legitimate state can only exist in a liberal democracy where the individuals are free and empowered and have access to necessary information as qualified by Held in category 7 above. Theoretically, one possible alternative of a non-democratic but legitimate state would be a state of an extremely homogenised -especially in terms of ideology- population who's popular will manifests itself in a non-democratic way, but this kind of society is highly unlikely.

Legitimacy is an important part of democracy; but democracy is a broader term. One of the most important terms in discussion of democracy has been Dahl's concept of 'polyarchy.' Polyarchy requires not only extensive political competition and participation but also high levels of freedom of expression and pluralism (1971: 3). According to Diamond a liberal democracy has following features:

> 1) Real power lies-in fact as well as in constitutional theory-with elected officials and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e.g. the military) or foreign powers.
> 2) Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman...)
> 3) ...electoral outcomes [are] uncertain...no groups that adheres to constitutional principles is denied to form a party and contest elections...
> 4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups...unempowered majorities, are not prohibited...from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture.

Additionally, citizens have alternative sources of information, associational freedom,

substantial freedom of belief. opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly. demonstration and petition; they are equal under the law and are protected from "unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture and undue interference in their personal lives"(Diamond 1996: 23-4).

It will be seen in detail that many themes similar to mentioned above emerged in Islamist criticism of legitimacy of regimes and lack of democracy in the Middle East in general and in Turkey in particular.

1.4.7 GLOBALISATION AND MODERNITY

I have analysed some important aspects of modernisation, namely, capitalism, secularisation, nationalism, modern state and state system, and industrialisation/economic change. Globalisation can be considered a closely linked process to modernisation that binds these aspects in a world scale. Globalisation is defined by Harvey as "time and space compression" (1990: 240). By using this term, Harvey highlights the feeling that (largely due to technological progress) the spatial and time related features of the world is exceedingly compressing to the point of collapse. A more precise definition of globalisation is offered by Held et al:

> a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions-assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact- generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power (1999: 16).

We are living in a globalising world where secular, anti-secular, industrialised (rich), underdeveloped, militarily powerful, weak societies (or groups, individuals) in the nation-states interact much more intensely compared to previous generations. Thus, globalisation becomes a central concept in analysing the evolution of modernity.

Rosenau gives primacy to technology in explaining globalisation:

> It is technology... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and many other innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the scale on which human affairs take place (1990: 17).

Giving primacy to technology can be justified if we define it broadly as *the things and ways used to increase human mastery over nature.*

As Waters points out, globalisation is a key development in 'three arenas' of life: 1. The economy. Production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services are increasingly being globalised. 2. The polity. The states' capacity of coercion, military power, surveillance is globalising. 3. Culture. Cultural products, values, symbols are produced, diffused or consumed increasingly globally (1995: 7-8).

Evidence for economic globalisation is obvious, as international trade has reached to unprecedented level of around 20 per cent of world output (Held et al. 1999: 149). Economic globalisation involves, *inter alia*:

1. Emergence of world markets for traded goods and services, which means emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in production of these goods and services.

2. World scale competition in production and sale of many services and products. In this competition, it can be said that Wallerstein's characterisation is still valid. The core (developed) countries are successful in keeping ahead of the periphery (underdeveloped) countries. And there is limited, but psychologically extremely important, success of some semi-periphery states (e.g. Asian Tigers). The success of newly industrialising states is providing both a hope/example of promoting one's

relatively underdeveloped economy in the world and an excuse for the developed countries in abstaining from providing economically important help to the underdeveloped (see, for example, Bauman 1998: 73). Among the many reasons of economic success or failure in an increasingly globalised world economy, the level of technological development occupies a special place. A higher level of technology ensures that a society may produce high value added (core-like in Wallerstein's terms) industrial products and services (satellites, computer hardware or software, medical equipment, cars etc) and hence highly paid jobs as opposed to low value added (e.g. agricultural) products or services.

The impact of economic globalisation is by no means even all over the world. This is mainly because of the relative immobility of the labour as opposed to almost full mobility of the capital. In other words, "people who invest" are no longer space-tied in their decisions but employees are, and cannot easily follow the company once it moves elsewhere (Bauman 1998: 8). Thus, globalisation can strike in the heartlands of the economically most developed countries in terms of unemployment, de-industrialisation, de-skilling or even decline of the welfare state.

If we turn to globalisation of the polity, we see that as far as the form of the state is concerned, the world is fully globalised, as the world is divided among the nation-states. However, there are vast differences among them in terms of political power defined in terms of means of violence and capacity of surveillance. Therefore, the globalisation of politics means that, increasingly, political decisions and actions in one part of the world can rapidly have worldwide ramifications. Political globalisation means that the more powerful states (e.g. the USA) have now larger capacity to project their power in a global scale. Their use of this capacity, for example in the Gulf War is

rapid, large scale and easily observable, even in the living room of our houses thanks to 24 hours news channels, like CNN[17], broadcasting globally. Their political decision not to use their power (e.g. in Bosnia, during first few years) also has worldwide ramifications with much more criticism in the Muslim world. Political decisions taken by powerful states can have dramatic effects on the small states but again the effects of globalisation are not linear or easily predictable and the dependence of the powerful states on the weak states can also increase. Today, political practices and political values of the modern (largely Western) states, which can be put under the umbrella of liberal democracy, have an enormous importance in world politics. Although the triumphalism of some (e.g. Fukuyama 1989) is premature, liberal democratic countries often, but selectively, use their political principles as yardsticks in their relations with other countries. Lastly, it should be noted that economic power is extremely fungible (i.e. transferable). An economically powerful state can have or increase political power very quickly.

Cultural globalisation involves, *inter alia*, diffusion of religions, secular ideologies, ideas, 'high' or 'low' cultural values, practices or products between societies. Therefore, the spread of world's most populous religions like Christianity, Islam or Hinduism; the spread of secular ideologies like nationalism, socialism are great examples of (limited) cultural globalisation. If we focus on today, we see that, once again, largely due to technological progress, there is an increasing movement of different cultural values, practices and products as well as people (who carry their culture with them) across the globe. We see globalisation of (Western?) scientific view among the world scientists. We see globalisation of football as a world sport with same

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[17]The emergence of Al- Jazeera in early 2000s providing an alternative perspective, for the Middle Easterners in particular should be noted.

rules applying in Japan or Turkey. We see globalisation of liberal democratic values as more and more countries are moving towards becoming democracies. We also see that as opposed to limited cultural influence of 'the rest of the world', there is an increasing cultural influence of the West on the rest of the world (Holton 1998: 163).

There are many factors contributing the globalisation of Western cultural influences. For example, historical developments of colonialism and imperialism, and technological-economical superiority of the West are important factors in making large sections of the world population speakers (as a second or foreign language) of the languages of the Western powers. The place of English is especially important. Language is perhaps the most important milieu of culture. The politico-economic power of the West and Japan means that they have a large capacity to project, carry/sell their cultural values, products. For example, affluent, large enough US market means large budgets (high-tech, more time, more people working) in production of cinema films, TV programs or music albums which are sold through well-organised (often backed by the state[18]) international distribution networks. As much as 30-70% of TV shows watched in many developing countries may be Western in origin (Bin Sayeed 1995: 147). It should be noted that cinema films, TV programs and music albums are not devoid of substance as mere entertainment products. Their contents have explicit or hidden messages sometimes unintentionally put across. Therefore, there are important cultural consequences of watching Western films, TV programs or listening to musical products in the recipient countries.

Increasingly, transnational developments are linked with local and sub-national

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[18] For example, when an MP in Turkey proposed a law to force cinema halls to allocate at least 25% their time to show Turkish films, according to Işık, President Bush, to safeguard the interests of Hollywood, intervened and the law dropped from the political agenda (Işık 1990: 90).

identities and cultural processes, thus forcing, for example, Islamic groups to articulate discourses and strategies against, for example, Western cultural, economic and political dominance.[19]

1.4.8 MODERNISATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

With regard to the question of "modernisation for what", most of the people would give an answer that "modernisation is desired for economic, social and political development". Clearly, there is no agreed definition of development; it is a normative term. However, it can be said that development is the change towards a valued state. Moreover, by definition, disagreements about the nature of development among individuals and societies are nothing less than reflections of their broader ideological and cultural commitments. For example, in his seminal paper Dudley Seers argued that development involved "the realisation of the potential of human personality" and suggested that this was best achieved through reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality. "If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse...it would be strange to call the result development, even if per capita income doubled" (1969: 2-3). When asked to revisit his meaning of development this time he included self-reliance and increased cultural independence:

> Development now implies, inter alia, reducing cultural dependence on one or more of the great powers -i.e. increasing the use of national language in schools, allotting more television time to programmes produced locally...raising the proportion of higher degrees obtained at home, etc (1977: 5).

As we will see, most Islamists share such an understanding of modernisation.

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[19] It should be kept in mind that, as Holton reminds us, despite the Western dominance there is not a single dominant centre in the global field. For many locations some other force than Westernisation or Americanisation may seem threatening (1998: 169-170).

1.5 MODERNITY AND THE WEST

Clearly, modernity started as a *European project*. Until the US became a major actor in the world, modernity was in the monopoly of Western and central Europe. Then modernity had become a western project. Is it still so? Today, the relative weight of the West in conceptualisation of the modernity is extremely important. It should be clear from the previous analysis in this chapter that 'the West' is a historical rather than geographical construct. By '*western*' one means the type of society seen in the West, politically and economically developed, capitalist, urbanised in short *modern*. Modernisation of these societies started *in Europe after feudalism*, so, modernity as a concept had been associated with a luggage of period and geography. It could be argued that it is still possible to associate modernity with a period that is *now* and, to some *extent*, with a place that is still predominantly *the West*. What is exactly at stake here is this *extent*. Level of debt in the definition of modernity to the West is extremely crucial. If it is too high then it means that the modern and the West can be identified.

As Hall points out, 'the West' as a term can function on different levels:

> First, it allows us to characterise and classify societies in to different categories... Secondly, it is an image, or set of images. It condenses a number of different characteristics into one picture...for example, 'western' = urban = developed; or 'non-western' = non-industrial = rural = agricultural = under-developed.) Thirdly, it provides a standard or model of comparison. It allows us to compare to what extent different societies resemble, or differ from, one another. Non-western societies can accordingly be said to be 'close to' or 'far away from' or 'catching up with' the West. It helps to explain *difference*.
> Fourthly, it provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster. (For example, 'the West' = developed = good = desirable; or the 'non-West' = under-developed = bad = undesirable.) It produces a certain kind of knowledge about a subject and certain attitudes towards it. In short, it functions as an *ideology*. (Hall 1992b: 277).

Development of *the West* as a concept, which is closely related to development and definition of modernity as a concept, is related to growing inadequacy of the term

Europe for the same task. According to one interpretation, modernity was all about the rise of Europe; 'The European Miracle', the idea of the miraculous nature of the European experience, and later the Western experience, cannot be disputed. How did Europeans manage to escape from 'the agrarian trap', from the dreadful regiment of kings and priests? One answer is, because, they were 'better' than those who failed. Indeed, they were better in certain aspects; for example, in constructing an economic system conducive to development (Marx), or in finding more rational religious interpretation of the world (Weber). This was the belief in superiority of the 'Western civilisation' and continued to influence most of the social scientists in the West, including theorists of modernisation school. They, like evolutionary theorists of the nineteenth century, also 'found' many, basically ethnocentric, explanations of the fact that why modernisation firstly took place in Europe. However, it is possible see the rise of Europe as a gigantic series of coincidences. Many factors, some old, long term, others recent, emanating from the European, Near Eastern and even Central Asian civilisational areas came together in a particular time and place to create something unusual (Gellner 1988; Mann1988).

It is also possible to see the rise of Europe and the West as a historical phase like rise and fall of many other civilisations in history. The point at which Europe 'overtook' Asia must have been around 1450 writes Mann (1988: 7). Prior to that Europe was inferior not superior to Asia in many aspects. Most innovations proved to have great positive implications in European development came from the East including gunpowder; the mariner's compass and printing. Naturally, one may think that the Western civilisation owes great deal to Eastern civilisations and religions including Islamic civilisation, which were once superior to it. Therefore, many non-Westerners, including many Islamists, like to think that it is possible for others to regain the lead

from the West.

Modernity can be seen as a historical phase and to attribute modernity to some ethnocentric factors that emerged in the West, - like individualism, Protestant ethic, or capitalism- is to state that modernity is inherently *western* or 'western modernity' is universal, and there is no way of escaping from it. Perhaps this attribution occurs because, "Modernity, the creation of Europe, itself created Europe" (Heller and Feher 1991: 146) (and the Europeans created the USA, Australia, New Zealand etc.). Therefore, discourse on modernity in the West is West-centric, because the term *modern* like the term western can function at different levels and one of them was being like an ideology in the formation of Europe and 'the West'.

But, if one chooses a reductionist conceptualisation of modernity like Lyotard, for whom modernity was characterised by "a desire to systemise and capture the world, to free human beings by using calculative thought to master and manipulate the conditions of life" (cited by Sayyid 1997: 106), then it is possible to disengage modernity from its socio-political connotations to a considerable extent. The importance of such disengagement is obvious. First, it provides a 'breathing space' for an anti-western but pro-modern ideological stance that, for example, held by many Islamists. However, even a conceptualisation of modernity, like Lyotard's, which effectively reduces modernity to the progressive mastery over the nature, is not free from problems. Because the change in economic activity to improve human mastery over the nature and hence to improve 'conditions of life' necessarily involves processes previously analysed; namely, societisation of the community, differentiation of the society, or rationalisation of human actions. It is safe to assume that these processes starting in economy would have social and political consequences like secularisation that have

wide range of effects on social and political life. There is extreme difficulty, not to say impossibility, to separate the modernity from the West as far as crucial modernising processes concerned. Secularisation as one of the most important process to be associated with modernity is also a fundamental aspect of the West. Therefore, it can be said that if a society is modernising, it is secularising; not only that it is also westernising in the sense that its socio-political system is, at least in part, resembling to that of the secular West.

It should be stressed that, apart from its secularising influences, economic modernisation understood in terms of using developing technology to improve the material conditions of life, is sought after by most societies if not all. Clearly, many secularising influences of economic change (be it industrialisation, economic differentiation which includes supply of religiously forbidden goods or services) are not welcome by religious individuals or societies and they think that these influences must be stopped or at least slowed down. However, even for the anti-secularist groups, it seems that majority of the economic modernisation is predominantly value-neutral and it does not present a problem, even if it means becoming closer to the western economic model. In other words, in anti-western countries it would not bother the regime or the people to produce cars or computers like in 'the West'. This might be so because of same biological or environmental limits of the human beings all over the world. For example, extreme exceptions aside, it can be assumed that all human beings want a shelter/house against the elements, adequate food, access to medical care (hospitals), mobility (car, planes), good education for the society (schools, teachers), communication (telephones etc), safety (adequate police force and adequate military), time (time saving machines like tractors, computers) and means of entertainment (e.g. music players, TVs, etc.). Economic modernisation (and globalisation) is exactly about

production of these or similar products or services to meet very similar human needs or wants. Although the global economic activity is very complex, it can be argued that as long as the West continues to be economically advanced, its importance in defining economic aspect of modernity will continue.

As Huntington points out, the West has been dominating and using the international economic and political structures to enhance its own position and interests. The West dominates international political and security institutions itself and economic institutions with the help of Japan. Decisions of the U.N. Security Council or the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as the desires of the world community (and the phrase 'world community' has become a euphemistic collective noun like 'the Free World'). The West promotes its economic interests through international economic institutions. The West also promotes its values, often presenting them as universal values (Huntington 1993a: 39-41).

Huntington points out that, non-western states have three alternatives to follow as their responses to the western power and values. The first is complete *isolation*, like Burma or North Korea, to insulate their societies against 'corruption' by the West. The second way, the equivalent of 'bandwagoning' in international relations theory, is to *join* the West by accepting its values and institutions as Turkey has been trying to do. The third alternative is to try to *balance* the West by creating economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western powers against the West, as most Islamist movements want. In other words, modernising while preserving indigenous values and institutions and thus not westernising (Huntington 1993a: 41). Huntington touches an important point. If the non-western societies are going to be more and more important in defining modernity they will have to be more and more important in

economic and political terms.

1.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to show that it is possible to see some processes as core processes of modernity. It could be argued that economic modernisation started with agricultural revolution and then industrialisation and now with growing importance of service sector in a globalising world economy has been central to modernity. In other words, it is not possible to imagine a modern society without a successful economy. As for the capitalism: although all collapsed at the end, Soviet Union and other socialist states had showed for a long time that a non-capitalist (socialist, planned) route to modern society is possible. However, today, capitalism remains to be the dominant economic system of modern societies. What is more, the capitalist model of economic modernisation is being followed by countries, such as Turkey, which has been under the influence of the West. This makes capitalism a central concept in the dominant or alternative visions of modernity in these countries.

Nationalism has been another very important component of modernity. Today, the world is a world of nation-states. In most of the nation-states, it is possible to see dominance of a particular nation, the French in France, the English in the UK, the Germans in Germany, the Chinese in China and the English-speaking white American in the USA. This is not to say that all these societies are fanatically nationalist; they are not. The point is the importance of *the act* of defining the nation as the subjects of nation-states. In this sense, the nation-states are being re-defined according to nationalist principles. Their societies are 'communities' created according to mainly a secular definition of the nation in each nation-state. A secular understanding of the nation is a great force against religions like Christianity or Islam.

The modernisation of the state and the international state system is also central to comprehend modernity as a global concept. The centralisation of the state with its oppressive machinery has been crucial in shaping modernity. However, it is a fact that, although in democratic (mainly Western) societies the power of the state has come under popular control, in many other, including Muslim, countries, as if in an 'arrested mode' the powerful-centralised state is still run by unaccountable rulers. Therefore, in these authoritarian countries, the political modernisation is behind the 'schedule' and this fact is often partly justified by referring the powerful Islamist currents that are perceived as more anti-democratic than existing regimes. Whether this is so will be one of the issues discussed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 starts with an analysis of the relationship between Islam and the West; Islam and the important concepts and processes brought about by modernity. After an analysis of the rise of Islamism, the views of Islamist groups in the Middle East on important aspects of modernity and the West will be analysed. It will be seen that while Islamists advocate economically and politically strong Muslim countries, they want to disengage some politico-ideological connotations of modernity from economic modernisation.

One of the sources of Islamist criticism or resistance against *modernity* is the criticism of the *West* as *the* embodiment of modernity. In other words, when the West is seen as a more or less unified (civilisational) entity that is thought to represent the modernity as the most modern part of the world, the criticism of the West also contains a criticism of the Western path to modernity. Islamist conceptualisation of an Islamic civilisation also includes a criticism of the West as a civilisation.

In Chapter 2, I will analyse the Islamist response to modernity and the West along the lines discussed in this chapter. The Islamist responses to modernity and the West are shaped by certain reinterpretations of historical sources of Islam and recent modernisation processes of Muslim countries usually under secular, nationalist elite.

CHAPTER 2

ISLAMISTS, MODERNITY AND THE WEST

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1, in an historical and selective approach, I have tried to put modernity in a context, recognisable by experts and Islamists alike. It is also important to put Islamist responses to modernity and the West in a context according to themes touched upon so far, to better understand the Welfare Party's stance in Turkey and this is what I aim for in this chapter with a special focus on the Greater Middle East.

2.2 ISLAM AND THE WEST, THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the previous chapter, I have argued that one important aspect of 'modernity' is that it is strongly associated with and can be seen, as the rise of Europe, vis-à-vis other continents. It is necessary to analyse the relationship between Islam and Europe to understand attitudes of Islamists towards modernity and the West. Although there seems an asymmetry between two terms, as one being a religion and the other is a geographical expression, the name of a continent, this asymmetry is more apparent than real. Europe is a European notion, it was conceived by Europeans and Europe discovered, named and made America. Also "Europe had invented both Asia and Africa." The notion of Europe as a cultural and political entity was relatively modern; it

was "a postmedieval secularised restatement of what had previously been known as Christendom" (Lewis 1993: vii). The civilisation formerly designated by the term Christendom has undergone a process of reform and secularisation and has come to be known, in various contexts, as Europe. Islam is not a place; it is a religion, but for Islamists Islam is not a religion in a narrow sense which has become the case in the West as a result of a long historical experience; it is not merely a system of belief and worship or an isolated compartment of life distinct from other compartments, left to non-religious authorities. "It is rather the whole of life. and its rules include civil, criminal, and even what we would call constitutional law" (Lewis 1993: 4). Therefore, Islam has been the counterpart not only of Christianity but was also of Christendom. It is also the name of a whole civilisation which flourished under the aegis of that religion. Additionally, it has become fashionable since the end of the Cold War to speculate that with the 'collapse' of communism, Islamism will be the next '-ism' that will challenge Western societies (see, Esposito 1995). This assumption is more or less based on the 'incompatible' qualities of Islam with the Western liberal values (Mernissi 1996: 251).

It is a common view among Muslims, not just among Islamists. that Islam survived to remain much closer to its original divine spirit whereas Christianity, like Judaism, had been falsified or corrupted by its followers. Christian doctrines of the Trinity, the son-ship and divinity of Christ were blasphemous and are explicitly rejected by the Qur'an (5: 75, 78 and 112:1-4; see Lewis 1993: 5-6) The prophetic mission of Muhammad (23 years) was to restore true monotheism which had been taught by earlier prophets (including Adam, Abraham, Noah, Moses, Jesus) but had been abandoned or distorted, to abolish idolatry and to bring God's final revelation.

After death of the Prophet Muhammad, the first phase of caliphatic periods

(632- 661) began. This period of first four caliphs[1], in addition to the time of the Prophet itself, constituted what most, if not all, Muslims perceive, as the *Golden Age* of Islam, witnessing the spread of Islam in a breathtaking speed and scale, idealised as untarnished by any worldly desires on the part of the rulers. This period was the locus for the formation and development of Islamic ideology without a prophet. It is a reference point for Muslim self-understanding. It is a time to which "both conservative and modernist Islamic activists return for guidance in their attempt to delineate the Islamic character of modern states." (Esposito 1991: 7).

For Muslims the age of Muhammad and the first four caliphs is the normative, exemplary period of Islam. It was the time when God sent His final and complete revelation for humankind and His last prophet, Muhammad. The Islamic community/state was created, bonded by a shared religious identity and purpose. The Qur'an and other sources of Islamic life and law, inspiring leadership of Muhammad originated at this time. Muhammad's exemplary behaviour (Sunna) and his traditions and sayings (hadith) and the early practice of the community of the companions of the Prophet set a model for Muslim life. Therefore, this period (or rather its particular understandings), is used as the reference point for all Islamic revival and renewal whether traditionalist or modernist.

At the Prophet's death (AD 632) Islam was still confined to parts of the Arabian Peninsula. However, within about a century, the geography of Islam had been transformed, in what was one of the most swift and most dramatic changes in human history. Under the caliphs, "Muslims progressed from victory to victory, from triumph to triumph", conquering a vast realm extending from the borders of India and China to

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[1] The first four caliphs were Abu Bakr (632-34), Umar (634-44), Uthman (644-56) and Ali (656-661).

the Pyrenees and the Atlantic -greater than Roman Empire at its zenith- and ruling millions of new subjects large numbers of whom converted to the new faith (Lewis 1995: 54; Lewis 1993: 4). Later, a new Islamic power, the Turks emerged who conquered parts of Anatolia from the Byzantines and in 1453 added Constantinople (Istanbul), as copestone, to their new imperial structure in Europe and Asia. The Ottoman sultans launched new series of further expeditions which took them to the plains of Hungary and twice in 1529 and in 1683 to the walls of Vienna. For a century and a half, the Turkish armies operating form their bases in Buda and Belgrade posed a greater threat to the heart of Christian Europe than had ever come from the Arabs in Spain (Lewis 1993: 11).

Military response of the Christendom to Islamic threat included the Crusades. It is interesting that for many of today's Muslims the Crusades symbolise the earliest and the clearest example of mindless militant Christianity, earlier manifestation of aggression and imperialism of the Christian West, a reminder of Christianity's hostility toward Islam.

The eleventh century marked a turning point in the relationship of the Christendom with the Islamic world.

> Up till 1000 the West was poor, backward and illiterate region, precariously defending itself against the assaults of barbarous nations by land and sea...All this while... Islam... was able to build up a brilliant and impressive urban culture. Now the situation was dramatically transformed...Trade and commerce revived, towns and markets sprang up; the population increased...the arts and sciences were cultivated on a scale unknown since the days of the Roman Empire. (Esposito 1995: 40, citing Saunders 1965: 154).

The Crusades and the offensive of the Arabs and the Turks toward Christendom/Europe were very important historical developments which are referred to by those Muslims and Christians who see 'the other' as militant, somewhat barbaric and

fanatical in its religious zeal, determined to conquer. convert, or eradicate the other; and thus an obstacle and threat to the realisation of world peace.

With the modernisation of Europe the tide of Islam embodied in the Ottoman Empire was decisively broken and the European superiority had begun to be felt by the Muslims firstly in wars; but sooner it was seen that the Europeans were 'superior' in their general social organisation and their success in wars was a result of their progress rather than a cause. The European success in economy, technology and war was the major external factor forcing the Muslims, first, to look at critically and then try to appropriate European modernity. Especially after the ascendancy of the U.S.A. in the world, modernity has come to be embodied by the West, particularly for the Muslim world.

2.2.1 Islam and Social Change: The Need for New Religious Interpretation

It can be seen that the original sources of Islam -the Qur'an and the Sunna- provide limited legal texts in various fields of life (for example with regard to the nature of state and government). When it is needed, new laws can be made through *ijtihad* -the process which develops new laws by employing juridical reasoning under the lights of the original texts and previous cases. *Fiqh*, that enormous corpus of laws, is the product of this intellectual process. Ijtihad is an unending process as the new situations of the Muslims demand new laws loyal to the spirit of Islam. Ijtihad can be done by a *Mujtehid*.

Unfortunately, by the ninth century "it came to be held by the great majority of ulema that the exercise of ijtihad was no longer permissible" (Watt 1988: 106). According to many non-Muslim or Muslim experts the end result was a stagnation of

thought in the Muslim world for centuries. It is important to note that, it was largely the European impact in 18th and 19th centuries that caused the Islamic reformers to speak about the need to reopen the gate of ijtihad (Cf. Tibi 1990: 41).

The issue of ijtihad[2] has a central place in religious history and political theory in Islam. A more precise definition of ijtihad is provided by Fazlur Rahman:

> the effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be subsumed under it by a new solution (1982: 8).

Ijtihad was understood in early Islam to be interpretation loyal to true sources namely the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. In other words the 'Interpreters' were restricted in their judgements. Today, for Islamists the Islamic credentials of a *Mujtehid* are important and for example the views of scholar who are close to secular regimes are subject to their scrutiny and often dismissed as it is the case for example in Egypt (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 39).

In the context of rapid modernisation, a broad current of Islamism emerged and has come to be one of the most important forces in many Muslim societies in the last few decades. After an analysis of Islamism and causes of its rise, I will analyse Islamist views vis-à-vis modernity and the relationship between modernity and the West. I will focus on their views on secularisation, democracy, state, nationalism and the nation-state, science technology and industrialisation, capitalism, and the West and its relationship with modernity.

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[2]The term Ijtihad is mostly used to refer to the need for fresh interpretation of Islamic principles in accordance with the social, economic, political developments in the world.

2.3 ISLAMISM

'Muslims' includes all who believe in and practice Islam, or who consider themselves to be Muslim in a cultural sense, part of a Muslim society whether practicing or not.[3] The term Islamic can be used for things related to Islam, thus Islamic countries means states that posses a Muslim majority. Islamic 'fundamentalism' as a much talked about term may be misleading, particularly because it is borrowed from a Protestant Christian experience and does not exist per se in the languages of the Islamic world (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 6). Although the term Islamic 'fundamentalism' is used as a convenient catch-all term in reference to particular Western concerns; there are more appropriate terms such as 'Islamism' and 'Islamists' which do exist in various languages of the Muslim world and are widely used in the literature. Islamism, as will be seen, is a larger term than 'political Islam,' because, Islamists are not just after the political power exercised according to their interpretation of Islam.

Roy rather narrowly defines Islamism as "the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology" (1994: ix). It is a form of protest produced by modernity (1994: 1). Islamism holds that Islam as a comprehensive way of life possesses certain laws and that society (as well as private lives of Muslims) must be organised according to these laws (Cf. Ruedy 1994: XV). It is always implied by Islamists that they have access to the correct understanding of Islam (Orthodoxy) and correct form of practice (Orthopraxy) and what they believe in and practice is the Islam of the Golden Age. This Islam is *complete*, *timeless* and *universal*. It is *perfect* because it is from Allah who not only knows the human beings but also the future. Since it is

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[3] Thus, very similar to Christianity, it is often justifiably argued that the terms Islam and Muslim have come to possessing very little analytical value in social sciences. On the one extreme there are Bosnian BDMs (Beer Drinking Muslims) and on the other extreme, there are cases of strict Taliban and Saudi understanding of Islam.

perfect, Islam does not need to change (modernise or reform) and adapt in its fundamentals[4]. It has answers to all new situations and it is the task of Muslims to interpret Islam while remaining loyal to its original spirit (Cf. Roy 1994: 37). To be able to re-shape society according to Islam, Islamists feel themselves obliged to engage in political activity which cannot be considered too dirty a business for the Muslims[5]. Prayers and piety is not enough. If Islam is to be lived as God intended the political power must be within Islamist hands[6].

Historically, emergence of Islamism is directly related to the impact of Europe and associated secularisation that took place in the Muslim lands. The first proto-types of Islamism and Islamic reformists in the Muslim states which were most exposed to European influences (e.g. Namık Kemal in the Ottoman Empire or Muhammad Abduh in Egypt) actively sought political answers within the Islamic heritage to newly emerging Muslim plight vis-à-vis the militarily and economically dominating Europe[7]. In fact, the impact of European and later Western dominance has been very deep. The West ended, in around 90% percent of the Muslim lands, the effective self rule of the Muslims from the very early period of Islam. The Western impact still continues in Muslim countries in political, economic and cultural terms.

However, European and later Western dominance was only one of the factors in emergence of Islamism. It should be noted that in Islamic tradition there has been

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[4] One Pakistani writer who received a Western education puts it like this: "Those who think of reforming or modernising Islam are misguided, and their efforts are bound to fail [...] Why should it be modernised, when it is already perfect and pure, universal, and for all time?" (see, Tibi 1990: 73).
[5] See, for example the introduction by Khurram Murad in Mawdudi (1991: 23).
[6] The necessity of political activism was stressed by influential Islamist leaders such as Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini, and by Turkish Islamists alike; for example Şevki Yılmaz, a Welfare Party MP, in his much publicised speech in a Pilgrimage (for which he was convicted) was saying that for years the devout Muslims have been kept away from political activity by arguing that it is a 'dirty business.'
[7] Obviously, there are other types of Muslim reaction to ascendancy of Europe, including blaming Islam for the backwardness and advocating a near-total rejection of Islam (see, for example, Ocak 1996).

movements of renewals (*tajdid*) by renewers (*mujeddid*) (Nasr 1996: 56; see also Algar 2001). For example, Imam Gazali is popularly known as a great mujeddid and there have been lesser mujeddids. The important point, of course. is the belief that Muslims had become lax in following Islam and with the guidance and hard work of the great, charismatic men of religion they could be more Islamic by a return to the 'correct' Islam and orthopraxy. In fact, the feeling that "something went awry" for and within the Muslim ummah has been with Muslims since almost immediately after the Prophet. But, this feeling has been much deeper in the last 2-3 centuries. And today it is hard to reconcile Islamic doctrine that the Muslims are the best ummah (community) with the reality that the members of this ummah rank among the underdogs in the world (Tibi 1990: 33). The cause of this decline of the Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims (e.g. Western societies), according to Islamists, is de-Islamisation of Muslim societies (to which the negative impact of the West contributed to)[8] and the cure is re-Islamisation. In other words, answers to the problems posed by the modern age are to be found in Islam.

In the second and third quarter of the 20th century, there emerged important Islamist scholars and leaders in Egypt, Turkey and British India. Turkey just became a republic (1923) under Mustafa Kemal who was determined to make his country a secular nation-state. He ended the caliphate in 1924 seated in Istanbul since 1517. Hasan al-Banna in Egypt and Mawdudi in India were living in very turbulent times under British rule. Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Their main aim was to establish an 'Islamic order' which included an Islamic state which was to come almost naturally in due process of reforming society by reforming the individuals. The

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[8] See Piscatori (1986: 22-24) for the three schools on the causes of the decline of the Muslims. One of which argues that the reasons are to be found in Islam itself.

Brothers' slogan has been "God is our objective; the Qur'an is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Struggle is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations" (Ayubi 1991: 132). Mawdudi was also an important Islamist thinker and some of his views will be analysed later.

2.3.1 Causes of Islamism

There are certain themes deployed by different experts to explain the rise of Islamism[9]. It was pointed out that the nationalist-secularist elites in Muslim countries failed to meet the demands of the masses. In other words, Islamism owes much to *failed* modernisation attempts by the secular elite.[10] A direct result of inadequate modernisation has been economic hardship among the Muslims which encourages radical opposition to the existing regimes. An important proportion of this discontent has been articulated in an Islamist language.

Another important factor has been that almost all Islamist movements saw and see the rapid social change under secular-nationalist elites as erosion of the Islamic culture. Islamism has been containing a strong reaction to the secularisation-westernisation of the national cultures. The Islamist elite have been challenging the secular elite who are accused of being alienated from the native-Islamic heritage and of leading/ forcing the masses along the same path (see, for example, Arjomand 2002).

Islamism often contains a direct attempt, through democratic or un-democratic ways (e.g. popular revolution), to capture the state authority. In other words, Islamist

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[9] For a critical analysis of these themes see, for example, (Sayyid 1997: 18-26 and Tuğal 2002).
[10] This includes failure in modernisation of the armed forces as well, especially in terms of training. The 1967 defeat is much quoted as land-marking event in rise of the Islamism (See, for example, Piscatori 1986: 26-27). It showed the complete failure of nationalist-secularist formula in Muslim countries against a 'religious' one: Israel (Ayubi 1991: 59, also Esposito 1995: 13-15).

movements often constitute *the* opposition in many Muslim countries (Fuller 2003). Generally speaking, Islamists emerge among those who have not been benefited from limited modernisation processes in their respective countries.

Perhaps the most convincing argument in explaining why Islamism as opposed to other ideologies (e.g. Socialism or Liberalism) has benefited from the failure of the nationalist-secularist modernising regimes is the 'availability' thesis.[11] According to this thesis the fact that Islam has been available as an alternative to the existing regimes unlike the other ideologies can account for much[12]. Simply put, since the nationalist-secularists failed, the communists were in prison, the only remaining alternative was Islamists. Obviously the reality is more complex than this but certain core developments can be identified in the emergence of Islamism as an ideology and movement:

1. The modernising drive under the nationalist-secularist elite has been a qualified failure. It is not a coincidence that many strong Islamist movements have emerged in those Muslim countries where socio-economic hardships have been very severe. Perhaps the most important example is Egypt where high population growth[13], accompanied by restricted industrial development[14] makes the country look like being in a permanent socio-economic crisis. Generally, in many other Muslim states, Islamists propagate to the masses the importance of (Islamic) virtues in the current socio-economic difficulties while blaming the un-Islamic elite for failing the population in general.

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[11] For a discussion of the availability thesis of Laclau, see, (Sayyid 1997: 73-83).
[12] Although as Sayyid points out, mere existence of Islam cannot account fully for Islamism (1997: 74-76).
[13] The high population growth among the Muslims has been a major factor of unemployment. Obviously, an effective population planning requires an effective birth control which in turn requires an adequate health administration on the part of the state and use of these methods by the population.
[14] Radical Islamists have attempted to devastate the tourism industry in Egypt by terrorist acts perhaps to facilitate the collapse of the regime which, presumably would give birth to a new Islamic order.

2. The ideological hegemony of nationalist/secularist ideology has never been complete in Muslim countries where it was pursued by the military or monarchic elite. Of course, the preservation of Islam in some form is a prerequisite for emergence of Islamism in Muslim countries.

3. Islamists have been successful in *extracting* an ideology (or ideologies with some common features) from Islam which in turn did not lose its ability of being a "master signifier" according to them[15]. Islamist currents emerged in many Muslim countries often influencing each other (Roy 1994; Ayubi 1991). There are 'deep sources' in Islam which lend themselves to Islamists to formulate *political* agendas which differ in many details but never loses their *significant* relationships with Islam.

4. Islamists had been helped by the nationalist governments in their effort to cultivate the 'cultural and symbolic capital' of Islam (see Ayubi 1991: 61). This argument is much favoured by leftists. There is no doubt that it happened for example in Egypt, Jordan and Turkey (where Islamists were '*used*' mainly against the left); but soon they were out of government control (see, for example, Abdalla 1993).

It is important to note that, Islamists do not put their interpretation of Islam across as a possible interpretation among many, but as an authentic, valid, true understanding of Islam based on sound Islamic knowledge. They trust their own religious scholars who provide a different interpretation of Islam than that of the scholars on the pay-roll of the state and part of the establishment. Islamism as an

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[15] "The master signifier is a signifier to which other signifiers refer, and are unified by – and it fixes their identity" (Sayyid 1997: 45). For a discussion of the term 'master signifier' and the Islamist attempt to make Islam is the master signifier in Muslim societies providing a nodal point and defining the nature and limits of the community see (Sayyid 1997: 45-49).

ideology and movement has been successful in promoting its own elite[16], some of these are men of religion but there are also an important section of intellectuals who provide a critical view of the West.

According to Islamists, the current Muslim societies and the world in general are not ordered according to Islam. In other words, the existing socio-political reality does not fit into an Islamist vision and Islamists struggle to change it (Tibi 1990:13). The idea that "life should or can be ordered according to a system, even an ideal one, and that is the business of Islam to provide such a system seems to be a modern idea" (Smith 1978:117).

'Islamism' is a modern term to denote a modern phenomenon. Islamist political movements are usually not led by religious scholars, and they are interested in modern mechanisms of publicity and mobilisation of the masses. Islamists espouse political, economic and social change in line with their understanding of Islam, usually in the interest of the lower and lower middle classes of society (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 6).

2.3.2 Islamisation and Its means

It can be argued that the main aim of Islamist groups is to re-Islamise[17] their societies which they consider to have become largely comprised of nominal Muslims. This perceived de-Islamisation of Muslim societies owes much in Islamist accounts to the impact of the West in the 19th and 20th centuries. Especially the secularised/ westernised elite who followed a secularising policy in most Muslim countries are

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[16] As Islamist movements gain importance, Islamist elite represent the views of Islamists and their views are scrutinised by non-Islamists to understand Islamists in general.

[17] It is assumed by Islamists and reflected in their choice of words that their societies were once thoroughly Islamic which is disputed by many secular writers.

blamed. The possibility of de-Islamisation has always been warned against and in fact expected in Islam which has generally a pessimist view of the religious steadfastness of human beings[18].

Perception by some sections of society of the need for re-Islamisation of the whole society is an age-old phenomenon. Re-Islamisation means to raise Islamic consciousness of the Muslims who are seen at best, as passive adherents of Islamic creed, or at worst. active opponents of re-Islamisation. Hence, perhaps the mostly used idiom, 'wake up', implies that there is almost no Islamic 'consciousness' in the most of society which makes the work of Islamists extremely hard. Naturally, to economise the limited resources, target groups of re-Islamisation (usually receptive lower classes) are carefully selected. There are certain means employed in the re-Islamisation of society.

Perhaps, the most important means of re-Islamisation are the Islamist groups founded by Islamist leaders. Generally an Islamist group considers itself as the model for the rest of society; the individual Muslim completes his/her transformation in the group. The group works within society to recruit new members but it also functions to carefully separate the members from the rest of society which is not Islamic enough yet. The group is run by the core members around the leader with the effort of full members, but often there are sympathisers of the group whose popular religiosity is used to collect different kinds of support (e.g. donations). Total Islamisation of the whole society is the ultimate aim (Cf. Roy 1994: 68-70).

Other means of Islamisation, usually utilised by Islamist groups, include, *inter alia*:

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[18] According to a much circulated hadith in Turkey, the Prophet himself predicted that with each generation the Muslims would be less and less observant with some exceptional circumstances.

- Books written in support of *the* Book (Qur'an). Magna opera of the revered Islamist ideologues like Qutb or Mawdudi; classic books of Islamic teachings like 'reliable' hadith books; books by founders or current leaders of Islamist groups; novels; books on scientific issues, either drawing attention to God's miraculous works or criticising or refuting some theories (e.g. theory of evolution) which are considered contradictory to the Islamic teaching.

- Television, audio or video cassettes, newspapers and periodicals to propagate their views (Esposito 1995: 10).

- Schools, child-care centres, youth camps. In these institutions, the modern scientific knowledge is transmitted in an Islamic milieu, characterised by segregation of sexes and the laws of the modern science are presented as the laws put by Allah. Students in state schools and at universities are also recruited in activities at spare times or by providing housing or financial help.

- Mosques, private mosques or houses, as in line with the Sunna, are to be used for Islamisation. If necessary, for example, if there is a strong state control of the mosques (as in Turkey), Islamists find other places, for gatherings and dissemination of the Islamist message.

- Professional associations like those of lawyers, engineers or doctors are also targets of Islamists to be controlled and used, firstly as power houses and then also part of the civil society as a force against the

secular state. The general rule for an Islamist, in line with the Sunna, is to start Islamisation from inner circles e.g. family, friends and the neighbourhood. Especially an Islamic education of the children is important.

2.4 ISLAMISTS, SECULARISATION AND THE POLITICS

Islamists claim that Islam rejects secularity. Secularisation as discussed in the previous chapter is defined as the decline of the social significance of religion. Ernest Gellner encapsulates the secularisation thesis similarly: "in industrial and industrialising societies, the influence of religion diminishes" and he adds that there are a number of versions of this theory which attribute it to the scientific basis of new technology which undermines faith, or to the erosion of social units which deprives religion of its organisational base, or to centralised, unitarian, rationalised religion which "cuts its own throat." However, Gellner voice a view, shared by many in the West, that "the secularisation thesis does not apply to Islam" and in "the last one hundred years, the hold of Islam over the minds and hearts of believers has not diminished and, by same criteria, has probably increased." (Gellner 1994b: xi). He observes that this hold is not restricted to some parts of society; it is not "backward" or socially underprivileged or rustics, or women or those linked to traditional regimes which are prone to preservation of faith; retention of religiosity marks both socially radical and traditionalist countries. Gellner attributes this development to the old internal division of Islam into a 'High' and 'Low' variants and the way this old tension between them played itself out under conditions of modernisation. In the past, there had been the unitarian, scripturalist, puritanical, rule-oriented, sober, literalist and anti-esoteric religious style of the urban scholars and their bourgeois clientele as opposed to the ritualistic, ecstatic, meditation-prone, esoteric path of the rural population and the lower strata of the towns which were committed to saint cults and organisations known as orders and brotherhoods. At

most times they had remained interpenetrated and they tolerated each other in peaceful détente. The 'High' form remained normative, recognised as true, even if not implemented due to resistance of the popular 'Low' form. The central power simply did not have necessary skills and resources to impose the individualist 'High' Islam which dispenses with mediation and presupposes literacy. However, "under the impact of industrial modernity" in most places, the colonial and post-colonial state was strong enough to destroy those rural self-help associations and eliminate the social need for the services of saints who mediate between groups. In cities and towns in particular "people turned to fundamentalist rather than saint-sectarian forms of religion." (Gellner 1994b: xii). Or more accurately, significant portions of Muslim societies gradually started to follow 'High' version of Islam.

To be able to understand the sources of Islamists' relationship with secularity, a brief look at the some related aspects of Islamic history is necessary. Because, for example, the Islamic Golden Age as an ideal is frequently referred both by Islamists to show the authenticity of their views and by the modernist Muslims to support their views on the compatibility of secularism and Islam. Although, perhaps the majority of those who favour a western style modernisation of the Muslim societies the real relevance of the Islamic history or even of Islam to the task of modernisation is minimal.

It could be argued that because of the doctrine of the oneness (*tawheed*) in Islam (see, for example, Cornell 1994) and the conduct of the Prophet as the only interpreter of Islam and his being the political leader of the whole of ummah (Muslim community), the chief justice and even the commander in wars, it is easy to see the 'monist' structure of Islam. There are too many examples of the Prophet's unchallenged authority in

various positions to refer to. In contrast, the examples of those who claim that Islam recognised secularity are so few. An oft-quoted one is the saying of the Prophet "You know your worldly things" after an agricultural advice of his to some date-tree farmers had failed (see, for example, Donohue and Esposito (eds.) 1982).

Since the conduct of the Prophet was perceived to be depending on the divine guidance, it is understandable that there is not much evidence of secular applications in his time due to logic that his conduct had religious significance by definition. There are other examples, during the Rightly Guided Caliphs, referred to as supporting an understanding of Islam compatible with secularity. One of them is the refusal of Umar to give the share of the *zakat* (tax) to a certain group of non-Muslims (in order to "warm their hearts" towards Islam) on the grounds that the Muslims had become too strong to need this kind of support. The second example is also his refusal to give the huge lands conquered during the wars in his time to the mujahedeen (warriors) who participated to these wars, as previously done by the Prophet on the grounds that the situation is different now as whole countries are conquered very quickly; probably fearing the effects of creating an extremely wealthy landed class overnight and thinking that it is contrary to egalitarian spirit of Islam (see, Donohue and Esposito (eds.) 1982: 156).

It is not convincing to argue that Umar or any other Rightly Guided Caliph acted as secular rulers and disregarded the Islamic doctrines by citing a few such examples. The overwhelming evidence shows that they were striving to be loyal to the Islamic teaching and even on the very small issues they refer to the Sunna of the Prophet when there is no clear Qur'anic mandate.

After the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the practice of rulers was often at odds with

the Islamic ideal. The Muslim masses were by and large passive. Many if not most of the ulema provided religious doctrines and justification for the conduct of the rulers. However, there were many personally pious Muslim rulers who tried to be as close to the Islamic ideal as possible. What is more, even though there had been un-Islamic conducts among the Muslim rulers after Ali, it is not easy to classify their acts as secular. Because predominantly, either out of conviction or for the purpose of ensuring legitimacy these were careful to be seen as loyal to Islam and if necessary, justificatory religious doctrines or *fatwas* (opinions) with regard to their actions were obtained from the ulema by coercion or financial reward. At times, they may have acted arbitrarily or independently of Islamic rules but they never challenged or abrogated the shariah (Khan 1992: 102). Therefore, theirs were not deliberate secularising policies, which has been the case in 19th and 20th centuries.

It is easy to understand the Islamist stance vis-à-vis secularisation. Since in their view, Islam asserts its centrality in both social and private sphere, it has been of paramount importance for Islamists to reverse the secularisation trend in the Muslim countries, which shapes not only the public sphere through the influence of the secularised state but also the private sphere. Secularism is rejected as an alien and unnecessary concept. If the secularism is too entrenched in state and society, as in Turkey, Islamists often propose a re-definition of secularism aiming to provide a breathing space for them, mainly by lessening the state control over Islam.

Secularism has been one of the most troubling western ideas for Islamists. It is important to note that beginning of secularisation in the Muslim world in the European sense, took place in countries which were most exposed to European domination. Two most important examples were the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The European military

and economic superiority rang the alarm bells and even caused Muslim self-doubt in terms of religious beliefs. The elite, who felt the shock of modernity much more than the general population, suffered more from this religious self-doubt which showed itself mainly in discussion of whether Islam (or certain elements in it) was inimical to progress in the European sense. This development was neatly summarised and criticised by an early Islamist Ottoman poet, Ziya Pasha (d. 1870):

> Islam, they say, is a stumbling-block to the progress of the state
> This story was not known before, and now it is the fashion
> Forgetting our religious loyalty in all our affairs
> Following Frankish ideas is now the fashion (in Lewis 1968: 139).

It can be said that Islamist views on the political issues revolved around rejection of secularity. Islamists hold that a political reading of Islam (that is the Islam of the Golden Age) is necessary. For Islamists, Islam is *Din* (religion), *Dunya* (world, i.e. a way of life) and *Dawla* (state). This holistic understanding of Islam can best to be realised by a collective action (Ayubi 1991: 68).

The main source of Islamist refusal of secularity is their belief that Allah asserts his authority in the Qur'an and Sunna. In other words, the metaphysical deity must hold the authority. Whereas secular politics means that human beings must have the ultimate say. There had been important socio-political,[19] scientific and philosophical[20] reasons in

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[19] The dominance and negative effect of the Church on the medieval European society is a frequently referred one. Islamists argue that that negative effect was due to existence of a clerical class in Christianity which does not exist in Islam. Therefore, laicism (understood as separation of the church from the state power) was both necessary and beneficial to Europe but is not necessary in Islam. However, the doctrinal non-existence of clergy does not mean that there has been a functional equivalent in Islam, classified as Ulema (plural of *Alim* which is active participle of Ilm: science). For example, Iran is now effectively ruled by Faqihs (scholars of jurisprudence).

[20] For example 'the question of evil' has been a troubling one among the Christians and Jews (especially after the Holocaust). How God can permit to such evil acts? B. Russell concluded that such a God must be at least partially evil (see, Janabi 1990: 131). In the Islamic world, arguably the doctrine of predestination had been dominant which suited some rulers to justify their seemingly un-Islamic acts. But Islamists argue, in line with another tradition of Islamic philosophy, that since God is the 'owner' of everything and gave to human beings 'free will', occurrence of evil does not make him evil. In fact, human beings will be accountable for evil acts and perhaps more importantly, 'seemingly evil events' are part of the 'religious test' of human beings in this, after all, temporary world. (Similar explanations can be found in a Christian worldview see, for example, McClelland 1996: 304-309).

the secularisation of Europe. In Muslim countries, however, it is argued, it started with the emulation of Europe under European pressure.

Islamists argue that secularisation causes social decline in secularising countries be it Muslim or Western. Obviously the concept of social decline cannot be measured objectively and strongly related to one's worldview. However, certain themes emerge in Islamist views. For example, according to Islamists, associated with the secularisation process there has been a laxity in following the Islamic dress code in Muslim countries taking its cue from the West where people, the women in particular are perceived to be slavishly following the fashion gurus. This trend is part of a general moral decay, particularly in sexual mores. Islamists want especially the Muslim women to dress Islamically.[21] Thus, the headscarf (covering the hair and the neck) had become an *issue* in some Muslim[22] countries. For example, in Iran the state make it compulsory even in the street[23]. In Turkey it is forbidden at universities. Islamists in Turkey supported by liberals argued that there is no difference between Turkey and Iran, both uses state power to dictate a certain dress code.

Islamists argue that due to the secularising effects of the modernising drive, in Muslim countries, the communitarian spirit has declined. This shows itself for example in 'get-rich-quick' attitude of business circles and ruling institutions, usually through corruption, which contributes to the disappointment and alienation from the system. The affluent sections of societies in Muslim countries seems most Westernised and most

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[21] According to predominantly accepted view in Islam a Muslim women should cover her body (except the face, hands and the foot) in a way concealing her figure, where as the man must cover only the parts between his belly and the knee cap.

[22] It has also become an issue in France where the education system has been 'militantly secular.'

[23] Therefore, it can be concluded that for majority of Islamists the dress of the individual is part of the public realm and subject to state coercion when necessary. In the Ottoman Empire, the non-Muslims were commanded to wear cloths that distinguished them from Muslims.

alienated from the population, insensitive to the socio-economic plight of the bulk of society. Many Muslims see that the young are becoming more and more disrespectful to the elderly. Society is becoming atomised as individuals are trying to 'save' only themselves. There is a deep nostalgia for the good old days and the model community which is believed to have existed in the early Golden Ages. Islamic commands of good neighbourly relations[24] and the care for the extended family members and the needy in the community[25] are not observed. For Islamists, it is because Muslims are not *Muslim enough* anymore. In Turkey, the much referred example of the decline of the community by Islamists and many seculars is the fact that many people who live in apartments do not know and talk to other people in the same building.

Islamists envisages a Muslim ummah which might be large but characterised by community-type (*Gemeinschaftist*) relations. According to Islamists, in this ideally Muslim society, the believers would have more empathy and sympathy towards the fellow believers and the rulers for the ruled. Contrary to a popular understanding of Marx, for Islamists, Islam is not the "opium of the masses" to be used to justify or mask the exploitation in society. In fact, currently Islamists use Islam mostly as an ideology of opposition to the existing socio-economic political systems that are, among other things, exploitative and characterised by a sense of alienation between the ruling circles and the ruled. However, Islam as a religion of competing strands is capable of being used in legitimisation of 'injustices' in society, but this does not mean that it can easily be a legitimisation *in toto*, as long as there are those who are subject to injustices in society who would have a different interpretation of Islam from any dominant version and would use it to air their discontent.

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[24] For example there is a much quoted hadith: "He who sleeps full when his neighbour goes hungry is not one of us."

[25] See, for example, the Qur'an: surah 107.

Another, presumably the most important form of alienation, according to Islamists, is the alienation of the human being from God which should be understood as the source of other forms of alienation. A Muslim must keep his/ her ties with Allah strong. *Muttaqi* (God-fearing and respecting) Muslims are an Islamist aim. A society consist of *muttaqi* Muslims will be free from all social ills.

Secularisation for Islamists is primarily a form of de-Islamisation. De-secularisation must be in the form of re-Islamisation. Re-Islamisation of the individual Muslims and society in general, is considered by Islamists as the answer to ill-effects of modernisation process largely attributed to secularisation. The circular logic dictates that Islamisation will surely produce the perfect believers. How can there be any social problem in a society of perfect believers? Deductively, if there are problems in Muslim societies it is because of de-Islamisation. And one can only ask to Islam to provide solutions or theoretical answers to problems in an Islamic society. In other words, the ills of capitalist or socialist applications in Muslim societies are not really Islamically relevant[26]. These societies must be re-Islamised first.

One would concede that the utopia of a society of 'angel-like' believers has a strong appeal in many Muslim countries where the corruption is rampant and seen as a main contributor to the economic hardships. Many Muslim countries like Pakistan, Turkey are high on the corruption lists routinely published by some international NGOs. Islamists generally argue that there has been a moral decay in Muslim lands and corrupt politicians and bureaucrats are among the results.

Desire for social change towards an Islamic society is common to all Islamists.

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[26] Although this does not stop many Islamists to argue that 'Islam is the solution' to the present problems of Muslim societies.

All Islamists are historicist in the Popperian sense (see. Popper 1961) as they all refer to the history to find both motivations and a map to change society. Widely shared belief in the Muslim world that the Golden Age of Islam is 'well documented' is a bonus for them. They are also 'essentialist' in two senses. Firstly, there is an explicit belief in the essentiality of the possibility of changing society by dedicated human agents, as done by the Prophet and the early Muslims. Secondly, according to Islamists all human beings are essentially the same; they have certain inherent qualities. Islam is universal and eternal because it addresses to these essential qualities in human beings (see, Qutb 1993 [1964]). It tries to bring the good out of a Muslims towards the fellow Muslims. Therefore, Islamist discourses do not accept the argument that human beings and societies are changing and Islam is no longer adequate as a system for modern societies, Muslim or otherwise. It is the only valid divine message, universal and eternal.

2.5 ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY

One of the most frequent criticisms levelled at Islam is its alleged incompatibility with democracy, and thus its being an obstacle to political modernisation in Muslim countries. This criticism is hard to substantiate at this level of generality simply because there is no monolithic understanding and application of Islam; the same is true for democracy as well. Conceptual confusion over democracy is so serious that Collier and Levitsky have identified 550 subtypes of democracy (cited by Diamond 1996: 21). However according to Diamond, liberal democracy has the following features: Real power lies –in fact as well as in constitutional theory- with elected officials. Executive power is constitutionally constrained; there are fair elections; freedom of association, protection of cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups; alternative sources of information; substantial freedom of belief,

opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition (Diamond 1996: 23-24). Needless to say, such an understanding of democracy is strongly related to the Western experience.

When liberal democracy is taken as the touchstone for democracy the historical record of Muslims is not encouraging at all. Lewis observes in 1996 that, of the 53 member states of Organisation of Islamic Conference, only Turkey (which is "in many ways a troubled democracy") can pass Huntington's test of democracy, a test which reveals existence of a very basic democracy if a country has made two consecutive peaceful changes of government via free elections (Lewis 1996: 53-54). Lewis attempts at making a rough classification of regimes in Muslim societies, seeing Turkey as "the great exception": Traditional autocracies like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf sheikdoms; Modernising autocracies, like Jordan, Egypt and Morocco that have their roots in traditional autocracy but are taking significant steps toward modernisation and democratisation; Fascist-style dictatorships, like Asad's [and now his son's] Syria and Saddam's Iraq (at that time); Radical Islamic regimes like Iran and Sudan and finally the Central Asian republics, classified by history and geography rather than by regime type and which are struggling to disentangle themselves from their former imperial master, Moscow (Lewis 1996: 58-60).

Analyses of the views of some prominent Islamists reveal some core Islamist ideas with regard to democracy. These ideas have been influential among the Islamists in the Greater Middle East which is the home of the heartlands of Islam. For example, Mawdudi has been a significant figure; he lived in India and after the partition, in Pakistan. He argued that "Islam [...] is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy" and it repudiates the principle of popular sovereignty. Islamic politics is

founded on the sovereignty of God and vice regency of human beings on earth.

> A more apt name for the Islamic polity would be the 'kingdom of God' which is described in English as a "theocracy." But Islamic theocracy is something altogether different from the theocracy of which Europe has had bitter experience [....] the theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. The entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. If I were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe this system of government as "theo-democracy" that is to say a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this system of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have also the right to depose it. (Mawdudi 1976: 24-25).

Thus 'Islamic democracy' is limited because not even the whole Muslim community has the right to change an explicit command of Allah in a secular manner (Cf. Osman 1986: 79). Rules governing the ummah are to be divinely sanctioned and in the lack of further revelation[27], interpretations of the experts of Islamic law become important. The experts would guide the Muslims by making sure that their conduct is Islamic. Khomeini drew this line of argument to it logical extreme by his principle of the 'Guardianship of the Jurist (*Velayet-i Faqih*), where the religious experts hold the real political power as well[28]. The political power is subject to certain interpretation of religious knowledge, and, does not flow from the popular will (Cf. Roy 1994: 44). Because the masses are ignorant of religious doctrine and they might be misguided.

One frequent theme among Islamists is that Islam in fact provides more freedom than democracy in which freedom is imaginary. For example Sayyid Qutb, whose views are influential among Islamists, puts it as follows:

> This *din* [Islam] is a universal declaration of freedom of man from slavery [...] Any systems in which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the source of all authority are men, deifies human beings by designating others than

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[27] The end of revelation means that there could not be no new prophets and only the original Muslim community of the Prophet and first four caliphs are the valid references (See Tibi 1990: 39).
[28] On the principle of Velayet-i Faqih, see Piscatori (1986: 125) and Sayyid (1997).

Allah as lords over men (1993 [1964]: 47).

Qutb uses a familiar word for the Muslims to attack the modern (or modernising Muslim) societies: *Jahiliyyah* (Ignorance) denotes the pre-Islamic society which did not have the Islamic knowledge.

> The jahili [ignorant] society is any society other than the Islamic society [...] any society is a jahili society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah alone in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal norms [..] all the societies existing in the world today are jahili (1993 [1964]: 66).

It should be noted however that despite this kind of ideological intellectual opposition to democracy, where possible most Islamist groups do contest in national and local elections, for example in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine (and once in Algeria) where they often have good results which shows that Islamists are not marginal but either constitute, or at least gather the political support of important parts of their societies. However, given the widespread strong negative Islamist views on democracy it should not be surprising that there has been a deep suspicion among the secular rulers and pro-secular parts of Muslim societies with regard to Islamist 'use' of democratic means. There are important questions: Is it 'One man, one vote, one time'? Are they sincere in advocating democracy as a permanent way of politics or once in power would they turn to authoritarian methods and never again allow free elections? Generally, the secular elite, whose belief in democracy is quite often minimal or non-existent, do not want to take any risk by allowing Islamists to share the power. Hence, their risk-free politics in practice means continuation of repressive regimes. This is another important factor; Islamists, however large their numbers be, are generally among the oppressed themselves, and do not live in democratic cultures (Mayer 1999: 189).

It is clear that the God-centric political understanding of the most Islamists is

not compatible with modern politics. Because a core characteristic of modernity is secularity, which means, *inter alia*, that the politics is a human prerogative. Therefore, advocacy to 'unchanging' rules like that of Islamists is anathema to a modern understanding of politics.

However, this is not to say that there are no Islamists who hold that democracy and Islam are compatible. In fact, as Robin Wright observes that there is a growing number of Islamist reformers to whom she gives two examples: Abdul Karim Soroush and Rachid al-Ghannouchi. According to Wright, for the reformers the question is "how to modernise and democratise political and economic systems in an Islamic context." These reformers contend that Islam is flexible, and its principles can be interpreted to accommodate and even encourage pluralism. They challenge the notion that Islam has a single, definitive essence that denies change regardless of time, space and experience; and therefore, for example democracy is incompatible with or alien to Islam (Wright 1996: 66-67, quotation from p.66). It seems that the central drama of a possible Islamic reform is the difficulty to reconcile Islam and modernity by creating a worldview that is compatible with both and that is acceptable to majority of Muslims.

For Soroush, a Shi'ite from Iran, there is no contradiction between Islam and the freedoms inherent in democracy. Islam and democracy is not only compatible but their association is inevitable. Islam can grow. It should not be used as a modern ideology, because it is likely to become totalitarian. Secularism is not an enemy or rival of religion but its complement. "It means to look at things scientifically and behave scientifically-which has nothing to do with hostility to religion. Secularism is nothing more than that" (Wright 1996: 70; on Soroush, see also Arjomand 2002).

Ghannouchi, a Sunni from Tunisia. says that "Once the Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of Western modernity. such as democracy and human rights, they will search within Islam a place... [for]... them." Islam brought only general principles and "It is our duty to formulate this program through interaction between Islamic principles and modernity." For him, like Soroush, Islam and democracy are an inevitable mix (Wright 1996: 73-74, quotations from p.73 and 74).

However this line of thought and its highlight by westerners are not free from critics. M. E. Hamdi, for example, accuses Ghannouchi of confirming the supremacy of Western values and playing the "democracy card" to attract support from Western circles. And that is why he is one of the favourite Islamists of Western scholars like Wright, Esposito and Burgat. Hamdi also observes that "Westerners have not exactly been keen to engage in direct dialogue with the most prominent representatives of "Islamic fundamentalism" from Iran, Egypt or Sudan" (Hamdi 1996: 83; Cf. Piscatori 1986: 20).

2.5.1 Women According to Islamists

The place and rights of women in Muslim societies are hotly debated and they go beyond the issue of democracy (Ahmed 1992; Hassan 1994; Badawi 1993; Baykan 1990). It is a common view that the place of women is much further behind in Muslim countries than in modern (mainly Western) countries. The general view is that, especially in the West, the modernisation process in the economic social and political sphere also involved relative emancipation of the women. In the West the woman has become an individual and is on a par with the man, if not always in practice, at least

according to the laws[29].

It is a fact that the Qur'an addresses both the male and female Muslims in many verses, implying that they are equal Muslims (Esposito 1995: 30). However, it is also a fact that, according to most Islamist interpretations, polygyny is allowed up to four wives[30], whereas, polyandry is categorically forbidden.[31] It is also generally accepted that the Muslim women are required to dress 'modestly' and leave only their faces, hands uncovered. Islamic teaching emphasises the importance of the family and the role of the woman as mother and wife while making the husband responsible to provide for the household.

During the medieval period. like in many other non-Muslim societies, the Muslim women were treated as little more than creatures for men's pleasure and reproduction. Islam had an important but ultimately limited effect in lessening the suffering of the women in conservative Muslim milieu with a dominantly patriarchal social system predating Islam. So much so that, although explicitly un-Islamic, the level of domestic violence towards the wife and female children was (and is) very high.

As far as the contemporary Islamists are concerned it can be seen that their views break up with the medieval tradition and they advocate greater involvement of Islamist women in social and economic life, albeit in an Islamic way. According to Islamists, women should work –quite often in 'feminine' professions as teachers in primary schools, nurses or doctors serving to the female patients- without compromising Islamic dress or other Islamic conditions (Göle 1991). There are certain

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[29] Although, Islamists repeatedly argue that Islam gives a higher place to the women and safeguards their rights much better than other systems (see, for example, Al- Lail 1996).
[30] Islamists defend this on various grounds.
[31] For other traditional and recent Islamic views on women see (Mayer 1999: 97-130).

factors for the increasing emphasis on the education of the daughters in Islamist circles. The predominant one is perhaps, however limited, the success of the modernising state in spreading the education and its economic failure in creating a healthy economy with well-paid jobs. Therefore, many Islamist families, as in Turkey, see education as necessary for their daughters to stand a chance of having a decent job and thus making the much needed contribution to the family budget.

It should be stressed that it is still the case for Islamists to emphasise the 'feminine' side of the women as mothers and wives in a way detrimental to their full participation in economic and political life (Mayer 1999). There are almost no high ranking women in Islamist groups. Biological differences are used to argue that physically weak and "emotional" (rather than rational) women are different (rather than equal to) from the men (Roy 1994: 59). Hence, it is necessary to protect them from the harshness of the street or of political life.

2.5.2 Islamists and the Minorities

According to shariah rules, Christians and Jews in the conquered lands were allowed to continue in their beliefs provided that they pay a special poll tax (*jizya*). Although in theory, polytheists when conquered had two choices, becoming Muslim or death, Muslim toleration also extended in history to the Hindus and other polytheists. It is still a matter of pride for Muslims that compared to medieval Christian standards the religious minorities were shown far greater tolerance by Muslims (See, Mayer 1999: 135-6). However, it was as late as 1839 and 1856 and under the European pressure, that the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were granted equal legal status much to the

dismay of the Muslims[32].

It should be noted that, the Islamist suspicion of the Western policies is extended to religious minorities and their relations with the Western powers (including Israel as well, in this context). One can see that religious minorities in many Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan are complaining of human right abuses (see for example, Kazemi 1996). It must be stressed that, given the traditional Islamic understanding of Islam as a superior religion, Islamists find the modern doctrine of equality of all citizens in a country, difficult to accept. Differential treatment of non-Muslims is considered as a religious precept. At most, the non-Muslims must be treated fairly; they can share economic goods and social benefits but not political power (Vatikiotis 1987: 55). They are not ordinarily to be accepted as first class citizens of an Islamic state (see Mayer 1999: 84).

It may be necessary to touch briefly on some other issues, shaped by certain interpretations of Islam and incompatible with the liberal understanding of human rights. One of these is the 'extreme' punishments prescribed for certain crimes. For example amputation of the hand for theft, much caricatured in the Western media[33] or stoning to death for adultery which is continuation of a Semitic tradition (Deuteronomy 22:24) and not prescribed in the Qur'an (Watt 1988: 20). Another one is the death penalty for a Muslim who renounces Islam.[34] These forms of punishments may be shocking, but faithfully defended by Islamists in general by arguing that they are

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[32] It was complained semi-humorously by the Ottoman Muslims that it was no longer permissible to call a *gavur* (infidel) *gavur*.

[33] For example, despite the fact that the amount of the stolen goods must exceed a certain threshold in some Hollywood movies it is shown that the verdict of stealing a bread or apple is amputation.

[34] Although, it is argued by some Islamists that, as long as the 'apostate' does not engage in an active opposition to Muslim community (treason) the death penalty is not applicable; it is certain that, generally speaking renouncing Islam is not included in Islamist understanding of freedom of belief.

applicable only in an entirely Islamic society where there will be no need for theft or no temptation to commit adultery. Therefore, given the additional factor of severity of the punishments it is argued that these crimes will hardly be committed. So it should not be a central issue[35].

Fuller argues that the majority of Islamist movements have reached the conclusion that democratisation is the best overall vehicle to put their agenda to the public and gain political influence, and eventually come to power (2003: 29). Esposito also argues that many Muslims came to accept the notion of democracy but differed as to its precise meaning. Certain Islamic concepts (like consultation: *shura,* community consensus: *ijma* and interpretation: *ijtihad)* can be reinterpreted to support democratic concepts and institutions like the parliament, representative elections. Islamic organisations like the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan, the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan, Kashmir, India and Bangladesh, WP in Turkey, FIS in Algeria, ABIM in Malaysia among others have advocated the principle of democratic elections and where permitted participated in elections (1995: 217). Indeed, it cannot be denied that there are serious soul searching going on to find Islamic roots to support some form of democracy (Nasr 1996: 88; Esposito and Voll 1996: 28). However, it should be concluded that although Islamist understandings of democracy might quite often seem more 'democratic' than the actual situation in many Muslim countries, their desire to move away from 'tyranny' do not reach to the logical final destination when judged from the perspective of liberal democracy. This is because their conceptualisation of politics rest upon the dictum 'rule by the Islamic rules' (as interpreted by them) and not 'by the people'. Islamists tend to present Islamic values as eternal, immutable and final; this is in direct clash with

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[35] This is clearly a result of Islamist quest for authenticity. They are afraid of opening the flood gates by accepting the reformist views which argue that the important thing should be the punishment not the form of the punishment.

secularism and liberal democracy, because one essence of secularism and democracy is acceptance that there can be no finality of forms or exclusive claim to absolute and indivisible truth (cf. Vatikiotis 1987: 98). A greater degree of flexibility in interpretations is needed if any form of Islamic democracy is to be developed.

2.6 ISLAMISTS AND THE STATE

After his forced emigration to Medina in 622, Prophet Muhammad consolidated his political power and established a city-state[36]. He was the political leader as well as the religious leader. He had all the state power as head of state, commander of the army and the chief judge. His authority and its acceptance by his followers were based on his being prophet of God and Qur'anic mandate: "Obey God and the Prophet" (3: 32), "Whoever obeys the Prophet, obeys God" (4:80). Moreover, He was the model which Muslims were to follow: "You have a good model in God's Prophet" (33: 21). Throughout the years, the Prophet's exemplary character and conduct, his continued reception of divine revelations, and his success, reinforced his position of leadership. Under Muhammad's guidance, Islam 'crystallised' as both a faith and a socio-political system albeit with some empty spaces as we will see.

Although there are no clear-cut definitions of the state and government in Islam, this does not mean that there are no general Islamic principles concerning the state. The state in Islam can be said to be founded on certain general principles laid down by the Qur'an and Sunna. The first and perhaps the most important principle is that all authority in the universe lies with Allah who created it. Thus only Allah is to be obeyed and man can be obeyed only if Allah commands it. The second principle is that the

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[36] The choice of date of Migration (Hijra) as the beginning of Islamic calendar by Caliph Umar 17 years later (Hitti 1970: 116) is indicative that the political independence and freedom from religious oppression provided by the establishment of Islamic state in Medina was of paramount importance for the early Muslims and of still symbolic value.

Islamic law has already been legislated in the Qur'an by Allah and in the Sunna of the prophet, the latter being the authoritative exposition of the Qur'an and which was also dependent on revelation (Brown 1996). The Qur'an and the Sunna are enough for the guidance of the mankind and Muslims must enforce existing Islamic regulations in all spheres of their life, or at most, must produce new interpretations through ijtihad which must be in conformity with the more basic Islamic rules (Iqbal 1986: 37: El-Awa 1980: 74-82).

According to the verse (3: 59), Muslims are commanded to obey Allah, the Prophet and those among them who are in authority. This verse has been traditionally interpreted by the Sunni scholars as commanding obedience even to tyrants who might be no more than just nominal Muslims for the fear of anarchy that would be caused by a rebellion and would result in greater evil (El-Awa 1980). Vatikiotis argues that since the 11th century "the only political theory of Islam has been that of passive obedience to any de facto authority," government by consent was unknown and autocracy has been the only experience (1987: 22). In contrast, today, Islamists generally hold that the obedience is conditional and it is a religious must only if the rulers themselves are in obedience to the commandments of Allah and the Prophet.

Traditionally, Muslim jurists have emphasised three important features of an Islamic state: the Muslim community (ummah), the Islamic law (shariah), and the leadership of the Muslim community (caliph, imam or emir). Since the absolute authority or ultimate sovereignty belongs to Allah, the Muslim community is to be governed according to the shariah[37] and the Islamic state must uphold the supremacy of shariah. The Islamic state must have an executive with a head of state to implement or

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[37] Although, today shariah is generally used to mean the Islamic law; in fact it means in Arabic, among other things, "the way to the water"; so shariah in a general sense means whole body of Islamic rules.

execute the shariah. Although, the head of state has no inherent power to legislate in certain exceptional circumstances he is authorised to alter, or suspend some Islamic laws or make subordinate legislation. But to do so, there has to be a body of advisers (*shura*) to consult its members to determine the nature of the subordinate legislation. According to a certain school of jurists though, he is not bound by their advice (Iqbal 1986: 38).

To use today's terminology, according to Islamic constitution the Islamic state has two important organs: the executive and the judiciary; the possible third organ -the legislative is constitutionally undefined, rather there is no place for a legislative like the ones in the western democracies. Because, it is assumed that all important legislation has already been laid down by Allah in the Qur'an and through the means of the Prophet whose Sunna was also dependent on revelation according to some views, or at least inspired and guided by Allah. Therefore, the government's duty is to implement it, not to change it. The need for legislation on issues not specified by shariah, which presumably will be subordinate rather than change the basics, can be met with due consultation with the shura or by ijtihad of the jurists. There are two verses in the Qur'an indicated by experts about consultation (42: 38 and 3: 159). In the first consultation is recommended, meaning that it is not obligatory. However the second verse, addressed the Prophet, contains instruction that those who have authority should consult the community on all matters of importance.

Islamic political thinking has been concentrated on the headship of the Islamic state (the caliphate or the imamate). It is evident that the first four leaders of the Muslim community could only be appointed with the consent of the people; women were not excluded from this process. It must be clearly pointed out that there was no hereditary

succession: one might say that it was specifically excluded. However, it was through hereditary successions that the caliphs came into their positions until 1924 when the caliphate was abolished in Turkish Republic.

What is important to note that, although the form of state is not clearly defined in Islam and constitutional theory is rather underdeveloped, as pointed out above, the general Islamic principles that are binding on Muslims are also to be respected by an Islamic state (El-Awa 1980: 74-82). Thus, in the Muslim world, Islamists and conservative Muslims often too easily argue that their governments are un-Islamic or not Islamic enough by pointing out their 'clear' disregard for these principles.

Today, the political importance of Islamists largely stems from their aspiration to state power. In Iran and Sudan they have succeeded. In Algeria they were stopped by a coalition dominated by the army. As discussed in Chapter 1, the modernisation of the state caused an unprecedented increase in its importance for society. It was relatively easy for the religious or political groups in medieval times to withdraw from centres of society as a form of protest or a way of escaping the wrath of the rulers, but escape from the modern state is not an option anymore. Its extensive power makes it almost natural for the political groups to fix their eyes on the ways of taking state power under their control. This is also by and large the case for Islamists. Therefore, it has no impact on Islamists to argue, like many of their critics do, that their aspiration to political power is indeed a radical break from the Islamic tradition. The cause of Islamist aspiration to state power, however, cannot be explained solely by the limited modernisation of the state where its new and more efficient apparatuses severely restricts breathing spaces for the Islamist groups which are generally in opposition (often *the* opposition). For Islamists the state power is also necessary for an Islamic society. Ayubi, who argues

that Islam is not particularly a political religion, accepts that it is not private or individualistic either and, Islam "stresses above all the *collective* enforcement of *public* morals" (1991: 35). Interestingly, he admits that his conclusion that Islam is not political depends on "a narrow and possibly artificial, conception of politics" that dominates contemporary political science (1991: 239). But, this is exactly the point; Islamists who advocate an all-encompassing interpretation of Islam do not accept a narrow conception of politics.

It can be seen that, starting from the second half of the 19th century, the state power has been used in many Muslim countries by secular elite to disestablish traditional understanding of Islam and popularise an 'official' version of it. Therefore it is not surprising to see that many Islamist leaders pointed out the importance of using the state power in the service of Islam (i.e. their particular understanding of it). "The reforms that Islam wants to bring about cannot be affected by sermons alone. Political power is also essential to achieve them" (Ahmed 1980: 5). However, there is no clear model of an Islamic state. This situation is defended by Mawdudi: "Islam does not prescribe any definite form for the formation of the consultative body or bodies for the simple reason that it is a universal religion meant for all times and climes" (1980: 260). In a sense, constitutional or institutional formulas do not occupy Islamists too much because there is a deep belief that Islam has the answer for all aspects of life. There is also a circular logic; the important thing is the quality of Muslim, the believer. If the Muslims are as virtuous as Islamists want them, the Muslim society will be problem-free, a paradise on earth. Therefore, the important thing is to emphasise Islamic qualities of the 'core' groups of Islamist groups who actually try to mould society in their own image.

As far as the Islamist political theory concerned, it can be argued that the main emphasis is changeable. Traditionally, it has been the head of the state rather than other possible organs like consultative body (*shura*) or judiciary. The main reason for this perhaps is the idealised historical record. The Prophet, the Rightly Guided Caliphs[38] and pious Umar Bin Abdulaziz are the examples of Islamic leaders. They were pious, wise, just. upright. strong in leadership. Today, these qualities are sought by Islamists in a leader. In other words the Islamist emphasis is on power rather than democracy; on *adala* (justice)[39] rather than freedom, on the group (community) rather than the individual.[40]

However, today is far from the ideal for Islamists who are in opposition and the state persecution and abuse of them is the rule rather than exception. Therefore Islamists aimed to gain a voice in the exercise of the state power, and worked toward removing or changing powerful elements within the state who opposes them (Fuller 2003: 124). It seems only natural for them to employ a certain interpretation of Islam in de-legitimisation of the present regimes in the eyes of the population. The immediate task is often to stop, or at least lessen, the secular state's arbitrary oppression by advocating, for example, to rule of law which exists in Islam in their view. It is an often emphasised point that Islam commands the rules to be applied fully and indiscriminately among the Muslims.

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[38] For example, Umar the second caliph considered the safety of a lamb on the bank of the Euphrates as his responsibility (Ayubi 1991: 16). The salary of the first caliph Ebu Bakr was only half a sheep a day.
[39] Justice depends on the wise ruler or judge who applies Islamic rules to each case impersonally but according its specificities.
[40] It is important to note that there are some views that since Islam is a 'comprehensive way of life' it is best suitable for a totalitarian society. One can argue that in Iran after 1979 a totalitarian interpretation of Islam was employed in the fervour of the revolution. The active participation of the individuals was welcome by the regime partly because of the war against the Iraq. However, in the late 1990's the so-called hard-liners took an authoritarian stance when the relatively moderate Khatemi who was selected as president tried to implement some 'liberalising' policies that he promised to the electorate.

For some Islamist groups who advocate the 'from-the-below', approach the capture of the state is not the main aim but it is a fundamental instrument within the larger aim of re-Islamising the whole society. After that the state may not be essential. For example, Turabi argues that the Islamic state cannot exist without an Islamic society and "Islamic society can exist and has existed without the structures of a state for centuries" (see, Esposito (ed) 1983: 241, 243). Nevertheless for the majority of Islamists it seems that the capture of the state, as their proportion increase in society, is a logical and necessary step. The state power must be used in further Islamisation of society 'from-the-top'; and to defend Islamist way of life against enemies within and non-Muslim foreign powers that might conspire to undermine it.

There are radical small Islamist groups who advocate an armed struggle against the state which are not focused upon in this study. They may be qualified as extremists or terrorist. They use terrorism against Western, particularly American targets. They seem to have an ambiguous relationship with the larger Islamist groups in general. It can be said the attitude of the state is crucial in this respect; when the Islamist groups are crushed by the state forces ruthlessly, using arbitrary, mass- imprisonment, torture or even extra-legal execution, like happened in Algeria or Egypt, it becomes easier for groups condoning terrorism to recruit new members from the larger Islamist population who become more radical (see, for example, Toth 2003).

2.7 ISLAMISTS VIS-À-VIS NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-STATE

Nationalism as analysed in the previous chapter, as a European creation, has been one of the most important forces of modernity. It has been mainly a secularising ideology and movement, closely related to the building of nation-states. The nation-

state based on a secular politics is the norm in the West. In the rest of the world, one can say that the secular nation-state is also dominant but there are a few nation-states where the religion is decisive in politics (e.g. Iran). It is important that Israel is also seen, especially by Islamists, as a state which has been founded and is being faithfully defended by the Jews who owes this success to their religious devotion. The lesson to be learned, of course, is that a similar attitude by Muslims would produce similar successes (Schwedler 2001: 10).

Nationalism has been a potent force in many Muslim countries too, where it has been often the major force in nation-state building. In the Ottoman Empire, under the pressure of modernising Western powers and Russia, the idea of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism were used to maintain its multinational structure with no success. Turkish nationalism was the last resort, after all the remaining imperial possessions in Europe were lost to nationalist movements in the Balkans. The World War I proved that the Arabs also wanted independence. With the support of the Western powers (especially Britain and France) the Arabs fought against the Ottomans who were fighting the Allies as an ally of Germany. Many Turks still see this Arab revolt as a stab in the back. Needless to say, contrary to the Western promises, the Arabs had to wait for decades for their real political independence. In discussing the Ottomans, Nadwi, a leading Islamist who influenced Qutb, laments the loss of their leadership, and their state as the shield of Islam against an advancing Europe. Nadwi recalls that the Ottoman state had a huge territory where Islam "held sway." Despite its decline, up until deposition of Abdulhamid in 1909, Christian and Jewish conspiracies and attacks against the Muslim Holy places (Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem) were halted. But, the Allies succeeded in attracting the Arabs to their side, thus separating the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire, and recast them as nation-states which, even when they attained independence,

had no strong hand to protect them. Then, Israel, a creation of big European powers. was eventually able to dominate these new states and to possess Jerusalem for the first time in history. "The end of the Ottoman Empire was the greatest victory for crusader Europe and world Judaism" (cited by Vatikiotis 1987:128). In these views the Islamist association of decline of Muslims with the loss of earthly power and their selective reading of history is clear.

In Turkey, Iran and most Arab countries such as Egypt. Syria. Iraq, Algeria (Saudi Arabia being an exception) political independence came under the leadership of secular, nationalist elites. Understandably, intellectuals from religious minorities and modernist Muslims actively supported the development of a secular nationalism. For example the development of Bat'hism as a form of nationalist Arab 'socialism' which has been influential in Syria and Iraq, owed much to Michel Aflaq a Christian from Damascus (Hourani 1991b: 404). Nasser, the charismatic dictator of Egypt, became the leader of Arab nationalism. His Egypt, along with Syria and Iraq built close ties with the Soviet Union. The ideology in some of these Arab countries was Arab Socialism. which was dubbed as "communism plus Allah". It was presented as a third way eschewing evils of capitalism (individualism, wealth concentration or consumerism) and of Marxist socialism (atheism, class conflict) (Esposito 1995: 73).

However, it is an important point that starting with Turkey in 1923, Muslims have begun to live in nation-states most of which have been based on secular nationalism. In the case of Arabs the success of nationalism, as far as building a state for the nation is concerned, is ambiguous. There are more than 10 major Arab nation-states for more than 250 million Arabs. This means fragmented, or artificially created - as Islamists and many other secular Arabs would like to put it- Arab states with many

conflicts among them. This fact in turn makes the Arabs disunited and hence weak in the international arena.

Islamists are generally opposed to nationalism and nation-state as ideas[41] for both doctrinal and pragmatic reasons. As discussed above. according to Islamists, Islam leaves no secular domain in life, let alone a secular space for the state power which is the natural result of a secular nationalism. It is often pointed out. in rejection of ethnicity based definition of Islam that among the close companions of the Prophet there were Blacks or Persians, and that the Prophet said that there was no Arab superiority over the non-Arab and vice versa. The Qur'an also declares that the different ethnic groups are created so that they may know each other not that they may despise each other. Superiority is only shown through religious piety (49: 13).

Therefore, in line with the Islamic doctrine, Islamists hold that the religious and political community (ummah) of Islam must be one. In other words, Muslims are a religiopolitical community (Esposito 1995: 30). There is no place for discrimination on the basis of race or nationality. The ummah is "We" and the rest is "Them" in the final analysis. Since the political community of Muslims is identical to the religious community, ideally it is governed by a leader who has both political and religious knowledge. All administrative acts are subject to Islamic norms. It is interesting to note that the medieval view of some scholars that there may be more than one caliph, because of geographical distances among Islamic countries which may prohibit effective ruling, cannot be defended today due to advances in the communication

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[41] See for example Mawdudi (1986: 37) and Qutb who writes "A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the *Shari'ah* of Allah is established [...] A Muslim has no nationality except his belief which makes him a member of the Muslim community in dar-al-Islam" (1993 [1964]: 103), these ideas are very similar to those voiced by Ottoman Islamists who declared many decades ago that Fatherland was where shariah prevails (Lewis 1968: 323).

technology.

Pragmatically, since about one fifth of the world population is Muslim, Islamists argue that a united front of Muslims would be a great force in world politics and it would mean the end of humiliating situation of Muslims. The political and economic problems of Muslims would be easier to solve. Jerusalem would be saved. Economic backwardness of many Muslim societies would be eradicated by the common use of Muslim wealth and energy. For example, the oil revenues would be used for the whole of ummah (an idea, naturally much disliked by rich oil states). A successful economic cooperation among the Muslims would not only provide much needed steady economic growth but also serve to boost the self-confidence in the cultural realm as well, especially vis-à-vis the West.

It is easy to see that a secular nationalism which denies the centrality of Islam in politics is in conflict with the ideal of an Islamic state where the political community is defined on the basis of religion.[42] However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, there may be nationalisms with religious ingredient. In this sense, it can be said that there are no qualms of Islamists in Iran, Turkey, Algeria or Egypt to accept a form of religious nationalism which define the nation as the Muslims in that country. Hence, the article 115 of Iranian constitution stipulates that the president must possess Iranian origin and Iranian nationality.

Many Islamists indicted nationalism for causing division among the Muslims. Today, it seems that all Muslim states accept the principles of international politics among the nation-states. There are serious conflicts among them[43] and almost no

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[42] Which is fully open to converts. See also Vatikiotis 1987, especially pp.42-44.
[43] Many Muslim countries have better relationships with the Western countries than their Muslim

preferential treatment (Piscatori 1986: 111), a situation which must be changed according to Islamists.

The institution of the nation-state and the principles of international state system are obstacles to an Islamist vision of the world. According to Islamists, Islam as a religion and civilisation must be a determining force in shaping the activities of the Muslims; however it is the other way around. Islam is subordinate to the nation-state structure in Muslim countries. To a considerable extent it is the state which defines and shapes the role of Islam in society and in international relations. Islam is just another factor, albeit often a very important one, in articulating the national interests. Islamist aim is to make it *the* defining one. Needless to say, a strictly ideologically defined foreign policy might be very ambitious to the point of world-domination and often makes a nation-state a threat to others. This can be seen in the case of Iran where the export of the 'Islamic Revolution' has been a state policy (Esposito 1995: 19-22) which made Iran a threat to neighbouring Muslim states, like Turkey, oil-rich Gulf states and hence to the Western countries (e.g. the U.S.A), because of their high dependency to the oil.

Unification of all Muslim states to constitute a super-state of all Muslim ummah is a utopia that is perceived to have existed in Islamic golden ages. Some argue that the unified ummah never existed (Tibi 1990: 11). For Islamists, establishment of Islamist regimes in some leading Muslim countries, for example in the Middle East which may cause great strategic threats to the West, seems an initial step towards final unification. Given the negative image of the West among Islamists of the region, it is highly likely that such states would take a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the Western states, but this

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neighbours.

is by no means certain. It could be averted by a change in the Western policies and a moderation in Islamist views.

Establishment of an Islamist regime in an influential Sunni Muslim country, for example, in Egypt seems a remote possibility, but if it happens this would send great shock waves to all other Sunni, and especially Arab countries with a great possibility of the establishment of other Islamist regimes there. At the moment the West is perceived to be supporting the current secular regimes and *betting* against a Sunni Islamic revolution. It happened in Iran against what turned out to be a Shi'ite revolution.

2.8 ISLAMISTS, KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIALISATION

As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, in the evolution of modernity, crudely put, growing amount of knowledge and changing (e.g. secularised) attitudes toward it, its development and systematisation as science, its application as technology and overall industrialisation of Europe (as a closely related development), do account for much. Islamists approaches to these concepts reveal their general stance vis-à-vis modernity.

It is a well known suggestion that one of the major reasons for the decline of the Muslim world is the Islamic attitude towards knowledge. This seems paradoxical given the well known hadith that "Seek the knowledge even from China" (i.e. even at the other end of the world). However, it is assumed that given the (alleged) other-worldliness of Islam, the knowledge must mean the divine knowledge, what really matters for the Muslims. It must be granted that other worldly tendencies in Islam are

well known and perhaps majestically manifested in the Sufi tradition.[44] It can be argued that the historical evidence is in more support of an Islam which encourages other-worldly orientated Muslim. The medieval passivity of Muslims vis-à-vis the political authority and their more recent passivity in responding to the advent of modern science[45] is largely attributed to their fatalism, a reflection of otherworldliness[46]. In this tradition, for example, many Muslims leave it to Allah to avenge their maltreatment, rather than taking action against it (Mernissi 1993: 57).

However, Weber classified Islam as this-worldly but lacking asceticism, which was also necessary in his view, for capitalist development. It would be more correct to accept that there are competing strands in Islam and both other and this worldly emphasis (Vatikiotis 1987: 32). In fact, the Prophet advised moderation in observing worshipping and forbid excessiveness in religion (see, Lemu 1993). Therefore, it would be more in line with the spirit of Islam, for a Muslim, to try to strike a balance between this world and the hereafter. Obviously this is no easy task due to many differing traditions and interpretations. For example for many sufis, this world had no significance to the point of nothingness in value, because after all, it is transitory. However, Islamists prefer to conclude from the Islamic sources that this world must be important and its importance stems from the fact that it is the only instrument to gain the pleasure (*Rida*) of Allah which, by definition, is the ultimate/real aim. Therefore, the

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[44] For example, it is reported that famous Sufi Ibn Arabi gifted his only house to a beggar who asked perhaps "for the sake of Allah", for the lack of anything to give or in the case of a Sufi who only ate flavour after coming to conclusion that he loses valuable time for chewing in which he preferred to *zikr* (chanting [attributes of God])

[45] Hoodbhoy observes that Muslims who lead the world in science between 9th and 13th centuries had not succeeded creating a scientific revolution and what is worse later they did not take the science and technology from Europe where they were developed. There was a larger problem than simple disorganisation on the parts of Muslim in importing these on time. Perhaps due to unfavourable developments in Islamic philosophy or extreme sense of superiority at that time, Muslims did not show enough interest in the scientific and technological development that took place in Europe (see, Hoodbhoy 1993).

[46] Otherworldliness finds encouragement in the Qur'an "What is the life of this world but play and amusement" (6: 32).

world, including worldly power (political, economical etc.) must be under Islamist control if the 'will' of God is to be realised and if Islam to be lived fully. This means in practice that Islamist understanding of Islam must be dominant in the Muslim community (ummah) and ummah must be free from un-Islamic, including foreign, influences. This, at a minimum, requires an adequate scientific, technological and industrial base.

One can often come across traditional categorisation of knowledge by Muslims as divine and non-divine. This seems to have some influence over Islamists who are anxious to subordinate interpretations of growing 'non-divine' knowledge to a proper understanding of divine message. Qutb's, stance is highly indicative of the Islamist attitude vis-à-vis knowledge. What really matters in the end is correct religious knowledge to live by[47]. Interestingly he includes economics in the issues like 'matters of faith, acts of worship, morals and principles of politics' which are to be learnt from a pious Muslim. Whereas "abstract sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, astronomy, medicine, industry, agriculture, administration (limited to its technical aspects), technology, military arts, and similar other sciences and arts" can be learnt from a non-Muslim if need be. To learn "these essential sciences and arts" to meet the needs of the community is "a collective obligation" for the Muslim ummah (1993[1964]: 92-93).

One can see that, self-servingly, the ideologues of Islamist groups tend to belittle non-religious sciences. The expertise in these sciences are encouraged but expected to serve obediently to the cause of building and maintaining an Islamist society, ruled

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[47] Watt argues that there is a difference in Muslim and Western approaches to knowledge. For Muslims knowledge is primarily "for living" and for the Westerner it is mainly "for power" (i.e. to dominate the nature and other human beings). In the kind of knowledge for living (religious and moral values) Islam claims finality and self-sufficiency (1988: 13).

ultimately in accordance with Islam as authoritatively interpreted by spiritual leaders (e.g. Khomeini, Qutb, Mawdudi) who are well versed in the Qur'anic and Prophetic (Sunna) knowledge.

The most important knowledge in Islam depends on the belief in the authority of Allah. Thus, Islam provides the ultimate Truth from Allah through messengership of Muhammad. However, since this knowledge is not a scientific knowledge in the modern sense, it is open to contestation[48]. Therefore, 'the Islamic Truth', like other truths, needs backing of the earthly power in practice for its claim to be the Truth[49]. This is because, as often, secular elite and scientists use the scientific knowledge as a "veil" in front of a correct understanding of Islam according to many Islamists. The limits of human reason and scientific knowledge must be recognised and it should not be forgotten that if properly understood natural sciences can only lead to Allah as pointed out by Islamist leaders from Said Nursi[50] to Qutb and Khomeini (see, Euben 2003).

It should be noted that, the secularised scientific method and conceptualisation of what amounts to be science and the methods of its research and transmission to new generations (e.g. the university) have all been developed in Europe and by and large became dominant in the world. This situation is causing anxiety for Islamists. Some Western scientific ideas (e.g. the Theory of Evolution) are perceived to be in conflict

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[48] It might be more accurate to call it Islamic wisdom which had been perceived to be in need of transmission (*nakl*) to new generations rather than reason (*aql*) (Ayubi 1991). However it should not be forgotten that, naturally Islam teaches that Islamic truths are the bases of one Muslim's life and there are different levels of knowing these religious truths. Thus, scientific knowledge can be taken as a preliminary, ultimately not that important stage in discovering higher and much more important truths.

[49] For the relationship between truth and power see (Foucault 1980). As Foucault argues the truth is not external to the power relations.

[50] An important concern for Nursi (d. 1960) the leader of the *Nurculuk* movement in Turkey, was to show that modern sciences coming to Turkey from Europe were actually showing the greatness of God rather than being a tool for systematic de-mystification of Islam, and some atheistic propaganda, at the hands of the secularised (see, Yıldırım 1995: 151).

with traditional Islamic beliefs. Many other scientific developments are interpreted in such a way to diminish the claim of Islam on certain aspects of life.[51]

It seems possible to make a few generalisations with regard to Islamist attitudes vis-à-vis modern scientific, technical knowledge and technology. These attitudes, as suggested above, include downplaying the importance or relevance of these knowledge vis-à-vis most important aims of life (i.e. leading an Islamic life). There seems a psychological barrier for Islamists to learn and borrow from the non-Muslims especially with regard to interpersonal relations and social organisation. Islamists advocate a selective approach toward the scientific knowledge based on the view that modernity is divisible. There are good and bad parts and it is possible and desirable to make learning and borrowing from non-Muslim (e.g. Western) cultures subject to Islamic scrutiny and approval. Technology can be separated from the social (i.e. Western) milieu that enables its creation. In other words technology is generally considered value-neutral (for example, see Nasr 1996: 52) and, can and should be harnessed for Islamic purposes. For example an Egyptian scholar, Yusuf Kardawi, who answers the questions via the satellites channels like Al Jazeera, is very much in favour of using the internet to be able to convey the Islamic message to the its intended universe. "We must use the technique of the age to serve to Islam" (*Yeni Şafak* 10. 5.1997).

There has been a tension testing the leadership ability of spiritual leaders of the Islamist groups. There are vast numbers of technically educated professionals in Islamist groups who might advocate a more secular organisation of economy and perhaps society. In fact, this occupational differentiation has been a core process of

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[51] One example is the occurrence of the rain. Islam teaches that it is, *inter alia*, a blessing from Allah. When some Turkish Muslims make ceremonies of 'rain prayers' during drought it is the *custom* of many secular Turks, including some elite, to belittle this as a useless tradition of medieval minds by talking about the mechanics of the rain (see, Dursun 1996: 45).

secularisation in the West. Islamist answer to this, the emphasis on the instrumentality of non-religious expertise, has not been fully successful: and it can be seen that, there is a certain level of secularisation – e.g. escape from the full control of the spiritual leader by the technically educated- in organising activities of Islamist groups observable for example in Turkey.

As far as technology is concerned it is important to note that the 'stagnation' of Muslims vis-à-vis the West has been felt due to the advance of the West in science and technology. The majority of Muslim countries have been the underdogs militarily, politically and economically for now around 200 years. In today's globalising world, modern technology imposes itself on everybody; it also willingly or unwillingly preoccupies Islamists at different corners of the world. One interesting example might be the sophisticated weapon systems (e.g. Stinger or similar missiles) possessed by the Taliban (whom might be considered partially Islamists but mainly rural ultra-traditionalists) in Afghanistan who on the other hand destroyed video tapes or cameras as un-Islamic.

The importance of technology and an industrialised economy is clearly shown by the West and some other advanced industrialised countries (e.g. Japan). Therefore, it is only natural for Islamists to advocate for a high-technology industrialised state and blame their current rulers for failing in this task. Usually cited causes like corruption and resulting mismanagement, waste or laziness are said to be against the Islamic virtues. Technological products are also of useful in re-Islamisation of society. Tape, video cassettes, fax, photocopy machines, the internet were and are very important in Islamisation efforts. Television or radio channels, often using satellites, are also used. There are large numbers of experts among Islamists who are well-versed in technology.

Another important disturbing point for Islamists is the lack of industrial base in most Muslim countries. Even rich ones capable of developing their industries generally make off-the-shelf purchases from the advanced western states. For example, Saudi Arabia spends tens of billions of dollars to buy arms from USA or UK but these weapons still failed to save them from humiliatingly requesting, largely American, help against the Iraqis during the Gulf War (Mitchell 2002). This kind of spending of petro-dollars or their investment in the West is criticised not only by Islamists but by more liberal Muslim intellectuals like Memissi (1996: 257) who points out that these funds may be used to provide employment to large number of unemployed young Muslims in North Africa and Middle East, who feel totally useless and let down by the current system[52].

2.9 ISLAMISTS AND CAPITALISM

Another important concept associated with modernity is capitalism and Islamist views with regard to it worth analysing. Since the Islamic world is one of the areas where endogenous capitalist development did not occur, it is very easy to argue that the reasons for the blockage are to be found in the precepts of Islam and in the historical developments (see, for example, Langman and Morris 2002). However, the conclusions of Rodinson (1974) are well known. A pre-capitalist sector existed in the Muslim Empire, and Islam did not stand in the way of its development.

It can be argued that a general evaluation would reveal that Islam is more conducive towards a capitalist economy than a command (socialist or fascist) economy. According to frequent themes in publications by Islamists, Islam safeguards private

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[52] In fairness, it must be pointed out that the Muslim states failed to save Kuwait and they would certainly fail to save Saudi Arabia or any other rich oil state in case of an occupation by a neighbouring

property and inheritance, justifies profit made in the market and accepts bargaining between employer and the employee to determine the wage. It encourages the active use of savings (capital?) by taxing it in the form of zakat (Khan 1995: 33). As far as socialism is concerned, it is possible to refer to examples in Islamic history encouraging egalitarian use of economic resources[53] and one should not forget the strong emphasis on the general welfare of the community rather than that of the individual (Vatikiotis 1987: 32). However, in recent times. perhaps most of Islamists have not been in favour of a socialist economic order which. *inter alia*, seemed to be guilty of associating with an 'atheist' state, the Soviet Union which pursued an aggressive secularisation policy which included de-Islamisation of millions of Muslims lived within its borders, as well as de-Christianisation.

Although, Islamists often propagate that they are in favour of neither capitalism nor socialism but a third way superior to both[54], so far their economic views have been closer to a capitalist understanding[55] which seems more in line with Islamist emphasis on justice[56] rather than on equality. Roy argues that many Islamists emphasise all that is compatible with capitalism in Islam (1994: 136). Ray Takeyh also argues that "[m]oderate Islamists are likely to be most liberal in the realm of economic policy. The failure of command economies in the Middle East and centrality of global markets to the region's economic rehabilitation have made minimal government intervention

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Muslim states. The Islamist wishes to create a Muslim UN or an Islamic International Court remain just wishes (Gauhar 1978: 309, Piscatori 1986: 101-111).

[53] For example according to a hadith humans have common ownership of three things: grass, water and fire. More importantly, a leading companion (Ebu Zer Gifari) was strongly in favour of equal distribution of the wealth, this led some to refer to him as the first Muslim 'socialist' (See, Abrahamian (1988) and Roy (1994: 135).

[54] For Mawdudi's views to this effect see (Nasr 1996: 103), see also (Turner 1994: 88).

[55] For example according to Hadar some clerics in Iran were economically liberal, ideologically closer to Thatcher and Reagan than pro-American statist rulers elsewhere (1993: 36).

[56] Justice in practice means that the individual are to be rewarded according to his ability. Erbakan once said that in justifying his small fortune, if a person does the job of three persons he can earn the weight of three persons in gold.

appealing to Islamist theoreticians" (see. McDaniel 2003: 518-519). However, given the lack of clear rules in Islam which can be interpreted as favouring a certain mode of economy; it should not be surprising to see Islamists in the future re-interpreting Islamic doctrines on economy as anti-capitalist if they see it fit. In fact, the existence of higher moral objectives in Islamist ideology provides a convenient tool for from arguing, for example, against consumerism to justifying economic failure, or belittling importance of economic factors in mobilisation of people, as in the case of Iran[57]. Very importantly, unlike in the West, for Islamists the economy cannot have its own fully independent logic; it must be subject to higher Islamic principles (McDaniel 2003). Therefore, it can be argued that, under normal conditions the capitalist economies with their pursuit of profit very little restricted by morality are to be more successful than an Islamically organised economy which may have a basically capitalist structure but nevertheless have to uphold certain moral principles[58]. This line of argument is countered by Islamists, similar to Marxism, that in fact an ideologically motivated work force and consumers in an Islamist society would ensure economic success.

It can be seen that with the increasing importance of economic activity and its gaining complexity, new Islamist interpretations are being put forward. These interpretations are often presented as depending on certain ground rules with an economic impact in Islam (e.g. zakat, participation in the risk in business and hence ban of usury (*riba*) (the Qur'an 2: 275-80, 30: 39)[59]. Thus Islamists have to systematise and

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[57] Khomeini said that the Islamic revolution was not motivated by a desire to make "melons plentiful", to argue that there were deeper ideological motives behind it (Behdad 1994: 811).

[58] This is like following an ethical foreign policy which restricts the sale of arms to certain countries at the expense of short-term economic loss which means unemployment.

[59] The precise meaning of riba is debated (Watt 1988: 107) and there have been some weakly put propositions that a 'fair' amount of interest should be accepted in Islam. One can see that, it is often argued by non-Islamist Muslim and non-Muslim experts that the proposed ways by Islamists to avoid interest in economic activity are quite often thin disguises that can only serve to guilt reduction (see, for example, McDaniel 2003).

conceptualise a coherent ensemble of basic shariatic prescriptions that would often offer a 'middle' ground between two systems of the twentieth century socialism and capitalism in various national contexts (cf. Roy 1994: 132-133). The economic activity must be exercised within the ethical framework provided by Islam. The political authority must ensure the social justice which is of paramount importance according to Islamic ideals. In fact, in the name of upholding the interest of the public an Islamic government can be said to have an enormous degree of flexibility and array of tools and as a result a more egalitarian and redistributive economic theory will remain within options of Islamism.

It can be observed that Islamism tends to function consciously or unconsciously as a vehicle for certain class aspirations although Islamists strongly oppose to Marxist interpretations of society with its purely material vision of life and its distinctions among warring classes, politics of hatred and envy[60]. Nevertheless, Islamists tend to attract social groups or individuals that felt excluded by the statist elite. Islamists have typically drawn their largest base of support from the lower-middle class, petty bourgeoisie and the urban rather than rural population (Fuller 2003: 34).

2.10 THE WEST AND MODERNITY ACCORDING TO ISLAMISTS

Defining 'the West' is hard, not just for Westerners but for Muslims as well. Sometimes to Muslims 'the West' means the entire industrialised world including Japan, in other words those who have dominant influence over the international economy, such as the G-7 states. At times, 'the West' means former colonial nations -all

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[60] This Islamist policy is also may be because in the Middle East "horizontal class divides are far less important than vertical cleavages between ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities" (Hale 1994: 320).

European- who conquered and dominated most of the Muslim world at some point in history. Sometimes 'the West' actually refers to the United States as the leading Western power and dominant political, cultural and economic actor in the Muslim world. On occasions 'the West'' refers to elements of Western populations who hold and express negative impressions of the Muslim world. It can be seen that Islamists use the term 'the West' usually to refer to the USA and leading West European countries.

Although as Lewis observes, "the Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the Muslim regions of the Third World been the most passionate and the most extreme in their hostility" (1990: 48), it became very common to argue, especially after the end of the cold war that Islam might be the next threat to replace communism (see, Esposito 1995: 4-5). Overall it can be argued that, perhaps not from the great majority of ordinary Muslims but from a sizeable Islamist minority within the Muslim world a most important, multidimensional challenge to certain Western countries and policies exists.

For Islamists, there are certain problems posed by the West to the Muslim World stemming from abuse of its superior power over the rest of the world, a fact which has become much more unmistakable after the collapse of the bipolar world. As Bin Sayeed observes, the West does have a hegemony over the Muslim world and more visibly so in the Middle East which is the region of many leading Muslim countries. Hegemony means, in this context, the dominant role that have been being exercised in the region by countries like the United States, Britain, France or other European states, either solely or in cooperation with each other. This hegemonic or dominant role is exercised by these certain countries because of their ascendant position in the world economy and nation-state system and is ultimately backed by their military and

technological superiority. Another important aspect of this hegemony is the fact that Western countries have not only penetrated Muslim countries in the region in economic and political terms but also in every significant cultural area. Therefore, the Islamic resistance to Western dominance is articulated not only in political and economic terms but also in cultural and religious terms (Bin Sayeed 1995: 5). In fact, Leonard Binder argues that, compared to Latin America, which has largely been concerned about European and American economic exploitation, the focal point of Middle Eastern resistance to Western dominance has been primarily religious and cultural:

> I think it is correct to say that no other cultural region is as deeply anxious about the threat of cultural penetration and westernisation. And the central symbol of this anxiety is Islam, with which authenticity, identity, dignity, and even manhood are associated (Binder 1988: 83, Cf. Tibi 1990: 43).

In other words in the 20th century, the Western world by its superiority caused a political and cultural crisis in many Muslim countries. This superiority also caused and causes a spiritual crisis for many Muslims: How Muslims who adheres to Islam, Allah's chosen religion, can be inferior to other cultures? (see, Smith 1957: 41). "Failure is scandalous. Either God has forgotten men, or men have forgotten God" (Roy 1994: 67). Obviously according to Islamists the latter has happened.

One of the important results of the superior Western economic and technologic base is undoubtedly the amount of knowledge produced in the West. This vast amount of knowledge also includes Western knowledge about the Muslim world which is far superior to the Muslim knowledge about the West[61]. The Western knowledge about the Muslim world is coming from an enormous array of sources including the military satellites, open and secret espionage and the universities. Clearly, this knowledge can

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[61] Of course it can always be argued that both sides do not *really* know each other.

both be used for peaceful goals as well as for more cynical ones. In fact, many Arab and Muslim scholars have accused the West of deliberately creating an entire body of literature and scholarship to be used against the Muslim world (see, for example Said 1995).

Fuller and Lesser argue that "the Islamic world feels itself under siege from the West in numerous vital political, military, cultural, social, and economic realms" (1995: 81). Especially Muslims in the Middle and Near East feel that because of the strategic location of the area "they have been under siege for nearly two centuries" by a continuous and often overwhelming force (Bin Sayeed 1995: 1). In the political arena. Muslim states face strong political pressures from the West in many ways. The greatest example is that Western states, especially the United States, have put enormous pressure upon the Muslim world to accept and deal with Israel. The friendship and support of the United States has been given to Middle Eastern states in close accordance with this main issue. In the eyes of Muslims, Arab Muslims in particular, Israel has been a most important source of humiliation and a defining issue in relationships with the West. Muslims see the issues related with Israel as visceral since they are associated with Muslim soil and Muslim refugees (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 81-2).

In military terms the Muslim world has also been a leading arena for Western military intervention. There have been continuous Western efforts to maintain a military presence in many parts of the Islamic world, a presence welcomed by few populations, even if it helped some rulers to strengthen their authority and domestic security. At various times, Western bases in Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Turkey and Pakistan have been viewed by regional elite and the masses, as opposed to ruling families or regimes, as Western infringement upon their sovereignty

designed to promote Western. not their own, strategic goals (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 82).

In the economic realm, frictions between the Islamic world and the West are even more complex and often reflect broader North-South frictions over relations of inequality. Although there are enormous differences among the Muslim countries in terms of their income level, generally Muslim countries are in the league of poor nations. Only those who have oil and other energy sources are rich and perhaps too rich for their fellow Muslims. Even this case needs qualification as among the Muslim countries which have oil or other energy sources only Saudi Arabia and other small countries in the Gulf have populations-which by no means a substantial proportion of the Muslim Arabs, let alone of all Muslims- with income comparable to that of the developed Western countries. Muslim-oil-states have wrested from the West the right to control 'officially' their own resources only over the last two decades. The extent of this 'official' control and its geostrategy is also a very much debated issue in the world and especially in the Muslim world. For most of the century, these oil resources were viewed so essential to Western economies that Muslim governments had very little say over their use. Ownership of oil companies and pricing policies were controlled by the Western powers (Esposito 1995: 172); local governments in the Middle East risked overthrow if they did not cooperate. Muslims are aware that this relationship has hardly been one of equality, mutual respect or even commercial convenience, but in essence a 'colonial' one. Ironically, possession of a critical and strategic international resource has not brought greater national sovereignty or a dominant place in international arena but actually diminished sovereignty of its owners (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 82-83).

Islamists remain convinced that Western, particularly American, policies are

dedicated to manipulation of the Middle Eastern politics to gain control of the oil[62]. For example the argument was being popularly invoked in the 1990s that the United States "set up" Saddam Hussein in 1990 by encouraging him to invade Kuwait in order to justify a massive U.S. invasion and establishment of a permanent military presence. United States interest in Kazakhstan is explained by many Muslims exclusively in terms of oil. United States intervention in Somalia was driven by an interest in "Somali oil reserves" according to much of the Arab press. There is what might be called a Muslim 'paranoia' relating to oil, its importance to the West, and its role as a source of permanent Western intervention (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 84).

The economies of the Muslim world are perceived by Islamists as deeply connected, in fact dependent, to the West and its powerful institutions. Beyond the financial control, most Islamists, see a more fundamental "cultural gap" that leads to friction with the West in the economic and social realm. In Islamist perception, the dichotomy is between an American vision of society designed to function on the basis of efficient capitalist principles and an Islamist predisposition to organise government and society to meet certain ethical, social and religious goals, involving interests of all social classes. When international financial institutions -dominated by the West- such as the IMF impose a narrow economic orthodoxy on the Muslim governments, along with many other Third World states, with austerity policies by starting with cuts in subsidies to the poor, this threatens the social stability. In many Muslim countries, states that for years have been committed to fulfilment of an "unspoken social contract with the public-social and economic security in exchange for political passivity-now find it ever more difficult to fulfil the economic end of that social bargain."(Fuller and Lesser 1995:

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[62] For the view of Moroccan feminist Mernissi on the relationship between oil and Western support of the ultra-traditionalist Saudi regime see (Mernissi 1996). For an interesting argument that conservative Islamic movements for example in Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been pivotal in global oil policies and helping to functioning of world capitalism see (Mitchell 2002).

84; see also Mitchell 2002). These developments help Islamism to grow.

The West may not be directly at fault for regime failures in many Muslim states. Nevertheless, Western policies have contributed a great deal to the existing situation by lending explicit or implicit support to authoritarian regimes and by a strong preference for stability over change across the Middle East (Hadar 1993: 39). In other words, the western support to *friendly tyrants* shows itself in many Muslim countries as persecution, repression or even extermination of Islamists. Obviously, this support much accounts for the Islamist critique of the West.

Islamists object not only to the Western political, and economical domination of the Middle East, but also to the cultural influence of the West which is perceived to be strongly contributing to the erosion of the Islamic character of their societies (Saleme 1993: 22). This is because they generally give priority to a social vision of society based on a "heavily idealised"[63] past. According to Islamists in an ideal society there must be, *inter alia*:

- An emphasis on the family and upbringing of children according to Islam. The task of women is very important here.
- Hence, importance of the married life, and disapproval of a sexually permissive society.
- Respect for the parents and the elderly.
- Protection of the weak (the poor, widows, orphans etc.)

According to Islamists, the cause of not following the moral commands of Islam, in the list above, is the fact that the Muslims grew weak in religiosity. The cultural influences of the West are seen as greatly contributing towards an un-Islamic society.

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[63] The term belongs to Saleme (1993: 22)

The television is the agent *par excellence* of the decadent West. The movies and other programs bought by secular state or private channels or accessed through satellite dishes do portray, often selectively, a Western life style where the spouses have affairs[64], the children are rebellious or more disturbingly "half-naked" women try to entertain the audience. Islamists see these as corrupting images bombarding the very fabric of society.

Generally speaking, Islamists have a selective view of the West[65] whose *realities* pale compared to the *ideals* of Islam[66]. The Western societies are seen on the brink of collapse due to social ills[67]. The West is greedy, double-faced[68], materialistic, individualistic, too competitive, lacks compassion, arrogant, sexually too permissive and deviant (e.g. homosexuality), full of alcoholics etc. The social system in the West (however defined, capitalist consumerist) has failed westerners because it breeds emptiness, dissatisfaction, and despair. Therefore, the imitation[69] of the West and its cultural effects are to be stopped by Islamisation of the Muslims, who would then understand the emptiness or at least 'un-Islamicness' of the things offered by the West. In other words a central theme in Islamist discourse is that Islam provides a much better

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[64]The TV series 'Dallas' has been one of the most known examples.

[65] There are conflicting Islamist views of the West as far as its commitment to Christianity concerned; often the West is depicted as an ultimately Christian entity, evident in its perceived incurable, religiously motivated hostility toward Islam. Islamist thinkers, who are aware of the degree of secularisation in the West though, argue that pretension to be emancipated from religion brought new, empty, forms of worship like worshipping autograph of a celebrity (Shariati 1987: 65).

[66] It is indicative of a self-conscious effort by Islamists to construct a 'modern' Islamic worldview "better" than offered by modern ideologies that Islamist formulas are favourably compared not with Christianity but with various western concepts political and economic forms of organisation (Nasr 1996: 83).

[67] Obviously, many non-Muslim non-Westerners also criticise the West in similar lines.

[68] Western use of double standards showed itself according to Islamists in Bosnia and Kuwait where the oil proved to be worthier than Muslim blood.

[69]The goodness or badness of imitation (*taqlid* in Arabic and *taklit* in Turkish) depends on the model. While the imitation of the West is condemned by the Islamists, (for example Erbakan referred to other parties in Turkey as 'imitators of the West', *taqlid* of a most learned religious scholar (e.g. an Ayatollah) (who presumably closely follows the Prophetic paradigm) in Iran might be a religious duty. Shariati makes an interesting argument that Muslims may imitate Europe (presumably in technical fields and for a certain period to acquire material power) in order not to resemble to Europeans (1987: 96).

blueprint for life than the western model in general, despite the western pretensions and claims of progress and enlightenment. Therefore, no intellectual guidance should be sought in the West (Mayer 1999: 186).

To be able to adapt technical and material advances, especially from the West, while resisting to its cultural influences Islamists have to hold that the modernity is divisible. By only doing so, it is possible to modernise Muslim societies in a selective way by rejecting certain components of modernity which seem un-Islamic, while adopting some. Secularisation and secular nationalism are rejected. Modern science and technology are accepted subject to an Islamic interpretation where necessary. Since the image of the West is negative among Islamists, it is often assumed and argued in the Islamist circles, similar to the arguments that can be heard in many other non-Islamic cultures, that the West does not represent true modernity or some aspects of western societies cannot be part of modernity or must be rejected even if they are part of modernity. This is so, because the ultimate reference is Islam, not modernity. There is not much to be learned from modern/ Western societies in terms of human relations. Therefore, modernity is reduced, in great extent, to technical ways and products which are supposed to be instrumental for the Muslims and ummah in general. Thus, in most Islamist discourses the link between modernity and the West is broken.

Although, one frequently come across with the view that many problems of the Muslim world could be attributed to the fact that it did not experience a renaissance, reform or enlightenment; Islamists beg to differ and often counter-argue that the Westerners will soon realise that they can derive the light they need from Islam.[70]

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[70] See for example Nadwi's speech at http://www.rauf96.supanet.com/role.htm, (last visited 1. 2. 2005).

The growing intellectual self-confidence of Islamists vis-à-vis modern concepts throughout the Muslim world is unmistakable. For example Hasan Turabi of Sudan strongly argues that Muslims need not be intimidated by the ungodly concepts by which modernity is perceived or articulated. Like the Prophet who did not hesitate to use the pagan Arabic idioms to preach Islamic monotheism, Muslims have the duty to engage in modern concepts to deliver the message (cited by Ibrahim 1999).

2.11 CONCLUSION

In the complex and long history of modernity, which in its formative phases had been almost exclusively shaped by the West, a special chapter must be opened for Muslims. In its first century Islam had contacted with Christendom and around two centuries ago, Europe decisively gained the upper hand against Muslims. The evolution of modernity in Europe (later West) created certain criteria with which modernisation of other cultures have been evaluated. For example, an important aspect of modernisation of the West has been secularisation. Thus, whether Islam is compatible with secularisation is an important question toward understanding compatibility of Muslim modernisation with Western conception of modernity. It can be seen that, contrary to those who argue that Islam is open for new interpretation (*ijtihad*), a broad school of Islamists, in accordance with their interpretation of Islam, argue that Islam is not compatible with secularisation. In their view, politics and instruments of politics (e.g. state) have to be conceptualised according to Islamic precepts.

I have tried to show that Islamism as an ideology can be qualified as basically modern. It has been shaped within Muslim countries which have been experiencing modernisation under strong Western influence. At the same time, this period has been one of rapid decline for the Muslim world. Therefore, it is only natural that Islamism, like other major ideologies of this period (such as secularism, nationalism, socialism) has some general views about these processes. In other words, it can be said that modernity imposes certain forms on various versions of Islamism. These forms stem from both self-perception of the 'moderns' both in the West and in the Muslim countries and conceptualisation of modernity on the part of Islamists. It is not a clean form obviously due to differences in particular histories (e.g. elite's attitude toward Islam), but all Islamists have to react to certain core processes of modernity (e.g. secularisation, nationalism). Thus, as we saw, Islamism first of all contains a certain interpretation of history and sees the decline of Muslims and increasing influence of modernity from this perspective. Islamist activism on the other hand contributes to decentralisation of the West in the definition of modernity.

Islam as a religion possesses a vast system of meanings and symbols that makes it open for various, even conflicting interpretations. Therefore, Islam can be *used* for different purposes. Islamism employs a selective re-interpretation of Islam to affect the social change toward re-Islamisation of society. It can be seen that there are some common themes shared more or less by Islamists. These common points stem from their general agreement on the perfectness, comprehensiveness and self-sufficiency of Islam (hence its superiority to any other political, economic or cultural formula). There are no significant secular spheres of life. Politics too, as

an important part of life, must be subject to Islamic principles.

The Islamist rejection and frequent stereotyping of the West, like other stereotypes held by non-Muslims, has enormous repercussions, for the world politics. The possibility of establishment of Islamist states or states with strong Islamist influences at the governmental level, especially in the Middle East is a feared one in the West because as things stand, such states would likely be important parts of anti-Westernism in the world.

It is possible to talk about a broad Islamist stance in the world vis-à-vis modernity as associated with the West and modernity as an abstract term reducible to its certain core processes. Islamists generally favour modernisation of Muslim countries defined as progress in science, technology and industrialisation. They oppose secularisation and secular understanding of the nation; democracy is often either de-legitimised or re-defined in a way incompatible with certain tenets of liberal democracy.

It can be concluded that not all aspects of modernity as it developed in the West causes equally fierce Islamist oppositions. For example, capitalism and nationalism and the institution of nation-state are accepted to a great extent either with a belief that subject to some corrective Islamic remedies they are in line with Islamic basics (e.g. capitalism) or they can take the form of a half-way stage toward Islamic universalism (e.g. the nation-state).

In the next two chapters, the views of the elite of the Welfare Party circles will be analysed vis-à-vis modernity and the West under the lights of the themes

touched upon in this chapter and Chapter 1. Especially their views on secularism, nationalism, capitalism, democracy and suitability of the West as a modernisation model for Turkey will be focused upon.

CHAPTER 3

THE WELFARE PARTY AND ISLAMISM, STATE, SECULARISATION AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1, I discussed, amongst other issues, the relationship of modernity with the modernisation of the state, and development of an international state system that contains both democratic and un-democratic states. Secularisation was also discussed as an important process of modernity. In Chapter 2, the emergence of Islamism in the Middle East and Islamist responses in this region to the rise of the 'modern' state and its use by the secular elite were among the issues. Islamist responses to secularisation and democracy were also analysed. These analyses provide the background for a focus on the WP vis-à-vis these issues. Although, the similarities and differences between Islamism of the WP and wider Islamism in the Middle East will often be pointed out in Chapter 3 and 4, rather than trying to make a comparison for each and every issue, I will make an overall comparison in the concluding chapter with regard to most important issues.

In this Chapter, the following important issues will be analysed:

- The rise, centralisation and secularisation of the state mechanisms in the hands of a secular elite which used the state in the service of westernising/secularising Kemalist reforms that primarily aimed for a radical break from the Ottoman/Islamic past.

- Important factors in the rise of Islamism in Turkey and the WP's place and role within it. The WP's attempt to shape Islamism and its relations with some other important Islamist groups. The party's Islamic discourse, characteristics and activism of its grass roots.

- The WP elite's views on secularisation in Turkey, on the principle of laicite and their struggle to re-negotiate its content to end its "strict" application especially in education system.

- The WP elite's views on democracy in general and on Turkish democracy in particular. Their views on the issue of women, media and the minorities.

Further analyses of the WP elite's views on the secular Turkish nationalism, science, technology and industrialisation; Turkish economy and capitalism; and the relationship between the West and modernity will be conducted in Chapter 4. Thus, a more comprehensive understanding of their stance vis-à-vis Turkish modernisation, modernity in general and suitability of the West for Turkey as a modernisation model will be reached.

A leading Turkish expert, close to Islamist circles, makes a very broad and all-inclusive definition of Islamism which shows that Turkish Islamists share certain

general Islamist views with regard the current state of the Muslim world:

The movement, consists of predominantly activist, modernist, eclectic political, idealistic, intellectual and scientific efforts, quests, suggestions and solutions in the way of *making Islam, once again, dominant in life in its entirety* (beliefs, worship, ethics, philosophy, politics, education...) and with a rational method to *save the Islamic world from exploitation of the West, tyrannical and oppressive rulers , enslavement, imitation, superstition [...] make it civilised, united, developed*" (my emphasis, Kara 1986: XV).

Indeed, Islamism as an ideology aims to re-interpret Islamic rules and symbols, make them once again valid for all areas of life. However, it might be possible for a Muslim or Islamic group to advocate a partial Islamisation or be content with partial re-Islamisation of the society as it is often the case in Turkey; this should not prevent them being called 'Islamists', albeit with careful qualification.

According to Türköne (1991: 32-32) a form of Islamism was originally developed in the period 1867-1873 by Ottoman intellectuals (see also, Mardin 1962). However, non-Ottoman intellectuals, such as J. Afghani, R. Rida and M. Abduh are often shown as pioneers of Islamic reformism (Esposito 1995: 55). It is indicative that both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, where Islamist thinkers first began to emerge, were the most exposed Muslim countries to the modernising impact of Europe. Therefore, an important part of Islamism that emerged and evolved in the Ottoman Empire and also later in Turkey has been a reaction and attempt to formulate an ideological stance against the penetration of European/Western references, symbols, political, social, economic ideas and systems. Obviously, Islamism has been much more than just a cultural reaction.

WP members shared and voiced a view, also widely shared by other Islamists in Turkey, that the rise of and most powerful period of the Ottoman Empire were directly linked to their Islamic steadfastness. When they remained loyal to Islamic principles

they triumphed both in battlefields and in their endeavour to build the '*most advanced*' example of Islamic civilisation. The more excessive aspects of the Ottoman Westernisation reforms were largely due to the personalities of the reformers who had less than the desired level of faith[1]. During the Ottoman reforms, especially in the second half of the 19th century, there were early Islamists who argued that the Westernisation drive should be more in line with Islam (Bora 1998: 80-81; Mardin 1962)[2].

There has been what can be called 'a tradition of Islamist critique of Westernisation' in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, since very early time of acceleration of Westernisation as the dominant version of modernisation. The argument that 'a selective' approach has to be taken when borrowing from or imitating Europe (later West), has been the dominant one among Islamists (see, Türköne 1994:62-63). A self-conscious continuation of this tradition was obvious in the WP.

3.2 EMERGENCE AND CENTRALISATION OF 'MODERN' STATE IN TURKEY

Modernisation attempts during the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire were a direct result of the superiority of Europeans and Russians on the battlefield that put the survival of the Empire in doubt. The Ottoman and early Republican reforms aimed for centralisation of the state and were inspired by Europe, France in particular. The initial predominant aim for these reforms was to increase the power of the state machinery, especially the armed forces vis-à-vis the external powers to guarantee its survival. Yet these resulted in a strong state mechanism in terms of its capacity of

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[1] It has been a frequent theme in Islamist discourses that many Ottoman reformers emerged among those individuals who were irreligious unlike their ancestors.

[2] Indeed, a central claim of all those Islamist movements in the world that do not deny the necessity of modernisation is that it can be done in an Islamic way.

shaping the political system and use of legal force[3]. The largely Sunni population continued to remain passive vis-à-vis any exercise of state power. Islamist intellectual İsmet Özel explains that, the fact that there has not been a tradition of rebellion on Turkish soil and the space given by the ruled to the rulers (not to give rulers any excuse to confiscate produce or money held by the general population) caused state power to become absolute in the modernisation process after the *Tanzimat*[4]. Yet, the same powerful state could not ensure the participation of the population in modernisation efforts to reach the targets it set (*Milli Gazete*, 12. 10. 1997).

The reforms, aiming to make the Ottoman Empire powerful enough vis-à-vis foreign countries and a place for all nations of the empire to coexist in peace, were too little and too late. As the fervour of nationalism increased among the non-Turkish subjects, the Ottoman Empire, weakened by the wars, disintegrated and effectively ended in the last months of 1918 with defeat, as an ally of the Germans, in the WWI. The dominant Turkish population of the Empire clung to Anatolia as the last piece of land in their possession; but in 1919 Greece occupied Turkish territory from Izmir to as close as 30 miles from Ankara. However, the Turkish War of Independence, under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal,[5] ended in 1922 with the defeat of the Greeks. During the war, The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was founded on 23 April 1920, ostensibly as the new centre expressing the national will.

Mustafa Kemal, who emerged as the new undisputed national leader, ended the sultanate (1922) and founded the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923. The main aim

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[3] As will be seen, in terms of providing economic benefits to the general population the state remained relatively weak. It is useful to make a distinction between the terms 'legal force' and 'legitimate force'. In the case of the former, a substantial amount of society may see state's use of force as illegitimate.
[4] The Ottoman reform period, 1839-1876.
[5] In 1934, European style surnames were made compulsory, and Mustafa Kemal took the surname of Atatürk (Father Turk) (Lewis 1968: 289).

for him and the Kemalist cadres (i.e. those who were close to him) was to pull Turkey from backwardness to, in his oft-repeated words, "the level of contemporary civilisation". In their view, the only viable models in front of Turkey were the Western countries (Toprak 1981: 39)[6]. To westernise was to modernise. The countries that served as a model for Turkey were industrialised and advanced in technology. For the Kemalists, one of the most important factors in the background of their progress was rationalisation of mind that produced scientific knowledge. Turkish modernisers wanted to create a new society of model individuals who would base their lives on scientific (observable) facts, rather than on 'revelation' (Göle 1997, Yavuz 1997, Ayata 1996). Certain aspects of Islam, if traditionally understood, clashed directly with the Kemalist image of a modern nation-state (Toprak 1981: 39). Under the influence of European modernity, and similar to their Ottoman intellectual predecessors, the Kemalists started to implement a "new religious policy" (Berkes 1964: 484). They held the view that Islam was a rational religion in essence; the only thing needed was to clear it of superstitions and to end its exploitation by reactionary men of religion, and 'crooked' individuals and groups. In truth, the 'new' Islam had to be 'rational' and national, i.e. to be free, as much as possible, from supra-natural dogmas and of organisations around religious leaders, who traditionally interpreted Islam for their followers and often claimed to mediate between them and God (Yıldırım 1995: 113-152).[7] Islam at the same time, needed to be 'nationalised' i.e. 'Turkicised' and no longer allowed to tie the Turks to other Muslims[8]. This tie, according to many secularised Turks, had brought nothing

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[6] Ahmad observes that "Kemalists had a linear view of European history, especially French history, from which they were convinced Turkey had much to learn" (1993: 78).

[7] Islamists in Turkey have also been trying to point out and change many folk understandings and practices of Islam which seem irrational, especially to more secular minded Turks. One of the most significant of these beliefs has been belief in ability of some people, e.g. *muskacıs* (who write *muskas*; religious formulas) or *üfürükçüs* (who utter religious formulas, even claim to make *büyü:* (magic) to change the course of things. This belief has been and is still causing exploitation, in many forms, by most of these trusted people, who are considered by many to be no more than charlatans.

[8] In fact Other Muslim countries were not in a position to be models, in terms of material progress, for Turkey which was still the most advanced Muslim country.

but 'Arabisation' and misery to the Turkish nation, which had made too many sacrifices in defending the Muslim world (Bora 1996: 21).[9]

The Kemalist modernisation drive aimed for a secularising social change but met with more of a muted societal inertia than active opposition. The state under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal used its power to silence the whatever opposition (whose a sizeable proportion almost instinctively clung to Islam) there was, and tried to impose its own understanding of modernity on the country with relatively more success in urban centres than rural areas. Therefore, in an undemocratic[10] atmosphere, the modernisation of the state meant centralisation of decision making and increasing of its power (largely defined in terms of legal force and control over education) vis-à-vis society (see, for example, Ergil 2000: 123; Lewis 1968: 239-293; Zurcher 1994).

The Kemalist reforms aimed for a radical break from the Ottoman past, which was heavily influenced by Islam.[11] Thus, reforms sought to diminish the role of Islam in policies of the state[12] and even in daily life of the population, where state power could penetrate. In this task, according to a veteran *Milli Gazete* columnist, many scholars of Islam and religious leaders betrayed Islam and served "the RPP dictatorship" (Eygi, *Milli Gazete*, 21. 8 1997).[13]

The Kemalist reforms and principles have survived and became the features of

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[9] I.e. the Middle East inhabited by Arab Muslims was saved by the Turks, from destruction by Christendom, but in the end, there was no loyalty from the Arabs who "stabbed" the Ottomans in the back during the WWI.

[10] Needless to say, democracy was not widespread in the world at that time. With the emergence of Hitler, the term dictator gained a new meaning and the Western media began to approach Mustafa Kemal much more favourably (Kologlu 1995: 87-91).

[11] Kemalism provided the proto-type for other secular-nationalist regimes emerging in the Middle East which also put emphasis on their pre-Islamic heritage as in Iran, Iraq and Egypt.

[12] Often written with a capital 'S' in official documents to emphasise its importance and its gaining a separate identity almost independent from society.

[13] I.e. they contributed to the legitimacy of the regime by active co-operation or simply by remaining silent; a "mistake" which must not be repeated.

the Turkish state, for example by becoming constitutional articles which cannot be amended. They have been fiercely defended by most of the secular military-civilian bureaucracy[14] and politicians. The WP circles shared the general conservative view that Kemalist reforms were unnecessarily radical toward Islam.[15] This view was one of the factors that made the Islamist WP clash with the secular state.

According to frequently made criticisms in Turkey, which the WP shared, the state in Turkey has been a powerful tool in the hands of Jacobin elite (Alkan 1998: 76). Jacobinism was defined in terms of using the state power to force the masses to change; a kind of social engineering by force that went directly against democracy (Göle 1997: 48). Kemalism only gradually changed society and "had initially transformed only the upper layers of society and had left four-fifths of society untouched" (Gellner 1994a: 87).

Very similar to Islamist criticisms in the region, the WP circles argued that, since the secular military-civilian elite perpetuates by certain mechanisms,[16] the state machinery continues to be the tool of a certain laic (secular), nationalist ideology.[17] In other words, the Turkish State is an ideological state; it promotes a laic, nationalist ideology. The advocates of this ideology are rewarded by the state, in terms of prestigious positions in military-civilian bureaucracy, including the judiciary, or access to state resources (incentives, exemptions etc.) which could make all the difference in economic life. In this sense, the situation in Turkey supports the view that in many Middle Eastern countries, in contrast to democratic countries, the state is not neutral

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[14] Since the *Tanzimat,* the state bureaucracy emerged as the principle carrier of modernity (mainly in the form of Westernisation) in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
[15] Vergin (1994) argues that the intellectual source of "intolerant" laicism in Turkey was a particular understanding of French philosophy.
[16] Such as control of education and recruitment into civil and military state cadres.
[17] The strict Turkish nationalist and secularist nature of the Turkish State is also often highlighted by non-Islamist experts as a source of lack of democracy in the country (Ergil 2000; Çandar 1999; Yavuz 2000).

toward society at all but is a tool for a certain group (e.g. secular, westernised elite).

One of the most important Kemalist reform, shaping the secular character of Turkey, was the adoption of the 'principle of *laiklik*' (laicite) in state affairs. The European model for this reform was France and the French word laic was rendered as *laik*. *Laiklik* can mean either laicite or laicism in day-to-day usage.[18] It officially became a characteristic of the state as late as 1937. However prior to this date it was included in the Republican People's Party[19] program in 1931. Starting from the mid-1920s politics was laicised and no interference from the religious part of the society was allowed. According to Bernard Lewis "Within four years, in a series of swift and sweeping changes, Kemal repealed the Holy Law and disestablished Islam" (1968: 404, cf Davison 2003, Dursun 1995). From the very early years of the Turkish revolution, the state took an active part in the secularisation of Turkish society. In 1928, the article designating the official religion of the state as Islam was removed from the constitution.

There was a tide of Kemalist modernising reforms mainly aimed for westernisation/secularisation of society. On 3 March 1924, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) ended the Caliphate and accepted the law of 'the Unification of the Education' which meant standardisation and complete secularisation of the education system. It also abolished the office of *sheyhulislam* and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, in their places two directorates were created (Zurcher 1994:195). In September 1925, the religious shrines (*türbe*) and the dervish convents (*tekke*) were closed down; in November, the fez was prohibited and replaced by the western-style hat. The *tekkes* and *türbes* were important components of the daily life of

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[18] The Islamists want *laiklik* to mean laicite (a form of governance by separation of state affairs from the religion) at its worst. They complain, however, that it often means laicism, an ideological stance against Islam adopted by the secular elite.

[19] Effectively the only party in Turkey until 1946, led by Atatürk until his death in 1938 and then by İnönü until his defeat by Bülent Ecevit in 1972.

Muslims especially in the rural areas and the hat, for the devout, was clearly a symbol of Christian Europe. In 1926 the European calendar, the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code were adopted. The penal code prohibited formation of associations on a religious basis. The Kemalists maintained this trend with complete secularisation of family life through abolition of polygamy and religious ceremony in marriages (Zurcher 1994: 180-181; Toprak 1981).

The adoption of the Latin Alphabet in 1928 (its predecessor, a version of Arabic/Persian alphabet was not fully phonetical) was another very affective way of cutting off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Islamic past and steering Turkey closer to the West (Lewis 1968:279) .[20] Other reforms such as adoption of the western clock and calendar in 1926, western numerals and western measures and weights in 1931, or making Sunday the official rest day instead of Friday[21] in 1935 were aimed at not only giving Turkey a more European image and facilitating communication with Europe but also cutting off its links with the Islamic world (Zurcher 1994:195-197). The new regime in Turkey saw westernisation as the only acceptable way of modernisation of Turkey, and westernisation mostly meant adopting European ways. For the Kemalists the secularisation of the social life, 'freeing' it from domination of Islam, had had a special place in their reformist thoughts. Atay, who was in Atatürk's close circle, defined Kemalism as a "fundamental religious reform" (cited by Karal 1981: 11).

Mustafa Kemal and his elite cadre as the pioneers of Turkish modernisation set a secular *tradition*. Since that time, the majority of members of the political and civilian-military bureaucracy, who can be called modernists, have continued to try to change a

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[20] According to a common Islamist criticism, thus, the whole nation was made illiterate overnight.
[21] The Islamists in Turkey would love to see the Friday as the 'day of rest', enabling them to go to the Friday prayers more "easily."

traditional country primarily by using the state power and through the force of example (Göle 1997). Prof. Ergil, a secular academic, points out that the modernists in Turkey "may present themselves as Kemalists, contemporary, Westernists and/or the secularists". He argues that "they all concur on statism and the central role of the state in running the daily affairs of society" (1997: 21).

In the 1990s the state was still strong, as is evident in its influence over the economy and perhaps more in its capacity to use of force, as embodied in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the police force. The TAF, in particular, continued to be considered as the most powerful institution in the country and the last bastion of the regime. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts serving in the military make the TAF much closer to the public than a purely professional army would be. The TAF has been identified as the most trusted institution in many public opinion polls. It has been efficient, hardworking and devoted to ideals of Atatürk especially to secular nationalism and laicite. As a number of studies show, the well educated and disciplined officer corps have been suspicious of politicians' honesty, devotion to the homeland and basic principles of Kemalism. The great majority of army officers continue to hold the view that, with the advent of multiparty politics, many populist politicians, especially the rightist ones have been giving too many 'concessions' to Islamic 'reactionaries' [Islamists],[22] in exchange for their political support. In other words, there has been tension between the electoral process as an important part of democracy and strict application of the principle of laicite. These 'concessions' have included, *inter alia*, opening up 'too many' Imam-Hatip Lycees (IHLs)[23], and allowing the Islamists to seize

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[22] Islamic reactionism or *irtica* was (is) a major threat in the eyes of the secular elite but for the Islamist leaders like Erbakan or Gülen it was (is) not. So, the term "reactionaries" in the secular discourse mostly means Islamists.

[23] In these schools, pupils received 7 years education after a primary education of 5 years. The pupils received religious (Islamic) education in addition to what the other pupils receive in secondary schools and 'straight' lycees.

some key official positions within the state. etc. Being among the pioneers of Turkish modernisation, the officers hold that the state power should be used to modernise the masses not for appeasing the religious feelings of fundamentalists who try to bring the shariah to Turkey. It is easy for those who exploit religion for political purposes to deceive the large sections of society, who are ignorant, but in the long run, this would be an obstacle for the modernisation of Turkey (see, Çandar 1999; Öztürk 1993; Birand 1985; Karaosmanoğlu 1993; Hale 1994). The WP elite criticised this view. For example, Abdullah Gül, a WP vice-chairman, argued that this attitude held by the great majority of the Turkish elite was justified by arguing that the masses were not mature enough. It was wrong of them to say "we know their interests better than they do" (*Milli Gazete*, 14. 9. 1997).

The secularised section of Turkish society was small in the first years of the republic, concentrated mainly in the elite, which controlled the state, but gradually large numbers of Turks became secularised and the seculars (laics or *laikler*) became the majority in the society.[24] During the political life of the WP and especially in its last 3-4 years (1994-1997) this became obvious only when political tension heightened. This might be natural in a country where de-politicisation was actively sought by the state and big media, after the1980 coup. The ideological gap between the seculars and the traditionally religious, the Islamists and the radical Islamists became wider, seeing each other as obstacles to a better Turkey. For the secular elite, the 'ignorant' masses have been ripe for exploitation by 'charlatans' who present themselves as men of God. For Islamists, the secular elite, similar to their counterparts in many other Muslim countries, have become too alienated from Islam and hence from the ordinary people.

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[24] This is in the sense that the majority opposed to any shariah based state and continuously voted for the parties that overall remained loyal to the principle of secularism.

It was disheartening to see that even reciprocal de-humanisation has been at work in Turkey between the secularists and Islamists.[25] Some Islamists, taking their cue from the Qur'an and Sunnah, likened the secularised elite and masses to the figures of *the age of ignorance* (i.e. pre-Islamic times) or the infidels who strongly opposed to the prophet Muhammad. The Qur'an itself calls those who do not follow Islam as worst kind of beasts, or lower, implying that unlike animals they have ability to think and yet do not heed God's message (7: 179; 8: 22). According to the Chief Prosecutor of the time Vural Savaş, "political Islamists [which included the WP members according to him]" saw the Kemalists as "modern idolaters" (1997: 75). For the secular elite and secularised majority the religious reactionaries (Islamists[26]) are like bats that are afraid of the light, their heads are full of spider webs (*örümcek kafalı*) (Işık 1990: 42). The chief prosecutor likened the WP to metastasis. The secular elite feared that Islamic reactionism could resurrect anytime if the majority of population failed to be vigilant.[27]

3.3 THE ISLAMIST PARTIES OF THE 'NATIONAL OUTLOOK'

It can be seen that Islamists criticised many of the Kemalist reforms from the outset. There have been quite a number of important Islamist figures like Said Nursi (1876-1960) and Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959)[28] who had shown their disapproval of the Kemalist reforms, yet these did not have any real impact on the character of the regime. The mono-party period ended in 1950, when the ruling RPP lost the elections and peacefully handed the office to the Democrat Party (DP) which made, according to Kemalist history-writing, 'huge concessions' to 'Islamic reactionism'

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[25] One of the major reasons of mutual hatred frequently observed between the secularised and Islamist sections is undoubtedly mutual ignorance about the lifestyle and thoughts of the opposite 'camps'; caricaturisation has been the rule rather than exception.
[26] Again, by 'reactionaries', they usually mean Islamists.
[27] The similarity to the de-humanisation of the Jews or Gypsies in the Nazi Germany is noticeable.
[28] There are still hundreds of thousands of followers of Nursi known as *Nurcus* and Tunahan known as *Süleymancıs* in Turkey; in elections, their leaderships often did not support the WP.

(Bora 1996: 21). These included making the call to prayers in Arabic again and allowing some religious education in schools.

The DP was not an Islamist party and the first Islamist political party that attracted considerable votes was formed under the leadership of Erbakan. On 26 January 1970 Erbakan and his 17 friends, mainly engineers, lawyers and politicians, formed the *National Order Party*. The party's foundation manifesto declared that:

> Today, the National spirit which extinguished the crusades one thousand years ago, passed ships over the land [allegedly, to Golden Horn, during the conquest of Istanbul] five hundred years ago [...]. created the miracles of the War of Independence half a century ago, once again risen. After a long period of attempts to deviate our Grand nation, which always progressed on the most noble route of humanity by remaining loyal to the Truth and promoting the Truth, and by enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, from its path. missiles are fired to put it back to its sublime and glorious historical orbit (Çakır 1994: 20).

As Çakır points out this manifesto shows the 'Ottomanist', pro- independence, Islamist and modernist nature of the party. There is a direct reference to the Qur'anic verse (3: 104): "Let there be a group among you, enjoining the good and forbidding the evil." It also shows the fascination of Erbakan, the engineer, by technological developments of the time. Erbakan declared that the party's door was open to anybody "except the Masons, Communists and Zionists" (Sarıbay 1985: 99).

The NOP was the first party of 'the National Outlook' (NO), the name of the political movement that was developed under Erbakan's leadership and its political ideology. It can be seen that Erbakan defined 'the nation' with two predominant elements: Turkishness and Islam; as since the 1970s Erbakan refers to the noble deeds of "our nation for a thousand years" which is the amount of time the Turks had been Muslims (see, Sarıbay 1985: 115). In other words, 'the nation' does not include pre-Islamic Turks or Muslims only, but the Muslim Turks (Kurds and other Muslims in

Turkey were also included in the conception of the nation in the National Outlook movement). Therefore, the term 'The National Outlook' refers to the prescribed ideology of the nation. Though it was never made too clear, the National Outlook had a predominantly Islamic character. Virtues were defined in terms of Islamic teachings and Turkishness was a natural ingredient.

The foundation of the NOP was encouraged by the İskender Pasha branch of the Nakshibandiyye Order, and some other influential orders and an important part of the *Nurcus* involved in this party. The NOP demanded Islamisation in every sphere of life, more religious education in schools, and new laws in accordance with Islam etc.[29] Just after the 12 March 1971 coup, the party was banned by the Constitutional Court for its anti-laic stance (Duman 1997: 79). In the eyes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the military-civilian bureaucracy and the secular politicians the NOP lacked legitimacy.

However, the political atmosphere rapidly thawed. In fact, it has been rumoured that the TAF encouraged Erbakan to form a new party, primarily to divide the right and hence weaken the Justice Party (JP) of Demirel and possibly as an attempt to integrate a considerable amount of Islamists into the political system (Duman 1997: 80; Çalışlar 1995). Thus, On 11 October 1972, the National Salvation Party (NSP) was formed.[30] The party's program was almost a copy of that of the NOP. In 1973 elections, the NSP gathered 11.8% of the votes and became the third largest party with 48 MPs. Yet, other equally strong Sunni[31] religious orders and groups continued to support centre-right parties. This shows that, not all Islamists saw the party as their own and the centre-right

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[29] Thus, this Islamist party as its successors broke the unwritten contract drawn by the secular elite which stipulates a degree of freedom to political parties in return of a commitment to basic principles of Kemalism (Sunar 1996: 144-145).

[30] On the NSP, see, Sarıbay (1985) and Albayrak (1989).

[31] Alevis (15 to 20% of the population) have been overwhelmingly supporting centre-left secular parties (see, TÜSES 1999).

parties, especially the JP continued to provide 'enough' to other Islamist groups in terms of protecting them from any pressure from the state and providing jobs and other benefits by using state resources (see, for example, Kara. *Yeni Şafak* 14. 10. 1995).

The 1970s witnessed the radicalisation of Turkish politics. During this period, the NSP, like other parties, used very inflammatory language and its cadres openly demanded implementation of the shariah in Turkey. Its youth partially participated in the struggle against the left, but real terror took place between the revolutionary leftists and the nationalists of the National Action Party of Türkeş. By the time the military intervened with the coup of 12 September 1980, there had been about 5.000 deaths in a decade. All political parties were banned after the coup (Özdemir 1995; Ahmad 1993).

3.4 THE RISE OF THE WELFARE PARTY

The Welfare Party, as the third party of 'the National Outlook tradition', was formed on 19 July 1983 but, due to veto of the ruling Generals, could not participate in November 1983 parliamentary elections. On 25 March 1984, the WP gained 4.4% of the votes in the municipality elections. This was around only half of the amount of what was considered the traditional proportion of the votes gathered by the NSP, the previous party of the National Outlook movement. This was largely due to the shift of its traditional voters to the Motherland Party (MLP) of Özal[32] who was firmly on the right and seemed personally religious enough for his voters. Özal's reforms were geared toward an economically and politically liberal and socially conservative Turkey (Erdoğan 2000: 228-236).

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[32] In 1983 elections, 45% of the voters supported the MLP despite the clear support by the Head of State Evren (former Chief of Staff and the leader of the 1980 coup) for another centre-right party headed by a retired general.

In 1987, the ban on former politicians was lifted by a referendum and, Erbakan, the undisputed leader of the National Outlook,[33] took over the party leadership. When the MLP called for early election on 29 November 1987, Erbakan likened the election, to the Turkish War of Independence:

> The MLP applied formally to melt Turkey in the pot of European Common Market [...] If the WP will be able to form a strong group in parliament Turkey will be saved (*Türkiye*, 12. 10. 1987).

However, The WP got only 7.16% of the votes, well below the 10%, required to gain representation in parliament. The first WP success came on 26 March 1989, when in municipal elections,[34] it won 2,170.365 votes (9.8%). This was an indication that in the next elections the WP could pass the 10% threshold. However, this was not certain and the WP leadership did not want to risk their chance for the parliamentary elections on 20 October 1991. After long calculations of costs and benefits, and hoping for very good results due to an idiosyncratic electoral system which strongly favoured most powerful parties, they agreed to form an alliance with two nationalist parties, the Nationalist Activity Party (MÇP) of Türkeş and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) of Edibali, the latter had very low support. The Nationalist Activity Party was the party of 'Grey Wolves' who were considered by many as ultra-nationalists and it cost the WP considerable amounts of Kurdish votes. The alliance which won 63 seats rapidly disintegrated. Those who achieved tickets on the nationalist quota resigned and the remaining 40 MPs formed the first WP group in the parliament (see, for example, Çakır 1994: 27-50).

The results of the 27 March 1994 municipality elections in which the WP

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[33] Erbakan has been portrayed by the 'National Outlook' movement as the man who has single-handedly developed the movement.

[34] As a sign of democratisation and localisation of Turkish politics after 1980, the local governments gained immense importance and Islamists usually successfully contested for local offices.

gained 19% of the votes and became the third largest party (behind the TPP and the MLP which gained 21% each) showed that the WP had finally succeeded in transforming itself from a small, ideological party to 'a mass-party with a strong, ideologically motivated core group of supporters.[35] It was a "Welfare Earthquake" according to the secular press; Ankara was "lost" to the WP, as well as Istanbul and many other big cities (Akdoğan 2000: 233). Later it was seen that the service record of the WP mayors was generally good, they worked hard and tried to solve the problems of their cities rather than engaging in political bickering (Kazan 2001: 249-336; Akıncı 1999: 78).

On 24 December 1995, parliamentary elections were held and with the help of the successes of its mayors the WP became the biggest party in Turkey with 6 million votes (21.4%). In the 550-seat parliament the WP won 158 seats , the two centre-right parties, the Motherland Party won 133 seats (19.7%) and the True Path Party won 135 seats (19.2%) . As for the two leftist parties, the Democratic Left Party won 75 seats (14.6%) and the Republican People's Party won 49 seats (Özbudun 1996).

For the military, other political parties and 'big capital', the WP has continued to be somewhat suspect as far as its commitment to the current secular political system is concerned.[36] Therefore, there was a hesitation on the parts of the two centre-right parties the TPP and the MLP about forming a coalition with the WP. According to the TDN editor Çevik, they had a rather alienating attitude toward the WP and the masses who voted for them and treating the WP "like lepers" did not serve to maintain stability in

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[35] This showed that as an important part of society in Turkey Islamists interacted with other sections of society and they often shared some main views with them, especially with those who were in the centre-right.

[36] There are a few frequently used terms to refer to the secular political system in Turkey like, 'the regime', 'the system', 'the order'.

Turkey (*TDN*, 26.12. 1995). In the end, the MLP and the TPP formed a minority-coalition government but it did not last. In the summer of 1996, the TPP agreed to form a coalition with the WP and, after 27 years in politics, Erbakan finally became the PM for nearly one year between 28 June 1996 and 17 June 1997.

3.5 THE WELFARE PARTY AND ISLAMISM

It can be seen that the WP continued to follow the National Outlook tradition with an Islamist political agenda, albeit with important modifications, the result of the political experiences over the years. There was a more or less coherent WP discourse. Coherence and party discipline seemed a requirement in Turkish politics, especially for the WP, under the spotlights of other parties, groups and 'big media' who were ready to denigrate any disconcerted voice (*aykırı ses*) as evidence of party disunity. Therefore, through an analysis of WP discourse, it is possible to understand the WP's views on Turkish modernisation and its elite's conceptualisation of modernity. This is not to say that 'the public face' of the WP had been very neat and clear or its public discourse had been refined or Islamically sophisticated.[37] As will be seen, there were important internal and external factors preventing this. For example, the intellectual capacity of the party leadership was severely handicapped by the 'one man show' of Erbakan who might have been a brilliant tactician in politics but was certainly not an Islamist thinker.

More importantly, the state (represented by attitudes and positions of the secular politicians, the officers who controlled the armed forces and other great majority of high ranking secular bureaucrats, including the judiciary), and more importantly, the laws of the republic did not allow the WP to put its views much more openly and directly to the

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[37] One could argue, with the exceptions of the WP and the nationalist NAP, none of the other remaining major political parties bothered to put seriously a party programme to the electorate. As if it was enough to be against the WP, they just emphasised that, in contrast to the WP, they believed in a secular political system.

public. The WP members needed to be very careful about what they were saying and how they were saying it. Often, they were accused of *takiye* (dissimulation) (see. for example *TDN* 17. 10. 1996), i.e. wanting in reality to create a shariah based state while giving the impression that they were playing by the rules.[38]

Another important factor was the low education level of the electorate in Turkey. WP voters still had lower than average levels of education and income. This 'forced' the WP elite and justified in their eyes as with many other parties, to give a coarse, unrefined message to the electorate.[39] The WP also preferred to address, 'the anger' of the religiously inclined toward the secular state and elite who, according to Islamists, had been repressing Islam[40] and the religious sections since the foundation of the republic.

An important part of the rise of Islamism in Turkey was emergence of an Islamist counter-elite (Göle 1997) who have been influenced by Islamist thinkers (e.g. Mawdudi, Qutb, Shariati) whose works have been translated to Turkish. Islamist sections consciously tried and raised their own elite and hence strongly contributed to increasing pluralisation of elite thought in Turkey.[41] The new political and economical Islamist elite guided the Islamic masses in their economic and political decisions.

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[38] The legal impediments to "talking freely" were raised frequently by Erbakan and other prominent members of the party. However, Islamist columnists, such as Ahmet Taşgetiren, implied that the Islamists were "aware" that not every aspect of the Islamist message could be voiced publicly in Turkey (*Yeni Şafak*, 17. 5. 1997).

[39] The education and political reaction levels of the masses had been perennial topics of criticism by many of the leftist, rightist and Islamist elite in Turkey. The usual metaphor, used for the masses which lack political reaction and are apathetic to the social political and economical processes that directly influence them, has been the 'sheep'. One often heard the saying that "As a nation, we are like flock of sheep." Obviously, ideologically motivated political groups, including the Islamists (and the WP) used different tactics to get their supporters mobilised.

[40] For the attitude of the leftist intellectuals, as a part of secular elite, vis-à-vis Islam, see (Subaşı 1996).

[41] Islamists in Turkey are, in the words of Göle, "writing best-selling books, becoming part of the political and cultural elite , winning elections, and establishing private universities [...] carving out new public spaces, affirming new public visibilities and inventing new Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities" (2000: 93-94).

Raising "its own politicians" has been a very important part of this process. because it has been perceived that politicians on the centre-right. like Demirel, "short-changed the religious" (Taşgetiren, *Yeni Şafak*, 26. 9. 1997). 'Islamist intellectuals'[42] increasingly had a great impact on society by their books, articles in new Islamist periodicals and newspapers, which they used skilfully in creating a vibrant intellectual life among the relatively elite section of Islamists.[43] Their relationship with the WP and indeed with any other big Islamic groups has been usually torturous. Although, some Islamist intellectuals had an impact on the WP, in general, the leading cadres of the party kept their distance from these 'undisciplined' and 'principled'[44] group. Yet, the WP had directly benefited from the efforts of Islamist intellectuals who strongly contributed to the Islamisation of worldviews of their readers.

The general trend of the Islamisation of certain sections of society in Turkey (which included *inter alia*, formation of organised large Islamist groups) had many reasons. Perhaps the most important factor has been relative democratisation that Turkey has been enjoying since the end of the WW II. This enabled various social groups to voice their views and attract new followers and forced the centre-right parties in particular to compete for the votes of the conservative-religious masses (Rouleau 1993: 120). In the rise of Islamism, increasing mass-education and modernisation of communication technology proved crucial; thus, large sections of society, active high school and university students could be reached by charismatic leader cadres of Islamic groups, including Erbakan and several other WP members. For example, despite very low levels of readership in Turkey[45] Islamist periodicals like *Sızıntı* or *Islam* regularly

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[42]For example, A. Bulaç, İ. Özel, A. Dilipak.

[43] For example on the same page of the Islamist daily *Yeni Şafak* edited by Islamist economist Mustafa Özel, one could read his review of Fukuyama's latest book (on trust), a translation of Robert N. Bellah's views about religion and modernisation in Japan, and translation of Wallerstein's views under the title of "No Hope from Progress" (2. 5. 1997).

[44] I.e. not as 'pragmatic' as it was felt the politics in Turkey demanded.

[45] According to a survey "68% do not read any books" (Ergil 1997: 13).

sold more than 100 thousand copies, very high by Turkish standards. There were numerous other periodicals addressed to other groups. The Islamist youth especially widely read publications by Islamists, like newspapers, books (on religious knowledge or novels[46]), and periodicals. Although the WP circles talked a great deal about the need for a strong media serving to their cause, the daily *Milli Gazete*, known to be closely related to the party, had just around 50 thousand copies[47] out of general circulation of 3 million in Turkey. Roughly one third of this circulation was published at some point by Islamist or Islamic[48] groups.

In fact, the rise of Islamist power disturbed the secular establishment. At the briefing the TAF gave for judges and prosecutors, it was told, "the reactionary movements are preparing for jihad. They have 19 newspapers, 110 magazines, 51 radio and 20 television stations[49], some 2,500 associations, 500 foundations and 1,000 companies as well as 800 schools and courses." There were some 30 reactionary radical organisations. With the WP-TPP coalition, the reactionaries started to form their own cadres within the state. Under the name of privatisation, state enterprises were being handed out to "fundamentalists" almost "as gifts" (*Hürriyet* 11. 6. 1997). Thus, the TAF made it clear that it had to take the initiative since no other state organ showed enough sensitivity toward the rise of 'fundamentalism'.

It could be seen that many WP members, like other influential Islamist groups worked for the Islamisation of an important section of the youth in Turkey. The youth

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[46] For the major themes in Islamist novels, see Çalışkan (1996).
[47] However, it was widely read by those WP supporters who were active and influential at local levels.
[48] Islamic (*Islami*) groups could be defined as those, which have been traditionally religious but not as Islamically 'radical' as Islamist groups. The daily *Türkiye* which at one point sold hundreds of thousands copies, for example, was controlled by an Islamic group and pursued a publication policy of being close to any centre-right party, including the WP when they were in government.
[49] One of the television stations close the WP was Kanal 7. Erbakan encouraged Islamist businessmen to support this station with their adverts and donations because "It is not possible to wage the jihad without television" which can be likened to "air force" or "tank force" [in a war] (*TDN*, 24. 10.1997).

organisation of the party was the MGV (National Youth Foundation). Similar to other Islamist groups, WP members supported university students and high school students for example by providing scholarships and places to stay.

The argument that in many Muslim countries the relatively secular state elite, often inadvertently, supported rise of Islamism by promoting a 'moderate' version of Islam (eventually getting out of state control), seemed to also be the case in Turkey. The Turkish state, especially after the 1980 coup, played its part by providing, (notably through the school system and the Directorate of Religious Affairs - DRA), a 'moderate amount' of Islam[50], as a panacea to social ills. However, this often served as a stepping stone in the further Islamisation of the youth. Many IHLs were opened especially by centre-right parties to cater for the religiously minded in the population. In other state schools, a limited amount of courses (entitled 'Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics' and usually given by graduates from the faculties of divinity who were often agents *par excellence* of Islamisation) also provided some vocabulary of Sunni Islam for the youth. The books in these courses classified religions as true or false, divine or non-divine, thus, not only favouring Islam over 'corrupted' Christianity and Judaism but also Christianity and Judaism over other religions. Islamists argued that the state's aim was to create an officially approved, a "TSE (Turkish Institute of [Commercial] Standards) Islam" (Dilipak 1991: 101). Others, leftists in particular, argued that these policies in fact contributed to rise of Islamism in Turkey. There have also been illegal activities, such as unauthorised Qur'an courses or youth camps, by Islamists to 'educate'[51] the youth.

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[50] According to İsmet Özel one of the aims of this 'manipulation' of Islam by the state was to keep the poor masses religious in order to prevent any social explosions (see, Akdoğan 2000: 172).
[51] This 'education' could be in various forms: *Tebliğ*: delivering the message of Islam, enabling others to hear that message; *tenvir*: to enlighten, *terbiye*: bringing up, educating according to good [Islamic] manners, etc.

The WP elite, like other Islamists, argued that ethics depend on religion, and one needs to be religious to behave ethically. To a certain extent, this view seemed to be shared by many in Turkey, including top generals of the 1980 coup (Yavuz 1997). According to the WP discourse, parents who sent their children to the IHLs or Qur'an courses just wanted their children to have some knowledge of Islam and be respectful to them and keep away from social ills such as gambling, alcoholism or drug use. Only few of them wanted their children to have religious professions, which paid poorly.

The Islamisation of certain sections of society in Turkey owed much to the activities of Islamists generally using their networks and means similar to other Islamist groups in the world as discussed in Chapter 2. Most importantly, Islamist groups used their core members to recruit new members and to have large numbers of sympathisers. These groups, like other groupings, based on common religious or ethnic background, provided a sense of belonging, and emotional and material support for their members and sympathisers. The relationship between the leader cadres and the rank and file in Islamist groups, including the WP, was a dynamic process oscillating between criticism and over-praising. On the one hand, the sense of guilt of the followers was periodically touched upon by reminders that compared to the Muslims of the Golden Ages, they were not working hard enough to spread the Islamist message. On the other hand, they were standard bearers of Islamisation and the only hope for a more Islamic Turkey. Generally speaking for Islamists in Turkey, including many WP members, a selective reading of history of Islam defined what periods and what kind of virtues were to be emphasised. *Asr-ı Saadet* (the Age of Felicity - the time of the Prophet) the period of first four caliphs and the most luminous periods of the Ottomans were the Golden Ages according to the WP discourse.

Islamists use a more or less coherent vocabulary in their relationships with each

other. The WP made the most skilful use of some of 'sloganic parts' of this vocabulary among the political parties to great effect.[52] For example, Erbakan and the WP officials pointed out that jihad is the struggle with one's wealth and life for Islam, and since the WP worked for a more Islamised Turkey, participating in party activities was jihad *par excellence*. Therefore, WP's core supporters worked for the party with a religious zeal: "they work for spiritual rewards [from God]" (Erbakan 1997: 91).[53]

In fact, although the WP and other important Islamist groups agreed on the need to re-Islamise Turkey, their disagreements on the method proved to be unbridgeable. Most importantly, the political style of Erbakan did not allow other Islamist groups to have a 'say' in the party that was proportionate to their support. For Erbakan and hence for the WP, other Islamist groups had to support the party like other ordinary supporters and give up their group identities in favour of the party identity. This had to be a crucial factor for the leaderships of many Islamic groups who preferred to support other centre-right parties.[54] Additionally, the rapid growth of the party and the Welfarist style of politics, in the judgement of many Islamist groups, were deemed too risky and likely to cause great upheavals, polarisation and even provoke military intervention. Another factor was that Erbakan was not really a 'saintly' figure for these groups.[55] First of all his flamboyant style, constant exaggeration of party targets or party power proved embarrassing even for some senior WP members. In short, according to many other Islamist groups, the WP was unable to provide the same kind of warm, sincere

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[52] Other parties, especially centre-rightist ones that enjoyed support of many conservatives and Islamists, also used Islamic symbols. For example Çiller, leader of the TPP, frequently appealed to the religious and nationalist feelings of the electorate by saying that "This call to prayer will never be stopped, this flag will never be lowered."

[53] For them the WP functioned like an Islamic community. For example, WP supporters in the Netherlands bought vehicles for Tuzla municipality run by a mayor from the WP, and these people had no connection with Tuzla but wanted the WP mayors to be successful, see, Çakır (1994: 185).

[54] This did not mean that all the members of these groups also supported the same parties. There is no study on this issue. However as some experts predicted, a significant amount of the members of these communities probably quietly voted for the WP.

[55] Both F. Gülen and E. Coşan, as leaders of very influential Islamist groups strongly criticised Erbakan, see, for example Yalçın (1994: 214-228).

atmosphere and sense of identity provided by them.[56]

In other words, although the WP occupied a central place within that Islamist section in Turkey, many Islamist groups often voiced different demands and pursued different tactics from the WP. Interestingly, overall, many of them, saw the WP as an obstacle in front of Islamisation of Turkey rather than facilitating it. For them the WP often acted like a bull in a china shop. It provoked some dynamic (*zinde*)[57] forces which once in motion would not just stop after crushing the WP but march on to also 'deal with' other Islamist groups whose institutions (e.g. schools, companies, press organs) and members (e.g. cadres in the state bureaucracy) would also suffer greatly (Heper 1997: 38-9; Laçiner 1997: 9). They were proved right in their fears, and what was perceived by many as a short-sighted and unnecessary challenge to the state by the WP raised the political tension in Turkey around the 28 February 1997 National Security Council meeting. Many Islamist groups that did not support the WP and that were busy trying to become more powerful (in terms of size, economic and political impact) through companies, unions, financial institutions, foundations for the needy (e.g. students), also became targets of state policies against the 'reactionaries' in "the 28 February Process", named after that meeting (Bayramoğlu 2001).

Yet it seems ironic that, for the influential secular circles in Turkey, all Islamists constituted a united front. This was due to the perception that the ultimate aim for all Islamists was a shariah-based state. They were all against laicite and this was their primary ideological stance vis-à-vis the Turkish state and society. (Laçiner 1996: 8).

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[56] What was worse, with its excessive emphasis on political activism, the WP was seen as preventing conveyance of a sophisticated and really effective Islamic message to the masses. For discussions with regard to differences between the working principles of the party and those of the Islamic communities see for example, Çakır (1994), Bayramoğlu (2001) and Akdoğan (2000).

[57] This term usually refers to the TAF.

The general trend of Islamisation amongst a considerable proportion of society allowed the WP to tell society "Vote for the WP if you are [a true] Muslims!" Other parties and secular media had to resort to the argument that the WP leaders were not really good Muslims but hypocrites[58] who unashamedly exploit things sacred for political purposes.

The WP used modified versions of its discourse in different parts of Turkey. In the South-East where the Kurds are concentrated the emphasis was more on Islamic brotherhood. In Central Anatolia it was more (Turkish) nationalist and so on. When the press was present, no disturbing things were said against Atatürk or the principles of the republic. Whereas in private, at their gatherings, extremely inflammatory language was quite often used against the same things.[59] Many laws and the power of the state prevented a more open and honest expression of the WP discourse in public.

Nevertheless, the main points of Islamist discourses in general and of the Welfarist discourse in particular usually reached their target audience.

It should be noted however that, the WP had been successful in gaining significant numbers of voters through projecting the honesty of its 'God-fearing' cadres. Indeed, many WP mayors proved much more honest than their secular counterparts who seemed immersed in corruption. According to a survey conducted by Piar-Gallup, among those who said they had voted for the WP at the last general election, WP supporters considered the party as one that would "restore justice," in Turkey. Poll findings indicated that the WP voters regarded the party as a 'saviour'. A majority

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[58] '*Münafik*' which has strong Islamic connotations. This is very similar to criticisms levelled at Islamists in other Muslim countries by seculars or by religious scholars close to the secular regimes.

[59] This fact became public in video recordings, probably used for intra-party propaganda, but which were handed to and/or broadcasted by media with very interesting timings. This led Islamists to believe that either secular media or some state agencies kept these cassettes for special times in order to secure maximum damage against Islamists.

(60.6%) of those surveyed expressed support for including Islamic rules in the constitution. When asked, 72.5% said that they trusted Erbakan, while 66.7% trusted his government. The TAF come third with a 65.9%. When asked, whether Hagia Sophia[60] should become a mosque, 63.3% said "yes", 25.2% said "no"[61] (*TDN*, 17.1. 1997).

It seems that there was a real uneasiness about application of laicite in Turkey and this helped the WP to attract more votes. For example, 45% of those who were surveyed for an academic project in the early 1990s said that they felt state pressure as far as laicite was concerned (47% did not). 48% said the state intervenes in religion (17% said it does not), and 60% said that there were foreign influences in adoption of laicism (see, Sezen 1993; cf Çarkoğlu 2004). In fact, some academicians argue that a major factor in 'politicisation of Islam' in Turkey is the state's refusal to meet even simple demands of ordinary Muslims (Türköne 1994: 70; Yavuz 1997) which fuelled Islamist desire to gain control of the state.

Formation and continuous reinterpretation of Islamist identities in Turkey were not only related to perceived socio-economic status but also to idealistic conceptions of Muslim identity. They were also related to intellectual integrity and self-respect, and had very important psychological dimensions and were often subject to emotional impulses (e.g. desire to help to Bosnians at that time). The WP had succeeded in becoming the most important player in these processes in the mid-1990s. Even by its existence as an important political party (which has been considered by many Islamists in the world as an un-Islamic form of political activism) (Akdoğan 2000: 276), the WP

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[60]This landmark was turned into a mosque, as a customary symbolic act, when Istanbul was conquered in 1453 and turned into a museum in 1935. For a very critical radical-Islamist view of keeping it as a museum, see, *Akit* 20.1.1998 ["Fatih's mosque is a museum"].

[61] The results also show that the WP grass roots had substantial differences with the party leadership which wanted the Hagia Sophia to be a mosque again as a symbol, and engaged in sharp exchanges of criticism with the military.

imposed a certain form on the Islamisation efforts in Turkey and bestowed a certain legitimacy, (which was crucial as it came from Islamists), upon the democratic procedures and the existing regime in Turkey.

3.5.1 Islamisation as a Solution to the Problems of Turkey

Similar to many other Muslim countries in the Middle East, there had been some serious social, political and economic problems in Turkey. These were important factors in the population's search for new policies and politicians. The TÜSES foundation researches show what the most important problems according to the electorate were, during the WP's height of power.

"What is the most important problem in Turkey?" (TÜSES 1999: 23):

Table 1: Electoral views with regard to most important problems (percentages).

	1994	1996	1998
Inflation- Economy	36.9	46.7	46.1
Terror [the PKK]	45.0	16.7	11.9
Unemployment	10.4	12.0	10.7
Administration of the country	1.0	4.3	7.2
Democracy, Human Rights	1.1	2.2	2.3

It is clear that there was a widespread discontent with what the previous governments, or the state in general, had achieved so far. As the PKK terror declined, economic hardships continue to preoccupy the people. Therefore, in Turkey, one can speak of a long lasting but limited crisis of legitimacy of the regime. However, this is not to say that the great majority of the discontented demanded a regime change. Only an important part of Islamists and radical left could have been said to be seeking the solution in that.

The National Outlook movement under the leadership of Erbakan had been working toward the goal of Islamisation of society in Turkey primarily by the means of

a political party since the late 1960s. Therefore, the WP had been the party of a tradition for 25-30 years (Çakır 1994: *passim*) that proposed Islamisation as a solution to socio-economic problems. During these years, although there have been shifts in party policies, it has been possible to identify some core aspects of the discourse and actions of the movement at any given period.

The WP carried the traditional discourse further. Similar to many other politically active Islamist groups in the Middle East, it continued to argue, for example, that it was necessary for more and more of the religiously inclined to participate in politics. This, it was implied, was because Islam wants to organise not only the private life but social life as well and, because Islamic political projects and Islamisation could only be realised by strong participation and sacrifices by Islamists. It can be seen here that, the emphasis placed by the WP, and indeed by other Islamists as well, on the difficulty of the task of re-Islamisation of society in Turkey has been a sign of their acceptance of the success of the secularisation process until then. At the same time, this reveals the 'historicism' of almost all Islamists in Turkey, in the sense that the huge task at the hand is likened to the task of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims. History 'teaches' Islamists that, since they had achieved their task with great sacrifices, today, a very similar task of struggle 'to make the God's word uppermost' requires a similar level of sacrifice. Therefore, for Islamists a teleological reading of history is necessary. It also allows them to invite the religiously inclined to channel their "anger,"[62] and work with them for a more Islamised Turkey.

Like most members or sympathisers of the Islamist movements, WP members

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[62] "O Muslims! Do not lose this hatred inside you," in the words of WP Kayseri Mayor, Associate Professor Karatepe (10 November 1996). For these words he was convicted for inciting hatred and served a jail sentence for 10 months. It was also used against the WP in the closure case.

were reacting to the socio-political developments under strong influence of their emotions. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the analysis of the Islamist movements purely based on their rational calculation of 'their interests.' This is because, most Islamists certainly pursue their interests, but also believe in 'metaphysical realities' taught by Islam and their interests are formulated in a framework heavily influenced by their perception of these metaphysical 'realities'[63].

The WP was certainly annoyed by repeated charges of exploiting or trading on the religious sentiments of the masses. "Our people are turning towards the party not because it exploits religion but because of [our] successful services [in municipalities], in fact our people are conscious and they have political maturity" (Welfare Party 1997a: 98). Yet the WP leaders were acutely aware that influential circles in Turkey considered the party an illegitimate exploiter of religion or even an illegal entity, because a large section of its members wanted to turn the country into a shariah-based state. The WP refused to be associated with political Islam, or the charge of wanting shariah, and said in its defence in the closure case that it was a political party not a religious or philosophical school (Welfare Party 1997a: 90).

The WP, like many other Islamist movements in the world and in Turkey, held that it was necessary to raise 'believer cadres' in state administration. This implies, as Islamist intellectual İsmet Özel summarises well, that "the cadres which had been raised according to official ideology do not posses the much missed characteristics." In order to rectify the problems in Turkey it is necessary to raise a new administrative elite that

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[63] Islam like many other religions teaches that in addition to this world which is visible there is another world and another dimension to God's creation, which is normally hidden from human beings but no less real. The believers are advised to consider what is best for them in the afterlife even when this means to forego certain things in this life. Thus, Islam expects its own version of ideological behaviour from Muslims/ Islamists, even if it seems sometimes irrational, fanatical and self-destructive, for a higher, mystical good. This fact further complicates the politics by making Islamist behaviour less predictable and manageable.

share the beliefs of the majority of society.[64] Thus, an important part of the Islamisation campaign according to the WP leadership was to appoint as many of its members or sympathisers to key bureaucratic positions and provide as many jobs as possible for its members and supporters in the state sector. This was especially so in municipalities, whilst even discriminating against other Islamist groups that did not support the party. In fact, the gradual increase of Islamists in state cadres has been a troubling development for the secularised section of society. Given the democratic parameters of Turkey, the secular state could not have been uniform in its reaction to this development. For example, while the TAF did not allow the graduates of the IHLs to join officer corps,[65] the very same students won the right to study in the most prestigious university faculties that, for example, traditionally educate the elite administrative bureaucracy.[66] The Islamist groups provided facilities that encourage their young members and sympathisers to enter university,[67] so that they would become valuable state officials in key positions,[68] lawyers, teachers, engineers, and doctors etc. Islamisation of society, according to the WP and almost all the other Islamists groups eventually would result in more and more Islamist youth becoming officers and NCOs in the army, or police officers.[69] Naturally, this prospect alarmed the secular sections of society, especially the TAF.

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[64] This project has failed so far, according to Özel, because, he argues, the new Islamist cadres also integrated themselves into "this corrupt system" (*Milli Gazete*. 21. 8. 1997).

[65] Karatepe, mayor of Kayseri from the WP, observes that since 1950 the [civilian] bureaucracy lost its character of being a homogeneous group strongly loyal to mono-party ideology. However, there has not been any radical change within the officers' corps that controlled the TAF (for example due to the discharge of officers with any connection to disapproved ideological movements). He sees this as an obstacle in front of democratisation (1997: 9).

[66] For example, it has been frequently pointed out in the mid-1990s that, as many as 40% of the students of the prestigious Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, were graduates from the IHLs.

[67] Since only about 20% of the lycee graduates could win the right for a place in universities after a 3-hour multiple choice exam, the preparatory courses for this exam along with the regular schools had gained immense importance. Many Islamist groups were quick to open these courses where they were and still are able to 'Islamise' thousands of students in extra curricular activities each year.

[68] Placing those people in these positions often requires political influence.

[69] Followers of Fethullah Gülen, in particular, have been frequently criticised by the secular media for trying to infiltrate the army.

3.5.2 Grass Roots of the Welfare Party

The WP had a variety of types of followers operating for different motives, and this fact made it possible for many observers to see and prioritise different aspects of the WP movement. For example according to a senior, secular observer:

> Millions of people have voted for WP not because they attach too much importance to religious issues or they expect the WP to introduce a Shariah regime in Turkey... [but] because of the bitterness they feel toward the forces which currently govern the Turkish state. Because they resent the fact that the state has created a certain mechanism which is bleeding the country dry like a leech. Because they want to protest certain fanatical circles who try to impose their own hegemony in the name of protecting secularism and other Kemalist principles. And, primarily because, they want a fairer share of the cake (Birand, *Sabah* 5.6. 1996 [as translated by the *TDN*, 6. 6. 1996] cf. Bulaç *Yeni Şafak* 27. 5. 1997).

In other words, the failure of the state, as also seen in many other Muslim countries, and the disillusionment with other secular political parties were crucial in the success of the WP. However, this is not enough to explain why the voters did not choose other parties, (especially the radical leftist ones, which were not guilty of associating with previous governments and which were also vehemently criticising the current regime), but voted for an Islamist party. The 'availability' of a rich vocabulary and the warehouse of symbols provided by Islam that is shared by perhaps a majority of the population with varying degrees, and skilful use of these symbols by Islamists on a massive and organised scale should count as important factors. The repression of the radical left by the state in the aftermath of the 1980 coup has been another factor. One of the most important factors was the dedicated activism of the core group of party members. Their attachment of religious importance to political activity was clear as frequently stated by Erbakan, "other parties have *members*, we have *believers*" (Erbakan 1997: 91).

The WP continued to advocate the 'Just Order' slogan of the National Outlook.

The 'Just Order' 'project' which is based on important Islamic symbols and rules, can be criticised for its theoretical shortcomings. Indeed its unsympathetic, naive language disturbed even Islamist experts.[70] Nevertheless, the Just Order still proved to be a valuable solid slogan in appealing to the electorate, largely because it meant that the WP wanted to change this "*really terrible*" order for the better. In fact, relative radicalisation of the Turkish electorate showed that they had serious misgivings about the current social, economic and political situation in Turkey. In 1995, the WP, the 'ultra-nationalist' Nationalist Action Party (NAP)[71] (which promised to solve the PKK terror with a hard-line approach), Islamist-Nationalist GUP, pro-Kurdish HADEP and other a few extreme leftist parties had around a total of 40% support of the electorate. The centre-left and centre-right blocs on the other hand could only muster around 30% each. If one includes the alienated voters of 10-15% - who did not bother to vote despite a small potential fine - into the analysis, it became obvious that 'the centre' of the political spectrum evaporated. It could be seen that voters in Turkey, in search of a radical change of the political and economic system shifted further toward the right.

Among the electorate, the WP typically attracted votes from the relatively religious,[72] Sunni Kurds and Turks in the landlocked areas of Turkey where the people have generally a more conservative outlook and relatively recent migrants from these areas to big cities (the party received higher than its average votes in many big cities like Istanbul and Ankara thanks to this tide of migration); and the relatively poor sections and those who received lower than average education. The rural, less industrialised South-East, East and East-Black Sea regions of Turkey which had

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[70] For example, Islamist economist Mustafa Özel (1993) criticised the WP for not using sophisticated enough language.

[71] The NAP is considered to be more nationalist than other parties, yet it should be noted that even the leftist parties have been nationalist in Turkey the DLP of Ecevit adopted the slogan of Nationalist-Left emphasising the independence of Turkey mainly against the American and European influences.

[72] Erbakan observed that the traditionally religious sections, which have been "ridiculed" by secular circles, found a place within the WP which respected their beliefs and appearance (Şen 1995: 123).

comparatively more traditional and religious populations gave higher than average support to the WP (see, TÜSES 1999; Çakır 1994; Akdoğan 2000).

Those who voted for ideological reasons (the so-called hard core) among the WP supporters were often estimated to be between 8-12% of the voters in Turkey (see, for example, Kahraman 1995: 30). Among these, there were substantial sections influenced by mosque imams and muezzins and other DRA officials and a certain group of teachers at the IHLs known as *meslekçi'* (i.e. teaching basic Islamic sciences). These groups almost by definition had an Islamist worldview and were underpaid, and would certainly benefit from a more Islamic order, at least in terms of gaining social prestige by virtue of their jobs and Islamic knowledge. This was certainly a main issue for the secular parties and they accused the WP of using mosques and the IHLs for political purposes.

The activism of Islamist women was very effective in the rise of the WP. In fact, no other centre-right political circle was able to develop a women movement comparable to that of the WP (Mert 1996: 57). Just before 24 December1995 elections, there were 300,000 female members of the party in Istanbul alone, while its nearest rival could muster only 15,000. They were organised in every neighbourhood and members' names were on a computer database. These active female members of the party were visiting almost every house in both urban and rural areas of Turkey, organising conferences, attending weddings, funerals, holding tea parties (*TDN*, 15. 12. 1995).

Since a level of support of 8-12% was not enough for the WP to be a partner in government, the party was at pains to try to be a mass-party, albeit without losing its distinct ideological identity. This left the party open to internal and external criticisms. According to a small percentage of more radical Islamists, the party was losing its

identity and making concessions to the current political regime. Many Islamist groups and individuals accused the WP elite by claiming that being a WP voter was more important for them than being a good Muslim (see, for example, Şen 1995).

It could be seen that, new societal sections, different from the traditional grass roots of the WP, were beginning to emerge and were choosing to support the WP. These were new Muslim 'capitalists' in rapidly industrialising provincial cities, highly educated technical and administrative cadres, a considerable numbers of youth coming from laic or even foreign language lycees. There were also a sizeable urban mass of women motivated by young women with good education, and a substantial amount of workers (Laçiner 1996: 9). Most of these new sections had a more assertive Islamic identity than that of the traditional party supporters.

There is a consensus among the observers that the WP superseded other political parties in terms of size, efficiency and dedication of its party machinery. A strong core group of activists acted very professionally, they were highly motivated, disciplined and strongly committed to the cause, defined often as a religious mission (a form of jihad).[73] They, like the vein in a body, functioned at community level, communicating with every voter if possible. Party activities were carefully organised to reach all voters (Çakır 1994: 51-9; Soydan 1994: 41; Şen 1995: 88, Yavuz 1997).

The grass roots organisation of the party carried the party discourse to people. The discourse 'explained' the causes of problems in Turkey and offered solutions couched in an Islamic terminology. The party grass roots also provided material benefits such as health care, assistance in finding jobs, food, fuel and other commodities to the

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[73] In the words of Erbakan "the success of our party registered so far is a product of our cadres who have worked with a religious zeal and sincerity by only aiming at the attainment of the consent of Allah" (see, Yıldız 2003).

poor. Furthermore they offered sympathy and an appreciation of difficulties of everyday life. Thus, they created an atmosphere of closeness. affection. congeniality and companionship. This combination of ideology, material benefits and personal touch worked and returned as votes. Other political parties did not posses or could not mobilise a comparable group of hard-core members; they were less convincing and their policies were more self-centred and showed little care for problems of "the little people" (Ayata 1996: 52).

3.5.3 A 'Nativist' Party

The WP shared a general characteristic of Islamist movements in the world by its emphasis on Islam as the most important local, constitutive cultural element. The WP was a professed 'nativist' party. Erbakan frequently addressed the crowds by stating "we are just like you, exactly like you." Presumably, this 'sameness' came from sharing the same 'authentic' cultural, Islamic values and background. Thus, according to the leaders of the WP, the WP was different from other parties, which were responsible for the socio-economic failure of Turkey. Asiltürk, a leading MP of the WP, was saying in 1995 that "the WP is on one side and all the others are on the other side. Other parties are merely establishments, consisting of various interest groups that look like a political party only in form" (*TDN*, 17.11.1995).

For the WP, Islam (as a shared system of symbols and meanings) brought the rulers and the ruled closer. Erbakan said that the WP's coming to power meant that "for the first time, the people came to power, its beliefs, its history came to power [...] from now on, the state will be at the service of the people, not the people at the service of the state" (*Milli Gazete*, 1. 10. 1996). The WP held that the gap between the secular elite

and the masses in Turkey was mainly result of the 'enemy-like'[74] approach of the former towards Islam: whereas, the masses were traditionally religious according to the WP. More disturbingly for the WP, a certain section of the secular elite was very active in trying to promote a nationalised, 'Protestantised' Islam.[75] For example, they opened a debate about performing *namaz* (prayer) in Turkish as opposed to Arabic, "despite" the fact that (as popularly claimed in the Islamist press), "they would not even pray in Turkish". This, non-practice of Islam (as a sign of not really sharing) by the secular elite, made them non-persuasive in the eyes of the religious Muslims. Nevertheless, their desire to 'modernise' Islam further in Turkey caused anxiety, because it was feared that by using the state power they might be successful in damaging Islam.

3.5.4 The Welfare Party and the Shaping of Islamism in Turkey

In various Muslim countries, the general colour of Islamism is naturally strongly related to the policies of existing powerful Islamist organisations. Similarly, the WP was an important actor in shaping Islamism in Turkey. As Yıldırım observes the WP behaved like a religious community at public level and as a political party at state level (1999b: 129-133), often sacralising its political activity as the most important form of serving to Islam (jihad). The WP elite often presented themselves as the only or the most important *representatives* of Islamic demands, *spokespersons* of the religious sections in Turkey, thus they attempted at monopolising leadership of Islamism in the country (see, for example, Bayramoğlu 2001: 60-61; Akdoğan 2000; Yavuz 1997). This was clearly a disturbing attitude for other Islamist groups. The WP members, like many other Islamist groups, conceived Islam as more than a political ideology; because unlike

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[74] See, various issues of Islamist dailies and Subaşı (1996: 155) for the 'Enemy of Islam' image of the secular elite in the eyes of the religious.

[75] For an interesting complaint by an Islamist intellectual about "Protestantisation" of Islam by "[secular] intellectuals" and 'Protestantisation' of the Islamists who ceases to be *homo Islamicus* in favour of being *homo economicus*, see (Yıldırım 1999b: 92-106).

ideologies, the argument went, Islam was not a human invention. Islam, as a comprehensive way of life, provided a political blueprint for society.

The WP shared the predominant Islamist view in Turkey and in the world that Islam is timeless and universal, so, does not need to change in essential doctrines. Views of influential Islamist intellectual Ali Bulaç is typical: Islam is different from other religions (e.g. Christianity) because, its essence, basic principles, and "its spirit" have been transmitted to the present day authentically, without any corruption, intervention or changes (as God promised in the Qur'an) (i.e. its perfect form did not change) and this makes any reform attempt absurd. What Muslims need is to change their, "decayed, corrupted, eroded" understanding of Islam according to 'ideal' Islam (1995b: 56-57). WP members also shared another Islamist view in the world: Islam is 'knowable' in its ideal form (Bucenun 1990: 113-116).

Islamists in Turkey have been trying to establish a new dominant *tradition* of Islam, especially since the late 1960s. They critically evaluate the Islamic tradition since around 662 AD from the perspective of what they assume to be correct knowledge about the Golden Age of Islam. Their approach also includes an idealisation of the Ottoman history. Thus, they reach an understanding of 'ideal Islam'. One Islamist argues that this understanding has been very important for Islamists in Turkey in rendering unsuccessful the efforts, by the state or foreign powers, to promote a modernised, convenient version of Islam, "a quasi-Islam" (Kaplan 1993: 99).

One can see that the WP circles did not accept a sociological explanation of Islam that took its shape by historical experience. For example, in the *Milli Gazete*, a former prime minister of the mono-party period, Günaltay was criticised for stating in 1949, "we will not follow the *ijtihads* of Imam Malik who made them over a thousand

years ago according to conditions of that time and geography in the Arabian deserts," and for his further claim that a considerable amount of verses of the Qur'an were not valid any longer (29. 9. 1997). In contrast, as Islamists, Erbakan and other WP leaders held that, 'commands' in the Qur'an that organise social and private life are valid forever. They clearly shared the general Islamist claim that, a correct socio-political World Order (*Nizam-ı Alem*) can and must be realised according to 'original' Islam.

From Said Nursi to Erbakan, almost all Islamist leaders in Turkey advocated a somewhat restricted space for *ijtihad.* Their traditional attitude has been that more and more people should follow Islam in detail. This is not to say that, they did not have a very critical approach to the Islamic history and especially the 'degeneration' of Islam in folk practice. Yet, it has been almost unanimously accepted that, there are the Qur'an and other trusted written sources that describe the 'correct form of Islam.' Therefore, Islamists have argued that much caution is needed about ijtihad; otherwise it could turn into the modernisation of Islam, changing it according to fancies of some people (e.g. the secular elite), and eventually turning it into another religion. Here, the Islamist craving for authenticity and claim to have the original divine wishes, as a blueprint for life, have proved to be much more potent forces than their perception of the need to change to accommodate 'modern' ways into their lives.[76] On the contrary, Islamist groups, including the core group of the WP, wanted their new members to follow Islamic rules strictly. In fact, being a practising Muslim seemed to be an unwritten rule for becoming a high level member of the WP.

It is possible to see that when Erbakan demanded that the members should not

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[76] In fact, it can be argued that many Islamists in Turkey do not want to cut hands off, or marry with 4 women (see, Çarkoğlu 2004). These are not important issues for them at all, but they cannot currently, bring themselves to deny that these are part of the Islamic heritage, because it is feared that such a denial would open the gates for wishful amendments to Islam.

give their *zakat* (alms) individually but through WP mechanisms, (so that the receivers of the charity would feel closer to the WP), he was at the same time making use of a fact that many Islamists would know, in the 'Golden Age' of Islam, it was state's duty to collect and redistribute *zakat*. Thus, he implied, the WP viewed itself as the natural heir to traditional functions of an Islamic state, as these functions were ignored by the secular state in Turkey. In fact, similar to many other Islamist movements in the Middle East (Kepel 1995; Toth 2003), providing for the needy by organisations formed either by the party members or by using the resources of municipalities, has been an important WP policy. Talat Halman, a social democrat and a former minister of culture, bitterly observed that the WP was the only party, which actually did something for the poor masses. It fed them, took care of the grass roots, and gave hope and aspirations about possibility of a better life (*TDN*, 12. 3. 1996). A New York Times editorial, just after the 24 December 1995 election, argued that the victory of the WP was linked to a lack of social services in big cities and the pressure applied to the Kurdish minority. The NYT noted that WP gained votes by providing cheap bread, health clinics and other social services desperately needed by the poor, many of whom were recent migrants from the countryside (cited by *TDN*, 29. 12. 1995).

The Islamisation of Turkey, according to many Islamists and the WP elite, has fundamentally been a problem of 'educating' the nominally Muslim masses about Islam.[77] So, one of the functions of the core group of the WP supporter was 'educating' the WP sympathisers and other target groups about the key Islamic concepts and political 'demands' of Islam from a Muslim.

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[77] Erbakan and many other WP leaders clearly attributed the low support for the WP in the 1980s to the ignorance of the masses about Islam. The party members assumed that the WP was the natural party to support for anybody who was Islamically conscious (see, for example, Ceylan 1996).

The WP leadership also implied that other Islamist groups should join them as the biggest Islamist organisation which was most likely to influence the current regime, toward more Islamic lines. The party leadership did not give enough respect to identities of other Islamic groups whose members often became subject to a 'Welfarisation' (*Refahlılaşma*) process when they came into contact with the party and lost their ties with their original groups (Çakır 1994: 54-56).

3.6 THE WELFARE PARTY AND SECULARISATION IN TURKEY

It is useful to keep in mind that for Islamists in Turkey secularisation means decline of the social significance of Islam, in other words secularisation means de-Islamisation more than anything else, the opposite of the main Islamist aim. It can be seen that the general discourse of the Welfare Party did not recognise secularisation of Turkish society as a natural process accompanying the general modernisation trend but mainly a reflection of the worldviews of the republican elite.[78] According to the WP, since most social groups in Turkey were either religious or at least very respectful of Islamic values and natural candidates to be religious again, the secularisation of society was not seen as an informed choice of the people but an effect of the laic character of the regime. In fact, in the WP discourse, secularisation (understood as decline of religion) was portrayed as something that did not need to happen in a modernising society. This was because the discourse defined modernisation not in terms of secularisation but for example in terms of industrialisation and technological progress.[79]

The WP argued that secularism should be understood as a principle guaranteeing

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[78] The relationship between the religiousness of the political leaders and their attitude toward laicite has been meaningful. For example, Atatürk (Bulaç 1995b: 65) and İnönü were not religious according to Islamists, whereas Özal was religious enough for the masses and Erbakan has been very religious since his youth.

[79] The emphasis on industrialisation accompanied and helped by technological progress had been there, from the start, in the *Milli Görüş*, (National Outlook) as will be seen in Chapter 4.

freedom of religion and consciousness.[80]

A common Islamist theme in Turkey has been that secularisation has weakened ethics in the country, as it did in the West, because Kemalism in general and the principle of laicite in particular have undermined Islamic values that are necessary for a healthy society. In other words, in the WP one can see the continuation of a general conservative view (which existed since the first decades of the republic), that excessive secularism as an ideology undermined family and community ties, and led to moral degeneration of youth, the weakening of spiritual values, spread of non- or anti-Islamic views (Karpat 1959: 274-78).

Çakır's observation that the WP had some modernising and secularising effect on its supporters (1994: 58) captured only the half of the story, because, the party at the same time boosted their confidence in opposing basic assumptions and targets of the Turkish modernisation project. In their own way, WP members, like other Islamist sections of the society, were modernising[81] but their modernisation pace and route, were slower and significantly different from those of the pro-laicite majority (especially from the relatively elite secular sections within this majority). The two different understandings of modernity were often perceived to be in conflict with each other in a zero-sum game in the country.

When pressed by the circumstances of the 28 February Process, it became clearer that there had been considerable secularisation in Turkey. According to one poll,

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[80] These terms appear in the Turkish Constitution and laws in tandem; freedom of *din* (religion) and *vicdan* (consciousness) which are under state guarantee.

[81] One of the best ways of seeing the 'modernisation' of the great majority of the Islamists in Turkey is certainly to look at the internal criticism of this modernisation trend by some more conservative fractions among Islamists. As they point out, many Islamists joined in the modernisation process (albeit in their own distinct way) and started to do things that would have been considered un-Islamic a few years earlier. An example might be the acceptance of adverts that contain women dressed 'un-Islamically' on their television channels or on their newspapers, justified on the grounds that these institutions (television channels, newspapers) needed these sources of income to survive.

the majority of the public (60.5%) saw the anti-secular activities as a greater threat than the PKK (*TDN*, 25. 4. 1997). However, the real important move against rising Islamism (defined as reactionism) and especially against the WP, came not from the civil groups but from the military through the National Security Council. The NSC was constituted by the President, the PM, 3 ministers (Defence, Internal and Foreign Affairs) and the top five Generals of the TAF. At the insistence of its military wing, the NSC on 28 February 1997 'recommended' 18 measures to the government, mainly to curb 'fundamentalism' in Turkey. These included the handing over of the private schools and hostels operated by Islamist groups to the Ministry of National Education, a new system of 8-year basic education (causing the closure of the junior sections of IHLs) and stricter control of the Qur'an courses by the state. The number of IHLs was to be reduced in accordance with the need for religious functionaries. Media reports showing the TAF as *anti-Islamic* were to be brought under control. The dress code of the Kemalist revolution was to be implemented fully.[82] Activities of the religious extremists that would fuel sectarian differences and divide the nation had to be prevented. Arms licensing rules had to be stricter.[83] Anti-regime organisations had to be prevented from collecting the skins of animals slaughtered during the Feast of Sacrifice [hence depriving them of considerable funds[84]] (*TDN*, 20. 3. 1997). The culmination of the 28 February Process was the ban of the WP by the Constitutional Court in February 1998.

Turkish secularisation has not been visible only in the emergence of a dominant secular elite. WP circles also complained about the increasing negative or indifferent attitudes toward Islamic values by a majority of the general population which they

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[82] The TAF was disturbed by the increasing visibility of men wearing *cübbe* (long jackets) and *sarık* ('Islamic' headgear) which were outlawed. Although Atatürk did not stipulate an outfit for the women, he was clearly in favour of parting with the headscarf and clearly against *carşaf* (black chador) which certainly looks very archaic to the secular minded in Turkey.

[83] The increasing amount of pump-action rifles, licensed for hunting, especially became a concern.

[84] Skins were collected by various, mainly Islamist, groups, including those close to the WP and the PKK.

perceived as part of de-Islamisation. For example, a *Milli Gazete* columnist Özcan wrote "our people, who have been deliberately shaped according to Western culture. understand Islam in an extremely corrupted form". According to these "Islam means fasting [...] visiting shrines. giving money to the beggars [...] following religious duties" is enough for being labelled as "an extreme religionist" (5. 7. 1997). A WP minister, Çelik, charged that some circles were trying to create an "atheist society" in Turkey by "abusing Kemalism and laicite" (*Milli Gazete*, 4. 11. 1996).

The level of secularisation (de-Islamisation) that the society had reached was very disturbing for the WP circles. The majority of the masses were no longer paying enough attention to Islamic standards. Westernised, secularised upper classes were leading largely "a materialist, hedonist, extremely consumerist lifestyle [...] wasting their time in orgies, drinking, gambling". The duty of Islamists was to "work day and night" and "raise world class writers, poets, historians, philosophers, artists, architects, with high moral values, virtues, wisdom [...and] gain economic power in the country" (Eygi, *Milli Gazete*, 2. 7. 1997).

3.6.1 The Welfare Party and the Principle of Laicite in Turkey

The principle of laicite had been the thorniest of the Kemalist principles for Islamists. Mainly because, it has come to be understood as the chief principle giving the character of the regime by the state elite, which have been "reluctant to give up its tutelage of the masses" in the name of preserving the founding philosophy of the republic (Kramer 2000: 1). Laicite has been usually propagated and understood as "separation of religious and state affairs".[85] It is attacked as such by Turkish Islamists who, like their counterparts in many other Muslim countries, have been arguing that it is

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[85] In 1928, during the discussions in TGNA, it was also defined as such (see, Özek (no date): 40).

wrong to keep Islamic rules away from the state affairs, because Islam was sent to be applied to all aspects of life. A former Commander of the Navy lamented that since the laicite had been taught so simple-mindedly in schools over the years, the young generations did not properly understood the good reasons behind the principle. However, this was a comment with the benefit of hindsight, after perceiving a failure to raise all the youth with a belief in the laicite.

In fact, the separation of state affairs from the wishes and desires of the population has historical roots in Turkey and many saw it as necessary. The politics and political offices and death often walked hand in hand, especially in the Ottoman Empire and many Grand Viziers and even Sultans were executed. In the Turkish Republic, the executions of the PM Menderes and two of his ministers in 1961, after the coup of 1960 are entrenched in living memory. Therefore, the separation of politics from religion has its rationale for the masses at large. Trying to involve Islam in political life has been engaging in politics *par excellence* and has been perceived to be too dangerous. Perhaps more importantly, it can be argued that, the same uneducated masses usually saw it natural that the running of the state should belong to high office holders, who by virtue of their education and knowledge understand what is best for the country. What is more, the laicite, understood as legislating and governing the country according to contemporary (modern) values and without paying particular attention to Islam or even deliberately banning some aspects of it, has been well guarded by the republican elite and laws.

Although, the leading members of the WP made it clear that they believed that the state had to be subject to Islamic rules and it should serve Islam as the religion of the great majority; these beliefs could not be voiced in public for legal reasons that were firmly based on the principle of laicite. Nevertheless, since certain Islamic

rules/symbols were (are) discouraged by the state (like the headscarf at universities). the WP members were able to show their stance by various symbolic acts (like joining protests to support these female students).

Although it was strictly against the principle of laicite. a substantial amount of Islamists wanted a shariah state in Turkey. The findings of the TÜSES[86] and other researchs are interesting. The results of polls conducted face to face as follows: "Do you want Turkey to be administered according to shariah?" (TÜSES 1999: 25).

Table 2: Attitudes toward Shariah (Percentages)

	1995	1996	1998
Wants shariah	19.9	26.7	19.8
Does not want shariah	61.8	58.1	59.9
No idea	18.4	15.2	20.2

According to these polls, at least 1/5 of the voters in Turkey wanted the shariah as a state system. The sudden increase by 6.8% in the one-year after 24 December 1995 election victory of the WP could be interpreted as a reflection of growing confidence among the religious. However, such figures should not be understood as unwavering support for a strict application of shariah.[87]

Party sympathisers'[88] attitude toward shariah in 1998 (TÜSES 1999: 92) is also illuminating:

Table 3: Party sympathisers' attitude toward Shariah (percentages).

	Wants Shariah	Does not Want	No idea or answer
Motherland Party	15.1	64.9	20.1
Welfare-Virtue P.	45.8	33.9	20.3
True Path Party	20.2	55.6	24.2
Nationalist Action P.	26.5	61.3	12.2
Democratic Left P.	6.9	80.2	13.0
Republican Peoples' P.	6.9	84.6	8.5

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[86] Social, Economic Political Researches Foundation of Turkey.

[87] As Çarkoğlu (2004) highlights when analysed in detail, support for specific prescriptions of Islamic law greatly varies in Turkey, for example, from 10 - 15% (e.g. for polygamy and larger share from the inheritance for the male) to 75% (for the headscarf at universities).

[88] Defined as "those who would want to vote for that party under ideal circumstances."

It appears that there were substantial pro-shariah sections among the NAP (26.5%). TPP (20.2%) and MLP (15.1%) sympathisers. These were centre-right or nationalist parties. 35% of those who wanted the Islamic law would vote for the WP-VP (Virtue Party, the WP's successor), 10.4% for MLP, 10.4% for TPP, 12% for the NAP, 5% for the DLP, the RPP and pro-Kurdish HADEP and the remaining were undecided or would protest the elections. In 1996, according to another TÜSES research, the WP would get 52.3% of pro-shariah votes. The WP was the only party whose supporters wanting shariah as a state system outnumbered those who did not. This showed both its distinctive Islamist character and the fact that not all of its supporters wanted a state based on the shariah. In interpreting this data it should not be forgotten that the word 'shariah' has become much tarnished over the decades in Turkey and strictly speaking, any attempt to base the regime on it, even partially, was and is against the law.[89] This might cause hesitation or even fear for ordinary citizens to say, "Yes, I want the shariah" to an unknown poll conductor.[90] Yet, research results, year on year, have been very consistent. At least around 20% of the population in Turkey was pro-shariah and 60% was against it, the remaining 20% being undecided or declined to answer. Therefore, it can be said on the one hand that secularisation has taken firm roots in Turkish society and on the other hand, there was a firm base for Islamists to cultivate. The Islamist argument, which the WP shared, that the "shariah means Islam"[91] did not seem to reach large sections of the society. The great majority of people considered themselves Muslim but opposed a shariah-based regime. On the other hand, the WP had a relative success in conveying the message to its grass roots that shariah means Islamic

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[89] According to Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution: "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets".

[90] Some Islamist publications, for example, the daily *Zaman* of Fethullah Gülen Group criticised this poll at that time, asking whether it was a pretext for gathering information on the religious persons.

[91] An influential theology Professor H. Karaman was arguing that shariah means Islam and it also means a part of Islam; i.e. Islamic rules related to political, economic, social and legal matters (see *Yeni Şafak* 25. 3. 1997).

rules and not a word one should be afraid of using.

It could be seen that there were both pragmatic and ideological reasons in voters' minds influencing their approach to shariah (TÜSES 1999: 70-71 [1998]):

Table 4: Reasons influencing electoral attitudes toward shariah.

Reasons for wanting shariah	%	% of whole population
It is the requirement of being a Muslim	47.6	9.4
It is a socially, economically and politically better system	39.8	7.9
It will bring morality and honesty	7.3	1.4
Reasons for not wanting shariah		
It is not a realistic thesis	31.2	18.8
It is against democracy & Human Rights	29.6	17.8
It is against contemporary rule of law principles	19.6	11.8
It is socially and economically a backward system	11.0	6.6

The WP consolidated its hold over its supporters with the help of heightened political tension in Turkey and by ensuring an animated debate over Islam and laicite, and constantly giving similar messages. Therefore, it was not surprising to see that (although not too different from some other parties), the most rigid voters belonged to the WP. Around 30% of whom would not cast their vote for any other party should the WP could not take part in elections (see, TÜSES 1999: 120-121).

The WP leadership shared and strongly argued the view that laicite has been wrongly understood and used against Islam in Turkey. For example, S. A. Emre, a leading WP member, criticised Bayar, the president of the republic between 1950 and 1960, who said in 1952 that "laicite is to make society forget religion completely" (cited by Dilipak 1991: 150).

Most WP members would agree with Ömer Laçiner, a socialist intellectual, who argues "in Turkey, laicite means ensuring the dominance and privilege of the 'modern' way of life over the traditional Islamic way of life by state hands and enforcement"

(1996:10). If laicite meant banishment of Islam from the public sphere (all kinds of official places; e.g. universities etc.) then, the Islamist drive, (in which many WP members took part), to open schools, preparation courses for the university entrance exam, even universities has also served to create Islamised spaces as a form of getting away from the "militant" laicite (see, Göle 2000).

It has been frequently argued by WP circles that Western countries are secular too, but there, religiously oriented people are much freer to practice their beliefs. They frequently compared Turkey with some other countries as far as secularity was concerned and thus criticised what was being done in the name of laicite in the country. Eygi summarises these views well:

> No, we do not want to turn Turkey into a Sudan or Iran but want to make it a democracy like Israel. And yes, it is possible to be a democracy without laicite. For example in Britain, there is no laicite where the sovereign is also head of the church.[92] If the laicite is the most debated issue in Turkey it is because everybody exploits this principle according to their ideologies... If the loyalty of the Jews to their religion in Israel cannot be considered reactionist then the desire of Turkish Muslims to lead a life in accordance with Qur'an and Sunnah should be considered natural (*Milli Gazete*, 7. 7. 1997).

In fact, even according to liberal observers, the Kemalists who thought that they were attacking the Islamic reactionaries, at the same time alienated "good, mosque-going Muslims" who gradually joined forces with Islamists and gave the WP a boost "in Anatolia" [i.e. in provincial, especially central and eastern parts of Turkey]. "In the end the Kemalists made themselves look like atheists and non-believers" (Çevik, *TDN*, 27. 2. 1996).

Leading intellectuals in the WP circles, like other Islamists, frequently argued that the state was trying to control religion in Turkey. "In our system the state controls

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[92] Note the distortion of reality to make a point. Britain, of course, is very much a secularised country.

the religion. There is the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), it has a hundred thousand imams, muezzins and muftis who are state officials on state pay roll" (Eygi. *Milli Gazete* 3.7.1997). A radical Islamist writer, Yaşar Kaplan was voicing a widespread Islamist perception that although the regime in Turkey does not in any way want to involve Islam into its affairs, it also does not want, and fears to be seen, as irreligious (1993: 85).

The secular elite has been justifying the 'exceptional' application of laicite by arguing that Turkey is a special case as far as laicite is concerned, because there has been a real threat of a theocratic state being established. The WP argued that the hard-line application of secularism in Turkey could not be justified, because, democracy was democracy everywhere and Turkey had to comply with universal standards (see, Welfare Party *Anayasa Değişikliği Uzlaşma Teklifi*: [no date]).

In fact, the WP circles advanced an argument, which was generally shared by Islamists in the region and in Turkey, that laicite was a foreign concept, and that was why people did not understand it; it did not match social values and realities in Turkey. "Laicite, born raised and developed outside of us. It does not have any parallels with our history, beliefs, cultural values [...] trying to patch laicism into Islamic world is nothing but only an attempt at the impossible" (Dilipak 1991: 171). The historical experience that gave birth to laicite in Europe did not have a parallel in Islamic history but "our ignorant intellectuals talk about dark medieval ages [...] this nation's medieval ages were enlightened. Europe's medieval ages were dark" (Ünaldı, *Milli Gazete*, 9. 10. 1997).

The *Milli Gazete* quite often pointed out that, though politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats who were in favour of laicism did not want Islam to influence the

system in Turkey, they were using Islam selectively when it suited them.[93] For example, President Demirel's statement that "the PKK terror is supported by Syria, if they are Muslims they should not lend this support" did not seem to sit well with what was happening in Turkey "where the WP is being judged because of not closing the IHLs and supporting the headscarf wearing students. Besides, in Syria "Muslims [i.e. 'good' Muslims] do not control the administration. On the contrary, it is being controlled by a small, sectarian [i.e. Alawite, a Shiite Sect[94]] junta which is determined to annihilate Islam" (*Milli Gazete,* editorial, 9. 10. 1997).

It can be argued that the prominent members of the WP tried to re-negotiate the content of the principle of laicite because it proved too firmly rooted in Turkish society for the WP to challenge it directly. For example at the 1993 WP congress, Erbakan was declaring "if laicite means freedom of religion and conscience, freedom to live as one believes, prevention of repression because of religious beliefs and state guarantee for these issues then the WP sincerely believes in these" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 235). The WP manifesto, for the parliamentary election on 24 December 1995, was arguing "in nowhere on the earth, laicite means being an enemy of religion. On the contrary, it guarantees the right to believe" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 235).

According to Erbakan, laicite should be understood as "acting in the light of science and rationality, whereas being reactionary is being dogmatic and ignorant. In our country, there are also laic reactionaries. These are fascist laics [...] Laicite means making the laws in the parliament". Erbakan also said that while separatist terrorism and reactionary movements must be fought, the affection shown to the Kurdish population

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[93] For the use of some Islamic discourses and symbols by the state forces when propagating against the PKK and strong claims of state forces' support of the WP as an alternative to Kurdish separatism in the region, see, (Yalçın 1994: 200-201).

[94] Which was strongly disapproved of by mostly Sunni WP supporters.

in general should also be extended to the *sincere* believers[95] (*TDN*, 12. 3. 1997).

Erbakan was claiming he had no problems with the secular system in Turkey, but he added that the state was continuing to use the principle of laicite to fuel anti-Islamic feelings and this had to stop. He gave the West as an example to correct the laicite application in Turkey: "In the West laicite means not to discriminate between beliefs and to respect and recognise the religion of the people [...] We do not want to change the secular principles of the state, all we want is that these principles are applied properly" (*TDN*, 9. 1. 1996).

3.6.2 Secular Education System and the Welfare Party

Most Islamists could not agree more with Professor Kongar, an influential secular intellectual:

> The education system of the Republic was indeed based on a reaction. The aim was to eradicate religious education of the Ottomans and its effects. The founders of the republic thought of education as a weapon against Caliphatists and Islamists and hence it assumed an ideological nature; this education system, which was open to the West, functioned as the carrier of foreign ideologies like nationalism and laicite (cited by Işık 1990: 45).

Thus, from the start, the education system had an important place in the Kemalist revolution, because the population had a very low level of formal education and most of the educated minority only had religious education. The education system was to be under strict control of Ankara and the new generations were to be given a 'unified' scientific education as opposed to a religious one. The policy of a unified laic education has been a 'half-success', mainly, because, the laic (secular) policies could not reach all parts of Turkey evenly. The centre's ability to control has been high in urban

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[95] As the TAF-led secular sections of the society tried to curb the rise of reactionism (Islamism), it became a political necessity to argue that the measures were aimed at 'reactionaries' not the "sincere Muslims" in Turkey.

areas, but some traditional religious education survived in "difficult conditions", especially in rural areas.[96] However, as Turkey democratised, the official education system started to loose its unity. Even the RPP felt obliged to concede some grounds in the late 1940s to the part of the population who wanted some religious education for their children in state schools (Bora 1996: 21).

In the mid-1990s, secular sections of society became increasingly alarmed by the systematic Islamist efforts to enhance the 'Islamised' space within the education system. They were continuing to open their private schools and number of students who came under the influence of Islamists in state 'controlled' schools (e.g. the IHLs) seemed to be rapidly increasing. Indeed, the IHLs had become one of the most sensitive issues between Islamists and the secular sections. The number of pupils in IHLs increased ten-fold in twenty years from 1975 to 1995 and reached 473,301 (Duman 1997: 179), some 15% of the total number of students in secondary and high schools. These schools seemed and were dubbed as backyard of the WP. Their graduates overwhelmingly favoured implementation of shariah in Turkey. There had been more graduates than the need for male religious functionaries (and very few women preachers) in state cadres, so, many of them entered faculties other than divinity and occupied important positions in bureaucracy after graduation. "The laic sections" of society and especially the high-ranking officers who spoke in the name of the TAF voiced their concerns and demanded a reduction in their numbers.[97]

In the 28 February Process, one of the key demands of military wing of the NSC from the government was to increase basic education from 5 to 8 years which

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[96] "Extremely difficult conditions" in which religious education was maintained during the mono-party period has been a frequent theme for Islamists and the WP leadership.

[97] Turkish General Staff "projected" in 1997 that if the trend of religious education continued without any intervention from the state, in 2005 a reactionary [Islamist] party could get 67% of the votes and could change the constitution.

meant, *inter alia*, the abolition of secondary school parts of the IHLs. "The 8 year primary education" law was enacted on 16 August 1997 by the TGNA (*Türkiye*, 17. 8. 1997). The WP circles argued strongly that, in education, advanced countries, like the Western countries or Japan (where pupils could choose a certain type of secondary school after 4 or 5 years of primary education), were needed to be taken as models not some "backward", "undemocratic", "Third World" countries (where there was 8 or more years of continuous education "aimed to indoctrinate the pupils") (Welfare Party 1997c: 38).

During the preparation and enactment of the law, the WP criticised the move harshly. According to Erbakan, the existing government was a leftist one and the Motherland Party had become just a prop of the left; democracy had been destroyed. He accused the government of working "day and night" to close the Qur'an courses, the IHLs and the religious foundations. This meant *fighting against the people.* The *religious minorities in Turkey were freer* than the majority in enjoying their religious freedom. The seculars wished to raise a certain type of people. Many WP members signed a petition saying that they did not want to be treated as '*slaves*'[98] in their own country nor want to be ruled against their will (my emphasis, *TDN* 30.7.1997). Later, Erbakan commented, "I wish, we can provide 11 years of basic-compulsory education for our 70 million people and teach more science, more modern knowledge, but this [law] is only to impede the religion of our people contrary to human rights; and to close junior parts of the IHLs. Contrary to contemporary trend in the world, some try to take Turkey back to the repressive regime of 50 years ago" (*Milli Gazete*, 29. 9. 1997).

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[98] The term often used by Islamists is pariah, as in the famous poem by Nationalist-Islamist ideologue N. F. Kısakürek (d. 1983) "*Öz yurdunda garipsin, öz vatanında parya*! (You [were made]. a stranger in your homeland, in your homeland a pariah! (in Düzdağ 1996: 108).

The WP circles were also "aware" that although the secular state has been trying to utilise the administratively highly centralised education system as an important tool in its quest of controlling Islam and promoting a certain 'harmless' version of it, its attempts have been strongly resisted and quite often derailed by Islamist efforts and tactics. An IHL student reflected the Islamist view, which the WP shared, well: "you [the secular elite] opened them [the IHLs] to raise imams who would be puppets of the regime, but God thwarted this plot and now we are studying law, medicine and engineering faculties we, the graduates of the IHLs, are coming *despite [those who call themselves] the contemporary, the civilised, the progressives and TÜSİAD members* (my emphasis; cited by Duman 1997:172-3).

According to the WP, another wrong application of laicite in the education system was the ban on the headscarf worn by female students. The WP repeatedly criticised the YÖK (the Council of Higher Education), especially the head of the YÖK for this ban and centralised control of higher education. According to an influential WP MP, Kapusuz, the YÖK was putting pressure on universities and firing Islamist academics (*Milli Gazete*, 22. 9. 1997).

Actually, the Constitutional Court[99] found the wearing of headscarf in universities against the constitutional principle of laicite. However not all universities applied the ban strictly. The European Court of Human Rights also found the ban lawful on the grounds that by choosing to go to a secular university, students accepted the rules of that institution.[100]

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[99] Consisting of 11 judges appointed by the presidents of Turkey.
[100] Although, as often pointed out by Islamists, all universities were and are subject to secular rules in Turkey. It is not allowed to open non-secular schools.

Islamists charged that, in the past secularists criticised the religiously oriented for not allowing and encouraging their daughters to enter higher education, but now they themselves did not allow these girls to be educated as they wished (Bulaç 1995b: 142). The headscarf ban was labelled as a *zulm* (wrongdoing), a term with strong Islamic connotations.[101] There has been fierce, emotional day-to-day condemning of this ban in the Islamist media. For example, a *Milli Gazete* correspondent reported that he was told by one member of the High Council of Religious Affairs of the DRA that there were non-Muslim foreign powers behind the headscarf ban in Turkey. The same expert on Islam further commented that those who ban the headscarf have nothing to do with modernity and could not be true Kemalists because Atatürk did not interfere with the dress of the women. The head of the council, Öner, told the reporter that it was certain that according to Qur'an and hadiths the headscarf was a religious requirement (*fard*).[102] The reporter lastly criticised the DRA because, while expressing its views at press conferences on almost every topic, it had not issued any official statement on 'the headscarf problem' in Turkey for the last four years (23. 9.1997). This is to imply that these scholars did not join in the Islamist 'struggle' as they 'should'.

3.6.3 The Welfare Party and Legal Secularisation

The WP circles shared the widespread Islamist argument in Turkey that the adoption of different bodies of laws from various European countries such as Switzerland, Italy, Germany (Gözaydın 2002) had been a mistake, as these laws did not conform to the native, Islamic culture. Therefore, the WP elite quite often implied that the harmonisation of the laws with Islamic teachings would boost social order.

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[101] For an analysis of the term according to the Qur'an see Ulutürk (1990).

[102] It can be noted that the Islamic style of beard was also banned at universities. While the headscarf is considered a religious must by the Islamists, beard is only a Sunnah, so the fact that there was no 'struggle' for right to have a beard by the Islamist students was indicative of how the Islamists drew the distinction between essential and non-essential religious rights.

The WP also adopted a 'solution', suggested by Islamist intellectuals, to the "problem of oppressive and uniform" application of secular laws to all citizens regardless of their wishes. The solution, principally suggested by Ali Bulaç and supported by some other Islamist writers like Dilipak, had drawn from the Medina Document, signed between Muslims around the Prophet and other communities in Medina. For Bulaç and some other Islamists, it showed that Muslims were and are willing to live together with other religious communities provided that every community is governed according to its own laws (Bulaç 1993a: 11).[103] This view was adopted by the WP and was translated as a demand that state intervention in the lives of people should be at a minimum and social life could be governed by ensuring the freedom of contract among the people. Thus, the religious would be free to reorganise their lives among themselves according to their wishes. Obviously, the secular elite found this idea of multiple laws as another way of limited introduction of shariah to society and an anathema to the whole philosophy of a unitarian laic republic (see, for example, Savaş 1997). [104]

3.7 THE WELFARE PARTY AND DEMOCRACY

The WP elite's understanding of democracy was strongly tied to their views about the application of laicite. Therefore, the above analyses of their stance vis-à-vis laicite are very much indicative of their stance towards democracy. Some other important issues related to their conceptualisation of democracy will be briefly analysed below.

First of all, it is worth keeping in mind that the WP supporters, like most other

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[103] For the text and an analysis of the document, see El-Awa (1980: 15-25).
[104] For the views of an MP from the WP supporting the system of "Multiple Laws" see (Zengin 1995).

Islamists in the world, did not exist in a fully democratic culture.[105] Islamists too shared the widespread view that Turkish democracy had many shortcomings.[106] In 1993, Tayyip Erdoğan argued that there was a "dictatorial regime" in Turkey, not "real" democracy (Gülalp 2002: 94) and according to the WP circles, "the tutelage of the TAF" was an obstacle in front of a full democracy[107] (*Milli Gazete* 15. 9. 1997). An Islamist intellectual, Mehmet Metiner, who worked closely with the WP, argued that his two identities, being a Kurd and a Muslim, posed problems according to the Turkish state. This was because "the political regime and state in Turkey were not democratic. The state was defender of an undemocratic nationalism and a Jacobin secularism". The solution was to save the state from being tool of a particular group or ideology (*TDN*. 28.12.1996).

According to some WP circles, many in the secular elite did not want a real democracy in Turkey, because in that case, they "knew" that Islamists would come to power. Instead, they wanted an authoritarian regime like in the 1930s and 1940s when there was only one party (see, for example, Eygi, *Milli Gazete*, 3.7.1997). Despite these feelings, it is important to note that contrary to widespread Islamist de-legitimisation of democracy - as a concept and method - in the previous decades, the WP elite, as a *legal* part of the political system, generally tried to re-negotiate the content of democracy rather than de-legitimising it from an Islamic point of view as often done by Islamist writers (see, Gülalp 2002: 93-95). This was mainly because, a democratic atmosphere

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[105] Although, Turkey has been "decidedly more democratic" than its Muslim neighbours in the region (Meyer 1999).

[106] When looked at from the perspective of liberal democracy as discussed in Chapter 1, some of the problems with Turkish democracy at that time (and arguably now), as often pointed out by various observes, can be summarised as follows: Not all of the real power lay with elected officials. Other 'unaccountable' actors (e.g. the TAF, and some other bureaucratic powers) were also influential. Cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups (e.g. the Kurds and the Alevis), and Islamists had some varying degrees of problems with the political regime.

[107] Like other Islamists who wanted more freedom, the WP elite downplayed the fact that Turkey has been one of the most democratic Muslim countries in the region.

promised them a chance to change the political system in Turkey peacefully. WP circles understood democracy in a reductionist way as the rule of the majority in parliament more than anything else. A common WP argument was that there could be no incompatibility between Islam and a 'true' democracy in Turkey. "Democracy means realisation of the people's will and since the Muslims are the majority in our country there can be no contradiction between Islam and people's will (Eygi, *Milli Gazete* 7. 7. 1997).

The WP leadership did not encourage intra-party democracy (Çakır 1994: 52-53) and used religious symbols and vocabulary in its attempt to silence criticism from other Islamist groups, many of which strongly reacted to this tactic. For example, in 1990, Esad Coşan, spiritual leader of the İskender Pasha community, accused Erbakan of claiming to be the *Commander of Jihad*, which meant wrongly arguing that there was a religious war going on in Turkey and he, as the leader of the whole Islamist camp in this war, was above the spiritual leaders of other Islamist groups (see, Çakır 1990: 54-55). These messages, which were coded in an Islamic vocabulary, were reaching out to certain sections of the society, such as many students, graduates of the IHLs in particular, who were familiar with this vocabulary. However, they were not effective on some very important Islamist groups like those who were known as the '*Süleymancıs*' and the '*Fethullahcıs*' who kept a distance from the WP.

For the majority of the secular elite the WP's "real" views were obviously incompatible with democracy. One important question was would party members resort to armed struggle to bring an Islamic order, a complete and strict application of shariah rules. For the TAF and important parts of the secular elite, the party had this potential.

Some careless remarks of Erbakan and other WP MPs did not help.[108] However, the WP officials frequently stressed that they would play the game (i.e. democracy) by its rules and would come to and leave government by way of elections. As many experts observed, the WP was against the use of violence to gain the political power in Turkey[109] (Soydan 1994: 122; Şen 1995, Akdoğan 2000).

The views that Islam and democracy were becoming compatible in Turkey and that people began to tolerate lifestyles of each other's proved too optimistic (Heper 1997). As Çakır observed, Islamists in fact wanted a change in secular lifestyles rather than promising to respect them.[110] For example, they (including many leading figures in the WP) argued that when Islamists come to power those who consume alcohol would 'voluntarily' 'save' themselves from it for good. On the other hand, the WP showed evidence from the West to the secular Turkish elite and charged them with not following the West, when doing so did not suit to their interests. For example, WP circles argued political parties were not being closed down in the U.S., France, Canada or Italy (*Milli Gazete* 4. 10. 1997).

Very similar to other Islamist views in the Middle East, Islamists in Turkey (including the WP elite) strongly questioned the legitimacy of the regime in Turkey.[111]

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[108] Most famously, in April 1994, Erbakan said that it was certain that they were coming to power; what was not certain was "would it be bloody or sweet" (see, Heper 1997: 42). The secular media showed the clip of this speech over and over. Some WP MPs disturbingly claimed that the TAF which did not "succeed" against a handful PKK terrorists could hardly be a match for millions of "Muslims," if tension rose in Turkey.

[109] In fact, lack of Islamically motivated armed struggle or violence toward the state forces in Turkey is usually explained by Islamist writers as a reflection of common sense of 'Islamic section'. The Sunni tradition of obedience to the political authority and strong state tradition of the Turks (belief in the necessity of a powerful central administration in the face of a potentially hostile international environment) should be mentioned as other important factors.

[110] In fact, as Yıldırım points out, the Just Order project of the WP, understood as a 'rational' blueprint to change the whole society, was a clear sign that the WP elite themselves were not immune to the lure of social engineering (1999b: 119) or ideas of progress and development (Yıldız 2003).

[111] An important part of this criticism was based on state's open disregard or violation of certain Islamic norms. Another important factor was economic performance and policies.

They often made it quite clear that their obedience to the regime was mainly due to coercion of the state. In other words, it can be argued that from a substantial Islamist section of society, state enforcement enjoyed only the first (following orders) and fifth (instrumental acceptance) types of obedience and support, according to classification of Held (1989: 101) as discussed in Chapter 1.

3.7.1 Media and Democracy

It could be seen that, during the WP's height of power, the Islamist media continued to be less influential than the pro-laicite media in Turkey.[112] The penetration of the Islamist media among the secular elite section of society was especially weak. What was more, considerable part of the Islamist media was critical of WP policies. Yet, most of the Islamist media shared the view that there were serious problems with democracy in Turkey and there was the need for a much more democratic atmosphere, mainly understood in terms of religious freedoms. For example, the Islamist daily *Yeni Şafak* strongly criticised "the Turkish type of democracy" where "the NSC decisions", enforced by the TAF, meant "democratic demands and beliefs of an important part of society are completely ignored" (9. 3. 1997).

The WP shared the general Islamist view that the pro-laicite media, the two big groups (the Doğan group and the Sabah group) in particular, had been trying hard to give a manipulated image of Islamists to the public.[113] The larger media had become a 'weapon' at the hands of their owners who used these media organisations to further

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[112] It can be argued that, as far as the television, the radio and the print media (especially newspapers) were concerned during the last 5 years of the WP, despite to their strong developments, the 'Islamist media' had around between 25- 30% of the viewers and readers.

[113] For example, Islamist writer Taşgetiren accused television channels and newspapers belonged to two big media groups of a "routine", "ugly perversion of truth" by misrepresenting a huge pro-IHLs meeting as organised by the WP (*Yeni Şafak* 13. 5. 1997).

their real business interests in various other sectors often with the help of the state.[114]

In Turkey, an important part of the media elite came from a leftist, secular background. According to the WP leadership "a certain section of the media", which tried to "defame" the WP and "acted like a political party", was favoured by some secular political leaders with state incentives in exchange for supporting their policies and this section of the media had become a cartel (see, for example, *TDN*, 31.5. 1997). The 'monopolisation' process in the Turkish press was obvious; two media groups owned by Aydın Doğan and Dinç Bilgin, had 66% of the newspaper circulation in Turkey as of November 1996 and also controlled the distribution networks. These two groups also owned the two most watched television channels: *ATV* and *Kanal D* (see, *TDN*, 1. 12. 1997).

The secular elite frequently argued that they were certain that a regime 'captured' by the WP or WP-like Islamist groups was not going to be democratic. Turkey could not risk being a big laboratory to see whether Islamism and democracy were compatible. Their solution was to suppress Islamism.

3.7.2 Women

Some generalisations can be made about the WP's approach to women. It could be seen that, like many other Islamist groups in the Middle East, the WP circles encouraged the active participation of Islamist women into political and economic life[115] (Göle 2000 : 99-103) without compromising the integrity of Islamic precepts.

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[114] This seems obvious because the advertising market was too small in Turkey to support so many national television channels and newspapers and many of them had to be constantly subsidised by their bosses.

[115] This was also a function of desire on the part of Islamist women, like secular women, to earn additional income for the family in difficult economic conditions and gain financial independence.

According to the WP discourse, the activism of Islamist women were necessary to secure certain "rights" (e.g. education and working in state offices with the headscarf) which were denied by the secular system. They were accepted as equal political agents in theory, but in practice, as with all other parties in Turkey, their influence in the party administration was very limited.[116]

It could be seen that the traditional roles of the women as mother and housewife were idealised in publications close to the WP (see, İlyasoğlu 1996). In other words, similar to views of many other Islamist groups in the world, the participation of women in modernity was to be subject to checks by Islam and tradition. They were to be protected from the harshness of the street and political life, and from destructive impact of foreign ideas (e.g. feminism).

It is a well-known observation of some academics that the 'headscarved' university students do participate in the shaping of modernity in Turkey (e.g. Göle 1991, Özdalga 1998). Nevertheless, for the great majority of the secular elite, the headscarf symbolised anti-laicism, anti-modernity and the oppressed women. The WP circles countered these criticisms by frequent reference to the idealised Islamic history. Nothing in Islam could ever be used to justify any oppression of the women. What should have mattered when deciding whether Islamist women were for or against modernity was whether they favoured science and development (which they did), rather than judging them because of their Islamic creed (and dress) as non-modern.

3.7.3 Minorities

One of the obstacles to a more democratic WP was undoubtedly the fact that the

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[116] This was justified by WP circles partly by referring to general disapproval by the state of the headscarf wearing women occupying official positions within political parties.

WP was very much influenced from the Islamic-Ottoman (*millet*) system, which meant that individual identities predominantly made sense in the religious community one belonged to. Thus, it was not surprising that, the WP's understanding of democracy fell short of granting and openly declaring equal rights for minorities, religious or otherwise. even just as a lip-service. As the secular system increasingly infringed upon the religious freedoms of Islamists, the WP's discourse strongly signalled that its policies would also be intolerant toward those that were ideologically and religiously different from them, and only Islamically-minded would feel comfortable in a WP dominated political system.

Very similar to the widespread Islamist attitude in the world, and indeed to the nationalist sections (e.g. the *Ülkücüs*) in Turkey, the WP circles generally approached religious minorities (e.g. the Jewish and Greek Orthodox) in Turkey with suspicion. It was frequently implied that they might be used as pawns by foreign powers in plots against Turkey and their loyalty to Turkey might be weaker than to Israel or Greece. As Bali succinctly explains, like other Islamist groups in Turkey, the WP discourse targeted *the Jew* as an abstract figure, not especially those who were living in Turkey. In fact, it was an anti-Zionist discourse criticising the Israeli "oppression" of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, anti-Zionist Islamist discourses often slipped into anti-Semitism. The WP leadership did not object to these until the WP became part of the government in 1996, after that, the anti-Semitic remarks by some WP elite died out (Bali 1996). As for the Phanar Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the *Milli Gazete* frequently warned that it was involved in activities against Turkish interests.

Another example of Islamist intolerance seen in Islamist publications was the approach toward the homosexuals. Homosexuality was not seen legitimate by the seculars and Islamists. Practice of male homosexuality in some pre-Islamic

communities is mentioned as a great sin in the Qur'an (for example, 27: 54-55) and the WP circles too, saw it as a perversion.

While many observers argued that the WP successfully integrated the peripheral societal sections (e.g. the poor, the Kurds, the religious), that have been marginalised by 'the centre', into the political system in Turkey (Bayramoğlu 2001: 68; Yavuz 2000, Akdoğan 2000, Özcan 2002), many others (columnists in favour of secularism in particular) argued that the WP was a disintegrative force and incited hatred among its supporters toward the regime.

Overall, it can be argued that the WP, similar to the general character of Islamist movements in the region, refused to internalise[117] and promote democracy in Turkey, especially when it had some opportunity as the bigger partner of the government (Gülalp 2002 114-115). Instead, there was an over emphasis and waste of energy on some Islamic principles (e.g. the headscarf). Their approach to issues related to women and minorities was similar to other Islamist groups in the Middle East and was not compatible with liberal democracy to a great extent. However, as an encouraging sign, contrary to many other Islamist thinkers and movements the term 'democracy' was not de-legitimised in the WP discourse.

3.8 CONCLUSION

Turkey is one of the first Muslim countries, which have been among the most exposed to influences of Western modernity. The rise of Europe and Russia forced the Ottoman elite to undertake a series of modernising reforms. European ideas also penetrated the elite mind. Later, the Kemalist cadres were among the first newly

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[117] Yıldırım argues that since democracy was presented in a Kemalist form, Islamists thought that it was incompatible with Islam (1999b: 116).

emerging nationalist and secularist elite that were seen in many Muslim countries. These new elites engaged in modernisation of the state and used the state power in their modernising drive.

The modernisation project in Turkey has been marked, *inter alia*, by centralisation of the state, imposition of secularism and secular Turkish nationalism which together have greatly influenced the level of democracy. In other words, the official content of Turkish modernisation has been mainly defined by powerful state organs that have been governed by the secular elite, which included politicians, high-ranking military-civilian bureaucrats, and the intelligentsia and the relatively westernised upper classes in general which together constitute 'the centre'. Turkey's transition to a relatively democratic system after the World War II enabled the excluded 'periphery' to penetrate the centre (mainly through centre-right parties) and influence decision making mechanisms. Turkey's relatively democratic system in fact has been one of its most important distinguishing feature among Muslim countries in its region and indeed in the world. This fact, understandably very much downplayed by Islamists, is also central to understand relatively moderate nature of the 'struggle' between Islamists an secularists since the 1970s.

Under the light of the fact that it took at least 20 years, after transition to 'democracy' for the first Islamist parties to emerge and the ebb and tide in the political support they could muster over the decades, it should be concluded that the mere 'existence' of Islam cannot explain much in the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Dedication and activism of Islamist groups, making most of the 'opportunity spaces' (Yavuz 2004) that became available in the 'democratic' atmosphere, in various spheres of life such as politics, economy, education and mass communication has been very important in the rise of Islamic sentiment from which the WP benefited greatly. In other words, a

comprehensive Islamist message (including that of the WP) in order to be effective needs not only a conducive socio-economic atmosphere but also effective presentation and delivery (e.g. through mass communication and face-to-face at the community level).

It can be concluded that, the Turkish case supports the view that the modernisation of state is politicising for Islamists too. In the case of the WP, this was due mainly to the use of state power in imposition of an 'un-Islamic' official ideology. In other words, the WP's (and other Islamists') objection was not directly against the centralisation and strengthening of state mechanism *per se* but rather against its 'abuse'. For the Islamist elite who controlled the WP, the party was first and foremost a perfect vehicle to gain the control of the state.

The WP greatly benefited from the rise of a cross-class Islamic sentiment, partly provoked by a shared 'sense of exclusion', among certain sizeable segments of society. WP members contributed to this rise, and tried to shape it. Around 1995, when at the height of its power, it could be seen that, approximately (only) half of those who could be classified as Islamists voted for the WP, effectively only Islamist party in the country. This meant around half of the electoral support of the party. In other words, the WP's case supports the view that Islamism in Turkey is multi-centred (e.g. the party, religious communities, unorganised individuals) and multidimensional (e.g. political, cultural, economic). The fact that great numbers of Islamists have supported other parties and the WP attracted votes from the non-Islamist sections of society shows that Islamism in Turkey is well integrated into especially conservative, centre-right sections and has no clear-cut political boundaries.

Very similar to other Islamist views in the region, Islamist members of the WP

saw secularisation as an unnecessary ingredient for modernisation. They also discredited secularism (laicite) as an alien ideology and diametrically opposed to Islam understood as rejecting any division between religion and politics. The party contributed strongly to the Islamist efforts to de-legitimise the regime in Turkey because of its 'strict' understanding and imposition of laicite on the population. The WP's proposed solution to 'correct' the relationship between tradition (mainly defined in Islamic terms) and modernity was a re-definition of secularism.

It should be once again stressed that Islam (or Muslim societies) constitute no exception to the secularising impact of modernity. As we have seen, in the republican era the majority of the society came to be in a broad agreement with the secular elite. In other words, they gave their implicit/explicit support to the secular politicians and the TAF-led bureaucracy, rather than supporting Islamist politicians and groups. In fact, according to Islamists there has been excessive secularisation in Turkey, enforced by the alienated elite. Nevertheless, the fact that Islamist groups enjoyed popular support of a sizeable proportion of the population and became an important factor in Turkish politics supports the view that secularisation cannot be considered as an irreversible process.

It can be concluded that when the liberal democracy was taken as the touchstone the WP elite had rather a reductionist understanding of democracy. They heavily criticised the application of democracy in Turkey for its shortcomings, primarily in terms of religious freedoms. Although they demanded the benefits of democracy, they themselves essentially believed in an "unchanged Islam" as a holistic system which by definition did not allow changes in the essential rules that society lives by. However, perhaps mainly due to its being a legal (legitimate in their view) part of the political system, the WP belonged to a small Islamist section in the world that did not de-

legitimise electoral politics and democracy as a term.

In Chapter 4, the following topics will be analysed: The religious nationalism of the WP and how it differed from the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey; the WP elite's conceptualisation of science, scientific and technological progress as important parts of modernity, the WP elite's desire for rapid industrialisation for strong economic growth by employing scientific and technological progress. Their views on Turkish economy and their favourable stance towards capitalism; the WP elite's views on modernity and the West; and their conceptualisation of modernity as divisible and separate or separable from the West will also be analysed. Thus, a more comprehensive view as far as their stance with modernity, the West and the Turkish modernisation project is concerned will be reached.

CHAPTER 4

THE WELFARE PARTY AND TURKISH NATIONALISM, TURKISH ECONOMY, CAPITALISM; SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIALISATION; MODERNITY AND THE WEST

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 3, I have analysed the rise of the Welfare Party (WP) and its elite's views and attitudes towards the modernisation of the state, secularisation and democracy. Thanks primarily to the dedicated work of the core group of its supporters, the WP managed to become the most important Islamist group in the country and tried to give its colour to the rising Islamism. In recent decades, an important part of Turkish society came to see certain versions of Islamism as a solution to their problems. The WP strongly contributed to articulation of a broad Islamist discourse that was very critical of the path that Turkish modernisation took under the rule of the secular elite.

I have argued that the WP elite had a distinct understanding of the modern concepts brought about by the Turkish modernisation project. For example, secularisation did not have to be a part of modernity. The major Kemalist principle of laicite (secularism) was challenged and re-negotiated by the WP elite both on the grounds of its wrongful application (as the strict state control over Islam) and as being

an "alien" concept to Islam.

The WP elite argued that the current understanding of the principle of laicite, the attitude of the secular media and the place of the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) were all responsible for inadequate democracy in Turkey. For the WP elite, democracy was part of being modern but they rather understood democracy in a reductionist way (e.g. the rule of the majority and religious freedoms).

In this chapter, analyses of the views of the WP elite, vis-à-vis another set of the important aspects of modernity and of Turkish modernisation will be done. Thus, by keeping the previous analyses in mind too, a more comprehensive evaluation of their understanding of modernity will be reached.

The main issues in this chapter will be:

- The religious nationalism of the WP and how it differed from the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey. The WP elite's view of nationalism.
- The WP elite's conceptualisation of science, scientific and technological progress as important parts of modernity.
- The WP elite's desire for rapid industrialisation for strong economic growth of Turkey by ensuring and employing scientific and technological progress.
- The WP elite's views on the way the Turkish economy was run and their favourable stance towards capitalism as an economic mode compared to command economy.
- The WP elite's views on modernity and the West; and their conceptualisation of modernity as divisible and separate or separable from the West.

4.2 THE WELFARE PARTY AND TURKISH NATIONALISM

Similar to the views of other Islamist movements in the region as discussed in

Chapter 2, the WP discourse portrayed (secular) nationalism as an alien and divisive ideology for the Muslims.[1] The main argument of the WP as far as nationalism in Turkey was concerned can be summarised in following terms: The most important and worthy base of people's identity in Turkey has been Islam[2]. The secular nationalist elite has promoted other sources of identity (e.g. Turkishness) as a counter force against Islam; this trend had to be stopped. Thus, the WP's conception of the nation with its emphasis on Islam differed from the secular nationalism[3] which has been dominant in the republican era, as the mainstream parties on the left and right subscribed to it. As Ali Bulaç and some other Islamist writers observe, since the 1970s, the Islamists in Turkey tried successfully to "free" their understanding of the nation from the relatively secular nationalism of the rightist parties (which have been enjoying support of the Islamic sections) (see, for example, Özcan 1997: 104). According to Islamist history-writing, in these years, the youth movement of the National Salvation Party was also attacked by the Idealist (*Ülkücü*) movement of Türkeş which waged its main struggle with revolutionary leftist groups. The *Ülkücüs* represented a version of Turk-Islam synthesis, emphasising both Turkishness and Muslimness. It is interesting to note that many leftist and rightist observers thought that although *Ülkücüs* were jailed, like the leftists and many Islamists, after the coup of 12 September 1980, their ideology was not very far from that of the Generals.[4]

Most, if not all, Islamists objected strongly to the special emphasis on Turkishness, by declaring that they were first and foremost Muslims. Islamist

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[1] Although, as we will see, the party did also put emphasis on Turkishness as the main ethnic constitutive force in Turkey.

[2] One particular and useful categorisation of different competing understandings of the nation (and nationalism) in Turkey is, as Bora (1998) employs, is to look at the "the place" of Islam in each one of them.

[3] For sub-divisions within the secular Turkish nationalism see (Bora 2003).

[4] In the famous remark of Ülkücü ideologue A. O. Güner "our ideas are in power, we are in jails" (Bora and Can 1991: 88), this book is an excellent study on the *Ülkücüs*, from a leftist point of view).

intellectual. Bulaç argues that since the beginning of the century, "the rightist parties saw Islam as *just one of the elements* that make the nation a nation... whereas we [Islamists] think that the *religion is everything*, in short, it is [the whole of] life" (my emphasis, 1995b: 62). For about 30 years, it has been very common among Islamists in Turkey to present the category of 'nation' as a God-given; since a person cannot choose his/her ethnic origin, it has been argued, it is meaningless to be proud of being a Turk. This denial of 'constructedness' of the nation has been serving to argue that, in contrast, one *chooses* to become a Muslim; and, the choice of leading an Islamic life is important, because God commands it.[5]

It could be seen that WP members also advocated a union among the Muslim countries. Following the National Outlook tradition, the WP too argued that if Turkey became a country governed by Islamists, like the WP leadership, it could play a vital role in creating an *ummah* which is vibrant and capable of discharging its duties conferred by Islam. It was assumed that, Islam constituted an adequate natural basis of co-operation among the Muslim countries. The Islamist initiative in Turkey was seen very important. Once Turkey started to implement a foreign policy with a 'character'[6] and with the help of other few influential Muslim countries (which would come under Islamist governance, it was assumed, all other Muslim countries would become much more Islamic. They would hence become part of a functional ummah (see, for example, Dağı 1998)[7]. The desire to end the humiliating geo-political situation of Muslims, as often seen in Islamist movements, was also obvious in the WP discourse. However, the proposed timetable by the party for realising it was very flexible. The foreign policy

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[5] Rational and utilitarian explanations of the benefits of Islamic precepts for the individual and the community have been used in the Islamist discourses but, in the final analysis 'authenticity' demands that their legitimisation must depend on the revelation.

[6] The WP discourse advocated *Şahsiyetli dış politika* [a foreign policy with a character], which meant an Islamist foreign policy. The WP shares the view that that so far foreign policy of Turkey has been colourless, mainly imitating Western, particularly American policies.

[7] Thus, the WP downplayed the diversity among the Islamist movements in the world.

objectives of the WP, which depended on national/ummahist interests defined according to being Turk and Muslim, were disliked by secular circles in Turkey (Bora 1996:22), not only on the ideological grounds but also because they were deemed adventurist and potentially dangerous. Ideologically [Islamically] defined foreign policy objectives could be too ambitious and costly, as they would certainly court confrontation with powerful non-Muslim countries.

If, the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey was using state power to homogenise society (as part of incomplete nation-building process) by enforcing certain criteria (e.g. speaking Turkish, subscribing to secular state ideology or at least not actively opposing to it), the WP envisioned a different kind of homogenisation, turning *citizens* into pious, honest, hardworking, devoted *Sunni* Muslim '*servants*' of God (cf. Bora 1996). During much of the WP's life, the secular Kemalist Turkish nationalism (represented primarily by the TAF and shared by most seculars) and Turk-Islam synthesis (represented predominantly by the NAP of Türkeş), had been challenged by a rising Kurdish nationalism. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) which claimed to be struggling for a Kurdish state emerged as the armed ("terrorist") wing of a section sharing this sentiment. The 'low-intensity war' between state forces and the PKK caused the rise of nationalistic sentiment on both Turkish and Kurdish sides. Turkish Islamists in general and the WP in particular could only give a weak reaction to the problem; i.e., the party did not seem passionate about the problem. It did not occupy any significant place in the party discourse despite the fact that the struggle against the PKK had been a very traumatic episode for the whole population of Turkey (Sakallıoğlu 1998b)[8]. Especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, thousands of soldiers (mainly conscripts at the age of 20 and officers), as well as police officers, and teachers, were

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[8] As the WP marched toward becoming an important political player, it did not want to disturb the voter groups with Turkish nationalist sentiments and the state elite (see, Bulaç, *Yeni Şafak* 14. 9. 1995).

"martyred"[9] by the PKK, which had strong foreign support.[10] In this atmosphere, any talk of a political solution to the South-East/ Kurdish problem[11] was considered nothing short of giving in to terrorism.

The WP tried to place emphasis on the universality of Islam. Considerable amounts of Kurds among the rank and file and party leadership contributed to this emphasis, and in reaching out to the Kurds this emphasis was very effective. The Kurds who generally live in more traditional parts of Turkey are more religious than the Turks and at least 25 to 30 % of them supported the WP in the elections in mid-1990s (significantly higher than party's national average) (see, TÜSES 1999). The party was careful in giving the message that in a more Islamic Turkey the Kurdish question would be solved 'easily' (i.e. between brothers and sisters in Islam) (see for example, *Türkiye*, 17. 8. 1996). According to the WP discourse, too much emphasis on Turkishness (by the secular Kemalist nationalism) was the root cause of the problems with "our Kurdish brothers" (see, Duran 1998). For example, Erbakan argued that if the state wrote to "everywhere," (including Kurdish majority areas), Atatürk's words, "How happy he/she is, who says I am a Turk" or children in schools are required to chant, "I am, a

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[9] Between 1987 and 1997 the PKK terrorists -as always emotionally stated in Turkey- "martyred" 4.209 security forces members and 4.245 civilians including women and children; 18.019 PKK terrorists were killed in the fights against the security forces *(TDN* 15.7 1997). Most of the PKK members who were killed were also young citizens of Turkey many of whom joined the organisation not necessarily out of personal conviction. Martyrdom as an Islamic term mainly referred to those who were killed while fighting the non-Muslims, one could see the transformation of the term applying to the soldiers died whether in actual combat or not and other civil servants and civilians killed by the terrorists.

[10] It could be seen that support for the PKK from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, and Greek Cypriots was obvious according to Turkish press. There was also widespread belief among the Islamists and seculars that the PKK was receiving direct or indirect support from many powerful western states such as the U.S., Germany, France, and the UK, which allocated the PKK a role in their policies in the Middle East.

[11] PKK terror was widespread, during late 1980s and first half of the 1990s in the South-East part of Turkey where Kurds live in great numbers. Even the naming of the problem was a very sensitive issue. The official name "*South-East problem*" meant that the terror was due to the regional economical and social underdevelopment. The majority of the population in Turkey (5 to 1) perceived the source of the problem as terror as opposed to being a 'Kurdish problem' (see, TÜSES 1995: 65). The "*Kurdish problem*" meant the existence of a political problem of separatist Kurdish nationalism. According to the WP documents, the problem increasingly turned to a separatist movement with considerable support of the Kurds, because of heightened nationalistic feelings caused by the bloodshed and heavy-handed security operations in the region (see, Çakır 1994).

Turk. honest. hardworking..."[12] then a Kurd has the right to say that "I am a Kurd. more honest and more hardworking."[13] Such state policies caused a split in the unity of Turkey. Kurds as *Muslims* would be first class citizens in a WP governed Turkey. The solution was not the creation of a Kurdish state which went against the general Islamist desire of uniting the whole ummah (Sakallıoğlu 1998b).

The WP contained some Kurdish Islamist intellectuals who influenced and shared views of the party. For example, according to one of these intellectuals Metiner:

> Turkey has suffered from the problems of being a nation-state. The nation-state is contrary to this society, it is a bad made-up mechanism. Because there is not one nation in this country, there are many different ethnic groups living together, with one thing uniting them, Islam. If the society is not homogeneous, a new model compatible with its heterogeneous structure is needed. A democratic state[14] where the rule of law reigns is the solution, not a federation.

In the same interview, Metiner argued that the WP had a positive attitude toward the solution of the Kurdish problem but feared that "some circles" would not welcome its proposed solution. "This situation made the party look like a state party, but it still cannot be put on the same scale with other state parties[15]" (*TDN*, 28.12. 1996, see also, Duran 1998 and Akıncı 1999: 90-91).

Indeed, complying with the dominant view within the state, which saw the problem primarily as a security issue, strongly related to economic backwardness, the WP did not propose any significantly different policies from other major parties, including the period when it was part of the ruling coalition. One can analyse their

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[12] The beginning of '*Andımız*' ('Our Oath') said collectively by primary school students at the beginning of every school day.
[13] Erbakan said this in 1994 and pro-laicite TV channels showed it repeatedly to attack the WP.
[14] Such a democratic state would undoubtedly be a modern, nation-state as well, as defined in Chapter 1. What Metiner tries to criticise is the strict, 'arrogant' understanding that the Turks constitute the dominant nation ("real owners") in Turkey.
[15] The term 'state party' meant both that most of the political parties in Turkey did not challenge the written or unwritten rules set by the powerful elite (e.g. military officers); and the state itself could sometimes act as the most powerful 'party' in the country if need be.

views on Kurdish question by examining the news of their plans or thoughts on the issue, which were not put into the public agenda seriously. According to the Islamist daily *Zaman,* Prime Minister Erbakan was contemplating some "courageous" moves on the issue by separating Kurdish identity from PKK terror. While the fight against terrorism was to continue "relentlessly", Erbakan wanted to start a campaign to promote the human rights in the region, by passing the necessary legislation in the parliament and allowing TV broadcasting and some other forms of publications in Kurdish. Overall, Erbakan preferred to give the image that he believed that the root cause of the South-East problem was primarily economic backwardness and hence, the state and the private sector needed to invest more in the region (24. 8. 1996; Cf Duran 1998).

For the WP, the nation (Muslim-Turks and other Muslims, like the Kurds in Turkey) was innately great. The 'glorious position' in history could be re-attained if the nation was encouraged/allowed to rediscover and hold fast to spiritual-cum-Islamic values which still existed deep down within the nation (Erbakan 1997, *passim*).

It should be noted that the religious-nationalism of the WP with its open association with the Sunni Islam in Turkey was anathema to the Alevi minority. It is argued that the Alevis, with their distinct non-Sunni Islam,[16] had been subject to discrimination and "systematic attacks" of the Sunni majority, since the Ottoman times. In the republican period, since they wanted to see the "common living spaces" freed from the domination of Sunnism, they have been especially supportive of the RPP and other leftist parties which have been staunchly secular (Bayramoğlu, 2001 [1995]:263-4). The Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, who probably make up around 15 % of the

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[16] Önder (1998) writes that - and this is the often-voiced Sunni image of the Alevis- the Alevis do not practice Islam as the Sunni majority does. (For an implied criticism of Alevi non-practice of Islamic obligations from a Sunni, *Nurcu* point of view see (Kırkıncı 1990). Whereas, for the WP and other influential Sunni groups, the Sunni practice is an integral part of being Muslim.

population[17], gave a very small, positive response to the WP's attempts to woo their support. Their traditional networks, ensuring overwhelming support for the pro-secular leftist parties largely remained intact (see, TÜSES 1999).

It can be seen that there were serious conflicts between the religious-nationalism of the WP and the dominant, official, secular, nationalism in Turkey. However, there were very important common grounds as well, like a capacity to "produce" foreign enemies. Deep suspicion of the West was and is, by no means peculiar to Islamists in Turkey (Bora 2002). Many leftists (especially 'extreme' left) have been more outspoken about western countries, especially about the U.S. More significantly, many high ranking retired officers contributed to this suspicion. For example, retired generals Beyazıt and Güreş openly criticised some western countries including the U.S. for giving open or covert support to the PKK in widely watched TV programs. President Demirel voiced the deep concern, shared by the secular and Islamist elites alike, by openly charging the Western countries of trying to compensate for their failure in carving out two more states from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, a Kurdistan and a [greater] Armenia.[18] However, it is important to note that, unlike many Islamists and 'extreme' leftists, the dominant theme about the West among the secular elite has been the belief that despite the problems Turkey should be co-operating with the West, and continue its historical march toward becoming a westernised/modernised country. By contrast, many Islamists, including the leading figures in the WP wanted to re-evaluate this policy and replace it with an ever-increasing co-operation and unification of the Muslim 'ummah' (see, for example, Dağı 1998).

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[17] Since it is a sensitive issue, there is no publicised official gathering of information on Islamic sectarian affiliations in Turkey. Depending on one's stance, realistic estimates about Alevis can be said between 10 and 20%; Sayarı estimates 10-15% (in Rand Corporation 1990: 24), whereas, Önder (1998) puts it as 15 million, around 25%.

[18] This suspicion of the West was named as the 'Sevres Syndrome' after the thwarted agreement that would have created, inter alia, an Armenia and Kurdistan in Anatolia in the aftermath of the WWI (see, *TDN* 18. 4. 1997).

There have been important repercussions arising from the 'ummahist' (*ümmetçi*) image of the WP. First of all, the party was perceived by secular nationalist circles as not sensitive enough about national [Turkish] issues (cf. Bora 1996). More importantly, the WP discourse on the 'easiness' of forming a mechanism of co-operation with other Muslim countries went against certain realities. For example, Syria and Iran as Muslim countries did not refrain from supporting the PKK. Syria and Iraq campaigned against Turkey, in the Arab world, for not letting enough water from the Tigris and Euphrates down to them (Öniş 1995: 61). In fact, Turkey's economic and political relationships have been much more friendly and intense with Western countries than with its Muslim neighbours.

However, it should be noted that, even if the WP was in favour of unification of the ummah, it was not unconditionally internationalist (as far as Muslims were concerned). Its this desire definitely revolved around Turkey (Bora 1996: 23). The WP shared a kind of neo-Ottoman vision that emerged with Özal and was entertained by some elites of the right (Erbakan 1997; Yavuz 1998). According to WP discourse, while Islam was supposed to unite, Turkey was to lead the Muslim countries and emerge as the guardian of Muslims like the Ottomans did. In fact, for the WP members and many other Islamists, the importance of Turkey for a worldwide revival of Islam was self-evident. It was assumed that many other Muslim countries, if they are governed by Islamists, would be prepared to follow an Islamised Turkey. Erbakan was even arguing that, among the candidates, which have the potential to lead the unification of the Muslim world, Egypt had lost its claim for this position by signing the Camp David Agreement in 1978. Indonesia was too far away from the centre of the Muslim countries and lacked the historical wealth of experience; Pakistan had economic difficulties and was too much involved in the war in Afghanistan. "Turkey with its economic strength, geographical location, historical experience is the only country which can lead co-

operation among the Muslim countries. Since the Europeans know this very well, they want to accept Turkey into the EC and thus control not only Turkey but also all other Muslim countries" (Ceylan 1996: 29 [1990]).

Like other Islamists in Turkey, the WP members too believed that they were following the Ottoman tradition of struggle for *Ilay-i Kelimetullah* (Promotion of the Word of God), in the path of ensuring a world order where the 'Truth' will be superior to brute force[19]. To respect the *Hak* (truth or absolutely right) was the way of the prophets and way of the National Outlook. The WP circles very much referred to the history of Islam and especially to the Golden Ages (age of the prophet and the Ottoman Empire, which were perceived and presented as well documented periods). There are strong parallels with other Islamists groups as far as using an interpretation of the Islamic history. Certain level of arrogance and belief in the 'organisational capability' of 'the nation', as also seen in other forms of nationalism in Turkey, was unmistakable in the WP discourse. For example, according to Prof. Çetin, Konya MP of the WP, "Our State has a great historical past. Our Nation is among the Great Nations who institutionalised and organised states." Therefore, the necessary models for re-organisation of the Turkish Republic were to be found within this great history; there was no need to look outside (*Milli Gazete*, 11. 7. 1997). A *Milli Gazete* columnist argued that "culture is made up of religion, language, history, law, morality, customs and traditions; if a gathering of people has these elements then they have qualifications to be [called] a nation" (Kara, 12. 7. 1997).

The nostalgia for the Ottoman past was not peculiar to the WP circles among the

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[19] All systems (orders) schematically divided into two basic categories in the Just Order discourse. One type, advocated by the WP, "holds the Truth up", i.e. accepts the superiority of what is [Islamically defined] "right" and the other type "holds the power up", i.e. the powerful gets what they see fit (see, the interview with Karagülle in Çakır (1994).

Islamists; many other Islamist groups (e.g. Gülen's group) would love to see Turkey have a strong influence over other Muslim countries, for example, over the Central Asian Turkic Republics. The Ottoman example, according to the WP members, showed that the Turkishness should not be emphasised when dealing with other Muslim nations as it provokes others to emphasise their own ethnic background (Bora 1996: 23).

Kahraman, a WP MP and Minister of Culture of the WP-TPP coalition showed a typical WP understanding by arguing that culture was to be understood as 'national' culture. "There is no such thing as world culture, we need to protect and develop our national culture." He saw some art forms as truly Islamic or traditionally Turkish (*Milli Gazete*, 24. 8. 1996). Other art forms like ballet or opera were seen as un-Islamic or alien.

Despite the differences, the Welfare Party had important common points with dominant (secular) Turkish nationalism. Most importantly perhaps, a strong, at least regionally dominant, Turkey was also a WP desire. Turkey, according to WP discourse had the potential to realise this goal. This message was voiced frequently by Erbakan in a populist manner: "Our 65 million children of this country are the most diligent people of the world. It is a young population. Our beautiful homeland is the most beautiful place on earth. [...] ornamented with God's blessings" (1997:7). These "blessings" included, the geographical location –which was "exactly at the centre of the world"-; forests, mines, suitable lands for agriculture and husbandry, unmatched places for tourism, a diligent people who were able to realise an industrialisation drive by different "projects" (Ibid.).

Despite the "blessings", the WP emphasised that, Turkey has not been very successful in "the race of civilisation":

> The real reason of foundation of the WP is to end [...] the backward position of Turkey in the contemporary race of civilisation. It is saddening for all of our people who love their homeland and nation that while world nations quickly progress in the technology and civilisation race, we are still very far behind of them in economic social and political terms (Welfare Party 1997a: 90).

According to the WP discourse, there was foreign interference to prevent Turkey's social and economic development. Turkey had a 'homogeneous' society consisted of individuals who wanted to live together: "Terror [the PKK] is a most important problem of our country. We know that this is provoked from outside, otherwise none of the children of this country would want to harm himself/herself or his/her homeland" (Erbakan 1997: 8 [4. 7. 1996]).

The WP shared the view that there were some serious enemies of Turkey who continuously "plotted" against her. For example, the Russian Federation was arming the Greek Cypriots with sophisticated weapons. Therefore, it was argued, governments must not wage war against their own citizens [e.g. Islamists] within Turkey and cause disunity but had to concentrate on foreign enemies (*Milli Gazete*, 11. 10. 1997):

> Imperialist countries and the Zionist circles were using the CIA, Mossad, and KGB agents to provoke wars and international conflicts to find markets for their products. These are the enemies of a Turkey [...] which is a candidate to be the centre of a new civilisation. That is why they are encircling Turkey and arming our enemies Greece, the South Cyprus and Armenia and supporting the PKK (*Milli Gazete*, 9. 2. 1998).

4.2.1 The Welfare Party's Vision of a New World Order

Very similar to other Islamist discourses in the region, the WP's discourse included a criticism of current politico-economic structures in the world. Incessantly arguing that the current world system was harming Turkey and other Muslim countries (as well as other weak non-Muslim ones), the WP circles often implied that a unity of Muslims would put an end to this. According to the WP elite, Muslims had to have the consciousness that they were part of the ummah. Globalisation was interpreted as a

process enabling increasing intra-ummah co-operation while its potential effect of causing more conflicts between Muslim countries and societies was downplayed (see, Ceylan 1996).

The WP wanted to recover the glorious position of the Muslims, and Turkish-Muslims (e.g. the Ottomans) in history. This could only be achieved by an ummah/nation, which must 'straighten' itself up by attaining its lost virtues. For example, a WP MP Arslan stated:

> Yes what a nation we were [...] which said to the Caliph Umar that 'first explain the shirt you are wearing before giving your sermon'.[20] A nation who warned the World Sultans by chanting 'Do not be too proud our sultan, God is greater than thou', a nation who did not fear from the rulers but feared only from God. And now, [there is] an unconscious *ignorant* nation [...]. A nation which does not listen to the order [in a hadith] 'he who remains silent against *injustice* is a mute *Satan'*, but follows the motto 'may the *snake* which does not bite me live a thousand years' [21] (my emphasis, *Milli Gazete*, 28. 9. 1997).

According to the WP circles, a new international order was needed. Erbakan said, "We feel that the world has to be reshaped" (*TDN*, 31. 12. 1996). The current one, dominated by the West, was repressing the Muslims. A *Milli Gazete* columnist summarised some of the roots of the Islamist rage because of this:

> Muslims are wronged everywhere, in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir [...] Everywhere, there is blood of the innocent, violation of honours, occupation, poverty, humiliation, threat and cries. Everywhere, Muslims are in danger of extermination [...] and today, big powers see Islam as an obstacle; one of their tools to annihilate this obstacle is the media. They use the media to portray the image of Muslims who are not worthy of mercy; who are frightening, who are to be hated, to be annihilated with pleasure. All over the world, books, newspapers, journals, TVs and radios are working hard to give a wrong image of Islam. And Islam, which brings brotherhood/sisterhood to hearts, which preaches virtues to human beings, is caricaturised by a few extremely ugly slogans like marrying with four wives or

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[20] As symbolising the Islamist quest for honest administrators, according to this oft-cited example, when the Caliph Umar, as head of the state, was about to start his sermon; one of the listeners demanded an explanation first, about how the caliph could get the shirt he was wearing completed. Because the amount of the piece of fabric given to others was not enough for one. It was revealed that the caliph's son had given his share to his father as well, so that one shirt could be done.

[21] A Turkish proverb, obviously disapproved of by the Islamists when used in the context of inviting the religiously inclined to be politically more active.

cutting hands off (21. 8. 1997).

Obviously, the WP circles shared the general Islamist view that Turkey was in desperate need of change towards returning to its 'true' identity. if it was. as Islamists wanted, going to be a worthy leader of the Muslims. Its current state was sending mixed signals: "Is it a country which controls others or being controlled; are we an Islamic country, or is Turkey considered by some Muslim societies as an apostate country? Are we a model for Turkic republics or a helper in their transfer from one yoke to another?" (Özel, *Milli Gazete*, 29. 9. 1997).

The WP argued that first the problems of Turkey and then those of the Muslim ummah would be solved according to Welfare Party "prescriptions". In realisation of closer co-operation with other Muslim countries, Turkey would be a pioneer and would greatly benefit from this co-operation. "Turkey is never a second class country. Naturally, Turkey, like happened throughout history, will be the vanguard of a new world" (Erbakan (1997: 11). Erbakan complained about current level of co-operation and lack of favourable treatment among the Muslim countries. For example, Pakistan was applying no customs duty for engines bought from Italy whereas it was collecting 80% duty for the ones from Turkey. These "small" problems needed be solved quickly: "We, the Muslim countries, must buy everything, if possible, from Muslim countries" (Erbakan 1997: 41). The WP elite argued that greater intra-ummah co-operation would help rapid economic growth and increase the bargaining power of Muslim countries vis-à-vis more advanced, mainly Western countries. Erbakan was aiming to increase Turkey's share of only USD 3.2 billion in the total import of 447 billion by the Muslim countries which took 65% of this from Western countries whereas trade between Muslim countries accounted for only 5.4% of this amount. It was stated that to be able to build a *common market of Muslim countries* this ratio must be raised to 40%.

Furthermore though Muslim countries have the 80% of world oil reserves. 60% of tin, 80% of jute... since they have not developed their industries they remain dependent on the developed countries (my emphasis, *Türkiye* 4. 8. 1996).

During the WP-TPP coalition, the WP's insistence on greater co-operation with some other Muslim countries caused a split in Turkish foreign policy. While Çiller, the President and the military were carrying out the relations with Western countries and Israel,[22] WP officials concentrated their efforts on Muslim countries. After becoming the PM, Erbakan made a few high profile, and sometimes controversial, visits to some Muslim countries such as Iran, Libya,[23] Malaysia and Indonesia in order to enhance economic and political relationships. During his trips, he praised the rapid industrialisation of Malaysia and some regions of Indonesia and showed them to be examples for Turkey. Erbakan suggested that some political leaders who were "very close friends" of his were willing to give their know-how to Turkey (Erbakan1997: 46).

Erbakan also initiated the 'D-8' which aimed to bring Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Nigeria together. The D-8 would be the foundation of a "just world order", 50 years after Yalta according to Erbakan. He criticised the fact that in the UN, 5 countries have the right of veto in the Security Council; this meant, "treating other countries like pariahs". Before the first D-8 meeting in Istanbul Erbakan was stated "Turkey will pioneer the creation of a just world order. Some western countries unnecessarily and artificially creating tension with Islam [...]

this group is not against any country or group" (*TDN*, 13. 11. 1996).

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[22] Israel was (is) an important country in the modernisation efforts of the Turkish Army and when in government the WP did not object to the continuation of this relationship.
[23] The Visit to Libya turned into "a scandal" according to secular Turkish circles when Qaddafi openly supported a Kurdish state.

It is interesting to note that Erbakan's vision of a new Islamic world order followed the example of the institutions initiated by the West. As early as 1980 Erbakan was saying that Turkey should unite with the Muslim world instead of the West. For the unity of Muslims, following institutions had to be realised:

1- A United Nations of Muslims.

2- A Common Market of Muslims.

3- "*Dinar*" as the common Muslim currency.

4- A common armed forces to defend the Muslim World.

5- Cultural institutions which would provide unity of ideas according to Islamic principles (*Milli Gazete*, 27. 08 1980).

In 1995, the WP officials were saying that these projects needed around 30 years to be realised fully, thus, leaving a moving space for the WP to be pragmatic in daily politics. According to Erbakan, since there were no great animosities between Muslim countries like the ones which had existed among European states, unification of the Muslim world would be much easier compared to the European integration (*Milli Gazete*, 21. 9. 1995). Although, according to Islamic political theory, Muslims are supposed to form one economic and political entity; the WP was not clear about whether very high levels of co-operation should eventually lead to a World State of Muslims. Perhaps this was only natural as such a political project would take too much time and to speculate upon it then was not necessary. What was more, a proposal like this could be interpreted to be against the laws jealously guarding the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey.

As in line with the political theory of Islam, according to the WP elite, the Islamic world had to solve its problems quickly and from within, without 'inviting' the intervention of the non-Muslims. It could use similar organisational patterns to that of

the UN, the NATO, or the EU[24] but what was important was to base them totally on Islamic ideals (see, for example, Erbakan 1991c).

A 'sense of urgency', widespread among the late developing countries was also obvious in the WP discourse. According to Erbakan, Muslim countries had to co-operate to catch up with the rich ones. "At a COMCEC[25] meeting we said that the per capita income of 1.5 billion Muslims is $660 and for 350 million people in the EU it is $20,000; they are 30 times richer" (Erbakan 1997: 162). Erbakan argued that co-operation among the Muslim countries would be successful and the Muslim world needed to be more confident for a number of reasons. For example, control of the 20 kinds of strategic raw materials like cotton,[26] rubber, chrome, belonged to Muslim countries. Until now these have been cheaply bought and finished products were sold to them dearly; this unequal exchange between industrialised countries and Muslim ones would be ended by adding more value to these raw materials (Erbakan 1997: 165). It can be seen that, the capitalist framework of the world economy was accepted and solutions were proposed within the capitalist system without mentioning its name. This is in line with the rising acceptance of "global economic principles" and central institutions of capitalism" by Muslims (McDaniel 2003: 519-20).

4.3 THE WELFARE PARTY, TURKISH ECONOMY AND CAPITALISM

As was seen in Chapter 1, economic growth with a capitalist mode of economy has been an important part of the development of Western modernity. It will be seen below that for the WP elite too, one of the most important things that was associated

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[24] Some more radical Islamists criticise this view of copying from the West as just mental laziness (see, Özkan, *İktibas* (March) 1994: 6 cited by Şen 1995: 14).
[25] The Committee for Economic and Commercial Co-operation of Organisation of the Islamic Conference
[26] The pro-Islamist MÜSİAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) were "planning to create a cotton union between Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran which would control 40% of the world cotton production" (*Türkiye*, 17. 8. 1996).

with modernity was prosperity, a result of steady economic growth that could be reached. in their view, by employing modern technology and industry. Therefore, the perceived lack of rapid economic growth in Turkey was used as evidence of failure of the secular elite and their modernisation project[27]. It will also be seen that, the WP elite acknowledged the capitalist system in Turkey and indeed in the world, in a realistic way.

4.3.1 The Welfare Party and Turkish Economy

In accordance with the great dissatisfaction of the masses with the state of the economy, the WP relentlessly criticised the secular elite who dominated the economy and the way economy functioned in Turkey. This shows that Islamist questioning of the legitimacy of the system in Turkey also depended on economic failure of the state as much as on its secular political nature. For example, Erbakan stated in 1996 that "Turkey is 63rd in the world according to per capita income; it means that we [i.e. previous secular administrations] could not provide prosperity for our people" (Erbakan 1997: 169). The psychological effect of the failure to realise adequate economic growth has reached such levels that the *Milli Gazete* had to reassure its readers:

> Prof. Veziroğlu of Miami University said that after the medieval ages the Turks have become backward but '*this is not because of any faults in our genes*, in order to reach to the level of contemporary civilisations we need to change our perception of the age and our economic and political system' (my emphasis, *Milli Gazete*, 10. 10. 1997).

The WP's approach to economy was very nationalist and competitive. For example, a WP official was pointing out that a number of countries like Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea developed rapidly in the last 40 years. "Let us work together. Turkey has better conditions for development. We cannot accept being the 60th in the world. We

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[27] In 1993 Erbakan argued that the "imitators" [i.e. secular elite] could not provide adequate housing, health facilities universities or jobs for the younger generation in the past decades (Şen 1995: 119).

must be among the first 10, the first 5 [countries]" (*Milli Gazete*, 9. 12. 1997). It was argued that the WP was founded to solve the problems of Turkey. It was to bring prosperity to the country, "to elevate Turkey above the level of 'Contemporary Civilisation', and to transform Turkey to a strong, prosperous, free, respectful to human rights, democratic, laic, social, a state of law, country" (Welfare Party 1997a: 90). It was a fact that Turkey with its mineral reserves, forestry, agricultural lands, fisheries, labour force, the young population had the potential to effectively compete with leading economic states (Welfare Party 1997a: 91). Due to the lack of economic development Turkey's independence was in jeopardy (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21...*: 8)[28].

The economic views, constituting the economic part of the Just Order, published under Erbakan's name[29] are worth analysing. His *The Just Economic System* (1991a), first of all, strikes the reader for its remarkably naive and provocative language. It starts by claiming that:

> the current system of slavery in Turkey is a direct result of modern colonialism which is a planned, programmed instrument of imperialist and Zionist forces [...] Zionism which has its centre in Wall Street, as a creed holds that the Zionists are the chosen people of God and all the other people are created as their slaves...They think that it is their duty to exploit other people. Imperialism and Zionism support imitator parties in Turkey...All the raw materials, particularly the oil of Muslim countries, are under the control of world imperialism.[30]

Erbakan was arguing that 700 billion dollars of the Muslim oil revenue was kept at "the banks of Zionists" who lend some of this money to some Muslim countries, including Turkey, at high interests. However:

> exploitation of mankind and Muslim countries by imperialism [sic] and Zionism occurs not only through giving credits but by other mechanisms in other areas. The worldwide transport and communication systems, the arm industry, basic strategic

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[28] As often the case with WP publications, this party booklet *Adil Düzen 21* Soru/ 21 Cevap [the Just Order: 21 Question 21 Answers] has no date of publication but it seems that it was published in 1994.
[29] Developed with the help of some Islamist experts but not refined.
[30] In the part (a) of introduction [there is no paging]; this pamphlet is mostly a loyal translation of his *Adil Ekonomik Düzen* (1991b).

> industries. trade, financial markets, [press] agencies, and media are all means of exploitation of imperialism and Zionism.[31]

The "system of slavery" in Turkey, which was set up by other parties, which were "imitators" of the West, was a part of this worldwide scheme. This system exploited Turkish society, for the benefit of "world imperialism", Israel and a few comprador holdings in Turkey, through five viruses: the interest system, unjust taxation, increase in the amount of money without justification (money printing), manipulation of the exchange rate, banking and credit system (Erbakan 1991a; Erbakan 1991b).

Showing the theoretical deficiencies in the Welfarist critique of the Turkish and world economy is easy. In fact, the naivety of the economic reasoning was very disturbing even for the Islamist economists (see, for example Özel 1993). For example, the WP propagated that in the Just Order the investment costs would be so low that there would be 5-6 times more investment since there would no interest to pay. Money that seeks interest would be channelled to investment,[32] running capital for each firm would be 3 times lesser; thus, there would be the need for 3 times more work force (see, for example, Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the WP, however clumsily, emphasised some real problems of Turkey. Its critical approach to the debt problem of the developing world is still shared by many others, including many Westerners, albeit often in a milder language. More importantly, WP leader Erbakan highlighted some of the most pressing economic problems of Turkish society (variants of which can be found in many developing countries including Muslim ones) analysed below.

One of the most emphasised economic problems has been unequal income

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[31] Ibid.

[32] The WP discourse argued that the money deposited in banks in return for interest was not being used for investment or production at all but in a fictitious game of "earning money out of money".

distribution. As Erbakan points out, if the population of Turkey is divided into 5 groups, the lowest income group of 20% receives only 4% of the national income. The second 20% of the population receives only 7%, the third group receives 14%, the fourth receives 17%, whereas the richest 20% of the population, "the happy minority", receives an astonishing 58% of the national income.[33] The WP highlighted the economic plight of the lower income groups in society, which included the unemployed, small farmers, lowly paid sections of workers and civil servants and "pensioners, widows and orphans."[34] The WP spent more time and energy discussing issues of equality, social security, welfare and social justice than any other political parties including the centre-left and centre-right parties (Ayata 1996: 54). However, this is not to say that, as a political party the WP did not try to promote the interests of some of the very important sections of Turkish society too, most importantly of the *esnaf* (shop owners, who are socially influential) and Islamist business circles against the 'big capital' which has a clear advantage in the changing economy[35].

The WP held that there were certain mechanisms ensuring unequal income distribution in Turkish society. Most importantly there was a small but extremely influential rentier class who owned large sums of capital and most of the banking system and who successfully sought rent from the state. First of all, the rentier, according to WP, exploited the masses by giving high interest loans to the state that needed bigger and bigger loans in the 1990s to finance the budget. In fact, the internal debt has become one of the most serious problems of the Turkish economy so much so

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[33] Erbakan 1991b: 9-11. These figures have remained mostly unchanged in 1990s as has been routinely reported by the media; see also (Erbakan1997: 123).

[34] These groups also appear in the propaganda of other parties. 'The right of the orphan' is an especially powerful figure of speech in Turkey, which is also frequently used in criticising the corrupt practices within the state. Orphan have a Qur'anic reference as well: "Have you seen him who denies Our religion? It is who harshly repels the orphan and does not urge others to feed the needy" (107: 1-3); translation is from (Qutb 1979: 315).

[35] For example small size entrepreneurs, many of whom supported the WP, unlike the big companies could not get cheap credits, even from the state banks.

that 80 - 90% of tax revenues were being paid back to the rentier,[36] just as interest. In the 1990s. the rentier had interest rates of 25- 30% per annum from the Turkish state in U.S. dollar terms. These high interest rates were due to poor management of the state budget by politicians and bureaucrats alike. This financial failure by secular governments has meant a net transfer of the wealth from would-be receivers with very low incomes to a small affluent rentier group according to Islamists.

Islamist economist and columnist Özel gives a definition and critique of rentierism in the Turkish context, from an Islamist point of view:

> Rentierism means going after the undeserved profits and acquiring them by political arrangements. Businessmen, co-operating with foreign financiers, started to rob the state [...] It has been estimated that this rentier minority has received 40 billion dollars [in interest] from the state in the last six years. Big industrial firms who received the great majority of this money, have not used it to boost their competitiveness but used it against the entrepreneurs in Anatolia[37] and strangled them... [T]hese firms, which have been always supported by the state in the last 30-40 years, still prefer to produce by licence [taken from abroad] and do not bother to develop their own technology and their brands. The Anatolian lions, which emerged in various cities, prefer competition instead of the rent or monopoly and the world markets instead of the internal market. The rentier bourgeoisie is very much disturbed by their competition [...] the Turkish state must not protect the monopolists against this competitive capital; because this will undermine Turkey" (M. Özel, *Yeni Şafak* 13. 6. 1997).

The WP circles blamed "the architects of this Turkey" which had the 5th worst income distribution figures in the world, with 10 million people under the poverty line. According to *Milli Gazete,* the secular elite 'attacked' the WP which tried to correct this: "They unleashed all their evil forces on" the WP cadres "who have the ideal of 'rich state, rich nation'," so that, the top "20% [of the population] continue to live like sultans. Let us unite closely around the cadres who want to stop this unjust course"

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[36] Islamists claimed that, only about a few ten thousands people gave the state more than 90% of the loans (see, Özel 1997a).

[37] Here, Anatolian means provincial, i.e. not the kind of capital which is usually from Istanbul or other big cities like Ankara or Izmir which has been enjoying close relationship with secular politicians and bureaucrats.

(Editorial, 4. 1. 1998).

In its criticism of the current state of Turkish economy, the WP drew support from civil associations with an Islamist viewpoint, which were also critical of the economic order in Turkey. For example, the Hak-İş (a workers' union), declared that, workers, civil servants, pensioners, small *esnafs* and small farmers (villagers), who received only 27.1 of the national income, paid more than half of the taxes, and demanded the rentier incomes to be taxed (*Yeni Şafak*, 23. 4. 1997).

Another very important problem of the Turkish economic system according to WP cadres was interest. It is interesting to note how the WP defended the 'Islamic ban on interest' categorically within a relatively modern economic context. In the Just Order there would be a ban on the interest.[38] As Islam aimed at creating a community of believers, charging interest is banned (the Qur'an 2: 276; Bukhari 1994: 468-469). The WP elite, like other Islamists, defended this ban by arguing that interest gives unjust advantage to the lender; causes inflation; and poisons the relationship among the brothers/sisters in Islam. The WP shared the view that there are Islamic financial institutions, which are perfectly adequate for a modern economy without needing to charge interest on loans. One of these financial institutions is the system of *profit-loss sharing*. The investors literally become partners of the firms and receive their shares from the profit or loss and the intermediate institution receives its own share (commission) (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...:37)[39].

However, it cannot be said *a priori* that an 'interest-free' economic system

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[38] Interest is defined as anything extra given back to the creditor other than the originally borrowed.
[39] The Turkish experience showed that the *ÖFKs* (literally, Private Financial Institutions) who use this method have less than 5% of the market and returned to their investors very similar yields when compared to banks. It is often pointed out that most methods of Islamic banks (e.g. mark-up fees) differ from charging interest only in name.

would work better than one which charges interest on credits. There are important variables; for example, a stable economy with low inflation and low real interest rates might be more efficient and satisfactory for both creditors and debtors. Yet, a categorical opposition to interest was the dominant position among the Islamists in Turkey as it is among other Islamists in the region. However, new Islamist interpretations on economic dealings are being put forward in accordance with changing times. For example, some of the Islamist elite like M. Ozel and F. Beşer point out that credits given by the Turkish state, with interest levels lower than the inflation, amount to direct wealth transfer by the state, and should be taken by the religious as well (see, for example, *Yeni Şafak* 16. 5. 1997)[40].

Another important economic issue in Turkey has been unemployment. Erbakan stated, "One of the gravest problems of our country, as we all know, is unemployment; in opposition to 22 million who make up the work force there are 11 million jobless. It is important to raise the living standards of all working people" (1997:9 [4. 7. 1996]).

The WP officials often voiced a key concern of its supporters and demanded an end to "discrimination" against the Islamist capitalists, dubbed as 'the Anatolian Lions'; and the favourable treatment of secular businessmen. "Currently everything is between two lips of the authorities [...] The Just Order will end the current application of enabling some firms to flourish and causing some others to go bankrupt" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 2). Many companies belonging to Islamists were not awarded state contracts and thoroughly boycotted by the TAF for "supporting" *irtica*; whereas "in last 30-40 years the monopoly capital [in Turkey] has been fed by the state...it is now so developed, like Frankenstein, that it gives loans to the state. It wants to play with the

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[40] It should be noted that there are views arguing that Islam bans the usurious rates of interests rather than ordering a categorical ban.

state" (*Milli Gazete*, 9. 12. 1997). The WP circles strongly argued that the pro-laicite capitalists (who were and are referred as *Big Capital* or *the rentier*, were using state institutions against the Islamist capitalists. "[In] last 10 years in many Anatolian cities new entrepreneurs emerged who do not want rent and monopoly but only a free market. They too produce for the world market, but this disturbed the rentier bourgeoisie" (Özel, *Yeni Şafak* 13. 6. 1997). While hiding behind the principle of the laicite, they in fact wanted the current politico-economic system to continue with its economic exploitation and political oppression (*Milli Gazete* 4. 11. 1996). These concerns showed what Islamists believed. Turkey had to increase its share of the world economy too in order to alleviate its economic problems that could not be reduced to being just a problem of distribution within the country.

4.3.2 The Welfare Party and Capitalism

From the beginning, Turkish modernizers have also tried to follow the route of Westernisation in the cultural arena. They tried to follow the model of European countries like France, Germany and Great Britain (the U.S.A. gained an important position too after the WW II) which all had followed the capitalist route to modernity in the economic sphere. In principle, the republican elite preferred to follow a capitalist route too, by explicitly rejecting the command economy of the Soviet Union and by trying to raise a 'national' bourgeoisie (Buğra 1994: 4-5). However, until the early 1980s, Turkey had followed a strategy of the mixed economy which meant a very high level of state control over the economy and an increasingly important private sector belonging to businessmen who were careful to remain very close to the bureaucracy and political centre (Öniş 1997).

It has been argued in Chapter 2 that, generally speaking, Islamists criticise both

capitalism and socialism. Although they try to portray their economic views as a 'third way', superior to both, their economic views tend to support basically a capitalist way of managing the economy, albeit their discourses voice some ethical concerns. This seemed certainly the case with the WP elite. Therefore, a meaningful analysis of their stance vis-à-vis capitalism, as an important concept associated with modernity, can be made.

During the WP's height of power, the influence of the politicians over the economy through state mechanisms was still high. It could be seen, during the last few years of the party's life, that the WP leadership, in line with the new developments in the world economy and changing profile of the rising Islamist business circles,[41] gradually started to take up the cause of a 'limited state.' The new duty of the state in the Islamist vision was to open the ways to compete with the outside world in industrial production and providing services. The 'limited state' would also mean an end to the state discrimination against the Islamist/conservative business circles (see, Özel 1997b, Öniş 1997, Gülalp 2001).

The WP elite was clearly disturbed by claims that the Just Order advocated a state-dominated economy. They declared that "the claim that the Just Order is an etatist [command economy] order is not true. The Just Order is a paradise for the private sector" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 24). Erbakan stated that, because they wanted a powerful Turkey, they aimed to put the Turkish economy on a sound track of development, with "the *private sector* in the driver's seat. We aim to make one lira equal to one dollar. Now one dollar equals 100,000 liras. This is ridiculous. It is

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[41] These Islamist business circles can be categorised in three sections: conservative-religious businessmen, Islamic holdings with multiple investors (which usually meant workers in Europe) and companies owned by religious brotherhoods or communities (see, Can 1997: 59-65).

harming Turkey's image" (*TDN*, 4. 12. 1996). One of the main reasons of the WP's strong pro-private sector stance in the mid-1990s was undoubtedly the changing political atmosphere of Turkey. Starting with Özal in the early1980s, Turkey embarked on a liberalisation policy[42]. The state control over the economy, especially through very big State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and state banks has been criticised for wasting resources and contributing to a regular budget deficit. Although the privatisation process has been painfully slow, in principle, the majority of the people and politicians have been in favour of further privatisation. The 'state' has proved clumsy and wasteful in running its economic enterprises, partly because of political appointments to administrative positions and large numbers to lower positions.[43]

The WP gradually became closer to the capitalist version of modernisation, partly due to rise of a strong capitalist Islamist section who saw no virtue in continuation of state interventions, red-tape, but "wanted" to compete in the world markets. They felt that their rising economic power within Turkey was not enough; they also had to contribute to make Turkey economically successful in an increasingly globalised world. The WP claimed that the Just Order would provide the necessary economic atmosphere to create a competitive Turkey (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21...*: 6).

The WP elite criticised undesirable features of capitalism, often in a naive and schematic way to prove that Islam provides a better economic system. According to the WP there have been "5 microbes of Capitalism": "Interest, taxation, mint, banking

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[42] For a discussion of post-1980 liberalisation policies that were motivated by "a desire to catch up with the rest of Europe" and encouraged by international institutions (IMF, World Bank and the OECD) see (Müftüler 1995).

[43] This has been one of the very important ways of party patronage system in Turkey. Thus, the parties in power have been able to transfer public funds to their supporters. Another way has been artificially low interest credits provided from state banks for the supporters. All these worsened the economic problems of Turkey.

system and exchange rate". which caused the following "diseases": "Hunger, poverty, high prices, inflation, unemployment, exploitation, backwardness, unjust income distribution, international disequilibrium. foreign debts, social explosions, wars, terror, mafia, bribery, moral corruption" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 30). Since "there are unjust, arbitrary interventions by the state, interest and exploitation; pricing by the monopolies, use of money as a means of enslavement" in capitalism, it prevents development, enterprise and production, and "cannot provide happiness for humanity" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 27). According to the WP, Communism developed as a reaction to capitalism, but it too made grave mistakes: "It removed profit too, while removing the interest [from the economy]" whereas *profit* is the most important vital factor ensuring the production of needed commodities and services" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 27). "It removed formation of the prices in the free market too, while removing the monopolies. Formation of the prices in the *free market* is a most vital element of a healthy economy. Thus, the economy orders itself in a best way and waste is prevented" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...:28); "[Communism] removed property ownership and free enterprising too, while trying to remove exploitation. Property ownership and *free enterprising* are the engines of the economy. Terminating these is against the *human nature.* Communism and Capitalism are indeed twins [...] The only difference is, in communism, the oppressing force is the Political force and in capitalism, it is the force of the Capital... As communism bankrupted, capitalism is too doomed to bankruptcy" (my emphases, Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 28- 29).

It can be seen that, overall, the WP was in favour of a market economy, private property and a 'share' for the capital from the production, three of the core aspects of capitalism in the West (Şen 1995: 41). Nevertheless, there were occasional anti-capitalist views expressed by some party elite; for example, the vice-chairman of the party Gül was saying that capitalism was not suitable for Turkey and he was against

interest. "But we must be realist. We need to make adjustments according to market economy. We cannot solve these according to our own views since we are in a coalition government" (*Türkiye* 4. 8. 1996).

The political, scientific, moral sub-orders of the Just Order proposed by the WP were interpreted as helpful tools for a kind of corporatist capitalism (i.e. in different branches of economic life, certain levels of internal discipline and control were expected) and potentially more discriminating than the current economic order. This was because, the WP was contemplating introducing additional moral checks defined in terms of Islamic virtues, on the entrepreneurs and business life (see, Şen 1995: 106-7; Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...; Çınar 1996).

The WP promised a healthy economy able to supply the 'needs' and 'wants' of the masses, ranging from adequate nutrition, housing, heating, health care, education to cars, vacations, designer clothes; and which would enable them to consume these. Some more conservative Islamist circles contended that many Islamist figures and sections, in Turkey have become very much part of the consumer culture that has been enveloping Turkey. As Yıldırım (1995) argues, many Islamist leaders consciously use Mercedes', which are power symbols, as a way of impressing ordinary people. Erbakan wore Versace ties and stayed in 5 star hotels during his vacations. He gave the impression that if one can earn money in a *halal* way it is all right to spend as much of it as he/she sees fit provided that it is not for blatantly un-Islamic things. However, generally speaking, the poor masses were much more disturbed by the consumption patterns of the secular elite[44] than those of the Islamist elite.

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[44] Shown in popular television programs like *Televole*. It was only half-jokingly commented by one head of the Turkish Intelligence (MİT) that these programs could make people "communists", pointing out the poverty level of the vast numbers of people and resulting frustration and anger.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a strong group of Islamist business circles emerged in Turkey who supported Islamist activities with their economic resources[45]; many of them supported the WP, and influenced its economic policies[46]. It could be seen that these newcomers to the economy were trying to organise among themselves. For example, pro-Islamist MÜSİAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was founded in 1990. MÜSİAD had 3,000 members as of early 1998, who were employing 500,000 people. MÜSİAD provided services to its members in terms of increasing their work related expertise and international business connections and trying to influence the policies of local and national authorities. For MÜSİAD the Islamic identity provided enough basis for co-operation among its members both at domestic and international levels (Gülalp 2001: 439). The Islamist ideology also provided, in a Weberian fashion, the ethical justification of the capitalist activity as put by MÜSİAD President: "...the goal in this life is to get the consent of the Creator, Allah... In this respect economic development is not an end itself, but simply a means to that end" (in Gülalp 2001: 440). Thus, it was an Islamist, and WP desire to replace the dominant secular businessmen with Islamist businessmen (Özel 1997a).

According to Islamists, the state bureaucracy in Turkey favoured secular business circles. For example, they argued that the "enterprising spirit" in Anatolia [i.e. conservative and Islamist business circles] was suffering due to discrimination by the Capital Markets Board (*SPK*) against them (*Yeni Şafak* 21. 6. 1997). For example, Kombassan Holding was accused of illegalities such as bringing the capital they

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[45] According to the *Milliyet*, the Chief of Staff had a blacklist of the companies who "finance the reactionarism" in Turkey. All army units were warned not to purchase their needs from these companies which included Kombassan Holding, İhlas Holding, Yimpaş, Ülker; MÜSİAD Members (see, Taşgetiren, *Yeni Şafak*, 7. 6. 1997).

[46] As showing the views of the TAF, the influential secular daily *Hürriyet* was writing that "at the briefing the TAF gave, the judges and prosecutors were told that with the WP-TPP coalition the reactionaries started to form their own cadres within the state. Under the name of privatisation, state economic enterprises were being handed out to fundamentalists almost as a gift" (*Hürriyet* 11. 6. 1997).

collected from the Turkish citizens in Europe in suitcases rather than by using the banking system, or collecting investment money in Europe without proper permits. Labelled as Islamist (or green) capital, these holdings were accused of funding Islamism.

It was observable that both the Islamist businessmen and the WP accepted most of the capitalist conditions in Turkey and in the world as a given. It can be argued that there was not much against capitalism in the Welfarist interpretation of Islam; especially as it is applied currently in the West (e.g. the UK and the U.S.) which was another factor enabling them to have a selective approach to western modernity. Thus, the WP formulated its suggestions of solutions largely within the world capitalist system. For example, it was declared in a party publication "it is a known fact that in the Just Order production will be very cheap. It is obvious that the capitalist order cannot compete with this cheap production. [...] It is impossible for the cheap productions not to find markets in the world" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 31). Cheap production was simplistically based upon "lack of interest to pay" and "just taxation." In the Just Order "taxes will not be paid from the profit [...] but it is the share of the state in return of its contribution to the production." Taxes will be collected justly and exactly, and since "The Just order is also an order of ethical rules, because of his/her beliefs, the taxpayer will want to pay more and more to his/her state, this had been the case throughout the history" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 33).

Despite their criticism of capitalism, the WP seemed to have no serious objection to a well-functioning capitalist economy in Turkey. It was assumed that in due course, some serious problems they attributed to capitalism would be solved by a transition to the Just Order, where ambitions would be checked by a 'humane' interpretation of economic rules, thanks to Islam.

The WP elite clearly accepted the fact that the world economy was functioning according to secular, capitalist rules: "the claim that the Just Order cannot get foreign credits is not true. Since Turkey will be a most profitable country [...] the capital would definitely come. *Because the economy has its own rules.*" Besides "the majority of the capital in the world belongs to Muslims, they will invest in Turkey if there is *stability* and *profit*" (my emphasis, Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 21).

It can be concluded that the WP elite had a fairly secularised attitude toward the economy. Especially in the increasingly globalised world, world markets seemed to be a reality and it was better to get integrated into them in favourable terms; insulation from their effects was not realistic or desirable[47].

The WP circles generally argued that Islamists businessmen were not part of an international class of capitalists as their secular counterparts were, but were working for the nation and the ummah. Nevertheless, since capital can no longer be effectively controlled by the nation-state, as indicated in Chapter 1, Islamist capitalists were quick to 'pressurise' the secular Turkish establishment by threatening to invest their capital elsewhere (such as the Balkans, in Germany or in the U.S.), if state discrimination against them continued. Thus, the unemployment problem would get worse. Developments like these and widespread disregard for Islamic virtues because of 'market realities' on the part of many Islamist business circles led to Islamist observers to frequently argue that, Islamists did not act like *Homo Islamicus* but mainly as *homo economicus*. "[M]any so-called Muslims [i.e. Islamists] think only about DMs and dollars" (Eygi, *Milli Gazete* 11. 10. 1997; see also, Özcan 1997: 41-53).

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[47] According to M. Özel "Anatolian Lions" (i.e. Islamic businessmen) are superior in spirit to the Big Capital in Turkey. As they wanted to integrate into world markets in an active manner; they wanted to see their business' as a constitutive element of existing as a nation, they wanted to do what the Germans and the Japanese were able to do in the recent past (1997a: 101).

It could also be seen that those Islamists who could afford to were also eager to join in the *consumption*, an important characteristic of capitalist economy today. Nevertheless they were conscious of trying to follow an 'Islamic' way of consumption in many areas (for example, different criteria were used for dressing, there were separate pools for each gender in hotels serving to them, and alcohol was not served in their restaurants). Thus, overall, they had important differences in consumption patterns[48] compared to laicised sections of the society and this still made them a threat in the eyes of the secular elite and the TAF[49].

Although the WP advocated a redistributive economic policy, the party as a recipient of cross-class Islamist support, in line with the general Islamist view that sees class as a divisive factor, deliberately rejected to discuss the problems of the capitalist system in Turkey in class terms. Instead it used more popular terms like the 'happy minority' (secular, upper classes which showed little or no sensitivity to the plight of the lower classes) or *ezilenler* (the oppressed) (cf. White 2002a: 166).

Whether the WP could have curbed the excesses of capitalism will largely remain a mystery. However, from the party's excessive emphasis on global competition, (especially between a would-be Islamic bloc and the rest - e.g. the West), and from the fact that the Islamist capitalists could not remain loyal to Islamic ideals (Özcan 1997: 41-53) (they, like secular capitalists, were taking full advantage of high unemployment in Turkey), it could be inferred that, the party, if it had ever secured a single party government, would have given priority to boosting the competitive capacity of Turkey.

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[48] The emphasis on consumption patterns constitutes an important aspect of Islamist argument that Islam was the solution to economic problems. It was frequently argued that if the well-to-do avoid waste/luxury consumption and fulfilled their religious duties (e.g. zakat, charity), this would have an important impact on the problem of poverty.

[49] Most importantly, many Islamists (including many WP members) allocated a certain amount of their income to fund Islamisation efforts, which alarmed secular sections of the elite and public.

A systematically developed, more just redistributive economic structure would have to wait. This was partly because of the sense of insecurity, as also seen in many other sections of Turkish elite, with Turkey's place in the global power structure.

So far, in this chapter, I have argued that the WP elite differed from the dominant secular Turkish nationalism by placing a much greater emphasis on Islam as the defining character of the nation in Turkey. They advocated a religious-nationalism as an alternative to secular nationalism of the Turkish state, which was pursued as one of the most important tools in its modernisation vision. The WP also suggested that greater intra-Muslim co-operation and unity of the Islamic Ummah was necessary for elevation of status of Muslim countries in the world.

The WP also had an alternative view of the Turkish economy and capitalism in Turkey and in the world. It generally championed the economic rights of the lower income groups and bitterly criticised the 'happy minority', which lived in luxury and did not care about these groups. However, the WP's economic vision overall remained within the category of capitalism with some moral commitment to more just income distribution. In the remaining of this chapter, I will analyse the views of the WP elite with regard to science, industrialisation, technology, the West and its relationship with modernity, and globalisation.

4.4 THE WELFARE PARTY, SCIENCE, INDUSTRIALISATION AND TECHNOLOGY

4.4.1 The Welfare Party and the Science

The rise of science and its association with a predominantly secular worldview has an important place in the advent of modernity as seen in Chapter 1. An analysis of

the WP's attitude toward science sheds some lights on their understanding of modernity. Although the WP members, like many other Islamists in Turkey, saw science as indispensable for technological and industrial progress necessary for a strong Turkey; secular conceptualisation of science by the laic elite and their frequent suggestions that modern science goes against traditional knowledge (which includes some aspects of Islamic teaching), caused great concern among Islamists.

As discussed in Chapter 1, since the Enlightenment, the West has eclipsed other regions of the world in science. Changing scientific views in Europe also influenced the Ottoman elite. The WP circles shared the view that the republican elite had also been under the influence of the West. For example, they believed in positivism, which, Islamists crudely put, took the form of believing only what is observable and measurable by human beings and rejecting any meta-physical '*reality*'. The WP circles pointed out the impact of Comte[50] and argued that positivism as such was long outdated. Islamist intellectual Ali Bulaç argues that science could not give satisfactory answers about understanding the universe, about the purpose of the creation and meaning of existence. Now science is beginning to accept that it has to give up the position of being "the guide." Because of this according to Bulaç many people are turning towards religions for the hope of finding the answers (*Yeni Şafak* 24. 4. 1997). Another Islamist intellectual comments that "the Industrial revolution was the victory of materialism [...] later, materialism diffused to biology and other sciences. Everything including the human being was seen as a machine [...but] today materialism is dead" (M. Özel, *Yeni Şafak* 12. 3. 1997). These comments reflect the general Islamist and Welfarist views on science.

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[50] Atatürk declared, "The truest guide in life is science" (as opposed to guides [murşids] in religious groups) and he clearly had a positivist worldview under the impact of Comte who emphasised order and progress in society (Özbilgen 1994: 114).

One could see that the WP elite were contributing to the Islamist efforts of putting the modern scientific knowledge into a 'proper' Islamic perspective, which holds that nothing in scientific knowledge goes against true Islamic knowledge. In fact, it was widely pointed out that some "true" scientists have become Muslims when they see that the Qur'an foretold some scientific discoveries, such as the developmental phases of the embryo.

It was indicative of the state of the current debate and a cause of resentment among Islamists, including the WP elite that they still had to argue that Islam was no obstacle to progress that could be attained through acquiring and applying the latest scientific knowledge in the world. They often pointed out that Islam encouraged scholarly activity and promised divine reward for helping and solving problems of human beings through production or transmission of knowledge. Scholars (in religious or non-religious sciences[51]) are highly praised in Islam[52]. Muslims needed to work hard to acquire the latest scientific knowledge and technology for the benefit of Muslims. Trying to understand the physical and chemical rules of nature was also serving to understand *sunnetullah* (ways of God) which was a religious imperative.

It can be argued that the WP members, like many other Islamists in the world, wanted first of all an Islamisation of the *presentation* of the current scientific knowledge. The fact that there were first class Islamist scientists made Islamists comfortable in rejecting some parts of scientific knowledge that are generally considered valid. More importantly, they were against certain secular interpretations and presentation of science in a way undermining to Islamic teaching. A famous Islamist,

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[51] The very term "non-religious" science is open to debate according to some Islamist views, as long as that branch of science proved *useful for human beings* and hence fulfilled an Islamic duty, it should also be categorised as Islamic

[52] According to an oft-cited hadith, "the ink that the scholar uses is more valuable than the blood of a martyr".

Harvard graduate, the brain surgeon. Yıldızhan, for example was writing that "the state has no right, with a Darwinian approach, to teach my kids the view that their ancestor was not Adam but monkeys which is against science and demeaning to human honour (1998: 756).

In other words, a certain Islamist interpretation of science, shared by the WP members, was unmistakable in Turkey in the 1990s. For example, despite many irreconcilable differences among them, all Islamist groups were rejecting the theory of evolution. The *Milli Gazete* was depicting a standard WP response to the theory well, in a news-commentary, under the heading of "Going back to the monkey":

> The government is planning to re-introduce the Theory of Evolution of Darwin, which was removed in 1985[53], into the school textbooks. The Evolution Theory of Darwin, which claims that humankind evolved from the monkeys has been rejected, according to scientific data, in the whole world and is not taught even in Cuba. Experts say that the real aim is to raise an atheist generation (*Milli Gazete*, 4. 1. 1998).

There was another important dimension of the WP attitude toward science. The party circles shared the Islamist view that Turkey and other Muslim countries are far behind the modern countries in scientific developments which is in deep contrast to pre-modern times. They believed that, for centuries Muslims were superior to Europe not only in military power, but in sciences as well.[54]

Islam has not been contrary to scientific developments, and in fact, there were signs of God indicating the future capabilities of humankind in science.[55] Many of scientific developments were reached by "copying the creatures[56] of God Almighty"

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[53] By the MLP education minister Dinçerler who belonged to conservative-Islamist wing of the MLP.
[54] In fact, this view is also shared by many western experts; see for example (Fuller 2003: 1).
[55] Özcan gives a well-known list; for example, Moses' extracting water from the rock with his rod signalled that humans would be able to invent the artesian well.
[56] E.g. camera copies the eye and radar copies bats according to Özcan

(Özcan, *Milli Gazete* 1. 7. 1997).

The WP circles shared a widespread Islamist view in the Middle East that without the contribution of Muslim scholars, science could not have developed so fast nor passed on to Europe. Erbakan argued, "in the development of science and technology the greatest share belonged to our [Muslim] ancestors. Today nobody [e.g. Westerners] has a right to be arrogant, everybody should be modest" (Erbakan 1997: 202).

A utilitarian and capitalist approach to science was discernible in the WP discourse. According to Erbakan, science should be at the service of the people and industry. Universities had to work to solve problems of the society (Erbakan 1997: 188). Scientific activity had to aim to be "useful"[57] (Erbakan 1997: 121).

The prominence of engineers in the WP (also seen in other Islamist movements, such as in Egypt), could be taken as an example of the effectiveness of the differentiation process, which accompanies modernisation. It also increased the importance of non-religious technical experts in Turkish 'Islamism' and decreased the social status and prestige of those who have religious knowledge. Thus, graduates of the IHLs, or many other Islamist youth wanted to be computer engineers, or medical doctors rather than a member of the clergy. This trend has contributed to a latent secularisation process among the religious sections.

It is important to note that the WP elite contributed to the Islamist efforts of rationalisation of Islamic thought. The rationalisation trend dismissed the *nakl* (transmitted Islamic knowledge) if it conflicted openly with the *aql* (reason) and valid

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[57] Reference to oft-quoted hadith is obvious "I take refuge in God from useless knowledge."

scientific knowledge. Thus, it was argued that Islam was suitable for progress, compatible with reason; and superstitions passed as Islamic knowledge cannot be used as excuses to argue - as some seculars do - that Islam as a whole was in conflict with science[58].

In the view of the WP elite, modern scientific knowledge could play a part in the salvation of Turkey. As Prime Minister Erbakan stated "his top two priorities will be democracy and human rights. He also added wisdom and *science* as tools to overcome the huge problems confronting Turkey" (my emphasis, *TDN*, 9. 1. 1996).

4.4.2 The Welfare Party, Technology and Industrialisation

Industrialisation has been one of the most important parts of modernity. The Islamist cadres who founded the WP and its two predecessors all emphasised the importance of industrialisation for Turkey to become a modern country. Erbakan advocated a "heavy industry drive" in the 1970s. 'Modern' countries meant the industrialised ones for Erbakan and other leading figures of the 'National Outlook' (Sarıbay 1985; Yıldız 2003).

Since industrialisation has been a major factor in modernisation of Europe and the West, it is not surprising that the 'National Outlook' movement too saw industrialisation as a must. Although, in the mid-1990s, the need of industrialisation was not an issue any more in the West, Erbakan and other leading WP members continued to say -although with less emphasis than in the 1970s - that Turkey needed industrialisation. This was normal in a late industrialising country like Turkey with still around 45% of its population living off agriculture that produced only about 15% of the

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[58] From Said Nursi to Erbakan (1969) it has been an important concern for Islamists to prove that Islam is compatible with science and cannot be undermined by new scientific discoveries.

national income in the mid-1990s.

The WP cadres were firmly believing and propagating that they were the ones who could deliver the rapid technological progress and industrialisation. Technological progress was seen as one of the keys of rapid industrialisation and hence, of rapid economic growth. A strong industrial base and high technology were deemed essential for an economically and militarily strong Turkey. Dependency upon foreign (mainly western) countries was unacceptable and had to be counted among the indefensible failures of the previous governments run by the secular elite (Erbakan 1997).

The WP elite showed *Germany* as a successful example of achieving prosperity, "out of ruins," twice in 40 years. Turkey could not achieve this in 80 years due to the wrong policies. According to Erbakan, the German model showed the way of industrialisation in terms of producing machinery, locomotives, cars, planes, and tanks. Turkey needed to develop its own heavy industry not just a 'montage industry'[59] or tourism and agriculture that could not sustain real economic growth (Welfare Party 1997a: 92).

The WP circles saw scientific and technological progress as vital means of reducing dependency on other countries. For example, technological dependence in defence industry was harming Turkey's independence.[60] Investment in this area would also bring much needed foreign currency to Turkey. According to Erbakan: "75% of the defence industry needs of the TAF are met from abroad but in Romania this rate is only 20%, so, we need giant steps in this area; in the future we expect to export important

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[59] The term montage industry refers pejoratively to the semi-production of industrial goods under foreign patent.

[60] Many western countries (e.g. US, Germany) applied pressure on Turkey in issues such as human rights (e.g. the Kurdish question), the Aegean dispute, and the Cyprus problem by not selling weapons or attaching strict conditions for their use.

amount of defence industry products to America and other western countries. Muslim countries too will buy from Turkey [...] we want the private sector too to get involved in the defence industry" (Erbakan 1997: 71-72).

It can be seen that in Turkey too technology was and is considered by Islamists to be predominantly value-neutral. "Technology itself cannot produce results, its results depend on the purpose of the users"; although current technology can solve many problems effecting people in the world, technologically advanced countries do not care enough about others (Özdenören 1997: 7-13 quotation from p. 13).

Islamist intellectuals, including the WP elite, were acutely aware that technological underdevelopment made the defence of 'Islamic truths' in the world very difficult. A strong industrial base was important for defending an Islamic way of life in Turkey and in other Muslim countries, and Turkey's national interests and pride. "We must progress in science, art, and technical areas, equipped with Islamic moral; otherwise, we could not protect even our prayer mats" (Hekimoğlu, *Zaman*, 29. 8. 1996). *Realpolitik* dictated that Turkey had to catch up with modern countries in terms of technology and industry. The 'backwardness' of Muslims in these areas had been causing great problems:

> Muslims have left inventions to others [...] The unworthy had gained control of technology [...] It should not have happened like this...Egypt of 25 million should not have lost in 1967 to 2.5 million Jews. Algeria should not have suffered at the hands of France; we should not have cried for Bosnia, Palestine, Chechnya, Azerbaijan [...] (Hekimoğlu, *Zaman*, 28. 8. 1996).

It is indicative of their positive attachment to technology that WP officials claimed they used it most efficiently among the political parties in Turkey and according to Çakır they were correct. So much so that, sometimes state officials requested them to make use of their comprehensive voter databases (1994: 73).

It could be seen that the WP elite was associating modernity with high technology, which was defined as, *inter alia*, as efficient, clean, fast and safe. "We are working for an electric power station in Bursa which will be utilising natural gas. [We are] creating it with Japanese co-operation. The most *modern* and most advanced technology in the world will be used" (Erbakan 1997:194). Erbakan reiterated that they successfully completed the Ankara underground, which was "a *modern* project," "we are bringing the *heavy industry* and the *most modern technology* to the country. Because *we are the real progressive ones* [in the country] (my emphases, *Milli Gazete*, 6. 1. 1998).

The WP elite had a clear understanding of how a modern industrialised economy should be. According to this understanding, Turkey must not be *dependent* on foreign countries for high technology products, but must meet its needs from within. According to the WP one other important aspect of Turkey's dependency on the West (with grave results) has been financial,: "credits [mainly from the Western countries] with heavy conditions, undermined production in Turkey and this means that our youth, sitting in the coffee houses, had to finance the employment of the youth in the Western countries" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21...*:8). These were very similar concerns shared by many other Islamists in the world as seen in Chapter 2.

The WP members shared the view that the next generations must be well-versed in science and Islamic culture, as succinctly put by Özal "holding the Qur'an in the one hand and a computer in the other" (see, Şen 1995: 31). Turkey needed highly qualified professionals. Thus, one of the prerequisites of economic growth for the WP was investment in education of the masses, particularly the youth, in order to raise scientists and technical experts. These would initially transfer and use the latest technology; and in a very short time make Turkey capable of developing its own technology and be one

of the most technologically advanced countries in the world.

According to the WP, if governed by their cadres, the industrialisation of Turkey would be very rapid; its industrial strength would then be used to help other Muslim countries. The double standards toward being technologically and industrially advanced could be noted in the WP discourse: Turkey was "being exploited" when she was behind; but selling industrial products and know-how, for example, to Iran, Iraq, Central Asian Republics, Russia, Malaysia. the U.S. or Belgium was a legitimate goal (Erbakan 1997).

Prime Minister Erbakan was explaining his vision of a new Turkey with bullet trains, dual carriageways (which would reduce traffic accidents to as low as in *Finland* or *Norway).* Each family would own 2-3 cars, electric consumption per capita would be 12000kWh each year as in Germany, and towns and cities would be illuminated. New satellite cities, with parks, shopping centres, universities, culture centres, mosques and sport areas, would be constructed. İskenderun would become the Singapore of the Middle East; parts of new planes by Airbus, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas would be produced in Turkey. Inflation would be around 10% (Doğru, *Sabah,* 26. 01. 1997).

According to the WP elite, one of the most important prerequisites of rapid industrialisation was production of cheap and abundant energy. They seemed to ignore the environmental concerns for this. For example, they were in favour of nuclear power stations in Turkey which were "the safest" and "most environment friendly" type of power stations. "Foreign companies will build four of these in Turkey but, in *contrast* to previous governments, we will also demand *technology transfer* as well; Turkey will be able to build nuclear stations in sister countries" (my emphasis, Erbakan 1997: 219-220).

In the case of the WP too we see the pragmatic Islamist approach to technical knowledge. It had to be sought after from wherever it was most advanced; therefore, one could see that many of the WP elite were sending their children to the West, especially to the U.S. for undergraduate and postgraduate studies. The technology or expertise transfer was not to be accompanied with non-Islamic, western or other retrograde ideas or values. In contrast to views of some of the westernised republican elite, they believed, as did the previous generations of Islamists in Turkey, that it was not necessary to adopt the whole of the social environment that produces the technology.

The WP elite wanted Turkey to be in the core group or preferably create an Islamic bloc of core countries in the Wallersteinan sense.[61] The most important step toward this goal was to attain the latest technology and a strong industrial base. They, like some other nationalist elite sections, were against the exchange of large amounts of agricultural and low technology products for industrial, high technology products from abroad. Erbakan like many other Islamist opinion leaders, was confident that Turkey could produce many industrial products herself (see, Ceylan 1996). For the WP, the relative backwardness of Turkey in science and technology compared to advanced countries was essentially an organisational and administrative problem. If society became more 'Muslim' and administered by Islamists, this problem would be solved.

It can be observed that technological progress creates certain problems for Islamists from a religious ethical point of view. For example with regard to organ transplantation, initially Islamist sections in Turkey remained rather hesitant; some

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[61] According to the famous characterisation of Immanuel Wallerstein "the structure of the world-economy permits an unequal exchange of goods and services [...] much of the surplus-value extracted in the peripheral zones of the world-economy is transferred to the core zones" (In Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 503).

opposed to it as it seemed to be interfering with God's will. However, in time, they approved it, provided that certain conditions are met[62].

If modern technology has brought new versions of 'sinning,' like watching Islamically inappropriate programs, Islamist columnists were quick to offer 'solutions' from the Islamic tradition. These included 'flight' (*hicret*) from the television room to another room or "arming oneself with the weapons of the 'enemy'", i.e. setting up Islamic television channels to counter 'westernisation' and de-Islamisation effects of mainstream (secular) channels. On the one hand, technology in the hands of the 'seculars', makes leading an Islamic way of life difficult: "The TVs entered our homes and from their screens sins, infidelity, rebellion [against God], hypocrisy are flowing into our houses, idols are in our hearts [...]"(Eygi, *Milli Gazete* 11. 10. 1997), on the other hand, it is seen as a must to have the same media (television, newspapers, internet etc) to disseminate the Islamist message.

As far as their visions of industrialisation and a strong Turkish economy were concerned, it should be said that the WP elite generally thought that women should be able to work and contribute to Turkey's development. However, this had to be done with an Islamist perspective; i.e. only in 'suitable' working places and 'feminine' jobs. They were frequent Islamist views that women should not work if there was no pressing need and if there was too much unemployment among the males who after all are responsible to provide for the females and children in the greater family according to Islam. Thus, the WP members shared the views that Islamic dress for women was not an obstacle to becoming an active part of Turkish modernisation. Islamist women joked

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[62] I remember that late in the 1980s, our teacher of "Culture of Religion and Knowledge of Ethics", a graduate of Theology Faculty, stated that a Muslim donor had to make sure that the receiver of the donated organ must be a 'good' Muslim. Such remarks made the Islamists be seen as having incompatible views with modern humanist values.

about that way of understanding modernity by saying that "did you send a shuttle to space and it entangled in our headscarf?" i.e. Islam was not an obstacle in front of technological and industrial progress which should be considered as real issues of modernisation.

4.5 THE WEST AND MODERNITY ACCORDING TO THE WELFARE PARTY

The WP elite had a fairly coherent conceptualisation of modernity and the West; and of the relationship between them. They believed, as Tayyip Erdoğan put it that "the most advanced (*muasır*) level of civilisation could be Islamic" (Çınar 1996: 33). In this respect they differed from secular politicians[63] and intelligentsia by refusing to take the West as the only touchstone for modernity.

Since the 1840s, the dominant definition of 'modern' in Turkey had been done by the state authority. With the republic, a modernising state emerged with a quasi-ideology, defined in terms of westernisation. As Mardin has argued the Turkish revolution was "primarily a revolution of values;" a new republican elite, those who supported Kemalist revolution, emerged with new cultural codes and lifestyles diffused from the West (see, Göle 1997: 50-51). Therefore, the Islamist elite, including the WP elite, were among the rising counter-elite who strongly challenged the secular, nationalist republican elite who behaved like "Janissaries of the West" according to Cemil Meriç (quoted by Özel 1997a: 172). According to self-styled "progressive" intellectuals (*İlerici Aydınlar*), Islamic reaction had been an impediment to progress. Delaying the introduction of the printing machine press to the Ottoman Empire (1727)

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[63] One former minister was writing, for example, "Atatürk has shown the way for the Turkish nation, this way is the West -modernisation and civilisation" (Kilercioğlu, *TDN* 28. 4. 1997).

has been an oft-stated example[64].

4.5.1 A Critical Approach to the West and Westernisation

In contrast to the secular discourse, the West was heavily criticised in the Welfarist discourse, very similar to the general Islamist discourse in Turkey and indeed in the Muslim world.[65] This general negative attitude toward the West because of its un-Islamic features, was a very important factor in Islamist reluctance to see the West as a holistic role model in modernisation. It is possible to depict the main themes of 'Welfarist' criticism: the West was morally decaying; it was hypocritical, sexually permissive; the family was in decline in the West; it was using its power against the Muslim interests, (e.g. supporting Israel). The West had an arrogant attitude towards non-westerners. In short, the party members shared the Islamist view that many western ways and ideas could not be justified according to Islamist *Weltanschauung*.[66]

The WP circles generally took a very antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the West. The *Milli Gazete* for example gave regular news-commentaries, which would cause hatred of Western countries among ordinary readers. For example:

> According to confessions of the Pentagon officials one of the main reasons for the new imminent American attack on Iraq is to test their new weapons -which are technological miracles- on the innocent and oppressed Muslims and thus effectively advertise them to potential buyers [...] we know that 2/3 of the world weapon production is done by the U.S. and the Russia and most of this production is done by the Zionist-Jewish bosses [...] (*Milli Gazete*, 9. 2. 1998).

The WP circles held that western countries and international institutions

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[64] For an Islamist explanation to this seemingly reactionary attitude, see (Özel 1995).
[65] Bahri Zengin a WP MP was arguing that the West was "trying to break up Turkey", there was something wrong with the "basic values" of the West, "because 100 million people perished in the wars in the 20th century" and "the biggest genocide has been done in America, Australia and Africa during the period of this civilisation" (1995:105, 113).
[66] Needless to say, emphasising the destructiveness and moral deficiencies of Western civilisation is not peculiar to Islamism and widely shared by many non-Westerners.

dominated by them did not want others to be economically developed. "Somalia was self-reliant 10-15 years ago but, in the traps of the IMF and World Bank, it sunk to today's miserable point". When joining NATO, they informed Turkey not to produce weapons, because they would provide them at cheap prices, "thus, they have undermined our industry" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21*...: 9). When asked about international organisations, WP supporters expressed the least belief in those from the West. Only about 25% believed that the IMF, the EU, the UN and NATO actually help Turkey. On the other hand, 59.5% said they think the Organisation of Islamic Conference (which receives very little publicity and is thus a relatively unknown organisation) helps Turkey (*TDN*, 17. 1. 1997).

Since the West was "hostile" toward Turkey, one *Milli Gazete* columnist wondered, "why try to be close to the EU and the US given that they prefer to support Greece and the Greek Cypriots against us, let us try to create a new balance [in the world]" (Özkan, *Milli Gazete*, 16. 10. 1997). The WP elite often pointed out undue Western pressure on Turkey not to develop its relations with some of its neighbours (Iraq, Iran, and Syria) which had serious problems with Western countries (e.g. the U.S.). According to WP vice-chairman Gül, Turkey had the right to improve relations with neighbouring countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria but this did not mean that the WP wanted to change "structural relations with the West" (*TDN*, 13 .2 1997).

Erbakan argued that the West's wrong policy of exploiting, cheating and not caring for others was causing serious problems in the world. In the long run, these problems would adversely effect the West and for example poor and hungry people from Africa might "invade" Europe. "Exploitation, arrogance and disparities" had to give way to "co-operation, peace and mutual respect" (1997: 144-145).

The West with its lack of affection for the poor of the world and its inertia when action was needed (e.g. in Bosnia), was condemned from an Islamic point of view. Actions of the West were perceived and presented as based only on self-interest. For example, the WP circles, like many Islamists and seculars in the region, believed that the West had been conspiring in, and manipulating the Middle East in order to control the oil resources. The *Milli Gazete* voiced a widespread conspiracy theory that the U.S. secretly encouraged/allowed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and then used this as a pretext to encamp in Saudi Arabia and gain control of the oil in this region. "What is it to the U.S. and the UK, who are far away, if Iraq has any deadly weapons?" These countries did not care about the lives of the people in the region. "The Iran-Iraq war continued for so many years because of the deadly weapons sold to Iraq by the U.S., the UK and other western countries. Does the U.S. really like the regime in Saudi Arabia? [...] the real aim is to control the oil in the region, even at the expense of the Muslim blood" (Editorial, 12. 2. 1998).

Islamists in Turkey, like many secular sections, were deeply suspicious and fearful of powerful, mainly western, states in the world. For example İsmet Özel was writing that "plans to re-Christianise Anatolia, to send the Turks back to where they come from [i.e. Central Asia] by world powers should be taken seriously"[67] (*Milli Gazete* 15. 9. 1997). The WP elite generally condemned the West for not getting rid off its "historical disease" of playing with less powerful countries in the world, including Turkey. Erbakan informed WP supporters that "the U.S.A. allows the MED-TV [which had close links to the PKK] to make propaganda, the UK and Belgium allowed a

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[67] It seemed a paradox that many secular and most Islamist elite argued on the one hand that Turkey was a very powerful and important country, on the other hand, they argued that it may be broken up easily by external or internal enemies. Or its survival could be in jeopardy if it is not ruled very carefully. These arguments served to argue both in Islamist and secular elite discourses that the masses had to be kept away from both foreign and domestic policy formulations, because of their alleged naivety regarding these issues.

Kurdish Parliament to meet, Madame Mitterrand said that the Kurds are oppressed in Turkey, [...] in Northern Iraq, the UN and the U.S.A. gave de facto support to the PKK" (*Milli Gazete*, 10. 10. 1996).

Ertan Yülek, a prominent WP MP, accused the NATO and EU countries for seeing Turkey primarily as a guardian of their security in South-East Europe over the years and a convenient base for possible operations by them in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. The same countries were very unwilling though when it came to sharing their economic prosperity with Turkey (*Milli Gazete*, 7. 10. 1997).

The WP's anti-western nationalism struck a chord with many Turks who felt rejected in their country's effort to be recognised as a partner deserving respect in its alliance with Europe and the U.S. "The West is making a big mistake, Turkey has always wanted to be with the West, but the West has always pushed it away." This "one-sided love story" had to be stopped. Turkey had to pursue a foreign policy according to its own interests even this sometimes went against the West. The West was using double standards according to Erbakan, for example, Washington did not accuse Italy of supporting terrorism for purchasing 1 billion dollar worth of Iranian oil each year, but attacked Turkey for concluding a similar energy deal with Iran (*TDN* 31. 12. 1996). Islamist business circles shared this view, for example the MÜSİAD vice-president Bayramoğlu stated:

> Turkey is an independent country, so, it can sign any contract with any country and nobody can prevent this [...] the U.S. cannot impose an embargo on Turkey because it needs Turkey which has a geopolitical importance [...] Because of the embargo on Iraq, although it has sided with the Western allies, Turkey has lost 30 billion dollars in the past 6 years" (*Türkiye*, 17. 8. 1996).

It is hard to over-emphasise the influence of the West over the Turkish elite in

general, as one prominent secular observer puts it:

> apart from 300,000 people in Turkey who are world class, there is a group of around 5 million. They are urban, well-educated professional and entrepreneurial category. They live, think, consume like upper or upper-middle class West Europeans. Their main reference is the West" (Ergil 1997: 11).

The WP circles argued that, the westernisation of large sections of this elite meant their alienation from the cultural values of the masses who could not, despite all efforts, be westernised as much as them.[68] Alienation of the majority of the politicians and military-civilian bureaucrats was pre-eminent in their ideological stance vis-à-vis Islam and in their lifestyles and standards. This prevented them from really understanding the plight of the general population. It was a well-established view among Islamists that the vast majority of these had minimal knowledge of Islam yet they belittled it. The WP cadres believed that by virtue of their Muslimness, they were the ones who could put an end to the state-nation alienation as a reflection of (secular) elite-mass gap. For example, at the beginning of his government, Erbakan stated, "our infinite thanks to God Almighty that we see these days [...] the unification of the state and nation will be realised" (Erbakan 1997: 11).

In the cultural arena, the WP circles, like other Islamists in Turkey, tried hard to promote Islamic symbols in rejection of the Western influence. These efforts sometimes reached novel forms such as organising a celebration for the anniversary of Mecca's conquest against celebration of the Gregorian New Year[69].

Turkey's efforts to become part of western institutions (e.g. the European

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[68] In fact, since 1839 (start of the Ottoman reform period) what has been happening in Turkey could not be called true westernisation but a poor "imitation of the West" according to the WP discourse (Dağı 1998: 43; Ceylan 1996: 27-8).

[69] The religious sections strongly argued that since it is a custom of Christians, Muslims should not celebrate the New Year, which would make them resemble Christians and this was wrong; as the Prophet did not want the Muslims to follow the traditions of non-Muslims.

Community/Union) were strongly condemned by the WP elite until the last few years of the party. In 1987 Erbakan argued that, Turkey, in effect, was abandoning other Muslim societies. For him this was tantamount to saying "we have been together with you for a thousand years but now we want to join in the EC and became one nation with Israelis [which would also join the EC in the future] (Ceylan 1996: 88-96). However, since there is no clear-cut Islamic principle which can be interpreted to be commanding fundamental opposition against non-Muslim (e.g. western) countries regardless of the conditions, some Islamist positional changes vis-à-vis the West in Turkey were possible. For example, as more and more people wanted EU membership, Islamists politicians, including the WP leadership softened their attitude towards the EU in the mid-1990s and shifted from an uncompromising negative position to one that demanded equality from the EU in bilateral relations.

Nevertheless, many in the WP elite continued to share a widespread Islamist view in Turkey that those who have the "Crusader mentality" in the West were afraid of the possibility of "the Turkish State making peace with Islam" and hence become the leader of the Islamic world. That was why they were trying to prevent "the Islamic awakening in Turkey by using the part of the media and intelligentsia which serve them" (Aydın, *Yeni Şafak* 12. 5. 1997).

As discussed in Chapter 2, from an Islamist point of view, the history of social evolution of the West in the modern era constitutes not progress but degeneration. WP circles shared this view and were against the influence of current western culture, which according to them, was a principal cause of moral decay defined in terms of increasing amoral individualism, hedonism, conspicuous consumption, disrespect to the elderly and traditional values, and sexual permissiveness. For the WP westernisation threatened "our culture" which meant the cultural values and code of behaviour defined

predominantly in Islamic terms. Western and other non-Islamic cultural values were to be discouraged. WP members, like other Islamists in Turkey, were afraid of negative Western cultural influences as much as degeneration from within. For example, according to the *Milli Gazete*, "entertainment crazes" spread by some television stations and newspapers, in combination with "the Western-imitating education system", were producing "horrors". The youth who were raised without beliefs and religious education, were in an "abyss" and were using drugs (12. 10. 1997). According to Turkish Islamists, the abhorrent signs of cultural penetration of the West included brands of western societies like McDonalds and Cola. It was frequently advised that Muslims had to choose to consume traditional products, for example donner kebab or *köfte (*meatball*)*, instead of a Big Mac, or a glass of *ayran* or *sherbet* instead of cola.

Nevertheless, during the 1990s *modernity* continued to 'come' to Turkey predominantly from the West. The relatively westernised/modernised sections of the society, especially the majority of the elite, appropriated and adapted this ever-evolving modernity according to their worldviews; and then the larger society was led, or carefully forced, to adapt to that modernity. One could argue that Islamist sections under the leadership of their elite (including the WP elite) found 'Islamic' ways of appropriating this modernity, which predominantly took the form of *reacting* to the secular interpretations of modernity.

As Islamists, the WP members had to counter the widespread acceptance that progress is a unilinear process. This was used by many secular circles in Turkey implicitly or explicitly to argue that western civilisation or modernity constituted a more progressive form of human development compared to a society based on Islamic rules which came 1400 years ago. Thus, the WP elite followed the Islamist tradition of separating the spiritual (*manevi*) and material (*maddi*) development of an individual or

society (see, for example Erbakan 1997; Yıldız 2003). Naturally, what really matters is the spiritual dimension and it may get 'better' or 'deteriorate' in time. If a society is to be worth living in, it must uphold *manevi* (spiritual-cum-Islamic) values, which are more important than material progress. Against the common, modern understanding of unilinear progress of humankind from the pre-modern to modern, from barbarism to civilisation, the Turkish Islamists enlisted the late intellectual Cemil Meriç: "There can be no time of civilisation, either you have civilisation or you do not (see, *Yeni Şafak* 22. 6. 1997). Thus, like many other Islamist groups in the world (Esposito 1995), the WP circles argued that Islamic civilisation could be re-lived in modern times. "Some accuse the Muslims [i.e. Islamists] of wanting to bring back the judgements of 14 centuries ago[70]; this is a demagogy; they want to live Islam in this age (Eygi, *Milli Gazete*, 7. 7. 1997).

For the Islamist masses, a philosophical discussion of modernity was too academic, whereas some Islamist intellectuals were attacking the very concept.[71] For example, M. Özel wondered "what is modernity other than the ideal of realisation of the paradise here and now" (*Yeni Şafak* 9. 5. 1997). However, the WP as a party was not de-

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[70] For example according to the Chief Prosecutor, the party "wants to take this country 1400-year back to a desert mentality" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 52).

[71] For example A. Arslan's comments worth quoting at length: "with modernity human being places himself/herself at the source of everything, good, bad, beauty, justice, truth, love, art. Modernity reshapes the religion and presents it as a new thing. Thus, the consumption of this new thing is not too frightening. But, since it came to us as westernisation we saw it as alien. We are face to face with a new concept, a native modernism, the synthesis of Islam and modernity is emerging. Muslims are producing this with their own hands with fashion shows and music like the ones done by the leftists 20 years ago. The real question is, whether there is going to be an Islamic modernity - we do not know yet - what will be left of Islam? What will happen if Islam becomes folkloric like Christianity? Modernity involves a secret polytheism [*şirk*] as far as the source of knowledge is concerned. Secularism is a fundamental defining characteristic of modernity. Secularisation means becoming worldly (*dünyevileşme*); making everything popular and presenting it to consumption. From a certain angle, it means stripping sacredness off everything. Thus, modernism means not irreligion but unreligion [. ..] A religion whose monotheism is not corrupted is, of course, an alternative to modernism, provided that we do not read religion with a modern consciousness. An example to this is trying to validate verses of the Qur'an by scentific data [...] Religions try to construct societal structures based on the community. At the centre of this is the 'believer' not the 'individual.' The individual emerged with Protestantism, especially in 1850s, belongs to modern world. Modernity's vision of the future is incompatible with Islam. It wants to create a paradise on Earth. Its ideology is to create a new life. Muslims resisted to this life style for two centuries by calling it 'Westernisation'. Today, they are opportunistically joining into this new life" (*Selam*, 24-30. 7. 1995).

legitimising the concept of modernity at all.

For the WP elite modernisation was a legitimate aim provided that it was done along Islamic lines. Since many aspects of the current Western culture clashed with Islam, its widespread association with modernity in Turkey was something to be undermined. In order to do this, similar to the general attitude of Islamists in the region, the WP elite made use of the selective *facts* about the West by comparing them to Islamic *ideals*. WP members believed and presented Islamic *Golden Ages* as models greater than the Western model. Nevertheless, the WP members did not have to reject the West in its totality. They could afford to be selective. For example, if modernity was associated with certain aspects of civility (*medenilik*) as perceived to be existing in the West (e.g. respecting the rights of others in traffic, bureaucratic efficiency, honesty in business life or hard work), there could not be any problems with accepting these as virtues actually commanded by Islam. Thus, Islamisation was *the* natural solution to the lack of these virtues in Turkey not westernisation.

Westernisation in Turkey has been observable in different forms such as, increasing influence of ideologies and ideas originating in the West, resembling western people in appearance, or penetration of similar consumption patterns. According to Islamists, including many WP members, those who acted under the influence of the West, were doing so either out of disdain for their own culture or because they did not give much thought to what these meant. Islamist duty included overturning this trend of westernisation by realisation of a cultural program of resistance to the foreign, non-Islamic influences and turning back to authentic sources and practices (see, for example, Ceylan 1996: 15-55).

4.5.2 A Non-Western Way to Modernity

Since according to the WP elite, social and individual 'progress' could

meaningfully be defined only in Islamic terms, the West could not be considered a model for progress. Like other Islamist circles, the WP preferred to see the modernity of the West mainly in terms of being technologically and industrially advanced. Even in these areas, the West was losing its edge, as was evident in its declining share in world production. "2% of world production is shifting from the West to the East each year; in 1994, 67% of world production was done by North America, Europe and Japan, but in 2019, 67% will be done by Asia and Japan" (Erbakan 1997: 93-94). Thus, the West was also losing its referential position in the definition of modernity. Therefore, westernisation could not be a preferable way of modernisation for Turkey. The WP made use of every-day association of modernity with industrialisation and prosperity and tried to draw attention to the fact that non-western countries were also achieving this, in a decidedly non-western way. The *Milli Gazete* approvingly quoted Prof. Veziroğlu: "The Japanese are working 60 hours per week and we want to work 37.5 hours a week (10. 10. 1997). Some non-western examples of rapid economic growth were clear: "The Japanese experience, [the South] Korea, Taiwan are examples in front of us" (Welfare Party *Adil Düzen 21...*: 31). Therefore, for the WP elite, the need to refer to the West as the geographical-cum-symbolical location of modernity was decreasing.

Although the Welfarist discourse favourably referred to certain characteristics of Western countries when it seemed appropriate, rapidly developing South-East Asian countries which had the 'virtue' of being non-western were shown as good models of "how economic and technological development could be combined with 'cultural authenticity'." (Gülalp 2001: 444): "Look at Batam [in *Muslim* Indonesia] it was a village of 600 people. In 18 years its population has become 220 thousand; the highest technological production in the world is being done here, the per capita income rose from $50 to $33,500. Look at Singapore it has per capita income of $35 thousand"

(Erbakan 1997: 145).

Therefore, it was a cause of resentment for the WP members that the West was still being presented and perceived as *the* model of modernisation in Turkey by majority of the elite and public. Islamist intellectuals joined in the de-legitimisation of the Western model; for example they argued that while "Islam kept the people in this country together for 1000 years, Western ideologies [e.g. laicite and nationalism] could not have kept it together for 50 years" (Özel 1997a: 127).

The WP had to argue that modernity was divisible and thus the West and modernity were separable. Only, if this division was accepted by the public, a selective modernisation model (which excludes Islamically inappropriate parts of westernisation), could it be put forward as a more suitable and desirable alternative for Muslim Turkey. Only in this way, could the suggestion made by the westernised/secular elite in Turkey that the West is the only viable model of civilisation, which has to be accepted in its totality, be countered.

According to the WP elite, Turkish-Islamic culture valued human beings more than the "materialist" West. Therefore, the solution to many social problems in Turkey was to re-vitalise *true* Islamic culture, not repeat illegitimate ways of western modernisation. "[W]e are not like those who flooded the world with blood and tears in order to exploit it. We are the grandsons/granddaughters of the Ottomans who spent their lives and property in the way of God" (Aydın, *Yeni Şafak* 12. 5. 1997). Thus, the rise of the West was primarily explained in terms of its exploitation of the non-westerners, rather than any inherent qualities of the West. This exploitation began with the geographical explorations and was still continuing. Such a route to modernity lacked legitimacy from an Islamist point of view.

The WP, like other Islamist groups, had a more coherent conceptualisation of modernity distinct from the mainstream, but a much less coherent, relatively secularised understanding of non-Islamists. Thus, the WP members like other Islamists criticised this dominant conceptualisation of modernity and the modernisation process in Turkey. As in the West, the family was under threat, respect for elderly diminished, and individualism had gone too far. Materialism had risen; a blatant lack of compassion for the poor in society was tearing through the social fabric.

According to the WP's discourse Turkey's route to modernity should not follow Westernisation (or Europeanisation[72]). Westernisation was one of the forms of 'de-Islamisation in Turkey and had contributed much to the collapse of the social structure. The WP elite, like other Islamist opinion leaders, quite often highlighted the dangers of this de-Islamisation showing itself in rapid *atomisation* of society, increasing legitimacy of get-rich-quick attitude (*köşe dönmecilik*), and increasing corruption (especially since the start of liberalisation policies in the early 1980s).

In their effort to re-define the dominant 'Kemalist' understanding of the relationship between the West and modernity (*çağdaşlık*), the WP elite started to argue that they were the true Kemalists in Turkey, because they were after real independence unlike "these imitators [other secular politicians] of the West". In other words, for them, modernisation was meant to increase the self-reliance and independence of Turkey rather than make it resemble to western countries mainly in appearance.[73]

It could be seen that only when pressed by the undemocratic circumstances of

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[72] It is interesting to note that Europeanisation has also, once again, become a legitimate and frequently used concept for many seculars, as Turkey's pre-occupation with becoming an EU member has increased in the 1990s.

[73] In this sense, rather controversially Erbakan argued, "if Atatürk were alive he would be with the WP" (*Milliyet* 7. 5 1997).

the 28 February Process. the WP leaders started to think that moving closer to the West might actually help to make Turkey more democratic. "The EU may well be the antidote of coups". a leading WP official told to the *TDN* (Çevik, *TDN,* 25.3.1997).[74]

One *Milli Gazete* columnists pointed out that when viewed from the EU perspective, the problems with Turkey were:

> human rights violations. lack of democracy, the Kurdish question, the Cyprus problem. The EU implies that the place of the NSC in the system is unacceptable for democracy. [...] the highest number of applications to the ECHR originates [from Turkey]. Turkey tries to solve its problems with military means instead of political and economic ones" (Kanber, *Milli Gazete,* 18. 7. 1997).

Thus, the WP elite implied that. the secular elite governing the country had to solve these problems (and thus, enhance religious freedom), if they really wanted the EU membership and if they were sincere in their desire to reaching Western standards.

It is indicative that, in 1996, 55% of those surveyed wanted EU membership, 16% did not (similar results in 1998), 40% of those who wanted *shariah* wanted the EU membership (TÜSES 1999: 79-83). In other words, almost half of those who wanted *shariah* did not see any conflict between being pro-*shariah* and being part of a highly secularised EU that contained many people with strong anti-Islamic feelings. Even as late as 2002, 90% of the people in Turkey did not feel that they knew enough about the EU (surely, similar lack of knowledge would be found about the West). Yet, they had a general idea of 'prosperity' in the West. 'The West' meant European and North American prosperous, democratic countries.

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[74] This can be categorised as an 'instrumental use' of the West, rather than a sincere appreciation that some important Western values are in fact compatible with Islamic ones. Some Islamist writers observed that many Islamists began to think at that time that another strategy against the secular centre in Turkey could be implemented after becoming firmly anchored to the West (e.g. by becoming a member of the EU; which would provide the necessary democratic atmosphere to secure the religious freedoms in Turkey).

Nevertheless, EU membership did not seem realistic or desirable for many of the WP elite both for economic and cultural reasons: Unemployment was at all time high since WW II in the EU. They would not tolerate Turkish workers "invading" Europe. In the European Commission and the European Parliament, the quota given to each member state was according to population size. As Turkey would pass Germany in the near future in terms of population, this meant that if accepted, Muslim Turkey would be leader of the Christian Europe. This was unacceptable for the Europeans. The most important factor, however was religious, "they are Christian and Turkey is Muslim" (Koç, *Milli Gazete,* 22. 9. 1997). Therefore, Turkey had to be careful not to make concessions over its national interest for membership that may never materialise.

An important part of the strategy of reaching an Islamically acceptable form of modernity was obviously protecting vital elements of tradition. As indicated earlier, the WP elite were by no means alone in perceiving that some traditional roles and values have been undermined by secular modernisation in Turkey. According to these often voiced conservative views, for example, 'modernisation' of family often meant exclusion of the elder members of the extended family from traditional family support system. Modernisation of women meant their exploitation (e.g. sexually, in advertising or in work places). A *modern* parent (usually the father) might mean that he allows his daughter (usually the daughter) to have a boyfriend. In other words, the modernised/westernised sections of society use modernity as a label for their self-awareness of having distinct ('superior') lifestyles from the traditional masses, the term modernity for the religious gained some negative connotations as far as social relationships were concerned.

The WP elite shared the view that Turkish society had to be on guard against the *contamination* of its traditional/Islamic way of life by Western lifestyles and values.

The inevitable interaction with so many different sections with different worldviews should not have led to concessions on the part of the Islamists to non-Islamic worldviews. As often put, the consensus of living together in Turkey had to be without *degeneration* (*yozlaşmadan, uzlaşmak*), without sacrificing Islamic identity.

WP circles shared the general Islamist view that westernisation, as the dominant form of modernisation, has produced societies consisting of materialist individuals who think only about themselves and money. Islamisation remains the only way of re-creating the 'warm society' of the past; a society with high community spirit, high moral standards which secularism failed to provide.[75] Such a society would be eager to solve the problems of each individual; the WP organisations tried to show a glimpse of it by trying to solve the daily problems of their needy supporters as discussed in Chapter 3.

4.5.3 Welfarist Counter-Definition of Modernity

Laçiner argues that while the traditional WP supporters had always felt a certain inferiority about not being able to participate in the creation of science, technology, economic-military power and the growth of prosperity, newly emerging supporters of the party could claim to be as familiar with the dynamics producing the 'modern way of life' as those who consider themselves modern in Turkey. However, there emerged considerable criticism and concerns from within modernity in the West itself. The Islamist elite (e.g. intellectuals) conveyed these criticisms to the wider Islamist sections. Therefore, Islamists could even contemplate presenting Islam as a superior (at least alternative) way of life (1996: 11). The WP leadership therefore increasingly felt more

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[75] Once again, it should be noted, whether Islamists remained loyal to these 'Islamic virtues' was a hotly debated issue.

and more comfortable in their effort to re-negotiate the content of modernity in Turkey and in criticising more secular conceptualisations of modernity.

Thus, the WP contributed strongly to the ongoing Islamist efforts of promoting a counter-definition of modernity in Turkey. This definition had to include arguments against associating modernity with some 'desirable' qualities by the secularists. For example against the association of modernity with emancipation from tradition (e.g. Islam) (see, Yavuz 1997), the common Islamist argument has been that although self-styled modern, westernised sections refuse to be slaves of God, they have become slaves of money, sex, status... Thus, for example the much praised West could be described as a "civilisation of *nefsi emmare*" (dominating self)[76] (Özcan, *Milli Gazete* 28. 9. 1997), i.e. the West contained many bad habits and passions, a Muslim must discard from his/her carnal soul.

The 'Welfarist' counter-definition of modernity included, as mentioned earlier, alternative models of modernisation to the West. For example, Erbakan claimed Malaysia "has become a shop-window of the Muslim world. We take Malaysia, which *lives* Islam and which has caught a *modern* line, as a model" (my emphasis, *Milli Gazete*, 3. 9. 1996). Malaysia has managed to create a successful economy without pursuing radical secularist policies. The WP elite were showing these examples but also praising the native human resources of Turkey: "Anatolian lions [i.e. Islamist businessmen] are superior to Far Eastern Tigers, so our development will be faster than [...] Malaysia, Indonesia" (Erbakan 1997: 45).

The WP elite shared the general Islamist thought that counter symbols and tastes

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[76] The lowest degree for the carnal soul to fall; according to Islamic *Sufism*, at this stage the carnal soul is absolutely corrupted, "with no hope of transformation for the better" according to Balcı (1992: 22), and thus, always orders the self to be rebellious against God.

had to be promoted against western ones. For example, Islamists felt the need of creating Islamic content for modern art forms. There had to be an Islamic cinema against the tide of Hollywood films, and the dominant secular cinema in Turkey, which had a corrosive effect on native Islamic culture.

It could be observed that, within the Welfarist counter-modernisation project the WP was itself selective, as some issues were not treated as belonging to 'the core' of Islam. Thus, the WP's position could be changed vis-à-vis some issues. For example, as Çevik highlights, when in government, Erbakan tried to change his rigid image. He has stopped attacking Zionism and Jews, abandoned his strong anti-Western rhetoric, redefined secularism in a way acceptable to the WP supporters, and praised Atatürk. "A few years ago", all of this would have been "unthinkable". "Yet 70% of the electorate" did "not trust WP", because its gestures were found "too artificial" (*TDN* 24.4.1997). Changing attitudes and modifying discourse was one thing, gaining trust of the secular sections of public or western governments was another.

4.6 THE WELFARE PARTY AND GLOBALISATION

The WP experience showed that Islamists are subject to global influences and they want to influence global developments to their benefits. They usually try to understand global processes through their elite who act as local interpreters. WP elite's discourse also included alternative strategies to counter negative effects of cultural, political and economic forces of globalisation. Greater political and economic co-operation among Muslim countries was presented as an important strategy that would help in this task (Ceylan 1996; Dağı 1998).

In the case of economy, in one sense, the WP acted as an agent of globalisation,

it advocated full integration of Turkey, preferably at the hands of 'Islamist capitalists', to world markets which is a sign of growing confidence of Islamist economic elite. At the same time, it promised by virtue of its loyalty to Islam. to safeguard the relatively uneducated, un-enterprising sections, especially those who were among its supporters, against negative effects of the global capitalist system with 'redistributive' mechanisms, which take their cue from Islamic rules and virtues. The central view was that Turkey and Muslims should not be on the losing side of globalisation.

It could be seen that the WP elite had internalised economic rules governing world markets and was confident, even within these secular rules, that Turkey could be successful, provided that Turkish elite played the game well. For example, Erbakan complained that despite the fact that Turkey produced 80% of the world hazelnut output, its bourse was in Hamburg and that "the Westerners who buy it cheaply and sell it dearly make the real profit; the bourse must be in Turkey (Erbakan1997: 54-55).

Although the WP elite was very much in favour of making Turkey a beneficiary of economic globalisation by working-hard and increasing trade, especially with Muslim countries, they were against integration with the EU just for economic benefits. They thought Turkey should not beg to be admitted into the European Union and should give priority to the development of its relations with Asian and African countries as an alternative strategy (*Sabah*, 14. 11. 1996; *Milli Gazete* 7. 10. 1997).

Turkish Islamists generally argued that Turkey must become powerful first and then its relationship with the West would be that of an equal.[77] Trying to become a member of the EU or intensifying the relationship with other western countries (e.g. the

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[77] For example leader of the GUP Yazıcıoğlu stated, "We are not obliged to Europe. If we make sure that we are unified in Turkey and develop our relationship with other Turkish republics, Europe will have to be friends with us" (*Yeni Şafak*, 7. 3. 1997).

U.S.) might seem attractive as the shortest way of reaching a regionally more powerful Turkey, but, this was full of dangers as far as protecting Islamic identity was concerned. In other words, there was an 'Islamic' and proper way for both Turkey and the Muslim world to take part in globalisation.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Turkey has not been an exception to the impact of Western modernity in its wider region and its people have not been an exception to giving a rather fragmented response to its advent.[78] In the mid-1990s, Islamists generally held that a more Islamic path toward becoming (more) modern was possible in Turkey. The WP occupied a central place within that Islamist section. This chapter discussed a cluster of themes that were related to the WP's understanding of different aspects of modernity and the Turkish modernisation process. In fact, the general character of Turkish modernisation imposed a certain form on the WP (like it did to other societal sections) to a large extent as far as its reaction to modernity was concerned. It also forced it to give its reactions within this general framework (e.g. having to be a legal organisation). It has been seen that, as expected, the WP had a distinct understanding of modernity and its relationship with the West. As Islamists, the WP elite opposed to more secular and 'ethnic' conceptualisations of *the nation* held by powerful centres (e.g. the TAF) and non-Islamist majority of society. In particular, secular Turkish nationalism was accused of being an extremely divisive and alien (Western) ideology in multi-ethnic Turkey and hence a great factor in the rise of secular Kurdish nationalism/PKK terror. The WP possessed its own version of religious-nationalism which meant much greater emphasis

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[78] Of course, as indicated earlier, being within the group of relatively more democratic Muslim countries and having a more diversified and better economy in comparison to many other Muslim countries in the region should not be forgotten. These factors also strongly influenced the relatively moderate character of the Islamist movements in the country.

on Islam and lesser emphasis on Turkishness. This distinct definition of the nation, they argued, was more inclusive as it would make non-Turk Muslims in Turkey feel like first class members of the society and curb ethnic nationalism in the country. However, the WP's religious-nationalism excluded non-Sunnis (e.g. Alevis) and large secularised sections in society. The party's nationalism revolved around Turkey that "deserved" to be the leader of the *ummah* which, if successfully revitalised, would mean a new world order and an end to the humiliation of the Muslim world by powerful (e.g. Western) countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that like other Islamist movements in the region the WP was also actually implicitly accepting the *modern* institution of the *nation-state* as a valid framework in formulation and implementation of its policies, at least for a (long) period, on the way to unite the *ummah*.

As for the economy, similar to other Islamists discourses in the Muslim world the WP did not neglect to condemn foreign forces (e.g. Zionism, 'imperialists', and the Western countries) for the lack of economic development in Turkey. However, the WP, which sided with the lower income groups of 'the periphery,' mainly argued that its Islamist cadres were capable of realising a rapid economic growth in Turkey with a strategy that included rapid technological and industrial development and 'radical' overhaul of 'redistributive' mechanisms within the economy. The use of the lack of economic growth in de-legitimisation of the secular elite (and regime) should not be considered as sign of *secularisation* of the WP ideology, rather it was a reflection of the holistic understanding of Islam that also safeguards economic interest of the faithful.

In rhetoric, very similar to other Islamists in the Middle East, the WP elite criticised both capitalism and socialism (which was another Western ideology). However, it can be argued that their economic views, which were put across as

alternative to the current Turkish economic order remained within the broad category of capitalism. This was mainly due to their preoccupation with economic growth (also seen in centre-right parties) rather than a particular economic mode and influence of recently emerged Islamist business circles with close ties to the party. It also related to their interpretation of Islamic economic precepts. 'Islamist capitalists' were in direct competition with pro-laicite business circles including 'the Big Capital' for state favouritism (or failing that, at least to stop state discrimination against them).

As for science, from which much rivalry emerged against religion in the historical evolution of modernity, the WP circles, like many other Islamist groups in Turkey and in the region, argued that it is not incompatible with Islam if properly understood. In fact, scientific and technological progress was seen by the WP circles as vital means of reducing dependency of Turkey to other, in particular western countries. Technology and industrialisation were seen as 'core' parts of modernity as opposed being 'modern' in appearance only.

The WP elite, like other Islamists, believed and argued that modernity is divisible between economic and industrial aspects, and the socio-political organisation of a society. While they were very much in favour of a modernisation process which would eventually make Turkey modern in the sense of material well-being (defined, for example, in terms of meeting the demands of individuals as consumers or meeting the defence needs of the country); they were against adapting foreign 'un-Islamic' cultural and social practices which were mainly coming from the West.

Similar to the views of other Islamists in the region, as seen in Chapter 2, the WP elite too resented the dominant role that has been being exercised by the Western powers in Turkey and the wider region because of their ascendant position in the world

economy and nation-state system. The WP elite argued that if an Islamic (/nationalist) resistance to Western dominance could be formulated in political, economic, cultural and religious terms in a conscious (Islamist) way Western 'exploitation' and dominance through various mechanisms could be stopped or reduced.

It can be concluded that since the WP elite, like many other Islamist elite in Turkey, were in fact 'at home' with capitalism, science, technology and industrialisation, and had their own version of nationalism, overall they can be conceptualised within modernity. Since they were against secularisation (an important part of modernity) in principle, they were also against secular nationalism and secular interpretation of some aspects of science. They did not regard the West as a holistic modernisation model. The WP elite shared and promoted the general Islamist view that only Islam provides a blueprint for life (not the western model). In this regard, the WP contributed strongly to the Islamist de-centralisation of the West in conceptualisation of modernity and thus to the pluralisation of conceptualisations of modernity in the world.

CONCLUSION

In this study, my main research concern was to understand how the WP elite conceptualised modernity; how this conceptualisation was formulated, constructed and what was its relationship with the West is in their view. It was understood that they had a distinct (Islamist) understanding of modernity and could not just be labelled and dismissed as anti-modernists. It was also possible to reach some conclusions with regard to whether their understanding of modernity was compatible with Western modernity, where it differed and where it came closer to dominant understanding of modernity held by westerners or by secularists (laics) in Turkey.

In Chapter 1, I have tried to put modernity in a time and space context. I have analysed historical evolutions of some of its most important processes and concepts. Modernity's relationship with the West was also analysed to set the background for analyses of Islamists' and the WP elite's views on aspects of modernity and the West. I have argued that it is possible to see the advent of modernity very closely connected with the rise of Europe (later West) through a chain of momentous economic, social and political developments. As a result, the West gained a dominant position in the world and exercised different levels of control over the rest (So 1990).

It was seen that some very important historical developments and concepts such as capitalism, the rise of science, industrialisation and technology, nationalism, secularisation and the modern state occupied central places in the evolution of modernity in the West. However, 'from the start', there has not been much agreement on the definition of these concepts. For example, Marx emphasised exploitative character of capitalism while Weber defined it in terms of pursuit of profit.

Nevertheless, it was argued, the capitalist mode of economic activity (defined as acceptance of market conditions. private property etc) has been far less resisted by the rest of the world compared to some other Western institutions (e.g. liberal democracy). It was also largely 'accepted' by the Muslim world and by Islamists, including the WP circles.

Nationalism as one of the most important and powerful modern ideologies was also analysed. It has generally been a secular force. However, its synthesis with religion has also been possible in various national contexts. Different theories, explaining the power and variety of nationalism were touched upon (nationalism as a response to industrialisation; a product of the modern, rational state or sub-elites who use it in their struggle for the control of the state; an ideological construct by intellectuals who seek to undermine *anciens regimes* and establish modern states and societies).

Secularisation has been another most important core process of modernity. The secularisation thesis asserts that the social significance of religion declines during the modernisation process. While it was conceded that this was what happened especially in the West and indeed in the Middle East to a great extent, it has been argued that secularisation is neither inevitable nor irreversible. New 'religions' (e.g. Communism. nationalism, Fascism, Humanism) emerged in modernity as formidable rivals of traditional religions (e.g. Christianity and Islam). Some processes of modernity (differentiation, societalisation, rationalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, and increasing mobility) disengage modern individuals from social forms of religion. Secularisation has been a process in which traditional religions have been pushed to the periphery of modern industrial societies.

However, in the last several decades secularisation as a form of social change and secularism as a political principle came under a strong attack from rising religious movements. Almost every basic assumption of secularisation thesis and secularism has been challenged (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2000, McClay 2001, Baird 2000). Islamism has been part of this global phenomenon.

The rise of the modern state has also been an important factor in the evolution of modernity. The difficulty of generalising about the state was recognised. However, Mann's definition of the state was taken as an important starting point: "a differentiated set of institutions and personnel", "political relations radiate to and from a centre" and "binding rulemaking, backed up by some organised physical force" within a territory (Mann 1993: 55). Thus, since the state influences every aspect of life from politics to economy, from ideology to law enforcement (Carnoy 1984: 3), it was argued, the modern state is politicising by definition. Although the nation-state as a political form became globalised, a distinction should be made between democratic (where the state is under popular control) and undemocratic countries, (where the state is under the control of a sub-group, - hence the frequent Islamist complaint about control of the state by secular, westernised or nationalist elites).

There are vast differences among nation-states (due to their being at different levels of economic, social and political modernisation). The public and politicians compare them on various indices of modernisation (GNP per capita, life expectancy, illiteracy, level of urbanisation, income distribution, and health expenditure). Such comparisons have been important for Islamist groups including the WP in pointing out that secular regimes in Muslim countries failed in the task of modernisation.

Globalisation, defined as "time and space compression" (Harvey 1990: 240), has become another central concept in the evolution of modernity. Globalisation is a key development in 'three arenas' of life: The economy, the polity and culture (Waters 1995). It was pointed out that, Islamism could be conceptualised, in one important aspect, as a resistance to continuing global influences of the West and an attempt to break the strong association between modernity and the West.

In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that, the modernisation of Europe brought the end of the superiority of Islam (principally embodied in the Ottoman Empire). The European superiority in war, economics and technology forced Muslims first to critically examine and then try to appropriate European modernity. Islamism emerged in this modernising context as a form of mobilisation around the central theme, with regard to modernity, that an Islamic path of social change/modernisation is possible in Muslim countries.

It was seen that Islamism is usually explained by the failure of the modernisation drive under the post-colonial secular, nationalist elite. This failure can be defined in various terms (economic, political and cultural). It was pointed out that the availability of Islam as an alternative to the existing regimes, unlike the other ideologies, has been an important factor. Much of the discontent of Muslim masses has been articulated in an Islamist language under the leadership of Islamist elites. Powerful Islamist groups emerged and they have been influential in re-Islamisation process. Islamists utilised both traditional and modern venues and means of mass communication in spreading their message. Today, in many Muslim countries Islamists constitute the main oppositional force vis-à-vis the regimes (Fuller 2003), and control many mosques, professional associations, schools and universities.

It was seen that secularism was rejected by Islamists as an alien (imported from the West) and harmful ideology imposed by a rather 'alienated' westernised/ secularised) elite. Secularisation, as a form of de-Islamisation, was seen as undermining Islam. the only working social cement. Another image of secularism was a challenge to Allah`s authority (i.e. making permissible what is Islamically not permissible and vice versa).

The liberal democracy was taken as the model for comparison (Diamond 1996) and it was found that the dominant Islamist understanding of democracy was a limited one. This conclusion was reached, by noting, for example, their attitude toward minorities and their tendency to see Islamic values as eternal, immutable and final (Vatikiotis 1987). However, the existence of a minority group of Islamic reformers (Wright 1996) was a positive sign of the possibility of a greater degree of flexibility in interpretations of Islam that would bestow much needed legitimacy on democracy in the Muslim world. It was also pointed out that despite the ideological and intellectual opposition to democracy, where allowed Islamist groups do partake in national and local elections, often with good results.

It was seen that Islamists advocate greater involvement of Islamist women in social and economic life, however, in an Islamic way and in 'feminine' professions (Göle 1991). They emphasise the role of the women as mothers and wives (Mayer 1999). Lack of any high-ranking women in Islamist groups and Islamist use of biological and 'psychological' differences to justify unfavourable treatment of women were noted as factors contributing to the continuation of the patriarchal social system (Roy 1994: 59).

I argued that the state's extensive power over society and its promotion of 'official' versions of Islam provoke Islamists to struggle to gain control of it. Many Islamist leaders want to use the state power in the service of their understanding of Islam (Ahmed 1980; Ayubi 1991). It was pointed out that since constitutional theory is underdeveloped in Islam, there is no clear model of an Islamic state. However, the general Islamic principles that are binding on Muslims are also to be respected by an Islamic state (Mawdudi 1980; El-Awa 1980).

The Muslim world has also been subject to the impact of secular nationalism. I argued that while Islamists have generally been against nationalism in principle (as a divisive force for the ummah); in practice, they usually espouse a version of religious nationalism. This can be attributed to the deep entrenchment of the nation-state (as another important modern institution) which has been a reality of life in the post-colonial period. It is accepted realistically as a valid framework of Islamic activism (at least temporarily).

As we saw in Chapter 3, the Ottoman Empire was among the first Muslim states, which came under the impact of Western modernity. The modernisation/rise of Europe (and Russia) forced the Ottoman elite to enact modernising reforms. European ideas penetrated the elite mind. Later, in the Turkish Republic, we saw the emergence of the Kemalist cadres who were among the first nationalist, secularist elites that were seen in most Muslim countries. The Kemalists engaged in further modernisation of the state (which predominantly meant an authoritarian centralisation) and used the state power in their modernising drive (e.g. imposition of laicite and secular Turkish nationalism).

Turkey's transition to a relatively democratic system after the World War II and growing confidence of Islamists enabled the emergence of Islamist parties of the

National Outlook Movement starting from the early 1970s. The WP (1983) was the third party of this movement. Its rise in the 1980s and peak in 1994 local elections (19%) and in 1995 parliamentary elections (21%) was described. It was pointed out that the WP greatly benefited from the general rise of Islamism in Turkey. The party's relationship with the broader Islamist section was also explored.

The WP was a manifestation of the rise of a cross-class Islamic sentiment, very much provoked by a shared 'sense of exclusion' among certain sizeable segments of society. WP members contributed to this rise, and tried to shape it. Around 1995, when at the height of its power, it could be seen that, only approximately half of those who could be classified as Islamists voted for the WP, despite it being effectively the only Islamist party in the country. This made up around half of its electoral support. In other words, the WP's case supports the view that Islamism in Turkey is multi-centred (e.g. the party, religious communities, unorganised individuals) and multidimensional (e.g. political, cultural, economic). The fact that great numbers of Islamists have supported other parties and the WP attracted votes from the non-Islamist sections of society shows that Islamism in Turkey is well integrated into especially conservative, centre-right sections and has no clear-cut political boundaries.

It was seen that the state, represented by attitudes and positions of the secular elite (politicians, majority of high-ranking military-civilian bureaucrats, including the judiciary) and the laws of the republic restricted the WP in voicing its views. It was shown that the WP gave a coarse and unrefined message to the electorate. It, quite often, preferred to address, 'the anger' of the religiously inclined toward the secular regime and elite.

The rise of Islamism in Turkey included a conscious effort to raise an Islamist counter-elite (Göle 1997). This Islamist elite guided the Islamic masses in their economic and political decisions. Islamist intellectuals, who were kept at bay by the WP, nevertheless interpreted Islam and the West (modern Western ideologies) for their followers.

In the rise of Islamism, a number of factors were prominent such as the transition to 'democracy' (at least in terms of introduction of a multi-party competitive electoral system albeit with some intervals of military rule), increasing mass-education and modernisation of communication technology. Thus, Islamists published newspapers, magazines, owned radio and television stations, and founded hundreds of associations, foundations, schools and courses. Islamisation in Turkey should be explained mainly by referring the heightened activism of the Islamist section, which expanded by recruiting new members and attracting new sympathisers. Islamist groups provided a sense of belonging, and emotional and material support for their members and sympathisers.

The Turkish case supported the view that in many Muslim countries the relatively secular state elite helped the rise of Islamism by promoting a 'moderate' version of Islam. After the 1980 coup, the state provided a 'moderate amount' of Islam (through the school system and the Directorate of Religious Affairs), as a panacea to some social ills. With the financial assistance of the religious sections, many IHLs were opened (especially by centre-right governments), and in other state schools, some vocabulary of Sunni Islam was provided for the youth.

It was pointed out that Islamists used a coherent vocabulary among themselves. The WP was very successful in using some 'sloganic' aspects of this vocabulary to a

great effect. For example, working for the party was presented as jihad. However, there were unbridgeable disagreements between many other Islamist groups and the WP with regard to methods to be used in Islamisation efforts.

The WP was annoyed by the charges of exploiting Islam for political gains. It explained its popularity by arguing that its cadres delivered services (e.g. in municipalities) that the electorate demanded. Yet, influential pro-laicite circles in Turkey considered the party illegitimate (even illegal) because, it was obvious in their view that a large section of its members wanted to establish a shariah-based state.

The Islamist groups shared the view that the secular cadres, who had been raised according to official ideology, did not posses the necessary Islamic characteristics. Therefore, they provided facilities and encouraged their young members, sympathisers to receive university education so that they can gain the control of key bureaucratic positions.

It was pointed out that the WP had a variety of types of followers operating for different motives. Disillusionment with other secular political parties, the 'availability' of a rich Islamic vocabulary that was shared by perhaps a majority of the population (at least in its basics), and skilful use of this by Islamists were important factors in the rise of the WP. The repression of the revolutionary left by the state in the aftermath of the 1980 coup was another factor. The most important factor was the dedicated activism of the core group of WP members (with strong women participation). They attached religious significance to political activity as stated by Erbakan, "other parties have *members*, we have *believers*" (1997: 91). The grass roots activism carried the party discourse to the electorate; it 'explained' the causes of problems in Turkey and offered 'solutions' often in an Islamic terminology. The discourse presented the party as a

'native' element; the party cadres were "sharing" the same 'authentic' cultural, Islamic values and the background with the target audience. Thus, the WP received higher than average support from the relatively more traditional and religious sections. These were Sunni Kurds and Turks in the landlocked areas, migrants from these areas to big cities, the relatively poor sections and those who received lower than average level of formal education (TÜSES 1999; Çakır 1994; Akdoğan 2000). It became clear for the WP that it had to develop its ties with non-Islamist voters in order to be a partner in government.

The WP was an important actor in shaping Islamism in Turkey. It acted both like a religious community and like a political party (Yıldırım 1999b). WP elite attempted unsuccessfully at monopolising leadership of Islamism in the country. This move disturbed other more intimate and often more sophisticated Islamist groups (Bayramoğlu 2001, Akdoğan 2000; Yavuz 1997). This was a clear effect of the diversity of Islamism in Turkey.

The WP elite shared the predominant Islamist view in the world that Islam is timeless and universal, and 'knowable' in its ideal form (Bucenun 1990), thus, does not need 'reform'. On the contrary, Muslims need to change their "decayed, corrupted, eroded" understanding of Islam according to 'ideal' Islam (Bulaç 1995b). The efforts, by the Turkish state or foreign powers, to promote a modernised, convenient version of Islam had to be resisted (Kaplan 1993).

One of the most important topics for Chapter 3 was the WP's views vis-à-vis secularisation. For Islamists in Turkey, secularisation was perhaps the most disturbing development. The WP discourse did not recognise it as a natural process accompanying modernisation but argued that it was a reflection of the worldviews of the republican

elite whose stance undermined Islam (and with it the family and community ties) and led to a general moral degeneration.

The WP was part of the Islamist effort to replace 'the official understanding' of Islam with their understanding of it. The WP elite shared the view that the laicite was aggressively applied in Turkey and it was abused to ensure the dominance and privileges of a minority. They tried to re-negotiate the content of the principle of laicite and make it, at least, much more respectful to religious freedoms.

The whole education system has been a 'battle ground' between Islamism and secularism in Turkey. In the mid-1990s, secular sections became increasingly alarmed by the systematic Islamist efforts to enhance the 'Islamised' spaces within the education system. The struggle focused upon the IHLs and the headscarf issue. The headscarf ban was considered a *zulm* (wrongdoing) and violation of a democratic right.

Another important area worth exploring was the WP's stance vis-à-vis democracy. It was pointed out that the WP elite and supporters, like most other Islamists in the world, did not exist in a fully democratic culture. They strongly criticised Turkish 'democracy' for its shortcomings and accused those who shared the 'official ideology' and controlled some important state organs (e.g. the TAF) of defending an undemocratic nationalism and Jacobin secularism. Nevertheless, very importantly, the WP elite, as a *legal* part of the political system, generally tried to re-negotiate the content of democracy and did not de-legitimise it from an Islamic point of view as often done by Islamist writers (Gülalp 2002: 93-95). This can be attributed primarily to the fact that existing 'democracy' enabled them to influence (ultimately change) the political system peacefully. The WP's understanding of democracy was reductionist (the rule of the

majority) and impaired by its negative attitude toward minorities (e.g. Greeks and Jews).

In Chapter 4, we saw that the WP discourse also portrayed (secular) nationalism as an alien and divisive ideology for the Muslims. Islam was the most important and appropriate base of people's identity in Turkey. Other sources of identity (e.g. 'Turkishness'), that were promoted by secular elite, were undermining the national unity and weakening Turkey. Like many other Islamists, the WP elite advocated re-vitalisation of Muslim community (ummah). Turkey could play a vital role in this task. The desire to end the humiliating geo-political situation of Muslims, common to all Islamist groups, was also obvious in the WP discourse.

The WP argued that secular Turkish nationalism was working against national unity/democratisation by refusing to recognise rights of sizeable non-Turks (e.g. the Kurds). Islam was presented a more inclusive supra-identity. The WP emphasised successfully the universality of Islam when appealing to Kurds who supported the party in great numbers (TÜSES 1999). Nevertheless, it was doubtful that Islam, as understood by the WP elite, was overall a more inclusive 'ideology', as it was clearly perceived as discriminatory against non-Sunnis (e.g. Alevis) and large secular sections of society.

The WP also espoused a version of religious-nationalism and its 'ummahism' revolved around Turkey. The initial aim of the party could be characterised as to make Turkey at least a regional power and a leader in the Muslim world. The WP circles referred to two Golden Ages (the first decades of Islam and luminous periods of the Ottoman Empire, which were perceived and presented as well-documented) in contrast to secular Turkish nationalism. The necessary models for re-organisation of the Turkish

Republic were to be found within these ages; there was no need to look further (e.g. the West).

The WP discourse included a populist appeal: Turkey contained "the most diligent people of the world," it was "ornamented with God's blessings" which included, the geographical location ("at the centre of the world"), forests, mines, suitable lands for agriculture and husbandry, unmatched places for tourism (Erbakan 1997: 7). Therefore, the lack of success in "the race of civilisation" was explained by lack of proper Islamic creed. partly due to attitudes of the secular elite and foreign interference.

It was shown that the rise of Islamism in Turkey had a strong economic dimension. For example, the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy was one of the most important factors. The WP's approach to the economy was nationalist and competitive. The "system of slavery" in Turkey was exploiting Turkish society, for the benefit of foreign powers and a "happy" minority in Turkey. The WP highlighted the economic plight of the lower income groups in society (the unemployed, small farmers, lowly paid sections of workers and civil servants and "pensioners, widows and orphans). It was a frequent observation that, the party spent more time and energy discussing issues of equality, social security, welfare and social justice than other parties (Ayata 1996).

The WP shared the Islamist view that Islamic financial rules are perfectly adequate for a modern economy. They, too, criticised both capitalism and socialism. However, it was shown that the WP gradually became closer to the capitalist version of modernisation. In the mid-1990s, the WP was clearly in favour of a market economy,

private property and a share of the capital from production; all among the core aspects of capitalism in the West (Şen 1995).

The WP circles shared the general disapproval of a secular interpretation and presentation of scientific knowledge. They defensively pointed out that, in fact Islam encouraged scientific activity. The WP elite saw scientific and technological progress as vital means of reducing dependency of Turkey on others, in particular western countries. The WP elite also participated in the Islamist efforts to 'rationalise' Islamic thought (i.e. clear it from superstitious folk beliefs).

The WP elite had understood modernity in comparative and civilisational terms. They believed that the most advanced form of civilisation could be Islamic (Çınar 1996). In this respect, they differed from secular elite by refusing to take the West as the model for modernity and the 'official' route to modernity via westernisation. The West was heavily criticised in the Welfarist discourse, similar to the general Islamist discourse in Turkey and indeed in the Muslim world. The West was morally decaying, it was hypocritical, and abusing its power against Muslims (e.g. supporting Israel).

The WP elite argued that the need to refer to the West as the geographical-cum-symbolical location of modernity was decreasing because the West was losing its importance in technological and industrial terms as was evident in its declining share in world production. Thus, the WP made use of the every-day association of modernity with industrialisation and prosperity and pointed out that non-western countries were also achieving this, in a 'non-western' way. Modernisation (economic and technological development) could be done while remaining loyal to 'authentic' culture (e.g. Islam) (Gülalp 2001).

It was shown that the WP contributed strongly to the ongoing Islamist efforts of promoting a counter-definition of modernity in Turkey. Thanks to the limited success of the overall modernisation project in the country (e.g. mass education), newly emerging Islamists (including supporters of the WP) could claim to be as familiar with the dynamics producing 'modernity' as those who consider themselves secular and modern. The WP elite employed modern concepts (like laicite, nationalism, and industrialisation), besides Islamic concepts, in developing their counter-discourse to the secular one. This shows the difficulty of escaping totally from the conceptual world of modernity. However, the WP elite did not seem to be much troubled with this; rather they gave priority to re-negotiation of the content of these concepts.

Analysis of the WP experience also showed that Islamists are subject to global influences and they want to influence global developments to their benefit. The WP discourse included strategies (e.g. greater intra-ummah co-operation) to counter negative effects of the cultural, political and economic forces of globalisation (Ceylan 1996; Dağı 1998). It was seen that the party elite and 'Islamist capitalists' wanted integration into world markets. At the same time, the party promised by virtue of its loyalty to Islam, to safeguard the relatively uneducated, un-enterprising sections against negative effects of the global capitalist system with Islamic 'redistributive' mechanisms.

Islamist ideology is much more influenced by modernity than vice versa due to asymmetrical relationship between developed and developing countries. Modernity imposes certain forms on different versions of Islamism. These forms are influenced by both self-perceptions of the 'moderns' (both in the West and in the Muslim countries) and conceptualisations of modernity on the part of Islamists. Due to differences in particular histories (e.g. elites' attitudes toward Islam) these forms have been different from each other, but all Islamists have been forced to react to certain aspects of

modernity (e.g. secularisation, rise of science, technology and industrialisation, nationalism and capitalism). Islamists tend to favour modernisation of Muslim countries, if understood, for example, as progress in science, technology and industrialisation while opposing secularisation and secular nationalism. Therefore, it should be concluded that not all aspects of modernity, as generally understood in the West, cause equal amounts of fierce Islamist opposition. In fact, the rise of Islamism owes much to, however qualified, 'successes' of modernising drives in Muslim countries (e.g. increasing mass education and means of mass communication) enabling dissemination of Islamist values and discourses. Islamists gained self-confidence vis-à-vis westernised/modernised elite and other sections of society. Islamist movements emerged in a modernising context. They share some common attitudes (e.g. opposition to secularisation and anti-Westernism) but these have not been enough to create an orchestrated Islamist movement in the Muslim world.

Islamism contributes to decentralisation of the West in the world. This goes hand in hand with renewed affirmation of local values (e.g. Islam) in each specific Muslim country. Islamism can also be seen as trying to replace 'universalism' of the West with 'universalism' of Islam at least in the Muslim world. Thus, one of the most important aspects of Islamism is its refusal to accept the West as a model (and hence the dispute over the definition of modernity). One of the most important sources of the debates over the definitions of modernity is the debate about the 'correct' interpretation of Islam. In other words, emergence of nationalist and secularist elites in Muslim countries mainly due to impact of the West led to pluralisation of Islamic thought (assuming that previously there was a greater unity). Thus, westernisation and "invasion" of western-inspired ideologies are presented in the Islamist discourses as alienation and a source of de-Islamisation. The relatively secular discourses present Islamism as anti-modern and a throwback to the "Dark Ages". Given the lack of any

common political ground or vocabulary in most Muslim countries (i.e. lack of adequate democracy). the debates quite often lead to violent clashes.

A key feature of both modernity and Islamism is lack of any central authority to define them. Nevertheless, it is possible to see some of the processes and concepts that were discussed in this study belong to the 'core' of modernity more than others do. For example, industrialisation, technological advances (together contributing greatly to sustained economic growth and military superiority) and secularisation tend to be more common and prominent in accounts of modernisation. Nationalism and the nation-state have also been prominent in different modernisation stories. Capitalism though has been prominent in the evolution of modernity in the West, is not regarded as a vital part of modernity in some other parts of the world. Liberal democracy is still not fully accepted by many societies and social groups (e.g. Islamists) as belonging to the core of modernity. Islamism, I argued, gives priority to industrialisation and technology in its definition of modernity while rejecting secularism. Islamism also accepted nationalism, the nation-state and capitalism to a great extent. Thus, central to the selective (through the 'filters' of Islam) modernisation strategy of Islamists is the belief that modernity is divisible between economic and industrial aspects on the one hand and the socio-political organisation of a society on the other. Likewise, the WP elite also favoured a selective modernisation. Paradoxically their argument that modernity was divisible was implicitly accepted by the seculars themselves by attacking the WP mainly because of its understanding of laicite rather than for example its approach to industrialisation or technology.

The strength and importance of Islamist movements like other social movements depend on the political, economic and social conditions. When these conditions change, the movements too change or even disappear. However, it is too simplistic to argue, as

some experts in Turkey do, that Islamism is pathological in the sense that it is a side effect of failing to realise a desired level and pace of modernisation in economic and political terms. Islamism can easily serve as an ideology in more modern and affluent circumstances, perhaps by becoming rhetorically less radical.

Overall, the general Islamist deep anxiety to arrest the secularisation in the Muslim world rejects the views of scholars who tend to see Islam (or Muslim societies) particularly resistant to secularisation (e.g. Gellner 1994b). In Turkey too, Islamists complained about 'excessive' secularisation. They were right in the sense that, the majority of the society gave their implicit/explicit support to the secular politicians and the TAF-led bureaucracy, rather than supporting Islamist politicians and parties in secret ballots.

Islamists share a widespread view in the world that the West has a rather arrogant attitude towards non-westerners and more importantly exploits them through various international politico-economic structures. It will be more and more dangerous for the world if greater number of Muslims came to agree with the opinion also voiced by Erbakan that the West only understands the language of power. In this sense, Islamist views contain strong warning messages to the more aggressive and exploitative governments (e.g. the U.S.A.) within the western 'camp'.

Islamism has a cyclical view of progress and rejects a linear understanding of it. The WP also rejected the view that western civilisation constituted the most progressive form of human development (in comparison to an ideal Islamic society). The WP elite did this by following the Islamist tradition in Turkey of separating the spiritual (*manevi*) and material (*maddi*) aspects of progress (Erbakan 1997; Yıldız 2003).

The WP elite, like other Islamists in Turkey, wanted to change the direction (content) of social change in accordance with their interpretation of Islam and history. They wanted to stop cultural erosion, defined as de-Islamisation and loss of other 'national' virtues. They wanted to correct the economic situation (poverty, income inequalities, economic exploitation and lack of adequate economic growth due to lack of industrialisation and high technology). They wanted to increase the political influence of Islamists without any serious effort to enhance democracy for all. This was because, as part of Islamist movement, the WP circles were mobilised in the name of Islam that was perceived to be under "attack" by secularism. The source of problems in Turkey was "diagnosed" as de-Islamisation and the cure was re-Islamisation. Lack of democracy, until the '28 February Process' hit hard, was not high on the Islamist list of priorities, as was also the case for non-Islamist sections.

Like other Islamists in the region, the WP elite selectively compared *facts* about the West with *ideals* of Islam. The Islamic *Golden Age* was a greater model than the West. If modernity was achieved with certain qualities as seen in the West (e.g. bureaucratic efficiency, honesty in business life or hard work), these were virtues actually commanded by Islam. Thus, "return to Islam" (Islamisation) was *the* natural solution to the lack of these virtues, not westernisation.

The criticism of the West, however, should not have been used as a means of escaping from facing the realities in Muslim countries. Most of the problems in Turkey (lack of a democratic, compassionate culture, corruption, nepotism, bureaucratic incompetence and inertia) were fault of the whole society, including the Islamist

section[1]. Perhaps, it was a bit naïve to expect a radical critique of the society from the WP, which after all, as a political party, aimed to win the most votes. However, the National Outlook movement presented itself as a 'religio-moral' group, and the WP as more than a party.

Characterisation of Islamism in Turkey as the mobilisation of urban poor by a section of middle class or reaction of Anatolian small bourgeoisie, who felt threatened by Turkey's integration into the world markets (Gülalp 2002), are inadequate. It was shown that the WP attracted more than average votes in most rural parts of Anatolia as well (Akdoğan 2000), not just from Istanbul or Ankara which received heavy migration.

Similar to other Muslim societies (Ayubi 1991: 221), in Turkey because of special historical conditions, culture and class have also become intertwined in a certain way; the upper classes tend to be more westernised and the lower classes relatively more 'native' in their cultural outlook. However, Islamism in Turkey was more than just a struggle in the name of authentic, native (/Islamic) values against the universal (Western) values. More importantly, Islamists in fact were also engaged in a struggle to persuade the wider society that their interpretation of Islam was the authentic (true) interpretation. The heterogeneous ideological/cultural make up of Turkey meant that there could not be any agreement over the definition of Islam and no agreement over the 'core' identity of Turkey.

The WP served as a vehicle for voicing concerns of peripheral societal sections (e.g. the lower income groups, the Kurds, the religious) and thus could be regarded as serving democratisation in that respect (Bayramoğlu 2001; Yavuz 2000; Akdoğan 2000,

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[1] According to an academic survey, while 98% of the population believes in God and 95% believes in 'sin', only 10% agrees with the statement that 'most people can be trusted' (see, Özkök, *Hürriyet*, 27. 1. 2001).

Özcan 2002). However, like many other Islamists in Turkey, the WP elite did not try to earn the trust of the large pro-laicite sections by respecting their lifestyle choices. Instead, they gave the impression that ultimately they aimed to change the whole society. They themselves were not immune to the lure of social engineering which they condemned vehemently (Yıldırım 1999b; Bora 1996).

'Politicisation of Islam' in Turkey was partly explained by the state's (or certain circles within it) refusal to meet even most simple and natural demands of ordinary Muslims (Türköne 1994: 70; Yavuz 1997). This also was related to the fundamental problem of Turkey's inability to consolidate its democracy (i.e. making democracy "the only game in town" (Özbudun 1996) which would guarantee rights of different social sections. Nevertheless, Turkey's relatively more democratic system in fact has been one of its most important distinguishing features from other Muslim countries in its region and indeed in the world. This fact, understandably very much downplayed by Islamists, is a key to understand the relatively moderate nature of the 'struggle' between Islamists and secularists in Turkey since the 1970s.

In Turkey, Islamist groups tried to make the most of 'opportunity spaces' (Yavuz 2004) that became available in the 'democratic' atmosphere, in various spheres of life such as politics, economy, education and mass communication. This heightened activism of Islamists can be explained by the fact that, they were amongst the most excluded by the centre, in both political and economic terms.

It was seen that for Turkish Islamists 'the West' predominantly meant the USA and powerful European countries. When viewed from an Islamist perspective, the West may seem more unified than it may seem from within itself. Analyses of Islamism in this study support the view that it is still possible talk about 'the West' (Hall 1992b;

Özcan 2002; Belge 2002). Nevertheless, this perception of a 'unified' West may change with regard to major international events (e.g. Western policies with regard to Iraq after September 11, 2001).

Partly due to considerable internal criticism and concerns over modernity in the West itself, the Islamist elite in Turkey (e.g. intellectuals) was even presenting Islam (i.e. as interpreted by them) as a superior (at least alternative) way of life (Laçiner 1996). However, the WP's Islamism, as shown shared important basics of Western modernity and lacked the necessary sophistication and theoretical development, where it differed, in order to be a serious alternative. In fact, the WP was on the way of repeating some modern mistakes, for example, because of its sense of urgency for rapid industrialisation in order to reduce Turkey's dependency and protect the Islamic way of life in a hostile international atmosphere. It can be argued that, the WP's position was not considered modern enough by westerners as was evident in the lack of any significant support from the West when the WP's closure case was continuing at the Constitutional Court.

The WP's discourse like its target audience was complex and multidimensional. The party discourse, as analysed in this study, was constructed with the contribution of a diverse elite with greater input of the core (*çekirdek*) group of Erbakan and his very close circle. The WP elite made use of popular, religious and cultural vocabulary that the target audience was very familiar with. The party elite and the supporters were connected to the party discourse with different degrees of commitment and awareness and not all aspects of the discourse were considered equally important by the supporters. While for the 'core' Islamist group religio-moral concerns and economic difficulties and sense of exclusion were important, the non-Islamist, protest vote was attracted because of party's anti-systemic (i.e. anti-centre) position.

İrtica (Islamic reactionism) and *bölücülük* (separatism, the PKK) have been identified as two greatest internal dangers by the TAF (and many other secular, nationalist groups). However, Islamists in Turkey were only loosely in agreement over some of the more vital issues in their view (e.g. the right to educate the next generation about 'Islam' and right to observe some Islamic 'duties' e.g. the headscarf) in *normal* times. They were subject to further fragmentation and internal clash under domestic or foreign pressure.[2]

It should be concluded that the rise and evolution of the recent version of Islamism in Turkey is a modern phenomenon. It is not the resurgence of an understanding of Islam that went into hibernation and resurrected in less repressive conditions. Rather, it is a new reinterpretation of Islam in the condition of modernity as it unfolds in Turkey and in the West. The WP elite's understanding of modernity was evolving with contributions from many factors such as their interpretation of Islam, their view of the West and modernity in general and the nature of their interaction with the dominant secular nationalist ideology in Turkey. In fact, the gradual moderation and reduction in Islamist demands was a result of the strength and determination of secular sections.

The supporters of the WP demanded modernisation, understood as socio-economic development in a conservative social atmosphere. According to the WP elite, Turkey as a latecomer did have the luxury of eschewing the negative consequences of Western modernity and Islamic values were actually a great help rather than being obstacles in front of progress.

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[2] For example, as seen in 'the 28 February Process', Fethullah Gülen argued that the headscarf was part of "details" in Islam which meant it could be discarded if necessary and the elections should be held while the WP's closure case was continuing to give maximum damage to the WP.

The Islamic set of criteria, with which the WP members was evaluating Western modernity and other foreign ideas or processes, was constantly evolving. Therefore, the Islamist WP members were willing to appropriate certain aspects of modernity that were deemed as good or at least harmless according to Islam. From internal criticisms among the Islamists, it was clear that, many Islamists were also taking part in different processes of 'modernisation' (e.g. becoming ruthless capitalists or plunging into consumerism) in Turkey even when it was contrary to Islamic precepts according to these critics.

More, detailed studies should be done about debates within the Islamist section with regard to different aspects of modernity and Turkey's relationship with the West (e.g. the U.S.A. and EU). Comparisons among Islamic groups (e.g. the Gülen Community, İskender Pasha Community, *Süleymancıs*) and political parties (e.g. the JDP, the NAP and the GUP) will further our understanding in these areas.

Studying the WP also, once again, showed that both Islamists and the Westerners must try much harder to know and understand each other's concerns. The West has greater responsibility as the dominant side. Without trying to understand the powerful, sophisticated, multi-layered, rich vocabulary of Islamic messages, there is little chance for the West for influencing future path of Islamism. There is a need to create an international atmosphere where Islamists are given real incentives to emphasise tolerant and peaceful aspects of Islamic tradition rather than ones glorifying various forms of sacrifices in clashes (e.g. with non-Muslims or secular Muslims).

The Justice and Development Party: The New Address for Islamists?

The WP was banned in February 1998 because the TAF and other defenders of a secular way of life (pro-secular politicians and bureaucrats and the big capital) saw the party as part of '*irtica*' (Islamic reaction). The Virtue Party (VP), the successor to the WP, was also banned in June 2001 on the grounds of violating the secular principles. Its cadres split into two and those who remained loyal to Erbakan formed the Felicity Party. Those who followed Tayyip Erdoğan formed the Justice and Development Party (JDP) on 14 August 2001. In the parliamentary elections held on 3 November 2002, in a highly-charged political atmosphere due to the most serious economic crash in the history of the republic (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 318), the Felicity Party gained only 2.5%. The parties in the previous government, the DLP of Ecevit (1.2%), the NAP of Bahçeli (8.3%) and the MLP of Yılmaz (5.1%) were severely punished. The TPP of Çiller (9.5%) also won no seats in parliament. The JDP with 34.2% of the votes won 363 seats and the RPP of Baykal (19.4%) 178 seats in the parliament. On 28 March 2004, in the elections for the local governments, the JDP increased its share of votes to 42% while the RPP gained 18.4%.

The leadership of the JDP distanced the party from the National Outlook heritage and presented the party as based on a new, familiar synthesis (socially conservative, economically liberal) (cf. Öniş and Keyman 2003: 99). The most prominent members of the party leadership are from the WP cadres (Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç) but there are people from the MLP, the TPP and NAP, so in this sense the JDP is reminiscent of the MLP of Özal. Although it is clearly the new address of the Islamist voters, the JDP flatly refused to be defined as Islamist and defined itself as Conservative-Democrat. Tayyip Erdoğan (2004) defines his party as a mass party based

on Conservatism, [3] occupying a central place in the centre-right (pS)[4]. According to him, the JDP seeks:

> A modernity that does not exclude the tradition
> A universality that accepts locality [native values]
> A rationality that does not reject the meaning
> A change which is not radical. (p. 12).

Global competition, trade and the web of international relations forces closed societies to open themselves to the world (p.12). The party believes that "radical rhetoric does not bring any good to Turkish politics". It is a social demand that consensus and toleration must replace polarisation and conflict (p. 14). Turkey must have "a pluralist, tolerant democracy with many voices" instead of "a *sui generis* democracy" (p.14).

It can be seen that the JDP constitutes a new strategy on the part of Islamist elites who secured the political support of the Islamist masses, for the time being, along with non-Islamist voters who come predominantly from the centre-right. The JDP constitutes in one sense a retreat of Islamists, this time in a leading role, into the fold of 'conservatism' of the centre-right which is more amorphous, more acceptable by the regime and hence less open to the attack of the forces of secularism. The new strategy sees democratisation and sound economic growth as solutions to the problems of Turkey (such as unemployment, the Kurdish question[5], lack of some religious freedoms

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[3] The JDP expresses its conservatism with regard to the subject of the family and women, need for protecting the traditional values (usually means Islamic values), see (İnsel 2003).

[4] With the further decline of the left, it could be argued that the traditional left-right divide in Turkish politics now stand as 25% vs. 75%. Due to problems within the RPP of Baykal, it is frequently pointed out that there is a vacuum of opposition (that is being filled by certain sections of bureaucracy e.g. the TAF, the Judiciary and the Council of Higher Education), and that the political alternative to the JDP could be another party on the right.

[5] Ali Bulaç criticises the JDP for giving a basically secular message to the Kurds in Turkey which "cannot be as effective as" the WP's message that emphasised Islamic brotherhood/sisterhood (*Zaman*, 6. 10. 2004).

according to Islamists). In this strategy, the role of the EU, or of the desire to be a member of it, is very much valued[6].

Turkey's desperate search for more democracy, a 'right' balance between tradition and modernity, between 'forces of Islam' and forces of secularisation continues. The fact that many Islamists, Kurdish leaders and liberal intellectuals in Turkey see EU membership as the only or the most important solution to these problems is an indication of very low level of belief in Turkey's ability to solve its problems peacefully through internal dynamics.

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[6] Early signs of this attitude were already seen immediately after 28 February 1997 NSC meeting, as discussed in Chapter 4: "The EU may well be the antidote of coups" (Çevik, *TDN*, 25.3.1997).

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